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Abstract 
 
 
 
Late eighteenth-century Britain was dominated by two features of economic 
life that were a major departure from previous eras, the economic growth of the 
Industrial Revolution and almost constant warfare conducted on a previously 
unprecedented scale.  One consequence of this was the rapid expansion, 
diversification and development of the professions. Sociologists and economists 
have often argued that economic development and modernisation leads to 
increasing rates of social mobility.  However, historians of the army and professions 
in the eighteenth-century claim the upper levels of the army were usually isolated 
from mobility as the highest ranks were dominated by sons of the aristocracy and 
landed elite.  Some claim social status was more important for career success in the 
late eighteenth-century army compared to its earlier counterpart, which if true may 
have led to declining rates of social mobility for the upper levels of the army.  This 
PhD thesis investigates the limits of social mobility during this period by examining 
the social origins and career patterns of the highest professional rank in the army, 
generals.  This study finds that generals were not isolated from social mobility.  
Modernisation did lead to increasing rates of social mobility among generals.  
However, mobility was limited in some respects. The rates of social mobility for 
generals were much lower than ordinary officers. In addition, most moves up the 
social hierarchy were fairly shallow. Generals usually came from relatively high 
levels of society and hence they were generally only moving from a high social 
position to a slightly higher one.   
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Chapter one: Introduction 
 
 
 
     I. Social mobility 
 
 
 
 Societies are usually arranged in a series of levels each indicating a different 
position in the social hierarchy determined by a combination of social status and 
income.1  Social mobility is the movement from one of these levels to another either 
higher (upward mobility) or a lower (downward mobility).2  The study of social 
mobility is one of the most important topics in economic and social history as levels 
of social mobility can affect a country’s leadership, its political and social 
philosophies, and rates of economic development.3  In a recent OECD report on 
social mobility, aimed at suggesting policy initiatives to increase rates of upward 
mobility, it was suggested the link between rates of social mobility and economic 
efficiency was twofold: 
“HFirst, less mobile societies are more likely to waste or misallocate human skills and talents. 
Second, lack of equal opportunity may affect the motivation, effort and, ultimately, the productivity of 
citizens, with adverse effects on the overall efficiency and growth potential of the economyH."
4
 
 
 
 
The views of this OECD report on the relationship between social mobility and 
economic development echo a wide-ranging literature from economic historians and 
sociologists that explicitly link rates of social mobility in a society with levels of 
economic development and modernisation.  As Goldthorpe noted, it is generally 
                                                 
1
 D.V Glass (Ed.), Social Mobility in Britain, (London, 1967), p. 5; P.A Sorokin, Social and Cultural Mobility, 
(New York, 1927), p.11. 
2
 S.M Lipset and R. Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, (Los Angeles, 1959), p. 1-2. 
3
 Ibid., p. vii. 
4
 OECD,"A Family Affair: Intergenerational Social Mobility across OECD Countries", Part II, Chapter 5, 
Economic Policy Reforms: going for growth, (OECD, 2010), p. 4. 
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believed that social mobility increases with economic development.5  One of the 
most well-known proponents of this view, David Landes, argued that social mobility 
was important to economic performance as nations which are able to put the ‘right 
people in the right place’ should be more competitive in the international 
marketplace.6   Lipset and Bendix claim that rates of social mobility increase with 
industrial growth.7  They do concede there might be limits to this relationship as 
some countries have different rates of economic growth, but similar mobility rates.  
Thus, social mobility and industrial expansion rates may only be correlated until 
countries reach a certain level of industrialisation.8   
 
 
In a similar fashion, some authors argue there was a close link between social 
mobility and modernisation.  Sorokin notes since the eighteenth-century there have 
been high and increasing levels of social mobility in the transition from pre-modern to 
modern society.9   Kingsley Davis argued a relatively high rate of social mobility was 
a necessary pre-condition for the emergence of modern society.10  A long historical 
tradition has stressed the relative openness of the English governing class.11   Cahill, 
who conducted a comparative analysis of the eighteenth-century French and English 
aristocracy, using published works by historians, also found there were relatively 
                                                 
5
 J.H Goldthorpe, "On Economic Development and Social Mobility", The British Journal of Sociology, 36 (4), 
(December 1985), p. 549; O.D Duncan, The American Occupational Structure, (New York, 1967), p. 429. 
6
 D.S Landes, The unbound Prometheus : technological change and industrial development in Western Europe 
from 1750 to the present, (London, 1960), p. 546. 
7
 Lipset and Bendix, Social Mobility, p. 27. 
8
 Ibid., p. 13. 
9
 Sorokin, Social and Cultural Mobility, p. 381. 
10
 Quoted in Goldthorpe, "On Economic Development”, p. 550. 
11
 The origins of this can be traced all the way back to Voltaire.  See Voltaire, Letters Concerning the English 
Nation, (London, 1733).   
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high levels of social mobility in England.12  This high degree of social mobility has 
long been seen to have positively affected many key developments in Britain’s 
economic and social history.13   It is claimed social mobility played a critical role in 
the agricultural sector’s remarkable efficiency, early industrialisation and the absence 
of revolution.14  Some sociologists have found that levels of social mobility in Britain 
were increasing during the Victorian and Edwardian periods, time periods important 
in the development of modern society.15   Britain’s relative economic decline since 
the late Victorian period has also been linked to rates of social fluidity.16 
 
 
The close relationship between social mobility, economic development and 
modernisation, however, is disputed by some authors.  In one of the more recent, 
and long-run, studies of social mobility economic historian Greg Clark claims 
England between 1200 and 2009 was a society without “persistent social class” and 
had in his view "complete" social mobility. He further asserts that since 2009 
“persistent social class” has emerged, which is a reversal of the traditional 
                                                 
12
 M.W McCahill, “Open Elites: recruitment to the French Noblesse and English Aristocracy in the eighteenth 
century”, Albion, 30 (4), (Winter 1998), p. 601, Table 3, p. 621. 
13
 G.E Mingay, The Gentry: the rise and fall of a ruling class, (London, 1976), pp. 5, 10; F.M.L Thompson, 
English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century, (London, 1963), pp. 122, 126; H. Perkin, Origins of Modern 
English Society, 1780-1880, (London, 1969), pp. 17, 37, 56, 61, 63; P. Jenkins, The Making of a Ruling Class: 
the Glamorgan gentry, (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 38-39.  
14
 L. Stone and J.C Fawtier Stone, An Open Elite? England 1540-1880, (Oxford, 1984), pp. 3-4; Perkin, Origins 
of Modern English Society, pp. 7, 17, 37, 56, 61, 63; F. O’Gorman, The Long Eighteenth Century: British 
political and social history 1688-1832, (London, 1997), pp. 108, 337; I.R Christie, Stress and Stability in late 
eighteenth-century Britain: reflections on the British avoidance of revolution: the Ford lectures delivered in the 
University of Oxford 1983-1984, (Oxford, 1984), pp. 56-59. 
15
 A. Miles, "How Open was 19th-century British society?  Social mobility and equality of opportunity, 1839-
1914", in A. Miles and D. Vincent (eds), Building European Society: occupational change and social mobility 
in Europe, 1840-1940, (Manchester, 1993), pp. 18-39. 
16
 M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities, (New York, 
1982), pp. 82-3; A. Gamble, Britain in decline: economic policy, political strategy and the British state, 
(Basingstoke, 1990); H. Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880, (London, 1989), p. 516. 
12 
 
relationship between social mobility and modernisation.17   In common with Clark, the 
prominent sociologist Goldthorpe also refutes that there was a close relationship 
between rates of social mobility and modernisation.  In Goldthorpe’s view, social 
mobility in Britain over the long-run has been trendless and modernity has not 
increased rates of social mobility.18  He further contends that Britain's level of 
openness or social fluidity is no different from other similar societies and its unique 
development cannot be explained in terms of social mobility differences.19  In a 
similar fashion, some historians argue rates of social mobility were not increasing as 
Britain industrialised nor was Britain more open than other societies.  Historians of 
the aristocracy claim European elites were more open than their English 
counterparts because newcomers could directly purchase titles.20  The limited 
number of peerage creations during the eighteenth-century is often seen as 
evidence of a closed aristocracy.21  These findings on the English titled aristocracy 
are sometimes extrapolated to the wider elite to conclude that:  
“...There is little evidence here to suggest that the social elite was expanding vigorously in the 
eighteenth century and finding room for large numbers of new comers.  On the contrary, it indicates a 
considerable narrowing of the commanding social heights....”
22
   
 
However, as some other historians have noted there are problems in using the titled 
aristocracy as a measure of mobility.  Wasson pointed out it was dangerous to make 
broad conclusions about the openness of the elite based on evidence solely from the 
                                                 
17
 G. Clarke, "Regression to Mediocrity?:  Surnames and Social Mobility in England, 1200-2009", unpublished 
paper, (June 2010), pp. 1-4. 
18
 Goldthorpe, "On Economic Development”, pp. 558-560; J.H Goldthorpe, C. Llewellyn and C. Payne, Social 
Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain, second edition, (Oxford, 1986), chapters 4 and 12. 
19
 Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne, Social Mobility and Class Structure, pp. 313-323. 
20
 M.L Bush, The English Aristocracy: a comparative synthesis, (Manchester, 1984), pp. 8-9; J. Cannon, 
Aristocratic Century: the peerage of eighteenth century England, (Cambridge, 1984), p. 8. 
21
 Bush, The English Aristocracy, p. 8; Cannon, Aristocratic Century, p. 24. 
22
 Cannon, Aristocratic Century, p. 33. 
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titled aristocracy who were few in number.23  The Springs argued peerage creations 
were not an appropriate measure of class attitudes as the peerage was neither a 
distinctive economic or social class.24     
 
 
II. Modernisation and social mobility 
 
 
There may be some disagreement over the relationship between social 
mobility, economic development and modernisation, but there are good reasons why 
modernisation may result in increased rates of social mobility.  Firstly, modernisation 
often leads to an expansion in the number of professional vacancies.  As Lipset and 
Bendix note, if the proportion of professional positions increases this should cause 
more upward mobility as long as the professions that expand retain their existing 
status and income levels.25   Secondly, the performance requirements of particular 
occupations may rise due to increasing professionalisation.  If the supply of those 
with the skills who can meet these new demands is limited rates of social mobility will 
increase. 26    
  
 
Modernisation in the eighteenth-century presented increased opportunities in 
professional occupations, such as law, the church, government and medicine, which 
                                                 
23
 E.A Wasson, “The Penetration of New Wealth into the English Governing Class from the Middle Ages to the 
First World War”, Economic History Review, 51 (1), (Feb 1998), p. 26. 
24
 D. Spring and E. Spring, “Social Mobility and the English Landed Elite”, Canadian Journal of History, 21 
(3), (Dec 1986), p. 345. 
25
 Lipset and Bendix, Social Mobility, pp. 57-60. 
26
 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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were important avenues of social mobility during this time.27  The professions 
expanded rapidly during the eighteenth-century and some of these vocations 
experienced significant changes in the way they were organised.  In addition to 
numerical expansion, specialist branches emerged from traditional professions, such 
as the law and the church, and completely new professions such as architecture 
came to the fore.  The growth of the professions was partly due to demand created 
for professional services by economic growth.  There was increased demand for 
lawyers who serviced the legal requirements of expanding businesses.  A rise in 
disposable income of the middle and upper classes indirectly impacted the business 
of professions such as medical practitioners.28   By the end of the eighteenth-century 
many of these occupations bore some characteristics of modern professions, such 
as specialisation and division of labour.29  As Larson noted "... professional work was 
becoming a full-time means of earning a livelihood, subject to the dictates of 
capitalist competition for income and profit....”30  However, they were still not fully 
professions in the modern sense as entry into these occupations tended to remain 
unrestricted until the nineteenth-century.  The professions typically contained a 
mixture of the middling sort intent on advancement and younger sons of the elite.31  
The diverse social backgrounds of those practising the traditional professions - the 
law, church, government and armed services – had important ramifications for their 
                                                 
27
 G. Holmes, Politics, Religion and Society in England, 1679-1742, (London, 1986), pp. 272-275, 319, 349-
350; P.J Corfield, Power and the Professions in Britain 1700-1850, (London, 1995), p. 223; Stone and Stone, 
An Open Elite?, p. 402. 
28
 J. Rule, Albion's People: English Society, 1714-1815, (Harlow, 1992), pp. 55-84. 
29
 M. Pelling, "Medical Practice in Early Modern England: trade or profession?”, in W. Prest (ed.), The 
Professions in Early Modern England, (London, 1987), pp. 90-128. 
30
 M.S Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: a sociological analysis, (London, 1977), p. 13. 
31
 Stone and Stone, An Open Elite, pp. 229-231. 
15 
 
development.  The social status of these professions increased and the highest 
professional ranks were allegedly dominated by the landed elite.32   
 
 
Outside of wartime, law was probably the profession that acted as the main 
avenue of social advancement.33    However, the importance of law as an avenue for 
social mobility may have declined as the century wore on.  Lucas found a significant 
drop in barrister enrolments between 1690 and 1800 and a notable rise in the 
numbers of barristers from elite backgrounds during the late eighteenth-century, 
which may have restricted opportunities for new men.34  In contrast, the prospects for 
those entering the church seemed to improve during the eighteenth-century due to 
institutional innovations such as the Queen Anne’s Bounty of 1704.  The real income 
of the clergy increased 200% between 1700 and 1830, an increase that positively 
affected most levels of this profession.  At the beginning of the eighteenth-century 
there were 5,600 clergy jobs paying an annual wage of £50 or less compared to only 
1,000 by 1810. 35  The increase in social status of the church profession did not 
seem to attract more aristocratic candidates.  It is estimated that 40% of the clergy 
came from business, professions and lower rural society backgrounds.36   Thus, the 
clergy appeared to remain a middling profession.   
 
 
                                                 
32
 G. Holmes, Augustan England: professions, state and society, 1680-1730, (London, 1982), p. 150; Corfield, 
Power and the Professions, pp. 225-227. 
33
 Holmes, Augustan England, p. 123; Mingay, The Gentry, pp. 5-10; J.R Halliday, “Social Mobility, 
Demographic Change and the Landed Elite of County Durham, 1610-1819: an open or shut case?”, Northern 
History, 30, (1994), pp. 58-60. 
34
 P. Lucas, “A Collective Biography of Students and Barristers of Lincoln’s Inn, 1680-1804: a study in 
‘Aristocratic resurgence’ of the eighteenth century”, The Journal of Modern History, 46 (2), (June 1974), pp. 
235-237. 
35
 R. O’Day, The Professions in Early Modern England, 1450-1800, (London, 2000), p.  102. 
36
 Ibid., pp. 110-111. 
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Growth also increased chances for businessmen to rise in this period.  
Expansion in trade and manufacturing created opportunities to advance for those 
entering business. One example of this was the career of Richard Arkwright.  
Richard Arkwright was the son of a tailor who rose to great wealth and was knighted 
for his work as a cotton manufacturer and inventor of cotton spinning machinery.37  
He was not alone in prospering through a business career as the work on the social 
backgrounds of MPs in this period shows.  Christie’s ‘non-elite’ MPs were dominated 
by businessmen throughout the eighteenth-century.38   Wasson found there were 
significant numbers of new men from business serving in the Commons.  The 
business share of MPs rose approximately 10% during the eighteenth-century to 
almost a third, which was a greater number than any other profession.39   
 
 
Lawrence and Jean Stone have challenged this view that a business career 
was a good avenue to achieve social advancement in this period.  In order to 
determine how open the elite was to newcomers they examined 2,246 owners of 362 
country houses in Hertfordshire, Northamptonshire and Northumberland between the 
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries.40   They concluded that “...those who did move 
up were rarely successful men of business....”, so the, “...idea that the fundamental 
cause of English political stability has been perennial openness of its landed elite to 
penetration by large numbers of newly enriched bourgeoisie is clearly no more than 
a hoary myth...”41    The Stones’ hypothesis found support from the research of 
Rubinstein into the very wealthy during the nineteenth-century.  He contended new 
                                                 
37
 ODNB, s.v. Arkwright, Richard (1732-1792). 
38
 I.R Christie, British ‘Non-Elite’ MPs 1715-1820, (Oxford, 1995), p. 129, Appendix A, p. 246. 
39
 Wasson, “The Penetration of New Wealth”, pp. 36-44. 
40
 Stone and Stone, An Open Elite?, pp. 452-453. 
41
 Ibid., pp. 402-403. 
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men of wealth purchased very little land and when they did it was not on a large 
scale. This led him to believe the landed aristocracy was a “...closed, caste-like 
group, hostile to new entries...”42 
 
 
This rather controversial finding by the Stones has been challenged on three 
grounds.43  First, the appropriateness of using country houses as a proxy of elite 
status has been questioned.  Halliday examined Durham’s hearth tax returns during 
the late seventeenth-century and found there was not necessarily a relationship 
between the size of houses and income.44  Second, it was pointed out the counties 
chosen by the Stone’s may not be representative of other counties or England’s 
experience generally.45  It may well be that social mobility varied greatly between 
different counties as Mingay once observed.46  Certainly, studies of social mobility in 
non-Stone counties tend to refute the suggestion that the landed elite were closed to 
men of business during the eighteenth-century.47  Third, there has been a great deal 
of disagreement between the Stones and other historians over what their figures 
mean.    For Stone, the elite were closed to businessmen because only 93 
                                                 
42
 W.D Rubinstein, Men of Property: the very wealthy in Britain since the Industrial Revolution, (London, 
1981), pp. 213-222; W.D Rubinstein, “New Men of Wealth and the Purchase of Land in Nineteenth-Century 
Britain”, Past and Present, 92, (Aug 1981), pp. 125-147. 
43
 There has also been a vigorous debate between Thompson and Rubinstein over the validity of Rubinstein’s 
methodology and conclusions.  See F.M.L Thompson, “Life after Death: how successful nineteenth century 
businessmen disposed of their fortunes”, The Economic History Review, 43 (1), (Feb 1990), pp. 40-61;  W.D 
Rubinstein, “Cutting up Rich: a reply to F.M.L Thompson”, The Economic History Review, 45 (2), (May 1992), 
pp. 350-361; F.M.L Thompson, “Stitching it together again”, The Economic History Review, 45 (2), (May 
1992), pp. 362-375. 
44
 Halliday, “Social Mobility”, pp. 50-51. 
45
 Halliday, “Social Mobility”, p. 51; E. Spring and D. Spring, “The English Landed Elite 1540-1879: a review”, 
Albion, 17 (2), (Summer 1985), p. 150; Wasson, “The Penetration of New Wealth”, p. 37.  
46
 Mingay, The Gentry, pp. 9-10. 
47
 Halliday, “Social Mobility”, pp. 58-61; D. Rapp, “Social Mobility in the Eighteenth Century: the Whitbreads 
of Bedfordshire, 1720-1815”, The Economic History Review, 27 (3), (Aug 1974), pp. 380-394; R.G Wilson, 
Gentleman Merchants: the merchant community of Leeds, 1700-1830, (Manchester, 1971), pp. 220, 232. 
18 
 
permanent newcomers from business rose to the elite between 1540 and 1880.48  
Other authors place more significance on different statistics the Stone’s produced.  
The Stones showed 22% of families were newcomers to the elite, a reasonable 
proportion of whom were businessmen, which may demonstrate the elite was in fact 
relatively open to newcomers regardless of their background. 49 
 
 
Even if businessmen did not purchase many country houses it does not 
necessarily mean the elite were closed to businessmen.  The elite would only be 
closed if businessmen had the opportunity and desire to purchase a large landed 
estate, but were unable to do so.  Research on eighteenth-century London 
merchants tends to indicate many businessmen simply did not aspire to a large 
landed estate and those that did were able to buy one.50  This lack of aspiration to 
purchase an estate was also found amongst many successful military contractors 
who simply did not wish to enter landed society.51   
 
 
III. The modernisation of the military 
 
If modernisation does lead to increased rates of social mobility a military 
career during the eighteenth-century may have been one of the best mechanisms for 
                                                 
48
 L. Stone, “Spring Back”, Albion, 17 (2), (Summer 1985), p. 171. 
49
 H. Perkin, “An Open Elite?”, The Journal of British Studies, 24 (4), (Oct 1985), pp. 498-499; Spring and 
Spring, “Social Mobility”, pp. 338-339; Spring and Spring, “The English Landed Elite”, pp. 153-155. 
50
 N. Rogers, “Money, Marriage, Mobility: the big bourgeoisie of Hanoverian London”, Journal of Family 
History, 24 (1), (Jan 1999), pp. 29-30.  A similar view of sixteenth century London merchants land purchases is 
given by R.G Laing, “Social Origins and Social Aspirations of Jacobean London Merchants”, The Economic 
History Review, 27 (1), (Feb 1974), pp. 28-47. 
51
 G. Bannerman, Merchants and the Military in eighteenth century Britain: British army contracts and 
domestic supply, 1739-1763, (London, 2008), p. 134. 
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achieving upward social mobility.  It is thought that during the early modern period 
modern warfare emerged due to key administrative, technological and ideological 
changes.52  However, the relative importance of different periods in contributing to 
the emergence of modern armies has been a subject of much controversy.  Michael 
Roberts, in a seminal paper, contended armies and navies were transformed into 
modern fighting forces by a military revolution between 1560 and 1660. 53   Perhaps 
most importantly in this view, the development of systematic drill improved the 
effectiveness of armies and their size was transformed through administrative 
reforms.54   According to Roberts,  
“...By 1660 the modern art of war had come to birth.  Mass armies, strict discipline, the control of the 
state, the submergence of the individual, had already arrived; the conjoint ascendancy of financial 
power and applied science was already established in all its malignity; the use of propaganda, 
psychological warfare, and terrorism as military weapons was already familiar to theorists, as well as 
to commanders in the field.  The last remaining qualms as to the religious and ethical legitimacy of 
war seemed to have been stilled.  The road lay open, broad and straight, to the abyss of the twentieth 
century....”
55
 
 
 
There were certainly important changes during this time and the origins of 
modern professional armies and navies can often be located in Roberts’s period of 
military revolution.  In Britain during the time of Oliver Cromwell there was a large 
standing army of 40,000 men, which was professional in many respects.56  The main 
reason this is not regarded as the beginning of the modern British army is because 
Cromwell’s army had a coercive political function as opposed to one solely of 
national defence.57  The first publicly funded national navy was created by Charles I 
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with his ship money fleet.58  A key administrative development for the British navy 
was a series of Navigation Acts between 1651 and 1662, which increased England’s 
merchant marine, the main source for skilled navy personnel, by ensuring English 
trade could only be carried on English ships manned by British sailors.59   
 
 
 The argument for a military revolution between 1560 and 1660 is not without 
its problems. 60  More important technological and tactical changes may have 
occurred before 1560.61  Parker argues these changes included the construction of 
quadrilateral angled bastions along fort walls, the emergence of gunpowder in 
battles, the invention of powerful siege guns and heavily armed sailing ships.62  Not 
all authors agree with Parker’s views; for example, Lynn downplayed the importance 
Parker placed on angled bastions.63 Nevertheless, it does seem a valid point to 
consider the key military changes before 1560.   Bean and Rogers believed 
developments as far back as the fourteenth-century, when archers replaced cavalry 
as the most effective weapon of war, should not be neglected.64  It also seems 
questionable whether the reforms that Roberts claimed transformed warfare 
significantly altered the nature of armed conflicts.  Some historians contend the 
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improved tactics, such as systematic drill, did not affect the outcome of battles.65  
Nor did larger armies necessarily increase their effectiveness as the actual numbers 
involved in battles remained the same.66   Finally, much of the administration could 
still be described as pre-modern, such as the heavy reliance on private contractors 
to raise armies due to the financial incapacity of many states.67  
 
 
In contrast to Roberts’s period of military revolution, military change between 
1660 and 1792 is often seen as limited. 68    It is pointed out that technology and 
tactical change remained relatively static during this period.   There were only minor 
technological improvements, such as replacing pikes with bayonets, compared to 
earlier periods.69  Tactics also remained similar with few key improvements.  The 
British Navy's fighting instructions, for example, which were first issued in the 1650s, 
remained in place for most of the eighteenth-century even though they reduced 
tactical flexibility.  In consequence, battles and wars were indecisive as officers often 
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tried to avoid defeat rather than seek victory, which usually resulted in wars ending 
once one side had been financially exhausted.70   
 
 
This period of limited military change and indecisive warfare was seen to have 
ended with a second military revolution during the French revolutionary (1793-1801) 
and Napoleonic wars (1803-1815).  Technology remained similar yet there were 
major tactical, ideological and administrative changes that appeared to alter the way 
wars were fought.   New offensive tactics made stalemate in battle less likely.  The 
British navy during the 1790s used aggressive melee tactics that increased the 
probability of victory in sea battles.71  Land forces also used more proactive tactics, 
such as the French army focusing on annihilating their enemies.72  Perhaps even 
more importantly, the ideological nature of warfare changed.  Previously wars had 
been contests between rival monarchs, but the French wars after 1793 were a 
competition between monarchy and republicanism.  This engendered greater levels 
of nationalism and patriotism amongst rival armies.73   The scale of warfare was 
transformed by the French introduction of conscription, which widened the social 
composition of recruits.74 
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The view that eighteenth-century warfare can be divided into a long period of 
limited change and indecisive conflicts, which ended with a second military revolution 
at the turn of the century does seem rather problematic.   For one thing, even if the 
probability of decisive battles was lower there were still decisive battles and even 
wars during this period of supposedly limited change and indecisive conflicts.  
Jeremy Black observes there were many decisive battles during the eighteenth-
century, such as Minden (1759), but conceded wars may have been indecisive due 
to the ‘umbrella nature’ of conflicts.75    Yet, others claim the Seven Years War 
(1756-1763) was one of the most successful and decisive wars the British have ever 
fought.76  The British achieved unprecedented territorial gains and emerged as the 
leading nation in the world as a consequence of their success in this conflict.77  
Brumwell argued the Seven Years War was an important watershed for the British 
Army as success in this war led to a dramatic expansion in the subsequent size of 
the peacetime establishment.78 
 
 
 
 There were also important administrative changes between 1660 and 1792, 
which were critical in the development of modern armies and navies.   In Britain the 
first sizeable standing army, without a coercive political function, only existed in the 
late 1680s when James II had a force of 34,000.79  Nor was it until 1689, when the 
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Mutiny Act passed, that the legal existence of the standing army was recognised.  
Before this time the army was not even able to punish deserters as it had no legal 
standing.  Thus, the worst punishment the army could inflict on anyone before the 
Mutiny Act became law was dismissal.80  In 1667 a new era in professionalisation 
began for the British navy with the requirement that potential officers must first pass 
qualifying exams and have served a minimum period of sea service – in 1677 this 
was three years, but gradually expanded over time so that by 1729 prospective 
officers had to serve six years - before they became an officer.81  This ensured a 
minimum standard of professional competence for all navy officers.  Perhaps the 
greatest challenge for early modern navies was posed in feeding crews, while 
keeping them disease free and able to remain at sea for lengthy spells.82  During 
1693, for instance, the British fleet only managed to remain at sea for two weeks 
before having to return home with its sailors in a ‘sickly and starving condition’.83  
However, the quality of victualling was transformed between 1716 and 1757 so that 
by the Seven Years War Admiral Hawke was able to stay continually at sea for six 
months.84  The introduction of half pay for officers has been seen as a watershed in 
the modernisation of the military as it helped to transform the nature of officership by 
encouraging long service and the tendency for some families to specialise in the 
military profession.85  The purpose of half pay was to maintain a reserve of military 
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personnel that could be called on when the state required their services.86  Half pay 
was given to some army officers as early as 1641 and provided half their salary less 
any deductions when they were granted half pay.87  Accordingly, a colonel of foot 
received £1 4s per diem full pay and 12s half pay.88  The navy first introduced half 
pay in 1668, but it was not until 1714 that half pay was payable to all officers in the 
navy and army.  This greatly increased the security and stability of the military 
profession as a viable full-time career option. 
 
 
Finally, many of the ‘revolutionary’ changes of the second military revolution 
can be located in earlier eighteenth-century wars.  The aggressive melee tactics of 
the British navy actually originated during the later stages of the American War of 
Independence (1775-1783).89  In contrast to earlier wars, this conflict saw a contest 
for the political support of the American people, which resulted in unprecedented 
levels of nationalism and patriotism.90  The American army, in common with the later 
French army, was drawn from a wider range of social backgrounds than the 
personnel of ancien regime armies.91   
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The scale of warfare certainly increased dramatically after 1793.  However, 
the Seven Years War was the first conflict that saw war conducted on a significantly 
larger scale than previously.  Seen in this light it could be argued the French 
revolutionary and Napoleonic wars continued the upward trajectory of larger scale 
warfare that began in 1756 albeit in a much more sustained fashion.  This is most 
evident when expenditure on the British army during the eighteenth-century is 
examined.  Figure 1 shows the annual nominal public expenditure on army services 
between 1692 and 1815.   
 
Note: These figures were obtained from three different reports.  Army expenditure until the 
Act of Union in 1801 was divided into two different establishments, the English and Irish.  
The statistics on army spending from 1692 until 1800 are taken from reports concerning the 
net public income and expenditure of the English and Irish establishments. For some reason 
the Irish expenditure on army services is missing for 1726. Therefore, the spending on army 
services in 1726 is only for the English establishment.  The third report detailed the gross 
public income and expenditure for the British establishment and provides the figures from 
1801 until 1815.   
 
Source: 
Parliamentary Papers, Volume XXXV (1868-1869), pp. 7-225, 231-355, 361-389. 
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The first significant increase in scale occurred during the Seven Years War (1757-
1763).  This is shown by peak expenditure on army services during war.  Prior to the 
Seven Years War, the peak expenditure in any war year was £5.06 million in 1710, 
whereas in the Seven Years War expenditure peaked at £10.44 million.  The wars 
after 1793 merely continued the larger scale spending on war that began in 1756, 
although this was at a greatly accelerated pace.  The peak expenditure on the army 
during the eighteenth-century occurred in 1799 when £17.40 million was spent on 
the army.  The Napoleonic Wars saw even greater expenditure as spending on the 
army reached as much as £42.4 million in 1814, although this latter figure is gross 
expenditure which consequently exaggerates the extent of spending.   Another 
important point is, as Brumwell noted, expenditure on the army during peace 
remained at a much higher level than previously despite dramatic declines in peak 
wartime expenditure.  Before the Seven Years War expenditure on the army during 
peace averaged £1.44 million per year, yet average peacetime expenditure between 
1764 and 1792 increased to £2.48 million per year.  It should be noted that 
expenditure on army services in this period may be exaggerated for two reasons.  
First, expenditure on army services is reported in nominal terms and does not take 
into account inflation.    Second, the second report on public expenditure after 1801 
only detailed gross expenditure and the information provided in the parliamentary 
papers does not make it possible to ascertain what an equivalent net figure for 
spending on the army would have been. This undoubtedly exaggerates the 
magnitude of spending on the army during the Napoleonic Wars.  The extent of 
these problems can be clarified by comparing changes in the size of the British army 
during this period.  
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Estimating the size of the army during the eighteenth-century is difficult as 
there were differences between the numbers of men voted by parliament, the army 
establishment, and actual numbers serving.   Historians of the army typically account 
for this difference by reducing the size of the official army establishment by 20%.92  
In consequence, to allow for differences between the establishment and actual 
numbers serving the size of the army is estimated as the official army establishment 
after a reduction of 20% is made to compensate for any discrepancies.  According to 
this method, the size of the army in 1746 was 62,132, which considerably increased 
in size to 96,507 in 1762, both peak years in these respective wars.93  This was fairly 
similar to the increases in army expenditure for this period; the size of the army 
almost doubled, while net expenditure on the army more than doubled.   The size of 
the army then increased massively to 315,481 by the peak year of the Napoleonic 
Wars, 1814. 94  This increase was not as great as army expenditure, but was still a 
very significant increase as the size of the army more than tripled.  These differences 
between army size and expenditure on army services were probably due to a 
combination of inflation and the fact that Napoleonic War expenditure was only 
reported in gross terms.   
 
 
The number of officers serving during peace, in common with peacetime 
expenditure on the army, also saw more sustained increases after the Seven Years 
War.  According to Houlding, the peacetime establishment of 1718-1739 contained 
1,950 officers compared to 2,600 between 1763 and 1771.95  The increased 
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peacetime establishment after the Seven Years War owed much to the globalisation 
of warfare and expansion of Britain's empire that resulted from victory.  These 
created more opportunities for army officers to be employed abroad than 
previously.96  This was shown by the number of regiments permanently based in 
colonial locations significantly increasing; British regiments stationed in North 
America rose from two in 1738 to fifteen by 1764.97   India only began to have 
regiments permanently based there from 1754 and by the 1780s there were often as 
many as nine regiments in this location.98     
 
 
There were certainly some differences between army expenditure and the 
size of the army, which were probably caused by inflation and the reporting of 
Napoleonic War expenditure figures in gross terms.  However, the main 
characteristics in the expansion of large-scale conflict remained the same whether 
viewed through army expenditure or the size of the army.  The first significant 
increase in scale of conflicts occurred with the Seven Years War as the peaks of 
expenditure or the size of the army showed.  This watershed was also evident in a 
much larger peacetime establishment than previously in subsequent periods of 
peace.  The scale of conflict after 1793 greatly increased compared to the major mid-
eighteenth-century wars, but the conflicts near the turn of the nineteenth-century 
accelerated the trend towards large-scale warfare that began with the Seven Years 
War. 
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The larger scale of conflicts affected the administration of the armed services, 
as Weber argued:  
“...Only the bureaucratic army structure has allowed for the development of the professional standing 
armies which are necessary for the constant pacification of large estates of the planes as well as 
warfare against far distant enemies....”
99
 
 
In other words, modernisation of the army was necessary to be able to conduct large 
scale warfare.  Yet this was a very complex process and causality worked both 
ways.  The increased scale of warfare and greater frequency of major wars also 
acted as a catalyst to intensify the pace of modernisation.  Conway noted war helped 
to promote reform as attempts were made to make the armed services more 
professional in order to increase their efficiency and state control of them. 100  Thus, 
there were often important administrative developments near the end of major wars.  
For example, the War of Austrian Succession ended in 1748, and between 1747 and 
1751 there were the following reforms: fictitious names banned from muster rolls of 
guards regiments, reform of musters, regulation of stoppages from soldiers pay, 
restrictions on captain’s dividends, the introduction of a relief system for regiments 
posted abroad, regulations concerning uniforms provided to soldiers, the end of the 
custom designating regiments by colonel's names and the banning of placing 
personal coat of arms on regimental colours.101  
 
 
 Modernisation of the military did seem to produce increasing rates of social 
mobility for those using an army career to advance.  Max Weber noted that the 
bureaucratization of armies brought with it increasing upward social mobility as there 
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was a “Htransfer of army service from the propertied to the propertylessH.”102  This 
thesis investigates the social mobility of a key group of army officers during the 
eighteenth-century when this modernisation took place.  It examines the social 
origins and career patterns of the highest professional rank in the army, generals. 
The study focuses on the social mobility of generals for two reasons. Firstly, despite 
increasing rates of mobility among officers it is often claimed social mobility was very 
limited at the top end of the army as the highest ranks were dominated by the landed 
elite.103  This is in line with one of the dominant theories on social mobility, which 
Goldthorpe describes as the ‘closure thesis’.  According to the ‘closure thesis’, social 
mobility generally occurs between individuals holding similar positions in society.  
The closer a person is to the top or bottom of a hierarchy the more limited mobility is 
as most mobility occurs for those at intermediate levels.104  Secondly, who became a 
general in the eighteenth-century had potentially important implications for military 
performance.  The outcome of key battles, such as Waterloo, often depended on the 
quality of leadership displayed by commanding generals, which could be adversely 
affected if there was limited mobility among generals. The key questions this thesis 
addresses are closely related to these themes of limited mobility at higher ranks, and 
modernisation and mobility.  In the first place, did the upper levels of the army 
remain isolated from social mobility?   In the second place, were the social origins 
and career patterns of generals different in the late eighteenth-century compared to 
their earlier counterparts?       
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In order to answer these questions the methodological approach is to 
examine the social backgrounds and careers of generals at two points in time during 
the eighteenth-century representing fundamentally different eras in the 
modernisation of the army.  1747 was chosen to represent the early eighteenth-
century, a period that could be described as pre-modern, and 1800 represents the 
late eighteenth-century after most modernisation had occurred.   
 
 
The thesis is structured in the following manner.   Chapter two surveys the 
literature on the army and social mobility and chapter three addresses what it meant 
to be a general in the eighteenth-century as the nature of generalship during this 
time was different from today. The next two chapters are concerned with establishing 
rates of social mobility. The chapter on family backgrounds measures mobility rates 
through the most common methodological approaches to measuring mobility, an 
intergenerational study of the family backgrounds of generals’ fathers and the extent 
to which future generals were self-recruited.  Apart from achieving upward mobility 
through career selection there are other mechanisms of mobility or what Sorokin 
terms "channels of social circulation”.105  In consequence, chapter four examines the 
role education and marriage, some of the most important "channels of social 
circulation” apart from careers, played in the future generals’ mobility patterns.  Two 
important aspects of an army career that were potentially affected by modernisation 
were the career patterns of officers, such as their career paths through the army, and 
rewards gained from service.  This is because modernisation affected the way 
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officials in public bureaucracies were promoted and paid.106 Career patterns and 
rewards are particularly important topics in studying the mobility of British army 
officers as these two aspects of an army career are often seen as ways mobility was 
restrained.107  Hence, chapters five and six analyse the career patterns of the future 
generals and rewards gained from army service. 
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Chapter two: The army and social mobility 
 
 
I. The army as a mechanism of social mobility 
 
 
 Non-military careers may have provided increased opportunities in the 
eighteenth-century to advance due to modernisation, but during times of war the 
army was probably one of the most important avenues of advancement.1   The army 
has always been an important avenue of social mobility as it offers the opportunity of 
upward mobility to those from even humble backgrounds.2  An army career gave 
relatively high status as historically officers were drawn from the aristocracy.3  It is 
estimated, for example, that most British aristocrats of military age had taken part in 
the War of the Roses during the second half of the fifteenth-century.4  The extent of 
this opportunity to advance through an army career greatly intensifies during periods 
of war, which was especially the case during the eighteenth-century due to the 
unprecedented expansion in the scale of warfare.  
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Sorokin outlined some of the reasons why the army is a particularly attractive career 
for advancing during war: 
“HThis institution plays an especially important part in periods of militarism, or international or civil 
war.  Whether intentionally or not, the service of a talented strategist, or a brave soldier, regardless of 
his social status, is highly appreciated at such periods. Besides, the war is apt to test the talent of the 
low born soldier or inability of a privileged noble.  The great danger to the army and to the country 
imperatively urges the army and the country to put the soldier in the rank corresponding to his real 
ability. The services of the low born soldiers force rewards by promotion.  The great losses among the 
commanding officers make it necessary to fill their places with people taken from the lower ranks.  
The war continuing, a leadership once obtained by a low born soldier is likely to grow, if he is a 
talented commanderH.”
5
 
 
 
  
 
 
The assertion that the army during the course of the eighteenth-century 
increasingly became a mechanism through which individuals achieved social mobility 
can be supported by comparing various studies’ findings on the social background of 
officers at different points in this period.  At the foundation of the regular British army 
in 1661 most officers were ‘gentlemen officers’ who according to Childs were ‘more 
politicians than soldiers’.   A study of these officers serving between 1661 and 1685 
revealed that 59.9% were related to peers, baronets and knights.6  The social 
backgrounds of officers became more diverse over time in line with the expansion of 
warfare.  Hayes’ study of officers serving between 1714 and 1763 showed that in this 
period officers were now drawn from four different social groups: titled and untitled 
aristocrats, the middle class and professions, foreign officers and officers promoted 
from the ranks.7  Odintz’s study of four sample infantry regiments in the mid 
eighteenth-century also showed a socially diverse officer corps.  Officers that could 
be traced came from the following social groups: aristocracy and baronetage (11%), 
                                                 
5
 Sorokin, Social and Cultural Mobility, p. 164. 
6
 Childs, The Army of Charles II, p. 37. 
7
 J. Hayes, “The Social and Professional Background of the Officers of the British Army, 1714-1763”, 
unpublished MA dissertation, University of London, (May 1956), pp. 64-67. 
36 
 
gentry (58%), middle-class (14%), foreign (15%) and working-class (2%).8   There is 
little research on the social backgrounds of army officers in the late eighteenth-
century, but the research that has been done suggests officers came from an even 
wider range of social backgrounds than previously. Taking a sample of 100 officers 
drawn from the 1780 army list, Razell found that 60% of officers came from the 
middle class, 16% from the gentry and 24% from the aristocracy.9  This finding was 
supported by the qualitative assessment of other historians.  Ward argued that 
during the Napoleonic Wars: 
“...The immense augmentation of the army in the years of the revolution and again after 1803, the 
temper of the time, and perhaps also the natural disposition of the Duke of York and his staff, had led 
the Horse Guards to accept officers from a class of persons which in ordinary circumstances would 
have been denied advancement in the service.  Whatever the causes, the Horse guards at the period 
of the Peninsular War was prepared to promote officers without money or interest on a greater scale 
than in the days of the King’s administration before the wars.  Officially, the emphasis was upon merit, 
and the foundation of the Royal Military College had been an attempt, praiseworthy in its intentions, to 
give an effect to this policy....”
10
 
 
Ward's view echoed Turner’s argument that the Napoleonic Wars saw an 
unprecedented widening of the social groups that officers were drawn from, even 
including lower middling sorts such as butchers’ and tailors’ sons.11  
 
 
 
 
The view that the army became an increasingly popular way of achieving 
social mobility as it expanded is not necessarily an opinion universally held.  Some 
historians argue there was an adverse change in the social character of the army 
between the early and late eighteenth-century, which if correct would probably 
restrain levels of social mobility.  Hayes claimed there was less ‘social snobbery’ in 
the early army compared to the late eighteenth-century.  Evidence of this was the 
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emergence of crack regiments in the later period when social criteria seemed to 
matter more than merit.  In contrast, merit allegedly mattered more than social 
background in the early army.12  Similarly, Guy argued “H during the decades from 
the Regency to the outbreak of the Crimean War, the officer corps became charged 
with snobbery and elitism founded on the criteria of wealth and ostentation rather 
than military meritH.”13  Holmes and Christie asserted that there were more “rags to 
riches” stories during the early eighteenth-century than the later period.14  Burton and 
Newman, in analysing the career of General Sir John Cope, claimed “... Cope made 
use of almost the last occasion when it was still possible for an officer to advance 
rapidly without money or political favour....”15    
 
 
The extent of any increase in social status through an army career may have 
also been limited.  The existing literature on the eighteenth-century British army often 
contends senior officers were isolated from any expansion in social mobility.  
Historians claim senior positions in the army were reserved for aristocrats.16   
According to Guy, colonels and generals were drawn from a minority of privileged 
officers.17  Barker summed up the consensus view on the promotion prospects of 
eighteenth-century army officers succinctly when he said: 
“...Irrespective of their ability, men of moderate means could not climb very high up the ladder of rank.  
So most of the regimental officers-the lieutenants, captains and majors-came from the middle ranks of 
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society, the rural aristocracy and the merchant classes in the cities, while senior officers-the colonels, 
brigadiers and generals-sprang from the nobility...." 
18
  
 
The strong connection between aristocrats and generals is noted in more recent 
works as well.  Collins, for example, calculated that nearly two thirds of operational 
generals serving in Spain during 1808 had aristocratic connections.19      
 
  
The findings of those who have examined the social backgrounds of senior 
officers in more detail seem to support these views.  Hayes found two thirds of all 
regimental colonels came from the upper levels of society and claimed more than 
50% of Scottish colonels were titled aristocrats.20  However, Hayes’ conclusions may 
have been unduly affected by the way he analysed his data.  Hayes sliced up 
regimental colonels from the gentry into two distinct groups.  The ‘influential landed 
gentry’ were included as part of his upper group along with noblemen and baronets.  
In contrast, the ‘country gentry’, professional classes and foreigners belonged to his 
lower group.21  The justification for this was that the ‘more influential landed gentry’ 
were in the upper group because they had inherited or acquired estates of their own.  
Yet, there was no mention of the size of the estates or whether they would have 
provided sufficient income to live off.  A professional income may have still been 
necessary for some of these officers to survive. Another important point is that the 
upper group was dominated by the gentry as it only included 73 sons of aristocrats 
and baronets.   It seems questionable to include the gentry and aristocracy as one 
social group because for the average member of these groups there were huge 
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differences in the economic and social resources they could draw on.  Razzell also 
found that senior officers came largely from the upper classes.  According to his 
data, 57% of those holding the rank of major general and higher in 1830 were 
aristocrats.22  For a slightly later period, Otley demonstrated that 45.5% of generals 
had close connections with the landed elite, military elite or other elites.23   Of 
course, the smaller nineteenth-century army made it more difficult to get promoted 
and so the situation may have been different before 1815.24    
 
 
The aristocratic dominance of high command was not necessarily restricted to 
the British army, but has been seen to be generally applicable to military forces 
during this time.  In the late eighteenth-century navy there were perhaps justifiable 
complaints that aristocrats were monopolising command appointments.25  Certainly, 
the proportions of peerage and gentry serving in the navy seemed to increase 
significantly as the century progressed.  Cavell showed both of these groups 
accounted for 5% of junior officers in 1761, but by 1801 this had risen to 17.6%.26  
Moreover, according to Wareham 61% of all frigate captains, one of the most 
popular command positions in the British navy, posted between 1801 and 1814 were 
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titled aristocrats.27  A comparison with the social backgrounds of foreign army 
officers is always difficult because definitions of nobility and proportions within each 
country can vary so widely.  Nevertheless, studies of European fighting forces during 
this period also tend to indicate senior ranks were dominated by aristocrats.28   
 
 
Two important aspects of an army career may have acted to constrain levels 
of social mobility.  The first aspect of an army career that possibly constrained levels 
of social mobility was the methods of entering and advancing with the army and 
variables affecting promotion.  Contemporaries, modern historians and sociologists 
have often claimed two characteristics of entering and advancing within the army 
negatively impacted social mobility and military competence of officers. 29  First, was 
the fact that many officers entered or advanced in the army through purchasing 
commissions.  It was alleged the main factor in promotion was wealth, excluding 
men of moderate means and making the army the preserve of the upper classes.30  
Childs argued that purchase restricted careers of army officers to those that had 
wealth, patronage and place thereby denying advancement on merit.31  Biddulph 
similarly found that promotion depended largely on “money and influential friends”.32   
Otley claimed the system of nomination, purchase and low pay acted in unison to 
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ensure the officer corps were socially exclusive and provided ‘insuperable obstacles’ 
to men of moderate means who wanted an army career.33  In turn, purchase 
adversely affected the competence of officers as capital was more important than 
ability.34  The problem, as many contemporaries saw it, was that: 
“...Money and powerful relations will always procure them what they want; they have therefore no 
occasion to apply themselves to the knowledge of their duty.  It is from this way of thinking that so 
many of them do so little credit to their place; not from the want of genius, but application....”
35
 
 
         
 
Modern authors have often taken up the same theme of purchase ensuring 
the dominance of rich high born officers and leading to military incompetence.  
Dickson claimed “... Professional ability, energy and dedication to the job counted for 
little.  If you were rich and well-connected you were in; if you were not, you were 
not....”36  Cannon asserted purchase "... played into the hands of young men of 
wealth and connections and was an essential part of aristocratic control of the 
army....”37  A similar view of officers generally was taken by Barnett.  He asserted 
purchase divorced promotion from merit resulting in an officer corps of incompetents.  
This was made up for, in his opinion, by a minority of officers who were very good 
and competent non-commissioned officers.38  Some authors contend this 
incompetence may have been even worse among those holding senior positions; 
many generals holding command positions it is argued were inadequate in the 
performance of their duties.39  This low level of competence was strongly linked to 
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the social positions of those becoming generals.40  Gates argued promotion to higher 
rank was not based on merit, but on monetary wealth allowing ‘unsuitable and less 
gifted’ officers to acquire senior positions.41     
 
 
An important part of this argument is an unfavourable comparison, in terms of 
social origins and competence, with the military services whose officers did not enter 
or were not promoted by purchase.  In the artillery, engineers and navy, officer entry 
was based on nomination and subsequent promotion depended on selection and 
seniority.   One became an officer in the artillery or engineers by nomination from the 
Master General of Ordnance.  Most officers in the navy started their career due to 
the patronage of a ship's captain.  In contrast to the army’s ‘incompetent aristocrats’, 
the general impression of these services is of one whose officers were mainly drawn 
from the middling sorts and who were more competent due to greater professional 
training than the army.42   
 
 
It is certainly true these services had higher standards of education.  To 
become an officer in the navy a potential officer first had to pass qualifying exams.  
Likewise, in the artillery and engineers prospective officers had to attend an officer 
training school, which taught amongst other things, mathematics, physics and 
chemistry.43  Of course, the nature of these professions probably required a higher 
degree of technical ability than the army.  However, research on engineers suggests 
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the social backgrounds of these officers were fundamentally no different from the 
rest of army society.44  Even though there was no purchase in the engineers many 
engineering officers also held commissions in the army and at least half of the 
engineers serving between 1741 and 1757 came from backgrounds that could afford 
to purchase commissions.45 
 
 
Glover’s detailed research on the role purchase played in promotion does cast 
some doubt on the view that purchase restrained social mobility.  Glover examined 
the methods of promotion for 2,151 regimental promotions taken from The London 
Gazette that occurred at the height of the Napoleonic Wars (September 1810-August 
1811 and March 1812-February 1813).  He found that only 21% of promotions were 
purchased during this time.46  Glover claimed wealth did not restrict one becoming 
an officer as it was relatively easy to gain a free commission due to the high demand 
for young officers.  Instead, commissions were restricted to the literate.47  The main 
effect of purchase seemed to be to accelerate promotion times and allow officers to 
increase their chances of gaining commissions in more desirable regiments.  Even 
during wartime purchasing continued to remain a popular method of obtaining a 
major’s commission and was more important the more prestigious a regiment. 
Glover calculated that only 17.7% of all infantry commissions were purchased 
compared to 45.1% of cavalry commissions between 1810 and 1813.48  Purchase 
also accelerated the promotion process by lowering the time spent at each rank.  For 
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example, an infantry lieutenant who relied on seniority would take on average seven 
years to become a captain compared to only four years if he purchased a 
captaincy.49     
 
 
Of course, Glover’s findings may only apply to the period of the Napoleonic 
Wars due to the massive expansion of the army.  Indeed, other authors have 
claimed that the nature of promotion during the Napoleonic wars was totally different 
compared to previous periods.  Barthorp alleged before the Napoleonic Wars the 
usual method of promotion was purchase compared to seniority, patronage and 
purchase afterwards.50  Perhaps some perspective can be gained on Glover's results 
by comparing them with the research of Odintz, whose study of mid eighteenth-
century infantry officers included a long period of peace (1764-1778), on methods of 
promotion for his sample infantry officers.  Odintz found that the proportion of infantry 
officers in his sample who purchased was as low as 33% of their commissions for 
lieutenant or as high as 46% for captain.51  These purchase rates were much higher 
than the Glover's findings, as only 22% of infantry captains in his samples purchased 
their commissions.52   This suggests purchase as a method of promotion was far 
more important during peace, which is perhaps why Otley’s research on generals for 
the nineteenth-century showed that for three different sample periods between 1816 
and 1853, 66.7% of promotions in the guards, cavalry and infantry were purchased.53    
This comparison suggests the importance of purchase also depended on the rank 
being purchased; both Glover and Odintz show captaincies and majorities were the 
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main ranks purchased.  Despite their differences the studies demonstrate that 
purchase may not have been as important as some authors think as most 
commissions were not purchased. 
 
 
Second, the importance of social status in promotion was also seen to hinder 
social mobility and military efficiency.  The negative effect of social status on military 
efficiency was first pointed out by Junius, the anonymous critic of eighteenth-century 
life, who claimed in 1769 that Granby while commander in chief used the army  
 
“... to provide at the public expense for every creature that bears the name of Manners; and, neglecting the 
merits and services of the rest of the Army,  to heap promotions upon his favourites and dependants...”
54
      
 
 
This led to grave consequences for the army, Junius claimed, as "H.Under such a 
system the army denigrated into a mere rabble, and was easily beaten by the 
AmericansH.”55  Similar criticism has often been taken up by modern authors.  In 
fact, there are some historians who regard social status as the only relevant factor in 
the promotion cycle.  Clayton contended promotion had nothing to do with merit, but 
was solely dependent on gaining favour with the Secretary at War.56  Robson argued 
“...entry into, and promotion in, the army, [was] a matter of favour rather than of 
merit....”57  In Otley’s opinion, the system of nomination provided an “aristocratic test 
of suitability” in order to continue “an aristocratic grip on the officer corps”.58         
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A high level of social status may have been particularly important in 
accelerating promotion prospects.  It was probably no coincidence that in Odintz’s 
sample of British officers all those closely related to peers became generals.59  
Indeed, he claimed that in the British army there was a group of officers "Hrelatively 
immune to the ordinary determinants of regimental promotion by virtue of their social 
statusH."60   Similarly, Hayes asserted members of the most prominent families 
generally secured more rapid promotion than others.61  French also argues rich and 
well-connected officers were ‘fast tracked’ in promotion compared to normal 
officers.62  The influence of social status on promotion may have also depended on 
the rank and time period.  It has long been thought that the upper ranks were the 
preserve of those with the highest social status, particularly for the ranks of 
lieutenant colonel and higher.63  In Houlding’s view, the highest an officer could 
advance without a high social status was lieutenant colonel if he was lucky and 
major if he was unlucky.64   The role social status played in career progression, 
however, may have been different depending on time period. Social status is often 
regarded as more important in career progression during the late eighteenth-century 
army compared to the earlier period.65   
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In summary, then, social status has been identified as the most important 
factor in army careers.  The key attribute of social status affecting progression was 
whether an officer was an aristocrat.  Aristocratic officers’ promotions were fast 
tracked due to their superior social connections and wealth.66  The aristocratic 
advantage in army careers, however, did depend on the rank and time period.   One 
of the main implications for the effect of social status on army careers was the 
adverse impact on military efficiency.  It is the main reason some historians claim the 
average British officer was worse than their French counterparts.67  
 
 
Even though purchase and social status were the two most important factors 
in careers, historians have recognized there were other considerations influencing 
promotion prospects.  War greatly enhanced promotion prospects by expanding the 
supply of officer commissions and creating many more “free” vacancies. 68  If an 
officer was born at the right time he might be well placed to take advantage of the 
promotion cycle during war.  In fact, Rodger has argued the most important factor in 
navy promotion was being born twenty years before the outbreak of a major war.69   
The reason for this was that the navy promotion cycle took on ‘feast and famine’ 
attributes; rapid promotions during the early stages of conflicts and few promotions 
during peace.70  The type of regiment served with may have also impacted on 
promotion prospects.  Regimental mobility could accelerate promotion prospects, 
especially for guards officers who usually possessed a higher army rank than their 
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regimental rank.  Many early eighteenth-century captains in the guards were able to 
gain regimental colonelcies of foot regiments ahead of much older colleagues due to 
their higher army rank.71  However, some authors contend this advantage may not 
have meant too much as promotion was also much slower in the guards and few 
guards officers changed regiments.72       
 
 
Some historians also point out that merit may have counted in career 
progression.73  Houlding, who regarded most British officers as generally competent, 
claimed experience and merit were important variables in promotion.74   Brewer 
argued most promotions in the army reflected military experience and competence.75  
For Hayes, ability and enthusiasm often played a critical role in advancing.76  Other 
authors have pointed out that promotion was generally determined by a mixture of 
competence and social status.77  Corvisier, for instance, argued that promotion in 
eighteenth-century European armies was generally a result of merit, favouritism and 
luck.78   
 
 
An examination of the promotion cycles of other military services also reveals 
that promotion depended mainly on social status and merit.  When Townshend was 
Master General of Ordnance during the 1780s he wanted potential engineering 
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candidates for the military academy at Woolwich to have the “proper birth and proper 
qualifications”.79   The navy is often held up as an example of a service where men 
of moderate means prospered and merit was rewarded.80  Benjamin and Thornberg 
asserted navy command was given in the expectation of superior performance and 
long term retention of command depended on continued good performance.81   
Some saw the navy as a place to escape ‘the tyranny of money’ that officers needed 
to advance in the army.82  It is often argued social status was not as important to 
navy careers. Baugh, one of the most eminent naval historians, claimed aristocrats 
did not dominate selection as there was a tendency for selection to be based on 
professional criteria.  Having naval connections would advance anyone as far as 
other connections.83  On the other hand, other authors contend social status played 
a key role in naval advancement.    Dandeker examining the late eighteenth-century 
navy claimed that ‘favourable kinship and political connections’ often overrode 
‘service’ considerations.84  As early as 1933 Richmond maintained that “... merit 
could obtain recognition, though recognition moved more slowly than a friend at 
court....”85  The most recent study of the social backgrounds of midshipmen and navy 
officers noted there was an inverse relationship between social and naval influence 
on promotion, but when social connections were evident they were given priority.86    
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Advancing in the navy in reality probably depended on a mixture of social 
status and merit.   It was important to have good connections and to be competent 
officer.  Navy patrons would not normally advance incompetent officers as it might 
damage their reputation, which would adversely affect their standing with the 
Admiralty.87  Yet, even Anson, who had a reputation for advancing candidates on 
merit, when First Lord of the Admiralty, did not advance all deserving officers as he 
tended to help his friends and hinder his enemies even though some of his enemies 
were very able officers.88   This seems similar to the way connections were often 
used in the army medical service.  Army doctors needed good connections to 
advance, yet it was rare for an incompetent doctor to be advanced.89  Patronage, in 
the absence of internal examinations and staff assessments, was used to 
differentiate between equally able candidates.90  Consolvo is the only author to have 
tried to quantitatively assess the impact of patronage and merit on military 
promotion. Using a sample of 225 lieutenants who entered the navy in 1790 he 
tested the influence of merit and patronage, defined in part by social status, on 
promotion to commander, captain and rear admiral.91  He found patronage was the 
most important factor in promotion to commander and captain, but not to rear 
admiral.92  Merit also had a positive effect on promotion, but was much less 
important than patronage.93  According to Consolvo, it took 1790 lieutenants 25 
years without patronage and eight years with patronage to become a commander.94  
The patronage advantage was surprisingly less for captains; officers possessing 
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interest became a captain in ten years compared to fifteen years otherwise.95  In any 
case, the advantage of patronage was far greater than for merit.   Consolvo found a 
meritorious lieutenant, defined as those officers who saw action in battle, took ten 
years on average to get promoted to commander compared to a mean of twelve 
years for all lieutenants.96  Thus, merit provided an edge of 20%, which was much 
less than the advantage of patronage.  The relative importance of these factors may 
have also changed over time.  In both the army and navy there are historians who 
claim the relative importance of merit declined and the role of patronage increased 
as the century wore on.97  However, this argument seems at odds with the increasing 
modernisation of the military during this time.  For example, it was only during the 
Napoleonic period that the army introduced competency reports for officers and 
instituted minimum levels of service at different ranks. 
 
 
The second important aspect of an army career that may have constrained 
levels of social mobility was the rewards and costs that resulted from serving in the 
army.98  The current literature on the army usually contends that this profession was 
a losing concern for officers as the cost of army service consistently exceeded any 
gains even for the highest ranks.   Admittedly, those reaching the highest ranks 
benefited from generous incomes, which may have exceeded other income 
sources.99  However, the costs of officership even exceeded these seemingly 
generous rewards.  Guy argued that once the considerable expenses of officership 
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are taken into account generally, and command in particular, even a “... proprietary 
colonelcy without independent means to sustain it was a prize of startlingly little 
consequence....”100  This view was echoed by Wellington who, while colonel of the 
33rd foot, thought a colonelcy was a losing concern.101   Certainly, the expenses of 
officership made it difficult for some officers to live off their pay.102   
 
 
It should be noted these conclusions about the costs and rewards of 
officership are usually based on a few anecdotal examples.  Guy, for instance, in 
examining the costs of senior officership used the evidence of three officers: the 
Duke of Cumberland, Richard Molesworth, and William Haviland.103  As there has 
been no in-depth study examining the costs and rewards of senior officership, using 
a larger sample of officers, it remains to be seen whether these anecdotal examples 
are representative of senior officers generally.  Indeed, a more optimistic picture of 
the rewards of army service is given by some authors.   Marshall noted that most 
engineers left wealth at their death and some profited greatly from army service.104   
The recent research on army doctors found that: 
“...Perhaps the most surprising finding of this study is how much money many of the cohort left that 
cannot be linked to any patrimony.  A third left more than £5,000 net of the value of any real estate 
they may have owned.  In present-day purchasing power this was an equivalent to a share portfolio of 
£350,000, an exceptional sum.  It would not be an exaggeration to describe the richest – the Estes of 
this world – as plutocrats.  Many made themselves rich through their civilian practice, but fortunes 
were also left by surgeons who had spent their whole adult life in the army.  This suggests, contrary to 
the general impression, that army service, though expensive, could be lucrative....”
105
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This image of senior army officers struggling to make ends meet due to 
modest rewards and exorbitant expenses is, in common with the social origins of 
officers, contrasted with the situation in the navy.  Senior officers in the navy, in a 
similar fashion to the army, were paid relatively low wages and had high expenses. 
The pay of admirals in 1793 was between £49 per month for a rear admiral and £98 
per month for an admiral.106  Admirals also needed to spend large amounts of money 
on their uniform and entertaining various guests.107  When Admiral Lord Keith was 
commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean he spent £8,000 per annum between 1799 
and 1801 keeping his table, which exceeded his salary many times.108   The 
difference between the two services was that a senior officer in the navy was virtually 
guaranteed to make a fortune in prize money. 109   The navy paid prize money when 
warships were sunk (£5 per enemy sailor) or captured and for the seizure of 
merchant vessels.110   Senior officers were able to make fortunes because they 
received most of the prize money.  Captains gained a two eighths share of prizes, 
while admirals acquired one eighth in prize money from ships under their command 
even if they were thousands of miles away from the capture.111  Further profits could 
also be made through carrying officially authorised freight, most commonly gold 
bullion, for which they typically received 1-2% commission, and, more dubiously, 
private commodities.112 
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The compensation structure in the navy was important for some historians as 
it helped explain Britain's unprecedented military success during the eighteenth-
century wars.  The traditional arguments for British military success have focused on 
Britain's ‘blue water’ policy, her superior money and credit and the quality and 
quantity of British navy personnel.113  In recent times economic historians have also 
used the navy's compensation structure to argue it played an important role in victory 
because prize money provided an incentive for British navy personnel to fight harder 
than their rivals.114 
 
 
This incentives argument has even been extended to army officers.  As long 
ago as 1960 it was claimed army officers may have received significant 
compensation from prize money.  In his thesis on the purchase system Bassett 
argued there was an implicit link between purchase and earning a capital gain from 
prize money.  He claimed the field commander would earn one eighth share of prize 
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money and cited prize money gains from victories in India.115   In a similar fashion, 
Biddulph alleged that “...there was always the prospect of prize money on active 
service....” and noted in a similar fashion to Bassett the gains from Indian service.116    
More recently, Allen alleged there was a link between purchase, prize money and 
British officer compensation.  He argued purchase encouraged officers to self-select 
according to ability and provided incentives to fight in line with overall strategic 
objectives.  In his view, the purchase system by paying officers with prize money 
gave an incentive to engage the enemy in battle.117  There is no question that some 
army officers benefited from prize money.  For instance, the general in charge of the 
operation to capture Havana from the Spanish in 1762 reaped a bounty of 
£122,697.118 Likewise, in 1809 Wellington received £1844 2s 6d as his share of the 
Copenhagen prize money.119  However, it remains to be seen how frequently prize 
money was gained by the average army officer.   Allen argued that soldiers were 
mainly paid “out of the spoils of war”.120  In contrast, Guy believed prize money was 
extremely rare.121  As there has been no systematic study of the rewards and costs 
of officership it is difficult to know the extent to which officers were compensated by 
prizes.  There were many prizes available in India - and these gains are cited by 
authors such as Allen - but the British army only had limited contingents of regiments 
in India due to the English East India Company having a separate army.122   
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II. Conclusion 
 
 
 The current literature on social mobility is unclear on the relationship between 
modernisation and rates of social mobility. On the one hand, there is a substantial 
body of work that suggests social mobility increases with modernisation.  On the 
other hand, many more recent works on social mobility, such as the work by 
Goldthorpe and Clark, seem to refute this view.  The literature on the army is also 
ambiguous on how modernisation affected army careers.  A comparison of different 
studies of army officers suggests that the army as a mechanism of social mobility 
was becoming increasingly popular over the course of the long eighteenth-century. 
Yet, there are historians who suggest there were fewer opportunities in the late 
eighteenth-century army due to the increasing importance of social status in army 
careers.  In the case of the army it is difficult to know the effect of modernisation on 
army careers due to the nature of previous research on officers.  There have been 
many different specific studies of officers, but most of these tend to concentrate on 
periods that end in the mid eighteenth-century or concern specific aspects of 
officership.123  This thesis will make an important contribution to this debate on how 
modernisation affected social mobility by examining the social backgrounds and 
career patterns of British generals during a period when the army was transitioning 
from a pre-modern organisation to one that had many aspects of a modern 
profession.   
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 Another key contribution of this project will be to determine the extent to which 
the highest ranks of a profession were ‘closed’ or ‘open’.  One of the dominant 
theories of social mobility suggests the peak of any profession is probably relatively 
closed as most mobility occurs through intermediate levels. In a similar fashion, 
historians of the eighteenth-century army have often suggested the highest ranks in 
the army were isolated from any expansion in social mobility.  However, these 
findings on the army have rarely been backed up by in-depth research on the social 
backgrounds and career patterns of senior officers.  Most studies of senior officers 
are military histories focusing on their activities in battles.124  There has only been 
one in-depth study of the social history of senior officers and this work by Otley on 
generals between 1870 and 1959 concerned a fundamentally different period of 
time.  The contribution by Glover and Hayes on generals and regimental colonels in 
the eighteenth-century are of much value, but these were done as part of wider 
studies on officership generally. 
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Chapter three: What is a general? 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction  
 
 
 
The 1800 army list specifies the names of 288 officers holding substantive 
general rank ranging from major generals to field marshals.1  What did it mean to be 
a general and how did these officers become generals?  In modern times a general 
is simply the highest active military rank in the army.  However, this was not 
necessarily the case during the eighteenth-century as the nature of rank at this time 
created two different types of general.  In a similar fashion to today, there were some 
generals who held general rank with high active military commands attached to their 
positions.  On the other hand, there were other generals who were generals in name 
only. They held the army rank of general, but may have never held high military 
command or even seen active service for many years.  The purpose of this chapter 
is to explain what it meant to be a general in the eighteenth century and how officers 
became generals.  Some attention will then be given to explaining how the generals 
to be studied were identified and exploring their characteristics as a group.  
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II. Rank in the army 
 
 
 The reason two different types of generals existed in the eighteenth-century 
was due to the nature of rank at this time.   All officers possessed two different ranks, 
a regimental and an army rank.  The rank structure was almost identical for both 
army and regimental ranks.   Ensign was the lowest rank of officer.  After ensign 
ranks ascended in the following order: lieutenant, captain lieutenant, captain, major, 
lieutenant colonel and colonel.  All of these ranks were both army and regimental 
ranks.  The highest regimental rank was colonel, but army ranks continued after 
colonel into the various grades of general.  In addition, the mid to late eighteenth-
century saw a new regimental rank, called colonel commandant, between lieutenant 
colonel and colonel for some regiments.  This was an honorary position and 
depending on the size of the regiment there could be different colonel commandants 
for each battalion.2 
 
 
The lowest army rank of general was different depending on the time period.  
In the early eighteenth-century a colonel in the army was followed by a brigadier 
general.  However, by the mid eighteenth-century the rank of brigadier general 
seems to have disappeared as an army rank.  There were no appointments to 
brigadier general in the army after 1746 until this rank was reinstated in 1946 as a 
substantive general rank.3  Instead brigadier general became a local rank.  Local 
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ranks were temporary command appointments abroad given while on active service.  
This allowed the army to appoint officers to higher command appointments than their 
army rank in the event there were no qualified candidates holding the appropriate 
army rank.  It was meant to be a temporary measure to aid the efficiency of the 
service.  Accordingly, local ranks ended when the overseas appointment they were 
attached to was relinquished or promotion was gained to the same army rank.  The 
first substantive general rank for mid-eighteenth-century officers, and the rank 
following brigadier general for their earlier period counterparts, was major general.  
Major general was followed by lieutenant general, general and field marshal.  Field 
Marshal in a similar fashion to regimental colonel was a rank that was honorary and 
was not obtained through the usual promotion methods.  Officers could only become 
field marshals by direct appointment from the King.   
 
 
The rank structure for regimental and army ranks may have been almost 
identical, but there were important differences between these ranks.  There were 
rather different responsibilities attached to regimental and army ranks.  All regimental 
ranks apart from regimental colonel which was an honorary position had active 
military commands attached to them.  Regiments were purely administrative 
organisations and were organised for fighting into battalions; most regiments 
consisted of one or two battalions.4  The regimental lieutenant colonel was the 
commander of the battalion assisted by the major.  Battalions were subdivided into 
smaller fighting units called companies.  There were usually ten companies per 
battalion, although this could vary especially during wartime.  Field ranks, that is to 
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say, those ranked captain and higher, were each in charge of a company and had 
sole responsibility for their company’s administration and military management.  The 
colonel’s company in his absence was the responsibility of a rather odd rank called 
the captain lieutenant who was essentially an acting captain.  Captain-lieutenant was 
a marginal rank as most officers in the army skipped this rank.   For example, only 
32% of infantry officers in Odintz’s sample served as captain lieutenants.5    In fact, 
some historians who have examined army careers entirely ignore this rank in their 
analysis.6  The most junior officer ranks, lieutenant and ensign, assisted the captains 
in the management of their companies.   Pay was in proportion to an officer’s 
regimental rank and the number of officer places per regiment was consequently 
limited.   
 
 
In contrast to regimental rank, an army rank did not necessarily entail any 
particular command responsibilities.  It merely provided the opportunity for active 
command in the army if an officer could gain an appointment to an army job such as 
a major general commanding a brigade. Specific army appointments did carry extra 
pay, but there was no financial compensation per se for holding a particular army 
rank.  Another difference for army ranks compared to regimental ranks was there 
were no limits on the number of officers that could hold army rank. One advantage of 
army rank was that it was only possible to become a commanding general through 
army rank and there were also some regimental benefits for those holding a high 
army rank.  Seniority in the army entitled officers to the same regimental rank as 
their army rank in another regiment through the patronage of the commander in chief 
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who had the right to appoint officers to regimental vacancies not caused by death in 
battle.  Army rank also excused an officer from regimental duty except for the duties 
that pertained to his army rank.  
 
 
 Methods of promotion were also slightly different between regimental and 
army ranks.  In both rank structures the standard method of promotion was 
promotion by seniority or what contemporaries termed "progressive advancement".  
Gaining regimental promotion through seniority was based on the date an officer 
joined his regiment.  A new ensign would join his regiment at the bottom of the 
ensign list as the junior of his rank.  As other ensigns died, were promoted or 
transferred he would gradually move up places until he became the most senior 
ensign in his regiment.  Once he achieved regimental seniority for his rank he usually 
succeeded to the next non-purchase vacancy for the next highest rank.  However, if 
officers transferred regiments they would go to the bottom of the regimental seniority 
list for the rank in the regiment they transferred to.   
 
 
Seniority in the army worked in a similar fashion, except that seniority was 
based on the date an officer first obtained his commission.  Accordingly, seniority in 
the army for each rank did not change and could be different than regimental 
seniority which varied depending on length of service with particular regiments.  An 
examination of the seniority of different general ranks taken from the 1800 army list 
demonstrates how "progressive advancement" worked.  In the army list of 1800 
there were 79 lieutenant generals.  The most senior lieutenant general was Harry 
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Trelawny, who became a lieutenant general in the army on 12 October 1781, while 
the most junior of this rank was James Pulteney whose commission dated 26 June 
1799.  When a vacancy occurred in the rank of general, the army commission above 
lieutenant general, Trelawny as the most senior lieutenant general in the army would 
automatically become a general and all lieutenant generals would move up one 
place.  This would then create a vacancy for the most senior major general, Henry 
Pringle, whose major general commission was dated 20 November 1782, to become 
a lieutenant general.   One consequence of the differences between regimental and 
army seniority was officers sometimes held different regimental and army ranks.  For 
example, one of the late eighteenth-century generals featured in this study, 
Cornelius Cuyler, in 1782 held the regimental rank of lieutenant colonel in the 55th 
foot while he was a colonel in the army.    
 
 
  Army and regimental ranks could also be different as there were ways to 
accelerate promotion that did not rely on seniority.  Regimental promotion could be 
accelerated without waiting for promotion through seniority by purchasing the next 
highest rank.  This was subject to the approval of the commanding officer and 
secretary at war.  Near the turn of the nineteenth-century additional conditions were 
imposed before purchase transactions were approved; minimum terms of service at 
different ranks were required before any promotion was possible.7   It should be 
noted that purchase was not entirely divorced from regimental or army seniority.  
Potential purchasers had their name put on "the list for purchase" and deposited the 
regulation price of the next rank with their regiment agent.  These names appeared 
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in order of regimental seniority and a purchase vacancy would first be offered to the 
most senior officer on the list.  However, regimental seniority could be usurped by 
army seniority at the discretion of the commander in chief.  The commander-in-chief 
was able to offer any purchase vacancy to an officer that did not have regimental 
seniority provided the officer concerned had seniority in the army. 
 
  
 After officers became captains in the army promotion could be accelerated 
through brevets to the next two ranks.  It was possible to become a major and a 
lieutenant colonel in the army without army seniority by brevet.  Brevets were 
awarded to field officers for particular merit or long service to accelerate the 
promotion prospects of deserving officers so they could gain ‘promotion to the higher 
ranks at an appropriate age.’8  The origin of brevet promotion seems to date back to 
the period 1660 to 1700.9    In the early eighteenth-century brevets were originally 
awarded to individual officers by local commanders in chief, but over time brevet 
promotion evolved so that by the end of the eighteenth-century it was “...a general 
promotion, by which a given number of officers are raised from the rank of captain 
upwards...”10  In May 1811, for example, Wellington recommended six majors and 
twelve captains for promotion by brevet as a reward for the meritorious actions they 
displayed in battle.11   A long service brevet was given to mark the King's birthday in 
1813.  This brevet promoted 71 long serving army captains to major for those who 
gained captaincies in the army between 1 January 1800 and 31 December 1802.12  
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The main advantage of brevets was to accelerate progress to general by enabling 
selected officers to make their way through the army ranks of captain and major 
much quicker than if they had waited for seniority.  In 1806 another perk for those 
gaining brevets was introduced.  For the first time some officers who held the brevet 
ranks of major and lieutenant colonel in the army were given an addition to their pay.  
Brevet majors and lieutenant colonels in the infantry and colonial corps gained an 
additional 2s per diem.13  There were various changes to brevet promotion after 
1815, but it remained an integral part of army promotion until finally abolished in 
1967, a decision which was made to bring army promotion in line with promotion 
methods in the air force and navy.    
 
 
  Apart from brevets gained through merit or long service it was also possible 
to obtain a brevet promotion in the army through serving with the foot or horse 
guards (which was renamed the life guards in 1788).  In 1687 regimental captains in 
the foot guards were granted the privilege of holding a brevet lieutenant colonelcy in 
the army.  This privilege was extended in 1691 to foot guards’ lieutenants who 
gained brevets as captains in the army.   Regimental commissions in the horse 
guards gave some officers even higher brevet ranks in the army than the foot 
guards.  Cornets, the equivalent rank to ensigns in the cavalry, ranked as captains in 
the army with regimental lieutenants equivalent to army majors.  Even some non-
commissioned officers in the horse guards held higher army ranks.  Corporals in the 
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horse guards ranked with the "eldest lieutenant of horse" in other regiments of 
cavalry.14 
 
 
 Brevet promotion through merit, long service or serving with the guards only 
took officers so far up the army list.  The highest brevet promotion was lieutenant 
colonel as the army authorities were unwilling to make officers colonel by brevet as it 
was "...not consistent with the organisation of this service to appoint to the brevet of 
colonel out of the usual mode of progressive advancement to that rank..."15  Hence, 
once officers became lieutenant colonels in the army promotion to subsequent army 
ranks became solely determined by seniority.  This meant that speed of promotion to 
general was based on the date an officer became a lieutenant colonel in the army.  
However, it was possible to accelerate the advancement of talented colonels within 
the confines of “progressive advancement” to general rank through a mass 
promotion of all colonels who were senior to the useful colonel in the service.  
Accordingly, in order to give Colonel Aylmer general command in 1813 it was 
necessary to promote 82 colonels to major general due to the dictates of 
“progressive advancement”.16   As there were no limits on the number of general 
officers all lieutenant colonels in the army who lived long enough, did not resign their 
commissions and were not dismissed eventually became general officers.   
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III. Types of general 
 
 
The system of army rank that resulted in all surviving lieutenant colonels 
eventually becoming generals inevitably produced two different types of general.  
The first types of generals were general officers that could most easily be described 
as ‘passive generals’ or non-operational generals.  ‘Passive generals’ were simply 
regimental field officers who never gained any command appointments as generals, 
but became generals through ‘progressive advancement’.  Often ‘passive generals’ 
were officers who had retired, but remained on the army list because they never 
resigned their commission and eventually became generals through living long 
enough.  Thus, it was not uncommon for a ‘passive general’ to only obtain a 
substantive general rank long after they retired or at an old age.   
 
 
An example of a ‘passive general’s’ career can be seen from the career 
pattern of Charles Vernon, who was listed as a general on the 1800 army list.  
Vernon entered the foot guards in 1741 as an ensign and served actively with both 
the first and second foot guards until he retired near the end of the Seven Years War 
in 1762.  At the time he retired he held the regimental rank of captain in the guards 
and army rank of colonel.  Shortly after retiring he became a major general in the 
army and eventually a general in 1783.  He was still listed as a general on the 1800 
army list because he never resigned his commission, was not dismissed from the 
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army and lived until 1810.17   There were other officers who became ‘passive 
generals’ without seeing any active service.  Charles Moore, the 1st Marquis of 
Drogheda, even became a field marshal despite never having seen active service.  
The closest he got to battle was recruiting a regiment in return for the regimental 
rank of colonel.  He raised the ‘Drogheda Light Horse’ in 1759 and remained colonel 
of this regiment through various name changes until it was finally disbanded in 1821.  
Edwards speculates that perhaps the King gave him the rank of field marshal as 
consolation for the loss of his regiment.18       
 
 
Generals of the second type were the operational generals.  They were given 
active military posts as generals and were compensated for their services with 
additional pay and allowances.  The operational generals were the most successful 
officers in the British army.  To be an operational general, officers usually had to be 
appointed to a specific role "on the staff".19  This was by no means easy as there 
were significantly more army generals than appointments available.  According to 
Glover, only two out of every five general officers had appointments "on the staff".20   
 
 
Most staff appointments went to the most junior ranks of substantive generals.  
The Irish staff in 1749 consisted of one general, one lieutenant general, three major 
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generals and eight brigadier generals.21  By 1812 the Irish staff had expanded with 
the overall expansion of the army, but one thing remained constant: most 
opportunities were available for the most junior grade of substantive generals.  At 
this time there was employment for six lieutenant generals and 23 major generals.22  
Nor was this characteristic isolated to Ireland.  Glover found that 59% of all major 
generals held staff appointments compared to 25% of lieutenant generals and only 
3% of generals.23 
 
 
Staff posts were based in a variety of different locations.   In 1812, 59% of 
staff appointments were overseas, while 26% were in Britain and 15% in Ireland.  
The most significant overseas locations were Portugal and Spain with over a third of 
generals, followed by the West Indies (23%), the East Indies (11%) and North 
America (8%).24  Within each country that had staff appointments general commands 
were further divided into regional districts.  In India there were different staff 
appointments for the three presidencies.  Likewise, Britain and Ireland was divided 
into several military districts with general commands attached to each district.    
 
 
The most important position on staff for generals was commander in chief.  
National commanders in chief were responsible for all military matters in their 
country and oversaw the work of local or regional commanders.  The first set of The 
King’s Regulations (1837), outlining rules for the government of the army, set out in 
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precise detail the roles and responsibilities of local commanders in chief serving in 
Britain.  A local commander in chief was firstly responsible for preparing and 
disciplining troops for active service.  To this end, he was expected to ensure troops 
were regularly paraded and exercised in ‘heavy marching order’ at least once per 
week.  A commander had to obtain accurate information concerning all military 
bodies and resources in his district with particular knowledge of the ‘strong features’ 
of his district, such as roads and bridges, and detailed knowledge of any defensive 
frailties.  The local commander in chief was then expected to communicate 
information on the efficiency of corps discipline, equipment and preparation for active 
service to the national commander in chief.  Many of his functions were supervisory 
in nature.  This included monitoring the commanding officers of individual battalions 
to observe ‘the indulgencies granted to soldiers, awards of minor punishments and 
the measures adopted to prevent drunkenness’.  Furthermore, commanding 
generals were expected to ensure general orders and regulations were obeyed, 
check on the regularity of regimental hospitals and care of the sick and take 
precautions to prevent damage to local farmers from loss of game.  Finally, 
commanders were expected to liaise regularly with magistrates and other civil 
authorities.25    
 
 
Other staff appointments in Britain were usually focused on preparing troops 
for active service or ensuring the internal economy of the army was as efficient as 
possible.  After commander in chief the other two main staff roles were adjutant 
general and quartermaster general.  The adjutant general was responsible for 
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discipline and clothing troops and the quartermaster general concerned himself with 
housing troops and arranging operations.  Another common job was to be 
commander of a training camp.  There were also roles explicitly tasked with 
supervising the efficiency of army procedures such as Inspector General of the 
recruiting service.  A small number of generals were appointed to serve on the Board 
of General Officers, responsible for financial regulations and its subcommittee the 
clothing board, who supervised clothing contracts entered into by regimental 
colonels.   
 
 
  Staff appointments based overseas had more active military responsibilities.    
Generals posted to staff positions abroad were frequently involved in fighting the 
enemy in battles and wars.   Depending on the particular circumstances of the 
engagement the person who had overall responsibility for a successful campaign 
was the national or local commander in chief.  Alternatively, a commander-in-chief 
might be appointed for a particular mission or expedition.  In battles the commander 
in chief in charge of overall strategy was assisted by several generals.  For the 
purposes of fighting, regiments were organised into one or more battalions headed 
by a lieutenant colonel or a major.  Between two and four battalions were then 
combined to make a brigade, the standard formation for operations.26  Brigades were 
typically commanded by major generals and were the most common command 
positions in battles.  However, at times generals also commanded even larger bodies 
of men.  Brigades were often formed into separate divisions, consisting of two to four 
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brigades, which were usually commanded by lieutenant generals.27   As the scale of 
warfare increased over the course of the eighteenth-century divisional commands 
became more common.  In 1813 it became necessary to organise troops within even 
larger formations.  At this time the army was organised into two to three corps, each 
made up of two divisions.28    
 
 
Another difference between overseas and other staff appointments was that 
those based abroad involved more active participation with civil authorities.   Many 
commanders in chief abroad were responsible not only for the military but also the 
civil administration of their jurisdiction.   Major General Lord Hugh Percy, a general 
on the 1800 army list, as commander in chief of Rhode Island in 1776 actively 
participated in the civil administration of Rhode Island making several civil 
appointments during his tenure.29   
 
 
There were also commands given to generals that specifically combined 
civilian and military responsibilities as governors and lieutenant governors of 
overseas jurisdictions.   It was fairly common, especially after the Seven Years War, 
for senior British army officers to be appointed governor or lieutenant governor and 
commander in chief of overseas locations.  A typical example of this was that the 
lieutenant governor of Jamaica was also the commander-in-chief for this area as 
well.  Accordingly, these roles entailed responsibility for the civil administration and 
defence of these areas.  Unlike governorships in Britain that were usually sinecures, 
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many of the foreign governorships involved military responsibilities similar to local 
commands such as Percy’s at Rhode Island.  Indeed, battles with the French and 
other enemies often occurred in these colonies.  For example, the lieutenant 
governor of Minorca, Lieutenant General William Blakeney, was responsible for 
resisting a French expedition sent to capture Minorca for 70 days in 1756 before he 
was finally defeated.30   
 
 
IV. Selection of generals for the study 
 
 
 This study focuses exclusively on generals who at some point in their careers 
possessed operational roles as generals.  The reason for excluding non-operational 
generals is the main concern of this study is to establish the limits of social mobility 
and the characteristics of the army elite so it is necessary to study only the most 
successful generals in the army. In addition, another area of interest is the efficiency 
implications of generals’ mobility patterns and for this reason working exclusively on 
operational generals makes sense.  An operational general for the purpose of this 
study is defined as an officer holding local or substantive general rank while serving 
"on the staff" or as a colonial governor with an active military command.   This focus 
on operational generals meant there was a two-stage selection process in deciding 
which generals to study: identifying all the general officers and then ascertaining 
which ones held operational commands during their careers. 
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 A key part of this study is to assess whether the nature of generalship 
changed over time with the expansion and modernisation of the army.   Hence, the 
first stage in the selection process was to choose two different groups of generals for 
study, one representing the early eighteenth-century and another representing the 
late eighteenth-century.  Generals in 1747 were chosen to represent the early period 
as this was before the great expansion in the scale of warfare that began with the 
Seven Years War.  It was also before many other notable aspects of modernisation, 
such as regiments no longer being called by their colonel's name, which occurred 
after 1748.  The proxy year selected for the later period was 1800.   Most of the 
expansion and modernisation of the army had occurred by this time.  Indeed, many 
of the most important reforms of the army, such as minimum length of service in 
each rank before promotion, had occurred by 1795.31  Comparing the careers of 
generals at these two time periods allows for an assessment of the impact 
modernisation had on army careers. 
 
 
The selection of 1747 as the early sample year was also influenced by 
availability of evidence.  Names of officers serving in the British Army, and their 
ranks, were published in army lists.  However, the information contained in these 
lists, and the frequency they were published, was very limited before annual army 
lists began to be published in 1754.  The first list of army officers was published in 
1642, as a list containing ‘cavaliers and brave commanders’.  In the period from 
1700 until 1740 there were only two lists published, the Blenheim Roll in 1704 and a 
list of half pay officers in 1714.  Neither of these lists contained every officer in the 
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army as only the officers who fought at Blenheim or were on half pay were included.  
From 1740 lists of army officers began to be published much more frequently.  In 
1740 the most comprehensive list of officers to date was published containing the 
names and ranks of all officers.  However, the next army list containing all officers 
was not to occur until annual publication started in 1754.   In the meantime, lists of 
senior officers were published titled The Succession of Colonels in 1742, 1745, 1747 
and 1749.   The Succession of Colonels only listed the names of generals, colonels 
and some field officers.  Lists of senior officers were important at this time because 
regiments were still named after their colonel.  As regiments were disbanded 
according to seniority, with the most junior regiments disbanded first, these lists 
which mainly listed ‘successions of colonels’, specifying every colonel of a regiment 
from each regiment’s foundation until the list was published, were helpful in 
ascertaining the order of regimental seniority.32  In deciding the proxy year to 
represent the early eighteenth-century The Succession of Colonels list for 1747 was 
selected as this was near the end of the last major pre-modern war providing a 
potentially larger population of operationally active general officers than the earlier 
army lists.  After publication of annual army lists started in 1754, and particularly 
from 1766 when indexes were first available, it becomes much easier to research the 
career patterns of officers.  This is because these annual lists provide not only the 
names of all officers from general to ensign, but also the dates of their army and 
regimental commissions.  Accordingly, the selection of 1800 as a period was not 
influenced by the quality of evidence in any way. 
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The names of generals, then, to be potentially used in this study were taken 
directly from the 1747 Succession of Colonels and the annual army list for 1800.  
Table 1 shows the total number of generals taken from these respective lists and 
their division between "passive" and operational generals. 
It was a relatively straightforward task to clarify whether an officer from these lists 
was a general.   However, it was much more difficult to separate operational from 
"passive" generals.     
 
Table 1: Population of generals, 1747 and 1800 
    
   
 ‘Passive’ Operational Total  
1747 40 55 95  
1800 160 128 288  
Source:  
List of generals: NA., WO 65/50, Printed Annual Army List, 1800; The Succession of 
Colonels to All His Majesties Land Forces from their Rise to 1747, (London, 1747). 
 
 Command positions: NA, WO 65/113, Printed Annual Army List, 1846; NA, WO 64/13 
Army Gradation List, 1775-1816; The Succession of Colonels 1749; ODNB; OCDB; C. 
Dalton (ed.), George The First’s Army, 1714-1727, Volumes 1-2, (London, 1910); J. 
Phillippart (ed.), The Royal Military Calendar, or Army Service and Commission Book, 
Volumes 1-5, 3
rd
 Ed., (London, 1820); http://www.westminster-abbey.org/our-
history/people/thomas-trigge; J.J Howard (Ed.), Visitation at England and Wales Notes, 5, 
(1903), p. 81. 
 
One reason army lists started to be published regularly was to assist regimental 
agents in the performance of their duties, such as recording purchase and sales of 
commissions, as agents needed accurate information on officers’ regimental and 
army commissions.  In consequence, army lists do not specify command or staff 
positions as these appointments were of little interest to regimental agents.  This 
makes it rather difficult to clarify which generals had active operational roles.  Thus, 
substantial additional research was required on each individual general officer to 
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ascertain whether particular generals were "passive" or operational.  A number of 
different sources were consulted to do this.   
 
 
 The main type of source used to clarify whether generals held operational 
positions at any point in their career were biographical profiles of generals in the 
Dictionary of National Biography for both Britain and Canada.  Operational generals 
were usually famous and well-known individuals so most operational generals had 
profiles in these sources.   
 
 
As not every general holding a staff position necessarily had an entry in a 
dictionary of national biography contemporary publications that listed the career 
patterns of army officers were also consulted.  For 1747 officers the volumes by 
Charles Dalton on George The First’s Army, 1714-1727 (1910) were useful.  Dalton 
lists officers serving in different regiments for the period when there was a large gap 
in the army lists.  Even more importantly, he also provides many biographical profiles 
of the officers mentioned, particularly the more high profile ones, in extensive 
footnotes to the lists.  A close examination of these volumes usually reveals any 
command appointments general officers held.   For later period officers, an extensive 
analysis was conducted of Phillippart’s third edition of The Royal Military Calendar, 
or Army Service and Commission Book (1820).  This is a valuable source for 
researching late eighteenth-century officers’ careers as it provides details of all 
regimental, army, local and command appointments for most field officers in the 
army.   
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There was also the occasional army list that mentioned details of command 
appointments.  The 1749 Succession of Colonels included details of general officers 
appointed to command positions in Flanders during 1748 and general officers 
holding staff positions in Ireland.  At the end of the annual army lists there is a 
section on the ‘successions of colonels’.  In later army lists other successions of 
some high profile roles are also published.  The 1846 army list (WO 65/113) included 
successions for command appointments such as commanders in chief of England 
and the East Indies.  A manuscript army list, called the army gradation list (WO 
64/13), also provided useful information on command appointments.  In common 
with other army lists, this source listed commission details of different officers.  
However, it also provided much more information because by each officer’s name 
was a comments section, which sometimes included details of command positions. 
 
 
 Identifying operational generals through these sources inevitably has some 
strengths and weaknesses.  The major strength is the various sources accurately 
clarify whether generals from the army lists held operational commands.  
Biographical profiles contain the highlights of an individual's life so for a military 
officer command appointments as generals are usually mentioned.  However, there 
are two weaknesses of these sources.  The sources do not necessarily capture all 
the command appointments a general may have held, particularly for the early 
eighteenth-century when the sources were not as good. Furthermore, there were few 
details mentioned on the nature of most staff appointments apart from for 
commander in chief.  The sources usually specified that a particular general was "on 
the staff" without any details of his precise role.  The research on generals’ 
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command positions created a potential group of 55 early period and 128 late period 
generals that definitely held operational commands.  Research was carried out on all 
of these generals or random samples taken from them depending on the topic.   
 
 
V.  Operational generals’ commands 
 
 
 At the moment the operational generals appear as mere numbers, but in 
reality they were actual people who achieved significant success in their careers.  
They were the commanders at virtually every major battle fought with Britain's 
enemies during the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth-century.  The 
operational generals were some of the most famous people in Britain and often 
achieved not only fame, but also significant social and financial rewards as a 
consequence of their services.  The 1747 operational generals included most of the 
main military commanders of a famous victory at Dettingen in 1743.  Many of the late 
eighteenth-century generals also achieved notable success. For example, Gerard 
Lake, commander in chief of India, who achieved great military success during the 
second Anglo-Maratha War (1803-1805).  According to his ODNB profile, he was a 
‘soldier’s general’ who achieved much on the battlefield by ‘ferocious energy and 
tactical skill’. 33   Another late period general who had an illustrious career was 
George Beckwith.   In 1809 he led a force of 11,000 men in a successful expedition 
to capture Martinique. During the course of this campaign he captured French 
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eagles, which were sent home to "great public acclaim" as they were the first seen in 
Britain.34  
 
 
Of course, not all operational generals achieved desirable outcomes from 
their careers.  Some generals never returned from the battlefield.  General Ponsonby 
was killed at Fontenoy (1745), Abercromby in Egypt (1801), Moore at Coruna (1809) 
and D’Oyly during Waterloo (1815).  Others ended their careers in disgrace or 
ignominy.  Perhaps most notoriously, Eyre Coote was stripped of his knighthood and 
military offices for indecent conduct, it was reputed he paid boys from Christ's 
Hospital to be flogged, after what had previously been a notable military career.35  
Thomas Bligh retired in disgust at the criticism he received after leading a failed 
military expedition to the French coast in 1758.36  Hew Dalrymple’s career ended in 
ignominy when as Commander in Chief of Portugal he gave overly generous terms 
to the defeated French.  He allowed the French army, with all its arms, equipment 
and loot gained in Portugal, to be repatriated using British ships.  Glover claimed 
“...on Dalrymple's side it was a masterpiece of ineptitudeHnever has a victorious 
army with every advantage in its hands signed an agreement which gave so much to 
its defeated enemies with so little to itself....”37  This caused Dalrymple's disgrace 
which resulted in a recall to London, a reprimand from the King and he was never 
given another command.38  John Whitelock was to face an even worse fate as 
commander in chief of the failed expedition to take Buenos Aries in 1807.  He was 
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dismissed from the army after being court-martialled for poor diplomacy, military 
incompetence, and negotiation of a shameful surrender.39 
 
 
During the course of their careers most operational generals held a variety of 
different command positions as Table 2 shows.    
 
Table 2: Command appointments of operational generals 
   
 1747       1800 
   
 N % N % 
National commander 16 19 44 17 
Local commander 8 10 49 19 
Governor 8 10 25 10 
Expedition commander 5 6 11 4  
Division/Brigade 15 18 35 14 
Staff 31 37 94 36 
Total 83 100 258 100 
Note: Each type of command appointment only counted once per general.  
 
Source: NA, WO 65/113, Printed Annual Army List, 1846; NA, WO 64/13 Army Gradation 
List, 1775-1816; The Succession of Colonels 1749; ODNB; OCDB; Dalton, George The 
First’s Army, Volumes 1-2; Phillippart, The Royal Military Calendar, Volumes 1-5, 3
rd
 Ed; 
http://www.westminster-abbey.org/our-history/people/thomas-trigge; Howard  Visitation at 
England, p. 81. 
 
 
Over one third of operational generals in both periods held the top jobs as 
commander in chief of a country, region or expedition.  Most appointments though 
were simply to the staff.  There seemed to be more continuity rather than difference 
between the different periods.  The proportion of generals in both periods, for 
example, appointed to "the staff" was almost identical.   Imperial expansion did make 
some difference.  The growth of empire provided the opportunity for an expansion in 
permanent national and local commander in chief positions in India, North America 
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and the West Indies that did not exist for the early period officers.  The proportion of 
generals who held the top commands of national or local commander or a 
governorship in the West Indies, India and North America increased from 7% for the 
early period to 35% by the late eighteenth-century.  This led to an increase in the 
proportion and absolute numbers of appointments to local commander positions.    
Perhaps the largest surprise is the small number of 1800 generals who gained 
operational commands at the head of brigades or divisions.  However, this is most 
likely due to the way appointments were reported in the sources consulted.  Most of 
the sources usually mentioned when generals had commander positions or were on 
the staff, but only incidentally discussed command of brigades or divisions. Hence, 
command appointments to brigades or divisions are likely to be significantly 
understated in table 2. 
 
 
 Most appointments were wartime positions that usually disappeared during 
peace.  For both periods, 90% of appointments to general command occurred during 
periods of war. There were always some appointments to general commands during 
peace.  John Leslie, 10th Earl of Rothes and a 1747 operational general, held an 
appointment on the Irish staff during 1751.  There might even be the occasional 
military action undertaken in a time when there were no global wars being 
conducted.  In the later period Major General Musgrave commanded a brigade in 
India during 1790-1791 before the outbreak of the French Wars.  However, it was 
rare for a general to have active military employment during peacetime.  
Employment during peacetime could also depend on the type and geographical 
location of the command. It was more common, for example, for generals to gain 
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employment as national commanders during peace than many other general 
commands.  This was particularly so with appointments to Commander in Chief of 
Ireland, 33% of which occurred during peace for 1800 generals.  Another common 
peace time appointment was as a foreign governor with active military command.  In 
the early period 50% of these appointments were made in peace, while nearly 30% 
became governors outside of wartime for the later period. 
 
 
 An analysis of where generals served in operational capacities shows there 
was also much continuity between the two periods.  There were three main 
geographical locations generals served in: overseas, Britain and Ireland.  Most 
generals in both periods served overseas; over 70% of all generals held active 
command positions overseas.  The high proportion of generals serving overseas was 
obviously related to the fact that most appointments occurred during war.  The main 
difference was between generals who served in multiple locations and those that 
only served in one location.  For the later period there was an almost even 
distribution between generals serving in multiple locations or one location.  On the 
other hand, two thirds of earlier period generals only served in one location.  This 
was due to a high proportion of 1747 generals, some 47% of all operational 
generals, who only served overseas.    
 
 
 
It was relatively uncommon for an operational general to receive command 
appointments in all three geographical locations.  Only 6% of 1747 and 14% of 1800 
operational generals held appointments in the three different geographical locations.  
Serving in Britain, Ireland and overseas locations usually indicated a general who 
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was one of the most successful operational generals.  Many of these highly favoured 
officers were constantly employed as generals.  One of the most successful 1747 
generals was George Wade.  After becoming a local brigadier general in Spain 
during 1707 Wade continually held different command positions.  During the 
remainder of the War of Spanish Succession he was frequently appointed to various 
brigade commands and acted as second in command on an expedition to Minorca.  
Then in the long period of peace that followed he held high profile staff roles as 
commander in chief of Ireland and then of Scotland.  The next major war saw Wade 
employed as commander of the forces in Flanders before being appointed to home 
posts as commander in chief of North Britain in 1745 and then, briefly, commander in 
chief of England.40  Thus, he was almost continuously employed in operational 
commands from 1707 until 1746.  The later period careers of generals such as Ralph 
Abercromby and William Cathcart show similar patterns of success in gaining 
commands.  The fact that few generals were employed in three different 
geographical locations was probably related to the supply of appointments; there 
were few appointments available during peace so only the most favoured generals 
could expect employment at this time.   
 
 
 It was far more common, especially in the later period, for generals to hold 
command positions in an overseas location and Britain or Ireland.  The timing of 
these appointments was often quite different depending on the general involved.  For 
some officers staff appointments in Britain or Ireland seemed to act as preparation 
for service abroad.  The first command appointments of John Francis Cradock as 
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general were on the Irish staff in the 1790s.  In this capacity he played an active part 
in suppressing the Irish Rebellion of 1798, which probably acted as good preparation 
for subsequent active commands in the Mediterranean, Egypt and India.  Many more 
staff positions in Britain or Ireland seemed to either act as a "rest" between more 
active command appointments abroad in the middle stages of a career or to round 
off a long and distinguished career.  For example, James Henry Craig’s period on 
the home staff came between more active commands abroad. He was commander 
in chief of the Cape of Good Hope and then held commands in India during the 
1790s before coming home and serving as commander of the Eastern District in 
Britain between 1801 and 1805.  This brief hiatus on the home staff was a prelude to 
him resuming more active commander in chief positions overseas as commander in 
chief of the Mediterranean in 1805 followed by North America in 1807.  The final 
command of particularly successful operational generals was often Commander in 
Chief of Ireland, Scotland or England.  These posts were the final command 
appointments of five 1747 and seven 1800 officers including such distinguished 
generals as Ligonier, Molesworth, Bland (1747), Baird, Beckwith, Cathcart, Dundas 
and Hewett (1800). 
 
 
 A notable aspect of where generals served in operational capacities was that 
a significant number of generals only served in one location. For the late eighteenth-
century, 24% of operational generals only served overseas, while 15% had 
command solely in Britain.  Perhaps the reason for this was that serving in one 
geographical area may have been the most efficient way for the army in many 
instances to manage the limited supply of operational generals.  An operational 
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general required many different skills ranging from administration and organisation to 
fighting and tactical ability.   The significant numbers of generals serving in only one 
location may have resulted from the different skill sets and experience required of 
home and overseas generals.  A general command in Britain required mainly 
efficient administrative skills, whereas fighting ability was critical for an overseas 
command.  Local experience also mattered for overseas commands as the physical 
contexts of places such as India were vastly different than at home.  In addition, 
there was large time costs involved in travelling from Britain to colonial locations.  
Often it could take months between appointment to a colonial command and actually 
arriving to take up the command.  For instance, Thomas Carleton was sworn in as 
Governor of New Brunswick, Canada on 28 July 1784, but did not arrive to take up 
his appointment until November of that year.41  Perhaps it is no surprise then that 
some late eighteenth-century generals such as Harris (India), Carleton (North 
America) and Melville (West Indies) only held general commands in one overseas 
area.   
 
 
 A proportion of generals also only served in one geographical location 
because they were highly privileged officers who had early command appointments 
abroad and then their career focus shifted away from active military command.  
George Townshend, an 1800 operational general, at first combined a military career 
with that of a parliamentarian holding active commands in North America and 
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Portugal during the Seven Years War.  However, after this period he concentrated 
more on his political career and never held active military command again.42   
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 
 The focus of this study is to analyse the social backgrounds and career 
patterns of British generals in the eighteenth-century.  In order to do this two 
samples of generals were chosen to facilitate an assessment of the impact 
modernisation had on generals careers.  In the eighteenth-century army the 
existence of two types of rank, regimental and army, created two different types of 
general.  Most officers holding general rank were not in fact operational or command 
generals.  They were generals in name only from the fact that becoming a lieutenant 
colonel in the army and living long enough to make it to general rank on the army list 
were the only requirements for an army officer to become a general.  The other type 
of general was operational generals who held at various points in their career local or 
substantive commands as generals at home, in Ireland and overseas.  These were 
the officers tasked with organising, managing and leading the British army in battle.  
This study concentrates exclusively on operational generals as one of its central 
concerns is to assess the career patterns of the most successful active officers in 
order to clarify the degree of social mobility at the highest levels in the army and 
whether it changed over time.    The results of the sampling process yielded 55 
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operational generals for 1747 and 128 operational generals for 1800 on whom the 
rest of this study is based.  
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Chapter four: Family backgrounds  
 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 Limits on the levels of social mobility in any profession is undoubtedly 
undesirable because low levels of social mobility can lead to misallocation of human 
capital and lower productivity.1  Some contend this is what happened with many 
generals in the eighteenth-century.  The limited levels of social mobility at the top 
end of the army led to the appointment of generals on the basis of their social status 
who were unsuited to their elevated positions, which in turn adversely affected 
military performance.2  The competency of generals was certainly a constant cause 
of complaint for Wellington.   In 1811 he complained to London that: 
“H I am obliged to be everywhere, and if absent from any operation something goes wrong. It is 
hoped that the general officers will at last acquire that experience which will teach them that success 
can be obtained only by attention to the most minute details and by tracing every part of every 
operation from its origin to its conclusion, point by point, and ascertaining that the whole is understood 
by those who are to execute itH.”
3
 
 
A year later his generals’ performance was still causing problems as they “...take 
alarm at the least movement of the enemy; and then spread the alarm and interrupt 
everything....”4  Thus, establishing the levels of social mobility among generals is 
important as the extent that generals were upwardly mobile has important 
implications for military efficiency.  To this end, this chapter examines the family 
backgrounds of the future generals to determine the extent to which generals were a 
‘closed’ or ‘open’ social group.  In other words, what were the rates of social mobility 
                                                 
1
 OECD,"A Family Affair ", p. 4. 
2
 Gates, “The Transformation of the Army”, p. 142; Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, p. 172. 
3
 Quoted in Glover, Wellington’s  army, p. 144. 
4
 Glover, Wellington’s  army, pp.  144-145. 
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amongst these officers and did future generals use military service to advance their 
social status?  Two main measures of social mobility are used; an intergenerational 
study of generals’ mobility through a comparison of the social status of their fathers 
and an analysis of the extent to which operational generals were self-recruited, that 
is to say, the degree to which future generals followed their fathers into the army.  
 
 
The data used to ascertain details of family backgrounds are drawn from a 
wide variety of different sources.  The main sources are hundreds of biographical 
profiles taken from the Dictionary of National Biography and History of Parliament of 
generals, their wives, fathers-in law, mothers, fathers, brothers, grandfathers, and 
uncles.  These two main sources are supplemented by a variety of other source 
material including: genealogical studies of the peerage, baronetage, knightage and 
gentry, a number of personal family histories, wills, foreign dictionaries of biography 
and contemporary memoirs or accounts of generals’ lives.    
 
 
This source material should allow considerable improvements in the quality of 
data on senior officers compared to previous studies.  Hayes work on regimental 
colonels used a wide variety of data sources including manuscripts from military 
officers, aristocratic records and some family histories.  However, his study was 
completed as long ago as 1957.  Since then there have been many improvements in 
the data sources available on eighteenth-century military officers.  During 2004 the 
biographies contained in the Dictionary of National Biography were revised, which 
resulted in many improvements.  There is also now much valuable data available on 
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the lives of military officers who served as MPs in The History of Parliament series.   
The History of Parliament for the eighteenth-century started to be published in 1964 
and was only completed in 1986.  This is a very useful source as 11% of all MPs 
were army officers by 1754-1790.5  In contrast to Hayes, Razell’s research on 
generals used only one source, Burke’s genealogical records, for all his data.  One 
problem with this is that using only one data source may mean the results are more 
subject to error than using multiple sources.  This seems especially the case for the 
eighteenth-century as data from this time tends to be rather patchy to begin with.   
 
 
The weakness of using biographical profiles as evidence is that social or 
career characteristics mentioned might differ depending on the background of the 
author and the purpose of the biography.  Some of the Dictionary of National 
Biography profiles written by non-military historians, for instance, contained less 
information on operational generals’ careers than those written by military historians.  
Likewise, most of the biographies in The History of Parliament series concentrate on 
the parliamentary activities of the officers concerned.  However, this is balanced by 
the fact that before this analysis they provide a brief social and career summary.  
Data issues were usually not a problem in tracing generals’ fathers’ details as most 
biographical profiles mention these if they are known.  An advantage of focusing on 
generals is that these officers were famous in their time and many details are known 
about their lives.   Accordingly, it was possible to trace the social status of 73% of 
1747 and 1800 operational generals’ fathers.  In comparison, only 23% of junior 
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naval officer social backgrounds could be traced for some sample periods in the 
recent study by Cavell.6    
 
 
II. Measuring social mobility 
 
 
 Analysing the social mobility of any group presents great problems due to 
differences in what is meant by social mobility and how best to measure it.  In society 
there exists a hierarchical structure of recognisable social groupings that are 
differentiated by social status or class.    Most authors tend to agree social mobility 
involves the degree to which individuals from these groups move up or down the 
different layers of society. 7  However, there is often disagreement on the 
classification of these different levels or social status groupings.  Glass pointed out 
there were a number of different criteria that could be used to indicate social status 
including income, occupation, education, material possessions, self-assessed status, 
social behaviour and status judgements of others.8     Bourdieu argued social status 
was determined by the extent to which individuals possessed three different types of 
capital.  The most important type of capital was economic capital as this could be 
used to purchase social or cultural capital.   However, social status was also 
determined by what he called social and cultural capital.  Social capital was the 
benefits derived from personal networks, but cultural capital is a little more obscure.  
It might be a cultural good, such as a notable book, or could come in the form of 
                                                 
6
 Cavell ,"A Social History ", Table 6.12, p. 207. 
7
 Glass, Social Mobility, p. 5; Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne, Social Mobility, pp. 18-19; Lipset and Bendix, 
Social Mobility, pp. 1-2. 
8
 Glass, Social Mobility, p.  30. 
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educational qualifications that conferred original properties on their owner.9  The 
problem with Bourdieu’s analytical framework is it is very difficult to differentiate 
between the different forms of capital.  Take education for example.  Education could 
possibly be considered economic, social and cultural capital.  Formal education often 
requires an investment which is made in anticipation of economic returns in the 
future through providing better work opportunities; it also facilitates the extension of 
personal networks through contacts developed at educational institutions and has 
cultural value as well. 
 
 
 The problem in measuring mobility is that social status or class is not easy to 
define.  There are usually no precise definitions of the criteria necessary to belong to 
any particular social group.  Nor is it often clear what the boundary between different 
social groups should be as social groups often overlap.  Hence, in measuring social 
mobility it is necessary to adopt criteria that indicate social status or class, which 
may be somewhat arbitrary.  The selection of criteria is also complicated by the fact 
that there is a high degree of inter-relationship between the different criteria used to 
indicate social status.  The criteria listed by Glass and Bourdieu to define social 
status do suggest that although social status cannot be defined with any certainty it 
is made up of two important elements.  Social status partly consists of economic 
resources, but also includes social characteristics.  Considering either of these 
elements of social mobility in isolation from each other can be problematic.  Relying 
purely on a socio-economic indicator such as income can cause problems as there is 
not necessarily a relationship between income and social status and there is also the 
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 P. Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital”, in J.E. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory of Research for the 
Sociology of Education, (New York, 1986), pp. 241-258. 
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issue of regional variation to contend with.10   As Lipset and Bendix argued, it is 
possible to be economically mobile, but not to increase one's social status.11  
Similarly, using a social category to indicate social status may be problematic as 
there can be a high degree of subjectivity in classifying different categories and there 
is not always a strong relationship between wealth and different social categories.12  
Hence, in assessing social mobility it is important to consider both of these elements 
of social status.   
 
 
 Indeed, the most robust social mobility studies tend to use criteria to indicate 
social status or class that capture both social and economic resources of the 
individuals concerned.  In one of the more recent studies of social mobility economic 
historian Greg Clarke examines surnames as indicators of social mobility.  This 
seems an appropriate measure of social mobility because surnames were often "a 
marker of economic and social status".13   Sociologists studying mobility in the 
modern era invariably use occupation as the main indicator of social mobility 
because modern occupations typically capture economic resources and are closely 
related to social status.14   According to Glass, occupation is a particularly useful 
indicator of social status as it not only captures economic resources, but many social 
characteristics such as education as well.15  Goldthorpe, in a recent study of social 
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 Mingay, The Gentry, p. 13; Rubinstein, Men of Property, 2
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 Ed., (London, 2006), p. 252; Speck, Stability and 
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 Lipset and Bendix, Social Mobility, p. 266. 
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 J.R Kearl and C.L Pope, “Wealth Mobility: the missing element”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 13 (3), 
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mobility in modern Britain, used occupation as an indicator of social class because  
"occupational order... now forms the back bone of class structure..."16  The common 
method in all of these studies for measuring social mobility is to divide occupations 
into a number of different levels or classes.  For example, Goldthorpe has seven 
class categories linked to occupation.17  Mobility is then measured through the final 
occupation of an individual compared to his father's occupation to indicate changes 
in social status or class.18  There are some studies going beyond the father-son 
dynamic to measure mobility, but they are much more uncommon.  Bibalarz and his 
co-authors did a study of social mobility involving three generations, but even then 
focused on the nature of parent and child linkages across the different generations.19   
Clarke seems to be the only exception in producing a mobility study that extends 
beyond the parent child dynamic, although the results of his work are yet to be 
published.20    
 
 
 It is easier to measure mobility in the modern period than in some other 
historical contexts due to modern occupations providing closer links between 
economic and social status.   The link between economic and social status, and the 
different divisions within society, was not as clear-cut in eighteenth-century Britain.21   
One problem is that it does not seem appropriate to discuss the different social 
groups of eighteenth-century society in relation to class.   Class confers connotations 
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 Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne, Social Mobility, p. 29. 
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 Ibid., pp. 40-42. 
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 Miles, Social Mobility, p.  107. 
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of conflict between antagonistic national social groupings.  However, class was not 
thought of in this way in the eighteenth-century.  It was a generic term in a similar 
fashion to ‘sort’ that became popular to denote differing social and economic 
positions in a time of great social and economic change.22  Terms such as ‘class’ 
and ‘sort’ replaced more traditional descriptions such as ‘ranks’ or ‘orders’ that were 
more related to birth. 23  During this time there were no particular class identities as 
local and regional differences tended to be more important than any national class 
categories.24  National class identities only began to emerge during the Victorian 
period.25    
 
 
 Another problem is establishing the different social groups of eighteenth-
century Britain, the criteria that needed to be met to be a member of one of these 
groups and the boundaries between groups.  This is a problem not only for modern 
historians, but was a matter of some debate even among contemporaries.  One of 
the earliest classifications of Britain's social structure in the eighteenth-century was 
articulated by Daniel Defoe in 1709.  According to Defoe there existed seven main 
social categories in Britain:  
"...the Great who live profusely, the Rich who live plentifully, the middle Sort who live well, the working 
Trades who labour hard but feel no want, The Country People, Farmers etc who fare  indifferently, 
The poor that fare hard, The Miserable that really pinch and suffer want..."
26
 
 
By the mid eighteenth-century it was far more common to classify the social structure 
of Britain into four or five different levels.27  A typical classification was Nelson’s of 
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1753.  In his view, there was the "... Nobility, Gentry, Mercantile or Commercial 
People, Mechanics, and Peasantry...."28  In most classifications examined the main 
social groups can be synthesised into five different levels: the aristocracy, the gentry, 
the middling sort, workers and the poor.   
 
 
 As membership of any social group during this time was defined in part by 
income and in part by social status an assessment of social mobility should centre 
on tracing movements up or down these different social groups.  In common with 
other social mobility studies the method adopted to do this is to compare mobility 
based on fathers’ backgrounds.   
 
 
 It is a far easier task to list the five main social groups than to establish the 
criteria that needed to be met to be a member of one of the different groups or where 
the boundaries that differentiated social status existed.  Definitive boundaries can 
only be drawn for those at the very top or bottom of the eighteenth-century social 
hierarchy.  The reason for this is that it is only at the very top or bottom of society 
that a clear correlation existed between economic and social status.  Accordingly, 
many historians adopt social classifications for this period that divide society in a 
binary fashion such as the elite and people.29  Thus, the main distinction made 
between social groupings to judge social mobility throughout this study is to first 
separate future generals into two distinct groups, aristocrats and non-aristocrats.  In 
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Defoe’s words, this is the difference between the "Great who live profusely" and the 
rest.   
 
 
Aristocrats were clearly differentiated from other groups based on their high 
social status and levels of income.  Peers of the realm possessed distinct hereditary 
titles ranging from baron to duke.  As members of the House of Lords, peers were 
the only group of individuals whose social position was defined legally.  There were 
also considerable income differences between aristocrats and the rest of society.  In 
the late seventeenth and eighteenth-century there were two contemporary authors 
who published estimates of the family income of different ranks in British society.  
Gregory King, who worked for the College of Arms and later became a government 
commissioner, published in the late 1690s a tract on the population and wealth of 
England.  His analysis involved dividing up British society into various ranks and 
estimating not only the number of families that belong to each rank, but their yearly 
family income.  Aristocrats were classified as "Temporal” or “Spiritual” Lords.  He 
estimated their income at £2,800 and £1,300 respectively, which greatly exceeded 
the next ranks of baronets at £880 and knights at £650.30   
 
 
The other main contemporary analysis of income in this period was conducted 
by Joseph Massie in the mid eighteenth-century.  Massie's work was more polemical 
in nature as the title of his 1760 pamphlet suggests, A Computation of the Money 
that hath been exorbitantly Raised upon the People of Great Britain by the Sugar 
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Planters, in one year from January 1759 to January 1760; showing how much Money 
a family of each Rank, Degree or Class hath lost by that rapacious monopoly, after I 
laid it open.  Despite this fact, as Mathias indicates in his analysis of this work, 
Massie's figures seem reasonably reliable.31  Massie adopted an almost identical 
rank structure to King in his work.  According to Massie, a “Temporal Lord” had a 
family annual income or expense of £20,000, while a “Spiritual Lord" earned 
£10,000.  In a similar fashion to King’s calculations, these aristocrats had much 
higher incomes than the next ranks in the social order, the baronets who earned 
£8,000 and knights at £6,000.32  These contemporary calculations of income 
demonstrate that aristocrats clearly had higher income levels than even those 
relatively close to them in rank or social status.  They were the only social group who 
were clearly delineated from other social groups based not only their social status, 
but also their income. 
 
 
The only issue that arises in dividing operational generals between aristocrats 
and non-aristocrats is whether to include baronets as aristocrats or to consider them 
as part of the next social group, the gentry.  Baronets are sometimes considered as 
part of the aristocracy, at other times part of the gentry and in some cases as a 
distinct social class below the aristocracy, but above the gentry.33  From a purely 
legal perspective, baronets were part of the gentry as they had no legal right to sit in 
the House of Lords.  However, if the high social status and income of many baronets 
is considered they seem more appropriately included as part of the aristocracy.  The 
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baronetcy shared with the aristocracy, and was dissimilar with other gentry, one 
central characteristic of nobility - a hereditary title.  Moreover, the income of baronets 
and lower level aristocrats was often similar.  As Mingay pointed out: “... the line 
between the more wealthy baronets and the less successful barons, earls, or even 
dukes, may indeed be difficult to draw...”34  Finally, including baronets as part of the 
aristocracy will facilitate comparison with other studies of military officers who adopt 
a similar approach.  Lewis, Wareham and Hayes include baronets with aristocrats as 
one titled group.35   In the most recent study concerning the social backgrounds of 
eighteenth-century navy officers Cavell included the baronetage with the peerage as 
part of the aristocracy.36  For these reasons baronets in this study are considered as 
aristocrats. 
 
 
Moving beyond the bipolar division between aristocrats and non-aristocrats 
involves a great deal of uncertainty in establishing criteria that reflect the social 
status and income of the other two leading groups in English society, the gentry and 
the middling sort.  It is difficult to say the exact criteria that differentiated, as Defoe 
put it, "the Rich who live plentifully" and "the middle Sort who live well".  There are no 
precise social or income definitions for these groups.37  In reality, there was 
considerable social and economic overlap between the gentry and the middling sort.  
Being a member of the gentry was not necessarily linked to income.  It was possible 
to be poor and be considered a gentleman or to be rich and not to be genteel 
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through displaying unfashionable dress or manners.38  The wide range of incomes 
between members of these groups meant it was possible for a successful member of 
the middling sort to earn substantially more than members of the gentry.39  This lack 
of income correlation between the two different social groups is evident in the figures 
provided by King and Massie.  Their calculations show the highest category of 
merchant often earned more than many gentlemen.  For instance, the annual family 
income of King’s "merchants and traders by sea" was £400 compared to £280 for 
"gentlemen".40  There were also large differences as a result of considerable regional 
variations in both income and social status.  As Speck noted, a yeoman farmer in 
Kent might earn significantly more than a gentry landowner in Cumberland.41  
Regional differences were also evident within the same social group.  To be a 
member of the middling sort could require different social attributes in London 
compared to the provinces; the necessary genteel education and social behaviour in 
London might be quite different from that in a more regional location.42 
 
 
It might be difficult to differentiate between the gentry and middling sort, but 
certain differences can be ascertained even if there is often considerable overlap at 
the margins.  According to Heal and Holmes, there were three key attributes of 
gentry status; owning land, exercising Lordship and local acknowledgement.43  
Modern historians, such as Heal and Holmes, typically divide the gentry into three 
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different groups; knights, esquires and gentlemen.44  Knights can be identified by the 
award of a knighthood.   
 
 
 It is rather more difficult to establish criteria for distinguishing between the 
esquire and gentlemen categories of the gentry.  Heal and Holmes suggests 
esquires were accorded this status from the fact they held local authority for the 
Crown and due to their wealth and family pedigree.45  Certainly, there was often a 
link between holding office and wealth in this period.  For example, to become an MP 
in the eighteenth-century, under the Property Qualification Act of 1711, any 
candidate needed to possess a landed income of at least £300 for borough MPs or 
£600 for county MPs.46   A senior official at the College of Arms in 1602 identified 
esquires as any "...who so can make proofe, that his Ancestors or himselfe, have 
had Armes, or can procure them by purchase, may be called Armiger or 
Esquier...."47   By the mid nineteenth-century esquires were defined as:  
 
“...A rank next below that of Knight. Besides those Esquires who are personal attendants of Knights of 
Orders of Knighthood, this title is held by all attendants on the person of the Sovereign, and all 
persons holding the Sovereign's commission being of military rank not below Captain; also, by 
general concession, by Barristers at Law, Masters of Arts and Bachelors of Law and Physic....”
48
 
 
The problem is there was never any fixed definition of who actually was an esquire 
or what criteria needed to be met in order to be one.   
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As one contemporary judge put it:  
“...It is, indeed, a matter somewhat unsettled, what constitutes the distinction, or who is a real esquire; 
for it is not an estate, however large, that confers this rank upon its owner....”
49
   
 
An identical problem can be found in distinguishing gentlemen.  One late sixteenth-
century definition of gentlemen emphasised studying at university, living idly and 
having the countenance of a gentleman.50  Owning land was an important aspect of 
being a gentleman, but as Corfield showed holding land was not the primary 
occupation of most gentlemen.51   Gentlemanly status was highly fluid and uncertain.  
It was not untypical for gentlemanly status to be determined by self-verification or 
social judgements of others based on dress, manners, consumption patterns and 
reputation.52   
 
 
 In common with the gentry, the ‘middling sort’ is not a social category that is 
easy to define by social status or wealth.  A recent work on these ‘sorts of people’ 
defined them as follows: 
"...The middling sort had to work for their income, trading with the products of their hands (for 
example, yeomen and husbandmen farmers and artisans) or with the skills in business or the 
professions for which they had trained, (for example, merchants, attorneys and apothecaries).  
Moreover, they were rarely employed by others in this-even the emerging group of government 
officials mostly depended on fees or viewed the offices as a property investment, as did the 
professions...."
53
 
  
 This is a similar definition to that adopted by Christie in his study of British ‘non-elite’ 
MPs in the eighteenth-century.  He claimed the key characteristic of the ‘non-elite’ in 
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this period was that they work for a living.54  Clearly, there were large social and 
economic differences between those at the top and lower end of the middling sort.  
This can be seen by returning to Massie's income estimates of 1760.  According to 
his calculations, a husbandman only earned £15 per annum compared to £600 for 
the highest grade of merchant.55  Barry acknowledged the middling sort could 
probably be divided into one thousand different categories depending on the nature 
of their occupations.56  There is also a particular problem with categorising the upper 
end of the middling sort.  In practice, they could equally be categorised as gentlemen 
or esquires as well as middling people.  This can be seen by examining trade 
directories of the late eighteenth-century.  Corfield in a survey of sixteen British 
commercial town directories of the 1770s and 1780s found that there were 1375 
townsmen classified as gentlemen or esquires.  However, the majority of these 
individuals listed occupations in the professions or business indicating many of the 
upper levels of the middling sort could equally be categorised as esquires, 
gentlemen or from the upper echelons of the middling sort.57 
 
 
 Given these problems in categorising the gentry and the middling sort what 
were the definitions adopted to differentiate between the gentry and the middling 
sort?  The historical reality was that there was no clear distinction between many of 
the gentry and the upper middling sort.  Inevitably, any border between these groups 
is somewhat arbitrary and necessarily remains blurred.  This border was drawn in 
two ways.  The first way was to ensure members of each group satisfied some basic 
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characteristics of being a member of these groups.  In the case of the gentry, this 
was to own land, exercise lordship or have local acknowledgement of their status. 58   
The criteria of local acknowledgement may seem a little dubious due to its inherent 
subjectivity, but as Glass pointed out self-assessed status and the status judgements 
of others is a valid criterion in assessing the social status of individuals.59   Hence, it 
is perfectly reasonable to include generals’ fathers as members of the gentry on the 
basis of their own or others' opinion of their status.  The criteria adopted for being a 
member of the middling sort was simply that they worked for a living in accordance 
with previous definitions of this group by historians.60   
 
 
There were many individuals that met criteria of the gentry and the middling 
sort.   Most of the upper middling sort would have owned land so could just as easily 
be classified as gentry given that some authors consider any landowners to be 
gentry.61   In addition, members of some professions could equally be described as 
members of the gentry.62   In consequence, a second differentiation had to be made 
between these groups.  The second distinction was a subjective judgement based on 
what their main focus was in life and where they derived most of their income.  If 
their main focus was living as a gentleman and they gained most of their income 
from land they were classified as gentry.  On the other hand, individuals that derived 
most of their income from non-landed sources such as business or a profession 
were characterised as ‘middling’.  The last two social categories in England at this 
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time, workers and the poor, do not feature in this study as it was found no future 
operational general came from a social group lower than the middling sort.   
 
 
 Clarifying the social status future generals originated from, using their fathers 
social status as a proxy for this, is only part of the problem in measuring their 
mobility.  Measuring mobility requires a beginning and ending social status.  Hence, 
it is also necessary to classify the social status of operational generals, or in 
sociologists terms the destination social status, of where these individuals finished 
their careers.   
 
 
The destination social status of operational generals is difficult to define as 
this was not defined in any contemporary publication.  Moreover, their final social 
status was also highly individualised based on their level of career success as an 
operational general, a subject that will be dealt with in much more detail in chapter 
seven.  On the one hand, the most successful operational generals’ final social 
status was certainly on a par with many aristocrats as these select officers gained 
aristocratic titles and immense financial rewards from their service.  On the other 
hand, some operational generals ended their career in disgrace and did not 
necessarily make large profits from their service.  However, a judgement can be 
made on the minimum social status achieved by all operational generals.  The lowest 
social status achieved by any operational general seemed to be somewhere 
between esquire and knight.  Some definitions of esquire suggest that captains in the 
army were entitled to call themselves esquire thus generals would rank above 
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esquires.  Many generals were awarded knighthoods as a reward for their service.  
However, as not all operational generals were knighted their rank should be placed 
somewhere below that of knights.  Accordingly, as the final destination social status 
of operational generals was at least between esquire and knight upward mobility is 
defined as those whose fathers’ social status was esquire or lower.  The destination 
social status of general also had one peculiar aspect to it compared to other 
professions.   Seniority in the army was unusual in that it often lifted, but never 
lowered social status.  No aristocrat lost social status by becoming a general. 
Consequently, there was no downward mobility for those becoming generals.  
 
 
III. Generals’ intergenerational mobility 
 
 
 
Changes in social status were firstly determined by separating generals’ 
fathers into the two main groups in society, aristocrats and non-aristocrats.   
 
Table 3: Social status of generals’ fathers 
   
 1747     1800 
   
 N % N % 
Aristocrats 24 60.0 41 43.6 
Non-aristocrats 16 40.0 53 56.4 
Total 40 100.0 94 100.0 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
 
 
Aristocrats were the leading social group among 1747 generals and remained a 
significant group for the later period.  There was a shift in favour of non-aristocrats by 
the late eighteenth-century as the relative proportion of non-aristocratic generals 
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increased at the expense of the aristocrats.  Nevertheless, the absolute level of 
aristocrats that were operational generals still remained high considering the small 
numbers of aristocrats in the population compared to non-aristocrats.  According to 
Massey's estimates of 1760, only 30 families were ‘temporal and spiritual lords’ with 
a further 40 classified as baronets.  In contrast to these small numbers of aristocrats, 
there were 17,920 families described as knights, esquires and gentlemen and 
65,000 families from professions such as the clergy, law, liberal arts, civil officers, 
naval and military officers.63  The aristocrats can be divided into two main groups.  
The ‘old’ aristocrats whose families held aristocratic titles for many generations and 
the ‘new’ aristocrats whose generals’ fathers or grandfathers were the first members 
of their family to possess an aristocratic title.   
 
 
It was the ‘old’ aristocratic families that featured most prominently among 
aristocratic generals.  In both periods, members of the Royal family held operational 
appointments as generals.  Moreover, 42% of 1747 and 44% of 1800 aristocratic 
future generals’ fathers held the ranks of earl or duke.  Some of the oldest 
aristocratic families in England were featured among these generals.  Perhaps the 
prime example of ‘old’ aristocratic families was the Dukes of Richmond.  The second 
Duke of Richmond, Charles Lennox, was an operational general in the early period.  
Two of his sons, Charles, the third Duke of Richmond, and Lord George, both 
appeared as 1800 operational generals.  In addition, there were many generals in 
both periods that held aristocratic titles that had been in their family for five 
generations or more such as the 10th Earl of Pembroke or the 10th Lord Sinclair.   
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There were also some ‘new’ aristocrats in both periods whose lineage was far 
more limited.  A typical ‘new’ aristocrat story of advancement and consolidation in 
the early period was that of General James O’Hara’s family.  His father was ‘a 
henchman and client of the Butlers, dukes of Ormond’ who started life for them as 
riding master.64  He entered the army, eventually becoming commander-in-chief of 
Ireland and was raised to the peerage for his military services on the campaign of 
1706.  A longer story of intergenerational mobility and subsequent consolidation was 
the case of the Fox family (1800).  General Henry Fox’s grandfather, Sir Stephen 
Fox, started life as a footman before entering government service.  He was one of 
the most successful commoners of his day and eventually rose to such positions as 
First Lord of the Treasury and Paymaster of the Forces.65   General Fox’s father, in a 
similar fashion to Sir Stephen, entered government service serving as Secretary at 
War and Paymaster General for which he gained the title of first Baron Holland.66 
 
 
Outside of these main two groups of aristocrats was a small group that has 
been excluded from the analysis due to difficulty in social classification.  This 
comprised three 1800 generals who were the illegitimate sons of aristocrats.  In the 
eighteenth-century relatively few people were born illegitimately.  However, between 
the early and the late eighteenth-century there was a steep rise in the rates of 
illegitimate children.  Wrigley speculated that by the end of the eighteenth-century 
one quarter of all births may have been illegitimate.67  Pre-marital sex was limited 
between females of higher social groups and their unmarried male counterparts.  In 
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consequence, sexual contact frequently occurred between aristocratic men and 
women of much lower stations.68  The aristocratic bastards who would become 
generals cannot be classified as aristocrats, but often received many of the 
advantages of being born legitimately.  Two of the 1800 aristocratic bastards 
followed the same career path in the army as their fathers.  The third bastard’s 
father, the Earl of Fife, paid for his illegitimate son’s education, army promotions and 
even a small estate for him.69  The advantages these aristocratic bastards received 
were due to the fact it was common for illegitimate children to be supported 
financially by their fathers.70   
  
 
    A second level of analysis can be performed by dividing the non-aristocrats 
into the two main non-aristocratic social groups, the gentry and the middling sort.  In 
addition, within these two social groups generals’ fathers can delineated by the 
different categories of the gentry or the middling sort.    The data on the 1747 future 
generals is somewhat limited by the small numbers of officers who became 
operational generals and the extent to which their fathers’ social origins could be 
traced.  Nevertheless, two important points do emerge from the data.  Non-
aristocratic generals in the early period appear to be dominated by members of the 
gentry or the sons of army officers.  These two groups account for 87.6 % of all non-
aristocratic 1747 operational generals.   
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Table 4: Social status of non-aristocratic generals’ fathers 
   
 1747      1800 
   
 N % N % 
Knight 2 12.5 0 0.0 
Esquire 6 37.5 19 35.8 
Gentlemen 1 6.3 6 11.3 
sub-total     
     -Gentry 9 56.3 25 47.2 
     
Army 5 31.3 10 18.9 
Navy 0 0.0 1 1.9 
Church 0 0.0 7 13.2 
Law 0 0.0 1 1.9 
Government 0 0.0 1 1.9 
Business  1 6.3 6 11.3 
Foreign 1 6.3 2 3.8 
sub-total     
     -Middling 7 43.8 28 52.8 
Total 16 100.0 53 100.0 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
 
A good example of a gentry general in this period was Thomas Bligh.  He was the 
son of a landowner and MP who eventually became a member of the Privy Council 
in Ireland.   As a second son Bligh pursued an army career, while his elder brother 
inherited the family estates and became a prominent politician.71   It is not surprising 
the gentry were the largest non-aristocratic group in this period as studies of the 
social backgrounds of British officers in the eighteenth-century typically emphasise 
most officers came from the gentry.  For example, in Odintz’s study of British infantry 
officers he found that 57% of those with traceable backgrounds originated from the 
landed gentry.72  Given the tendency of many professions to self-recruit, an 
important measure of mobility in itself and a subject that will be discussed in more 
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detail later, it is not unexpected that a key group of army generals came from the 
sons of existing army officers.     
 
 
The social backgrounds of non-aristocratic 1800 generals show some 
similarities to the earlier period, but differences also emerge.  In a similar fashion to 
1747 generals, the two leading categories of future generals’ fathers for the later 
period remain the sons of the gentry and army officers.  However, the relative 
importance of both of these leading groups declines over time.  There are fewer sons 
of the gentry becoming generals by 1800.  By the late period the middling sorts 
overtake the gentry as the second leading social group behind aristocrats.     
 
 
There is also a greater diversification in the professional backgrounds the 
middling sorts were drawn from.  In the early period future generals from the 
middling sort came from only three types of professional backgrounds and the army 
accounted for most of the future generals from the middling sort.  In contrast, by the 
late period the number of professional categories future generals were drawn from 
had doubled and the army share of the middling sort declined.    Most notable were 
increases for those from church and business backgrounds.  It should be noted that 
fathers from the later period middling sort were usually among the most successful 
members of their professions.  Out of the seven churchmen whose sons became 
generals five of the church ranks held were Archbishop, Archdeacon, Dean, Cannon 
and Rector.   
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There were some future generals whose fathers achieved only modest 
professional success, but these were in the minority.  For example, when David 
Baird’s father, who had worked as a merchant, died it put his family in ‘financial 
hardship’.73  Far more typical of businessmen appeared to be the father of Banastre 
Tarleton who was one of the leading merchants in Liverpool and left him £5,000 in 
his will.74   In both periods there were some foreigners who became generals, 
although their antecedents were different.  In the early period foreigners were usually 
Huguenot refugees, whereas by the later period this changed to Americans.  
Foreigners who became generals may have possessed a lower social status than 
native Britons due to their foreign roots, but in common with their British counterparts 
they usually came from well-to-do families.  The father of Ligonier, one of the most 
successful early eighteenth-century generals, was a landowner from France who 
possessed the title of Sieur de Moncuquet.75  Likewise, the father of Staates Long 
Morris’, one of the future 1800 generals from America, was a judge of admiralty court 
and a wealthy landowner in New York.76   
 
 
How do these findings on operational generals compare to the previous 
research on the social status of eighteenth-century military officers?    Comparisons 
of this kind are very difficult due to different samples, levels, periods, definitions and 
methodologies adopted.  It seems a hazardous exercise to conduct this comparison 
through analysis of the three main social groups, aristocrats, gentry and middling 
sort given the definition difficulties and differences adopted by authors studying this 
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subject.  However, this problem can be resolved by simply returning to the bipolar 
division between aristocrats and non-aristocrats, which removes many of these 
definitional issues.   
 
 
Accordingly, table 5 compares the aristocratic share of different eighteenth-
century military ranks.   This table makes clear that the extent to which aristocrats 
could be found in the different military ranks depended very much on the level of 
rank, the rank’s social status and time period.  Greater proportions of aristocrats 
were found among the senior ranks.  This was particularly the case when the ranks 
involved lucrative command appointments such as operational generals or frigate 
captains.  Thus, operational generals had some of the highest proportions of 
aristocrats in their ranks compared to other groups of officers.  The social status of 
the military branch aristocrats served in also mattered.  There were more aristocrats 
in the army than the navy for most of the period.  It is notable in this respect that the 
engineers and East India Company army, which both had a lower social status than 
the regular army, had few aristocrats.  Infantry regiments of the regular army, if 
Odintz’s figures are any indication, had similar numbers of aristocrats serving to the 
navy.   There were also significant variations over time. The aristocratic share of 
operational generals and generals declined over the course of time, whereas the 
opposite could be said of frigate captains.  In the case of the army this is surprising 
as historians often emphasise the late eighteenth-century army had enhanced social 
awareness at the expense of duty compared to its earlier counterpart.77   
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Table 5: Aristocrats’ share of military ranks, 1714-1815 
   
              Senior officers 
 Period % N 
Wood operational generals 1747 60 40 
 1800 44 94 
    
Hayes regimental colonels 1714-1763 31 325 
    
Razzell generals 1780 30 155 
 1810 27 390 
    
Wareham frigate captains Pre-1793 33 148 
 1793-1800 34 148 
 1801-1814 61 148 
    
 Officers 
 Period % N 
Marshall engineers 1741-1783 3 37 
    
Odintz foot officers 1754-1783 11 268 
    
Razzell E.I.C army officers 1758-1774 2 448 
 1775-1804 3 626 
Razzell army officers 1780 24 100 
    
Conway army officers 1780 30 ? 
    
Cavell junior navy officers 1761 13 31 
 1771 20 114 
 1801 12 131 
    
Lewis navy officers 1793-1815 11 1800 
Note: E.I.C stands for East India Company. Wareham’s sample size of 148 for frigate captains is the 
cumulative sample size for all his periods as he does not provide a breakdown of the sample size for 
the different periods. Razzell’s generals figures define aristocrats as those with inherited aristocratic 
titles attached to their names.  This is likely to significantly underestimate the number of aristocrats as 
it excludes many sons of aristocrats, such as sons of barons, who did not possess titles.   
 
Source:  
Operational generals: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds. 
Regimental colonels: Hayes, “The Professional and Social Background”, pp. 68-69. 
Frigate captains: Wareham, The Star Captains, Table 3.4, pp. 93-94. 
Engineers: Marshall, “The British Military Engineers”, pp. 137-142, 152-153. 
Foot officers: Odintz, “The British Officer Corps”, Chart II, p. 182. 
Generals, army and E.I.C officers:  Razzell, “Social Origins of Officers”, Tables 1, 7, 9, pp. 249, 254. 
Army officers: S. Conway, The British Isles and the War of American Independence, (Oxford, 2000), 
p.31. 
Junior navy officers: Cavell, "A Social History”, Appendix H, JO Charts. 
Navy officers: Lewis, A Social History of the Navy, p.31. 
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Aristocrats may have held a higher share of operational general positions 
compared to other military ranks in the eighteenth century, but this did not preclude 
many future generals using military service to advance their social status.   Even if 
the final social status of an operational general was only between esquire and knight 
this meant that many generals in both periods achieved upward social mobility.   The 
beginning social status, measured by their father’s social status, of 35 % of 1747 
generals was esquire or lower indicating these officers increased their social status 
by becoming operational generals.  The social status gains were even more 
impressive for the later period generals, 56% of 1800 generals had a beginning 
social status of esquire or lower.  Hence, levels of social mobility among generals 
were relatively high and increasing as the century wore on.  Admittedly, many of 
these mobile generals came from wealthy families, but they nevertheless managed 
to use the army to increase their social status.   
 
 
IV. Self-recruitment 
 
 
An important point to come out of the intergenerational analysis of generals’ 
mobility was that a key group of future generals were the sons of army officers.  This 
group has only been considered in respect of those officers who belonged to the 
middling sort.  However, this underestimates the army connections of future 
generals’ fathers as aristocrats and gentry fathers may also have served as army 
officers.  It is important to consider the army connections of future generals’ fathers 
in more detail because at the top end of a relatively closed social hierarchy self-
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recruitment often plays a critical role in keeping outsiders from the top ranks.78   
Succession owes something to the influence of family tradition encouraging the next 
generation to follow the father’s calling and self-recruitment occurs when office 
holders give preferment to immediate family members or via networks.  Accordingly, 
Bendix and Lipset noted that those with high status positions usually try to maintain 
them for their kin and heirs.79   Mobility studies that have shown high degrees of 
closure at the peaks of society also usually demonstrate high levels of self-
recruitment.80  Of course, within any social grouping there is likely to be a certain 
amount of self-recruitment regardless of how open they are to outsiders.81   
 
 
The extent to which future generals were self-recruited thus seems another 
important measure to judge how open they were as a social group.  Social mobility 
studies typically measure self-recruitment by the extent to which sons follow their 
fathers into the same professions.82  Accordingly, a similar approach is adopted to 
measure the extent to which generals were self-recruited.   Self-recruitment is 
defined as the extent to which future generals, whose father’s social status can be 
identified, followed their fathers into the army.    
 
 
The focus is on father's experience in the army exclusively, rather than 
including the navy and analysing the military profession in general, for two reasons.   
First, few future generals’ fathers were navy officers.  Only one 1747 and three 1800 
                                                 
78
 Goldthorpe et al, Social Mobility, pp. 18-19. 
79
 Lipset and Bendix, Social Mobility, p. 2. 
80
 Glass, Social Mobility in Britain. 
81
 Goldthorpe et al, Social Mobility, p. 44. 
82
 Glass, Social Mobility, p.  310. 
118 
 
future generals were the sons of navy officers.  Hence, the sons of navy officers did 
not seem an especially important social group of future generals.  Second, there is 
no evidence that high-ranking naval officers could more actively advance the careers 
of sons in the army than those from non-military professions.   
 
 
In contrast, there is much evidence of army fathers using their positions in the 
army to actively advance the careers of their sons.  This seemed particularly 
pronounced during the early eighteenth-century.  Fathers using their influence to 
enable their sons to replace them as regimental colonels were relatively common in 
this period. Take for example the rapid advance of James O’Hara, a future 1747 
operational general.  His father, Charles, 1st Baron Tyrawley, was a regimental 
colonel and operational general.   James entered his father’s regiment, the 7th foot, 
at the rank of lieutenant in 1703.   Two years later he was promoted to captain and 
replaced his father as regimental colonel in 1713. 83  From entry to regimental 
colonel in only 10 years was a remarkably quick rise even for the son of such an 
influential officer.    Another 1747 future general, Roger Handasyd, also replaced his 
father as a regimental colonel of the 22nd foot after previously serving as captain and 
then lieutenant colonel in the same regiment.84         
 
 
Nor was the phenomenon of army fathers using their influence to positively 
advance the careers of their sons isolated to the early period.  George Harris, an 
1800 general officer, played a key role in advancing the career of his eldest son, 
                                                 
83
 ODNB, s.v. O’Hara, James (1682-1773). 
84
 Dalton, George The First’s Army, Volume 1, p. 162. 
119 
 
William.  William’s active service was initially in India in the army commanded by his 
father.  He also gained two of the hardest promotions to get, major and lieutenant 
colonel, in his father's regiment, the 73rd foot.  William Harris initially transferred to 
this regiment from the 49th foot through purchasing a majority and then when a 
second battalion was raised in 1809 he became the second battalion's lieutenant 
colonel.85  George Harris also made attempts to resign his regimental colonelcy in 
favour of his son.  This was much more difficult to do in the later period and he was 
ultimately frustrated in his attempt to get his son to take over his regiment.86  
Nevertheless, Harris maintained that such succession had taken place on at least 
two other occasions in the late eighteenth-century.87   
 
 
The extent to which future generals were self-recruited is shown by table 6.   
Self-recruitment occurred at two different levels.  There were those fathers who 
served as officers between the ranks of ensign and lieutenant colonel.  This may 
have brought some advantages for relatives of these officers, but any advantage 
was typically limited as these officers were not usually involved in appointments or 
promotions.  Then there were the officers who could be considered part of the army 
elite, the regimental colonels and operational generals.  Regimental colonels often 
had substantial power to influence the careers of those officers serving in their 
regiment.  They had a significant say in regimental appointments as the way 
Generals O’Hara, Handasyd and Harris advanced the prospects of their sons 
demonstrated.  
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Table 6: Self-recruitment of generals 
 
                                                     1747 
  Social status (%)  
  Aristocrat Non-aristocrat N 
Father’s  
rank 
Ensign-Lt. Colonel  0 38 6 
Operational General 25 12 8 
Regimental Colonel  13 0 3 
sub-total    
     -Self-recruited 38 50 17 
No army service 62 50 23 
N 24 16 40 
     
                                        1800 
  Social status (%)  
  Aristocrat Non-aristocrat N 
Father’s  
rank 
Ensign-Lt. Colonel 10 21 15 
Regimental Colonel 0 1 1 
Operational General 27 8 15 
sub-total    
     -Self-recruited 37 30 31 
No army service 63 70 63 
N 41 53 94 
Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as percentage of final row N. 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds. 
 
Regimental colonels often also had free vacancies they could allocate to those they 
favoured.  Consequently, it was not uncommon for several relatives of a regimental 
colonel to serve in his regiment as officers.  John Dalrymple, the 2nd Earl of Stair, 
who commanded the 6th Dragoons from 1715 to 1734 and was an operational 
general, had at least eight of his relatives serving in his regiment at any one time.88  
At the army-wide level operational generals often had the power to exert significant 
influence on the career patterns of officers they favoured.  One way of doing this was 
to appoint favoured officers as their ADCs, an army appointment that marked officers 
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of promise or influence and took them away from regimental duty to work on the staff 
for the general who appointed them.   
 
 
The overall rates of self-recruitment were respectively 43% for 1747 and 33% 
for 1800 future generals.  This is perhaps less self-recruitment than expected given 
that hereditary recruitment, with many families specialising in particular professions 
such as the army or law, was a central characteristic of the professions in this 
period.89  Odintz’s study of foot officers found that 46% of officers’ sons followed 
them into the army.90   Cavell’s six samples of junior officers between 1761 and 1811 
showed those from navy backgrounds varied from 27% to 39%.91   It is possible self-
recruitment was more prevalent in the military than other professions as according to 
Lucas the percentage of the bar made up of attorney and barristers sons during the 
eighteenth-century varied from 6% to 22%.92     
 
 
The proportion of generals which was self-recruited is even lower if the 
measure of self-recruitment is centred on the army elite, regimental colonels and 
operational generals.  Only 28% of 1747 and 17% of 1800 future generals’ fathers 
held these ranks in the army.  The extent of self-recruitment by the army elite does 
not seem especially high if these numbers are compared with self-recruitment in 
other high occupational levels.  Mitch conducted a study of occupational recruitment 
                                                 
89
 Lucas, “A Collective Biography”, p. 233; P. Virgin, The Church in the Age of Negligence: ecclesiastical 
structure and problems of church reform, 1700-1840, (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 110-111; Corfield, Power and the 
Professions, p. 228; Holmes, Augustan England, p. 90. 
90
 Odintz, “ the British Officer Corps”, Chart VII, p. 275. 
91
 Cavell, "A Social History”, Appendix H, JO Charts. 
92
 Lucas, “A Collective Biography”, Table A9, p. 255.   
122 
 
in Victorian society.  The self-recruitment of his top occupational category, out of five 
occupational categories, had a self-recruitment rate of 61.4% for the period 1839-
1843.93   Even in modern Britain, in a place and time that should be more 
meritocratic than the eighteenth-century, Goldthorpe found that 25% of his highest 
occupational class were recruited from sons of this class.94   
 
 
There were important differences in the self-recruitment of future generals 
between the different social groups and time periods.  First, there was typically a 
large difference in the level of army connection between aristocrats and non-
aristocrats.  Aristocrats were usually connected to the army elite, whereas the 
average connection levels for non-aristocrats were ordinary officers.  However, they 
were similar in the sense that many of these families, from both social groups, 
appeared to specialise in the army profession with sons of successive generations 
usually entering the army.  A typical aristocratic family with a long tradition of military 
service was the Stanhope’s, the earls of Harrington.  Charles Stanhope, third Earl of 
Harrington and the eldest son from his family, was a general on the 1800 army list.  
His only brother Henry also served in the army becoming a colonel in 1794.  Their 
father was a general and colonel of the horse guards.  Charles’s grandfather, 
William, was also a general in the army before gaining distinction at the highest 
levels of government and diplomatic service.  The Wolfes appeared representative of 
professional army families during the early period.  General Edward Wolfe’s 
grandfather served as a lieutenant colonel in the Irish regiment of foot guards.  He 
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had one son, another Edward, who rose to the rank of major before his death in 
1715.  Both the future 1747 general, Edward, and his brother, Major Walter, followed 
their father into the army. 
   
 
  Second, changes in self-recruitment over time were different depending on 
social group.   Aristocrats who were to become generals were self-recruited to an 
almost identical extent in both periods.  The only difference was the strength of their 
connections to the army elite weakened somewhat over time.  In contrast, there was 
a significant decline in the numbers of non-aristocrats who were self-recruited.  Non-
aristocrats whose fathers did not serve in the army increased from 50% to 70% 
between 1747 and 1800. This phenomenon may have been a function of individual 
choice playing a greater role in career selection over time.  In contrast to the earlier 
period, several late eighteenth-century future generals started their working life in 
different professions, but ended up changing careers to the army.  James Grant 
studied for a career in law on the advice of Lord Elchies, his patron, but switched to 
the army because he preferred a military career.95   Other generals, such as Fawcett 
who “from his earliest youth” had the “strongest predilection for army”, always 
intended to follow their chosen career.96  The selection of the army as a career did 
not always meet family approval.  
This was most evident in the career of William Goodday Strutt whose father acceded 
to his wishes of an army career most reluctantly: 
“...When your Mother and I thought it was proper for you to leave School and turn to some Profession 
that might give you the Opportunity to pass through Life with Comfort and Reputation, we consulted 
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your Inclinations.  You wished the Army.  It was then determined to send you to Mr. Lochee’s Military 
Academy that you might learn the first Rudiments of the Profession, and that you might feel yourself 
and have time for Reflection and not be hurried into a situation in which most probably you was to 
spend your days.  You still wished the Army.  I then (seeing you fixed) after much Consideration and 
the best Information I was able to obtain from a little experience and from Communication with 
Gentlemen of that Line, procured you through the favour of Lord Barrington a Commission dated the 
23
rd
 May 1778 as an Ensign in the 61
st
 Regt. of Foot...”
97
 
   
Even after a few years in the army his father was trying to persuade him to pursue 
other career options: 
 “...Your time of life being such that you might without much loss or any reflection on your conduct 
have turned from the profession of Arms to the more peaceable and less dangerous situation, I have 
given you the Option of the Church in which I had good preferment for you at Chignal, Mashbury, etc-
but you having again and again declared that it was your fixed resolution to pursue your present 
line...”
98
 
   
It is not clear whether this decline in service interest between the two periods was a 
characteristic that was shared by the other main professions.  On the one hand, 
there seemed to be a similar decline in service interest in law.  In 1755-1764 17% of 
barristers and attorneys’ sons were admitted to the bar compared to only 6% by 
1795-1804.99  On the other hand, levels of self-recruitment in the navy appeared to 
remain relatively static over time.  The navy share of junior officers was 29% in 1761, 
but only decreased to 27% by 1801 and then rose to 32% in 1811.100 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 Operational generals were dominated by the privileged groups in society.  
Aristocrats held a disproportionate number of positions given their small numbers.  
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Indeed, a comparison of different military ranks showed that there were a far greater 
proportion of aristocrats who were operational generals than in other positions.  
However, this did not mean operational generals were a closed group inaccessible to 
those from below.  In contrast, rates of social mobility amongst generals seemed 
reasonably high.  The social status of an operational general can at least be equated 
to a rank between esquire and knight.  The intergenerational study of 1747 future 
generals’ fathers’ social status showed that 35% of fathers were esquires or lower 
indicating a significant number of generals who increased their social status through 
military service.  The analysis of self-recruitment also indicated operational generals 
were relatively open to outsiders.  Nearly 60% of future 1747 generals had fathers 
who pursued non-army careers and the sons of generals only accounted for 20% of 
future generals, a number comparable to recruitment at the elite end of even 
modern-day professions.   
 
 
There were also indications that over time operational generals’ mobility was 
increasing.  By the later period a lower proportion of aristocrats and gentry were 
operational generals as the middling sort gained ground at their expense. In 
consequence, the proportion of future generals’ fathers who were lower than knights 
increased from 35% to 56% by 1800.  This was also reflected in rates of self-
recruitment.  Nearly 70% of operational generals on the 1800 army list had fathers 
who did not serve in the army and the recruitment of generals’ sons declined to 16%.  
However, these findings of relatively high mobility and openness have to be 
tempered by the shallowness of most moves for those that used the army to 
advance.  Future operational generals did not advance from low levels of society up 
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to their present positions.  They were overwhelmingly already drawn from privileged 
groups in society.  In this respect they were merely advancing from a relatively high 
intermediate level in the social hierarchy to a very high one.  In the early period this 
was usually from the gentry, whereas by the late eighteenth-century this had 
changed to those who had fathers of the most successful and wealthy middling sort.   
It is certainly notable that no future operational generals in either period came from 
either the workers or the poor.  The extent to which upward mobility was increasing 
between the periods may also be slightly exaggerated due to changes in the size of 
the army relative to the pool of aristocrats during this period.  As the number of 
operational generals increased over time if the number of aristocrats did not increase 
or increased lower than the rising demand for generals then a higher percentage of 
aristocrats would have to join the army just to ensure the proportion of aristocratic 
generals did not decline.  Therefore, a declining proportion of aristocratic generals as 
the army increased in size would not be unexpected.  Nevertheless, even if this 
accounted for 5% or 10% of social mobility increases it does not change the fact that 
rates of social mobility among generals still increased impressively between the early 
and late eighteenth-century. 
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Chapter five: Education and Marriage 
 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Apart from achieving upward mobility through career selection there are other 
mechanisms of mobility or "elevators" of social advancement.1  Two of the most 
important mechanisms of social mobility aside from careers are education and 
marriage.2  The purpose of this chapter is to examine how education and marriage 
affected the mobility patterns of future generals.   Did the level of education future 
generals received play a role in them becoming generals or facilitate their 
advancement?  What part did marriage play in their mobility patterns?  Education is 
important to mobility as occupational achievement is often related to previous 
educational success.3   In modern societies educational achievement positively 
affects mobility as there is a direct link between human capital and labour 
productivity.4   In Sorokin's words, education acts as a "social elevator moving from 
the very bottom of a society to its top".5   Of course, the extent that education can be 
used to achieve upward mobility depends on the accessibility of educational 
institutions to different members of society.  Nevertheless, even in societies when 
education is only accessible to members at the higher levels of society there are 
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usually some from the lower levels who manage to use education to improve their 
status.6 
 
 
Marriage may be an even more important mechanism in achieving upward 
mobility than through occupation.7  There are two reasons for this.  First, marriage 
patterns represent voluntary associations, whereas occupation is heavily influenced 
by labour market characteristics.  Second, marriage choices are made much later in 
life than occupational ones and may be less subject to family influence, especially as 
fathers often take greater interest in their sons’ futures than their daughters.8  
Accordingly, some historians have found that achieving upward mobility through 
marriage was easier than through career selection.   In Victorian England there was 
more openness in the social backgrounds of marriage partners than there was in 
occupational recruitment.9   Marriage is certainly a critically important mechanism of 
mobility as Thompson pointed out: 
"HThe social identities of marriage partners[...] are among the most sensitive and acute indicators of 
community or class feelings.  Who marries whom, without courting alienation or rejection from a social 
set, is an acid test of the horizons and boundaries of what each particular social set regards as 
tolerable and acceptable, and a sure indication of where that set draws the line of membershipH."
10
   
 
 
The main sources used to gain evidence on the education and marriage 
patterns of the future generals were, in a similar fashion to the analysis of family 
backgrounds, biographical profiles taken from the Dictionary of National Biography 
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and History of Parliament of generals, their wives and fathers-in law.  These two 
main sources are supplemented by genealogical studies of the peerage, baronetage, 
knightage and gentry, a number of personal family histories and wills.   The 
advantage of using these sources for information on the educational and marriage 
patterns is that education and marriages are two of the most frequently reported 
social characteristics in biographical profiles.  Nevertheless, some issues do arise in 
the quality and extent of information that can be gained from these sources. 
 
 
The number of observations found on future generals’ educational patterns 
was very limited for the 1747 operational generals.  Information was only found on 
the education of 18 out of the 55 early eighteenth-century operational generals 
whose father’s social background can be traced.  Accordingly, more than half of the 
population of 1747 operational generals’ education is ‘unknown’.  The very high 
number of ‘unknowns’ compared to ‘knowns’ could potentially affect the results.  It is 
not clear the degree to which the ‘unknowns’ were educated.   However, a high 
number of ‘unknowns’ is an unavoidable problem in a study of this kind due to the 
nature of surviving data.  Other studies involving the social backgrounds of military 
officers in this period have had similar problems tracing social characteristics.  
Cavell’s 1761 sample of junior officers and quarter-deck boys, for example, only 
located the place of birth in 45 cases out of 572.11   A similar problem occurs for 
1800 future generals with the number of ‘unknowns’ outnumbering ‘knowns’.  
However, in the case of later period officers this does not present such a problem as 
there were so many more operational generals by 1800.  Consequently, even though 
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most of the education of the 1800 population of operational generals is ‘unknown’ it 
was still possible to confirm the educational details of 51 different future generals 
whose father’s social background could be traced. 
 
 
Another data issue was in analysing the social status of marriage partners.  
The sources usually stated the general’s father-in-law name, but often said nothing 
about their social backgrounds.  A typical entry in this respect was General William 
Loftus’s first marriage.  The sources revealed that his father-in-law was Maccaret 
King, but say nothing about Mr King's social origins or occupation.  Thus, in tracing 
the social background of fathers-in- law for future generals marriages there are also 
a great number of unknowns.  Another problem with the marriage data is that often 
the date of marriage was not stated so there is a difference between the number of 
first marriages and date of first marriages.  This is particularly a problem for early 
eighteenth-century marriages.  The main impact of this difference is that for some 
generals it was difficult to clarify at what point in their career they got married.   
 
 
II. Education 
 
 
Education can positively affect upward mobility in two different ways.  Firstly, 
attaining certain educational levels may be needed for entry or advancement in 
different occupations.  This is particularly the case in professions, such as law or 
teaching, that require minimum educational standards to work in these fields.   
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Consequently, education levels are often closely related to career choice.  Education 
may also facilitate progress as preferential access to high-level positions could be 
given to those with higher levels of education.12  Secondly, attending formal 
education institutions may also provide social benefits that help advancement.   
Attending a prestigious school or university might provide the opportunity for making 
important social connections that contribute to future advancement. 
 
 
The often close relationship between education and career choice may mean 
that the role education plays in mobility is dependent on the type of career selected 
and the time period involved.   Some careers require more education than others 
due to their technical complexity.   Barristers careers have always required a higher 
degree of education than many other career paths due to the nature of legal work.  
The level of education required can also be significantly different depending on the 
time period.  In the early modern era education was often conducted on a more 
informal basis than today.  Most early nineteenth-century army doctors, for example, 
attended university in some capacity, yet only 40% of these obtained degrees.13   
 
 
Entering the army as an officer in the eighteenth-century did not require a high 
degree of formal education.  An officer had to be literate.   The ability to read and 
write was a fundamental requirement as officers needed to be able to read orders 
and communicate by letters with their superior officers.  Some level of numeracy was 
also useful as the decentralised military administration meant regimental captains 
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played a role in the financial administration of troops under their commands.  A link 
did develop later between becoming an officer in the army and attending public 
school.  Most future officers by 1890 entering officer training school at Sandhurst 
were previously educated at public school.14  However, this was a mid-nineteenth-
century phenomenon.  Studies of officers in the eighteenth-century have shown that 
officers were generally not educated at public school.   Odintz found only 21 of his 
394 foot officers attended a public school.15   Similarly, Glover noted that in 1809 it 
was surprising how few officers had gone to public school.  There were over 10,000 
officers in the army at this time, but according to Glover’s estimates only 283 had 
attended public school.16   
 
 
Even though most officers may not have been highly formally educated this 
does not necessarily mean the role of education in the career success of future 
generals was limited.  Table 7 shows the future generals as a group, whose 
education level is known, tended to be highly educated.   Most future generals were 
educated in formal settings, rather than informally by tutors.  Indeed, more than one 
half of 1800 future generals whose education is known attended university.    It is 
difficult to read too much into any differences or similarities between the two periods 
due to the small number of observations for 1747 future operational generals.   
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Note: A breakdown of the specific education by officer is available in Appendix 1, Social 
Backgrounds.  Excludes education of illegitimate generals and whose father's social status 
could not be traced.  UK university includes Scottish and Irish universities. 
 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
 
Nevertheless, one difference does appear clear; levels of formal education appeared 
to be increasing over time.  This is not unexpected as educational provision was 
expanding during this period and levels of education were also increasing in other 
professions.  Barristers at Lincoln's Inn who were admitted to the bar and attended 
university increased from 45% in 1695-1704 to 70% by 1795-1804.17 
 
 
 Examining the educational institutions attended by the future generals from 
the later period does reveal a number of interesting characteristics about the 
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 Lucas, “A Collective Biography”, Table A7, pp. 251-252.   
Table 7: Education of generals 
         
Type of 1747 1800 
education Aristocrat Non-aristocrat Total Aristocrat Non-aristocrat Total 
Oxbridge 2 3 5 10 4 14 
UK university 1 0 1 2 8 10 
Foreign university 1 0 1 5 3 8 
Inns of Court 1 0 1 2 3 5 
sub-total       
      -Higher 5 3 8 19 18 37 
Military academy 1 0 1 2 4 6 
Eton 3 1 4 10 6 16 
Other public school 2 2 4 11 4 15 
Tutors 5 1 6 8 6 14 
Grammar 0 0 0 2 9 11 
Civilian academy 0 0 0 2 0 2 
sub-total       
      -Secondary 11 4 15 35 29 64 
Secondary & Higher 2 1 3 15 7 22 
Total 16 7 23 54 47 101 
Unknown 16 12 28 13 29 42 
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education received.  In the first place, nearly half of all educational establishments 
attended were either Oxbridge or a public school. There seemed to be no particular 
difference between Oxford or Cambridge as almost equal numbers attended each 
institution.  However, this was not the case for those attending public school.  There 
was a clear preference for Eton over other public schools as half of those attending 
public school went to this institution.  Most of the other public schools attended were 
also highly prestigious institutions; nine went to Westminster, four Harrow and one 
each to Rugby, Felsted, Charterhouse, King's School at Canterbury and 
Portarlington.  
 
 
At public school or Oxbridge these future generals would have had an 
education concentrating on classical subjects such as French, German, Italian, 
Greek and Latin, and grammar.18  A classical education was not necessarily 
important to an army career per se, but could provide indirect benefits.  Knowledge 
of Greek and Latin was well thought of in this period and could be a useful skill as 
Latin was still widely used in official documents.19  Moreover, future generals often 
used high levels of literacy later in their careers to publish books on military matters, 
which in some cases aided career progression.  Humphrey Bland’s publication of A 
Treatise of Military Discipline (1727) contributed to his rise by earning him royal 
favour and the friendship of the Duke of Cumberland.20  Publication of similar military 
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books on tactics seemed to help the careers of David Dundas and William Fawcett in 
the late eighteenth-century.21   
 
 
The social benefits gained from attending Oxbridge or a public school could 
have helped careers. Social connections made at these prestigious institutions at 
times affected entry and progression in the army.  George Harris' early progress in 
the army was helped by social connections his father, who became a curate in the 
church, made while at Westminster and Cambridge.  Harris initially entered the army 
through the influence of Lord George Sackville, an operational general, who was at 
Westminster with his father. Then his appointment as lieutenant fireworker in the 
artillery, and subsequent transfer to ensign in the 5th foot, was arranged through the 
offices of Lord Granby, the lieutenant general of ordinance and future commander in 
chief, who was at Cambridge with his father.22  Even if high social connections were 
not made while attending formal educational institutions the social value obtained 
from such education could be useful.  Scottish officers in this period often 
emphasised the social value of an English education.  Major Horsburgh, a Scottish 
field officer with the 39th foot, educated his children at an English institution and 
advised his wife that “... the utmost care ought to be taken to preserve the English 
accent they have...”23   
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The significance of attending Oxbridge or public school to future career 
progression in the army should not be overstated.  Matriculating at these institutions 
seemed to play a lesser role in reaching the peaks of the army compared to other 
professions.  For example, attending Oxbridge or public school seemed far more 
important in becoming a government minister than an operational general; 87% of 
ministerial posts between 1775 and 1800 went to those who attended public 
school.24   An important point in this regard was that there was a large difference in 
the social backgrounds of the future generals who attended Oxbridge or public 
school.  Those educated at public school were mostly aristocrats, whereas non-
aristocrats usually attended different educational institutions. The non-aristocrats 
studied to a far greater extent at grammar schools, which provided a similar 
education in classics, or non-Oxbridge British universities.  As non-aristocrats did not 
need to go to public school or Oxbridge in order to become a general this may be 
suggestive of greater social mobility. 
   
 
Another factor in the education patterns of future generals was the fact that 
many of the individuals attending university did so with the intention of pursuing other 
career paths requiring higher levels of education than a career in the army.  Lord 
Cathcart studied law at Glasgow and Dresden and was admitted to the faculty of 
advocates in 1776 before changing his mind on career direction and joining the Army 
in 1777. This may have been related to his father dying in August 1776 and his 
inheritance that followed.25  The phenomenon of future generals gaining a high 
degree of education to enter the law and then changing careers to the army seemed 
                                                 
24
 J.V Beckett, The Aristocracy in England, 1660-1914, (Oxford, 1986), pp. 98-102. 
25
 ODNB, s.v. Cathcart, William Schaw (1755-1843). 
137 
 
relatively common in the late eighteenth-century.  William Villettes was another 
future general whose family intended him to follow a law career and was educated 
with this career path in mind.  He went to St Andrews University and attended two or 
three terms at Lincoln's Inn before his father finally relented and allowed him to join 
the army, a career William was always set on.26    
 
 
A final noteworthy characteristic of future generals’ educational patterns was 
the tendency of a minority to attend military academies before embarking on an army 
career. In the late eighteenth-century three future generals attended Lewis Lochée's 
military academy at Chelsea and three others foreign military academies in 
Strasbourg and Turin.  Lewis Lochée's military academy was founded in 1770 and 
was ‘exceptional in providing a carefully conceived combination of theoretical and 
practical instruction’.  The practical instruction included work on manoeuvres and 
digging fortifications.27  Attending a military academy was perhaps an indication that 
these future generals were serious about pursuing a successful military career. 
 
 
Education seemed to play only a minor role in becoming a general.  It was 
necessary to be literate to be a general, but this did not require a high level of formal 
education.  Certainly, generals appeared to be more highly educated than average 
officers, yet this was probably closely related to their different social backgrounds.  
The high level of education some generals possessed may have assisted them in 
rising through the ranks, but it was hardly a necessary requirement in becoming a 
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general.  This is important because education can act as a mechanism to increase 
social closure.   A high level of education requires an investment, which may be 
beyond the means of the non-privileged thereby acting as a barrier to social mobility.  
Most generals attending Oxbridge or public school were aristocrats, whereas non-
aristocrats were usually educated at grammar school or non-Oxbridge British 
universities.  This may also indicate that education did not act to increase social 
closure of generals as it was not necessary to attend Oxbridge or public school in 
order to become a general.  Furthermore, many of those attending Scottish or Irish 
universities did so with the intention of pursuing other careers that required higher 
levels of education most notably law.  Finally, the high number of future generals 
whose education could not be traced may demonstrate most generals only received 
a modest education.  These ‘unknowns’ probably had some education, but perhaps 
not at prestigious or formal education institutions.   
 
 
III. Marriage 
 
 
 Apart from education, marriage is another important "channel of social 
circulation” that affects social mobility.   According to Sorokin "Hmarriage usually 
leads one of the parties either to social promotion or degradation...”28  This may be 
overstating the impact of marriage on mobility somewhat. However, marriage is 
certainly an important characteristic to consider in analysing the mobility of any 
group of individuals.  Studies have found marriage is often a key factor in 
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subsequent mobility for men.  A Danish study in the 1950s showed that the most 
significant indicator of married men’s social mobility was their wife’s social status.29  
Mobility through marriage is important because marriage can act as a substitute to 
other mechanisms of mobility such as mobility achieved through occupation.  In 
other words, those not able to achieve mobility through occupation may be able to do 
so through marriage. 30   Marriage can also be complementary to those achieving 
upward mobility through their occupation.  Occupational success may enable those 
advancing to consolidate and assimilate further into higher social groups through 
marrying wives whose fathers are higher in the social hierarchy than their own 
fathers.31  Thus, it is important to consider how the marriage patterns of the future 
generals affected their mobility. 
  
 
 There are many different factors that can impact on the marital mobility 
patterns of individuals.  These factors typically either facilitate increased mobility 
through marriage or greater social endogamy, that is to say, marrying someone from 
the same social group.  Factors thought to facilitate mobility through marriage 
include: a modern labour market, means of transport and communication, adult 
mortality, economic independence at an early age and romantic love. On the other 
hand, factors such as parental control, community traditions and peer group control 
increase the likelihood that marriage partners will come from the same social 
backgrounds.32 
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 It is often claimed the eighteenth-century saw the weakening of parental 
control and the rise of romantic love, factors that should result in greater mobility in 
both directions.  This allegedly led to more marriage outside of social groups 
individuals were born into.33   At the beginning of the early eighteenth-century, so the 
argument goes, most marriages between the middle and upper social groups were 
arranged as commercial transactions between families with little role for individual 
choice in marriage decisions.34  As the Marquis of Halifax advised his daughter in 
1688: "H It is one of the Disadvantages belonging to your Sex, that young Women 
are seldom permitted to make their own ChoiceH."35  This situation changed  by the 
mid-eighteenth-century due to the rise of ‘affective individualism’, which resulted in 
people marrying for love rather than money.36  ‘Affective individualism’ stressed the 
importance of the individual over the male dominated family leading to more 
egalitarian relationships between husbands and wives.  This was a fundamental shift 
in family life as patriarchal families were replaced by nuclear families.  These 
changes were closely related to changes in property law as strict settlement 
protected the individual property rights of married women by legally limiting their 
husband’s control.37  Even for aristocrats close emotional bonds between partners 
became more important and kinship ties declined in significance.38 
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 Recent research on the family does tend to cast some doubt on the extent to 
which ‘affective individualism’ dominated family life and marriage patterns in the 
period.  According to Tadmor, the historical consensus on this is that there was more 
continuity in family life than divergence with past practices.39   In some of the most 
recent research on the subject, Tague found that aristocratic families bore hallmarks 
of mostly continuity, but also noted some changes.40    
 
 
A review of the somewhat limited literature on mobility, class and marriage in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries indicates a similar finding; much continuity 
with a limited amount of change.  Most tended to marry people from the same social 
group in the eighteenth-century, but there was also some intermarriage between 
different social groups.41  According to Rogers, 61% of mid-eighteenth-century 
London merchants married partners, whose social origins could be traced, from 
commercial or finance backgrounds.42  This tendency to mainly marry people from 
the same social group even persists today.  Glass found that in modern Britain 45% 
of partners marrying were matched by social status.43  Nevertheless, there is some 
support for changes in marriage patterns between the early and late eighteenth-
century.   For instance, ‘In-marriages’ of the peerage dropped 4% between 1700-19 
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and 1800-19.44  These changes were perhaps a consequence of ‘affective 
individualism’.  Yet, the extent of this change is probably overestimated by some 
authors.  A recent wide-ranging study on levels of social endogamy in European 
society during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries demonstrated that change 
over time was limited and the regional context was far more important.  The six 
different regions examined did not show one consistent pattern of change over time 
in social endogamy rates. In some regions endogamy rates actually increased, 
whereas in others they remained stable or decreased.45     
 
 
For those that were highly successful in their careers similarly to the 
operational generals, there is evidence of slightly more upward than downward 
mobility through marriage.  In the case of London merchants, 25% married wives 
from the gentry or peerage, thus increasing their social status through marriage, 
whereas 14% married those from a category described as "other", which presumably 
captures downward mobility.46    An earlier study of seventeenth-century London 
businessmen showed slightly more of an equal division between upward and 
downward mobility through marriage. In a similar fashion to Roger’s study of 
merchants, over 60% of businessmen married those from commerce or finance, but 
only 21% advanced through marriages to the gentry or peerage compared to 18% 
                                                 
44
 D. Thomas, “The Social Origins of Marriage Partners of the British Peerage in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries”, Population Studies, 26 (1), (March 1972), Table 3, p. 102. 
45
 I. Maas and M.H.D van Leeuwen, " Total and Relative Endogamy by Social Origin: a first international 
comparison of changes in marriage choices during the 19th century", M.H.D van Leeuwen, I. Maas and A. 
Miles (eds), Marriage Choices and Class Boundaries: Social Endogamy in History, (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 
285-290. 
46
 Rogers, “Money, Marriage, Mobility”, Table 3, p. 2
143 
 
marrying those described as "other".47  A rather more wide-ranging study of British 
marriage mobility in the nineteenth-century was conducted by Mitch.  An important 
part of his study involved examining the marriage patterns of those who were 
upwardly mobile through career success.  For those husbands that reached the top 
occupational category, marriage acted as a further way for some to continue their 
advance, whereas others married wives from the same or lower social backgrounds.  
According to his data, 37% of grooms in his highest occupational category for the 
period 1839-1843, who achieved their occupations through career success, married 
into the leading occupational category as well.  There were also a significant number 
of grooms that married beneath themselves, 25% of category one husbands had 
fathers-in-law from lower occupational backgrounds.48    
 
 
There were two important aspects of marriage in the eighteenth-century that 
potentially affected rates of marital mobility.  A high proportion of people remained 
unmarried and marrying relatively late in life was common.49  In 1746 10% of those 
aged between 40 and 44 were unmarried.50  Particular social groups may have had 
an even greater propensity to remain unmarried than the wider population.  
According to Rogers, 17% of London merchants remained unmarried.51  The 
numbers of unmarried operational generals were even greater.  Nearly one third of 
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1747 operational generals did not marry, although this decreased to 18% by 1800.52  
The proportions of unmarried future generals were similar to other officers in the 
army. Almost one third of army officers who were MPs between 1715 and 1754, and 
who left the army before making it to general (‘officer MPs’), never married.  There 
was also a similar trend over time; the proportion of unmarried ‘officer MPs’ sitting in 
Parliament between 1754 and 1790 declined to 20%.53  
 
 
Table 8 shows that people married relatively late in life. The average adult 
man in the eighteenth-century did not marry until his mid to late twenties.  This was 
very late in life when life expectancy at age 25 varied from 27.8 to 36.6 years during 
this time.54  The high cost of marriage was one reason so many people married late 
in life or not at all.  Newly wed couples were expected to set up an independent 
household.   This entailed relatively high initial setup costs and on-going additional 
expenditure.  One way a newly married couple might set up an independent 
household was through buying a small farm.  Wrigley has calculated the initial setup 
cost for a pastoral farm of twelve acres was £65 5s.  This would take ten years of 
joint saving if both future husband and wife were ‘in service’ and received no 
assistance from their parents.55   Consequently, marriage was often delayed until the 
necessary funds had been saved to meet this high expenditure.56   
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Table 8: Age at first marriage for different social groups 
           
 Percent          Number 
 Age 0-24 25-34 35+ Mean age  N 
Adult males  1700-24 41.0 48.4 10.6 27.3 1233 
               1775-99 57.0 35.3 7.7 25.7 2121 
Generals  1747 15.4 26.9 57.7 36.1 26 
                  1800 13.9 48.6 37.5 33.6 72 
‘Officer MPs’  1715-54 19.2 52.0 28.8 31.3 52 
                          1754-90 20.6 47.6 31.8 31.7 63 
Peers  1725-49 34.0 46.3 19.7 ? 356 
Businessmen  1740-59 22.4 55.3 31.0 32.4 58 
Source: 
Adult males: Wrigley et al, English Population History, Table 5.4, p. 141. 
Generals: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
‘Officer MPs’: Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volumes 1-2, Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–
1790, Volumes 2-3. 
Peers: T.H Hollingsworth, “The Demography of the British Peerage: Marriage”, Population 
Studies, 18 (2), (November 1964), Table 4, p. 14. 
Businessmen: Rogers, “Money, Marriage, Mobility”, Table 2, pp. 22-23. 
 
 
 
The high cost of marriage was undoubtedly one reason why London 
businessman and army officers married so late in life.  London businessmen, 
generals and ‘officer MPs’ on average delayed marriage until their thirties.  
Moreover, significant numbers of these individuals did not get married until much 
later. It was usual for one third of London businessmen, generals and ‘officer MPs’ to 
delay marriage until the age of 35 at least.  In a similar fashion, army surgeons, even 
though they came from different social backgrounds than generals or ‘officer MPs’, 
also did not get married until their thirties.57  One consequence of late marriage was 
that London businessmen and future generals usually only married when they had 
achieved senior ranks in their professions.  Most businessmen married after they 
became partners or were about to secure a partnership.58  Over 70% of future 
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operational generals in both periods did not marry until they had reached the rank of 
regimental major or higher.   The most popular rank to marry at for late eighteenth-
century future generals was lieutenant colonel, the most senior active rank in a 
regiment.59   That marrying so late in a career persisted over time might appear a 
little odd as average marriage ages decreased between the different periods, but this 
is accounted for by the lower average entry ages of later period future generals. 
 
 
 High marriage costs do not seem a satisfactory explanation on their own to 
account for the particularly late marriage patterns of army officers compared to the 
general population.   The nature of an army career may also help to explain this 
phenomenon.   An army career usually required frequent travel and serving in many 
different locations both within Britain and abroad throughout a career.  This could 
have affected the propensity for future generals to marry.  It may have increased the 
likelihood of sexual encounters outside of marriage thus reducing the incentive to get 
married. There is certainly much evidence of unmarried operational generals having 
relationships outside of marriage.  John Ligonier, for example, had a relationship with 
Penelope Miller of Southwark which produced a daughter.60  Other generals also had 
children out of wedlock.  Even though Sir James Henry Craig was unmarried, he 
made provision in his will for a natural daughter.61  Likewise, it appears that one of 
the main beneficiaries of General Hawley’s will, Captain Toovey, was probably his 
son.62  The constant travelling could also have made it more difficult to find a suitable 
wife.  Geography is an important factor in who people marry; most people tend to 
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marry those that live close to them.63   As generals were only stationed in locations 
usually for short periods of time it may have made it harder to find a suitable long-
term partner.  From a wife's perspective, an army husband may have had many 
disadvantages.  Long absences from their husband would be the norm and there 
was also the possibility of financial hardship if their husbands died in battle. There 
were many cases of officers dying on the battlefield without leaving their family 
adequate financial support.64 
 
 
In the case of future operational generals, career success could also be a 
factor in why they married so late in their careers. An officer generally received some 
degree of financial independence when he gained a captaincy.65 Hence, if marriage 
was delayed due to high costs it should have been possible for most captains to get 
married.  Indeed, nearly 80% of 1754-1790 ‘officer MPs’ married when they were 
captain.66  In contrast, only 27% of 1800 operational generals married at the rank of 
captain or lower.67  A high level of career success may have affected the rank at 
which generals married in two ways. The future generals could have been more 
focused on their careers than other officers and so may have delayed marrying and 
having families.  The demands of operational commands could also have made a 
difference in marriage patterns. Operational command usually involved more 
overseas postings and greater travel requirements than simply being an officer on 
regimental duty.  There were a higher proportion of operational general posts based 
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abroad than regiments in these locations.68   It was also likely generals based 
overseas spent longer in these locations than regiments as regiments rotated home 
on a regular basis from the 1760s, but there was no specific rotation policy for 
generals.  Many generals only left overseas operational commands when they 
requested leave to come home or be replaced.   
 
 
  The tendency of future operational generals to marry late or not at all has 
important implications for the role of marriage in their social mobility.  As generals 
were well advanced in their careers by the time they married this may have meant 
marriage was only a minor factor in becoming an operational general.   However, 
marrying after achieving substantial career success may facilitate better matches in 
the marriage market.  Historians have found a correlation between age of first 
marriage and the size of fortune left behind, with those who marry later in life leaving 
larger fortunes.69  Army surgeons who married before the age of 31 left an average 
estate value of £3,950 compared to £6,142 for those who married later and £6,922 
for those that did not marry.70  Consequently, operational generals who married late 
may have been able to leverage their career success, and wealth gained through 
their career which was probably increased by not marrying earlier, in the marriage 
market by marrying those from higher social groups or brides that brought with them 
significant financial resources.  Thus, marriage could have provided a mechanism to 
continue their advance beyond the parameters of their career success.  
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IV. Marital mobility of generals 
 
 
In order to explore this latter implication in further detail it is necessary to 
assess the marital mobility of operational generals.  The method used to measure 
marital mobility is in common with other mobility studies a comparison between the 
social group the operational generals’ fathers belonged to and the social group they 
married into as represented by the social status of their fathers-in-law.71  The future 
generals are divided into the two main social groups of the period, aristocrats and 
non-aristocrats.  The reason for this bipolar division of social groups is twofold. 
Firstly, as discussed in the chapter on family the distinction between the gentry and 
the upper middling sort is difficult to draw. Consequently, it is difficult to be certain 
that upward mobility occurred in marriage if a future general from the middling sort 
married a wife from the gentry. Often they were probably marrying a partner from a 
similar social background. On the other hand, marrying a member of aristocracy for a 
non-aristocrat was a clear case of upward social mobility in the marriage market. 
Secondly, there is the practical problem that the number of observations on gentry or 
middling marriages is so small that it makes more sense to combine them into one 
category of non-aristocrats.  A second measure of mobility is also examined to 
expand the number of observations by assuming those fathers-in-law whose names 
are known but whose social background cannot be traced were from the same social 
group as their sons-in-law.  The assumption that fathers-in-law came from the same 
background as their sons-in-law seems reasonable based on the fact that most 
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people married those from the same social groups.  This second measure is used to 
see if it would change the main findings materially. 
 
 
To put the results of generals in some perspective, the marital mobility of a 
second group of army officers is also considered in some detail.  This second group 
of army officers can be described as ‘officer MPs’.  ‘Officer MPs’ were MPs listed in 
the History of Parliament who pursued army careers, but unlike the operational 
generals only achieved moderate success in their careers.  Moderate success is 
defined as only achieving at best the regimental rank of lieutenant colonel and 
leaving the army before making it to general.   As ‘officer MPs’ came from relatively 
similar social backgrounds to the future generals, but achieved a much lower level of 
career success a comparison between the marital mobility of these two groups 
should reveal much about the impact of career success on mobility through 
marriage.  In order to aid comparison between the periods the marriage patterns and 
careers of two different groups of ‘officer MPs’ are considered; those who sat as MPs 
in the period 1715-1754 and MPs sitting in the Commons between 1754 and 1790 
who served in the army. 
 
 
The tendency of army officers to marry late in their careers and the literature 
on the family, social mobility and marriage in this period allows the specification of 
three hypotheses regarding the marital mobility of army officers.  First, most officers 
will probably marry those from the same social group.  Second, there should be 
differences in the marital mobility patterns of army officers over time.  The rise of 
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‘affective individualism’ should result in a declining rate of social endogamy among 
aristocratic army officers between the early and late eighteenth-century.  Third, a 
significant minority of non-aristocratic officers should continue their advance through 
marrying aristocrats.  The extent of this marital mobility should be greater for 
generals than ‘officer MPs’ due to their higher levels of career success.  
 
 
The first measure of marital mobility is presented in table 9.  This excludes 
wives whose father’s name is known, but whose social background could not be 
traced. Interpreting the marital mobility of army officers in the eighteenth-century 
presents some problems due to the small numbers of observations in many 
instances.  Consequently, it is very difficult to comment on the marital mobility of 
non-aristocratic 1747 operational generals.   
 
 
The first hypothesis that most army officers would marry those from the same 
social groups seems well supported.  For the social groups that have at least fifteen 
observations rates of social endogamy in all cases exceed 60% and go as high as 
71% for later period ‘officer MPs’.  This appears to be a relatively high level of 
endogamy and even exceeds that of London merchants.72  Data limitations constrain 
judgements on how endogamy changed over time.  In the case of ‘officer MPs’ there 
is no evidence to suggest ‘affective individualism’ altered the patterns of marriage 
over time. The number of aristocratic ‘officer MPs’ marrying fellow aristocrats 
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remained essentially static, while rates of endogamy among non-aristocrats seemed 
to increase.  
 
Table 9: Marriage mobility of army officers by first marriage 
  
  1715-1754 1754-1790 
  Wife  Wife  
  Aristocrat Non-aristocrat N Aristocrat Non-aristocrat N 
‘Officer MPs’ Aristocrat 67 33 30 68 32 28 
 Non-aristocrat 40 60 15 29 71 17 
 N 26 19 45 24 21 45 
        
  1747  1800  
  Wife  Wife  
  Aristocrat Non-aristocrat N Aristocrat Non-aristocrat N 
Generals Aristocrat 85 15 13 63 37 27 
 Non-aristocrat 50 50 6 33 67 18 
 N 14 5 19 23 22 45 
Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as percentage of final column N. Excludes 
marriages of illegitimate husbands or wives and whose father's social status could not be 
traced. 
 
Source: 
‘Officer MPs’: Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volumes 1-2; Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–
1790, Volumes 2-3. 
Generals: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
 
 
 
As hypothesised earlier, becoming a general allowed a significant proportion 
of non-aristocrats to continue their upward mobility achieved through their army 
career by marrying aristocrats. An upward mobility rate of 33% for 1800 operational 
generals in the marriage market was similar to Mitch’s top occupational category in 
Victorian England and exceeded the 25% of mid-eighteenth-century London 
merchants who married into the gentry or peerage.73  Army officers using marriage 
as a means of mobility in this period seemed fairly common.  It has been suggested 
that army surgeons chose their wives in order to seek social advancement by 
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establishing themselves in ’respectable professional families’.74  Many non-
aristocratic ‘officer MPs’ also advanced socially through marrying aristocrats. The 
hypothesis that generals would have higher rates of marital mobility compared to 
‘officer MPs’ due to their different levels of career success does not seem well 
supported by the data.   Admittedly, 1800 non-aristocratic generals’ marital upward 
mobility was slightly higher than ‘officer MPs’.   However, the similarity of these rates 
of upward social mobility through marriage suggests career success was not as 
important as family background in the marriage market.   
 
 
One problem with this conclusion is that it does not consider the fact that 
gains through marriage were not only achieved by non-aristocrats marrying 
aristocrats. Another way non-aristocratic operational generals could take advantage 
of their career success in the marriage market was by marrying wives with significant 
financial resources.  This is difficult to measure quantitatively due to lack of 
information, but there were several instances in both time periods of generals 
gaining substantial financial resources from their marriages.  Typically these 
marriages occurred after obtaining senior positions in the army.  When Phineas 
Bowles, a 1747 operational general, married the heiress of Samuel Hill he had 
already been regimental colonel of the 12th dragoons for several years.  He gained 
from this marriage a large Irish estate portions of which were settled on him 
absolutely at marriage. Bowles’s financial gains through marriage may have 
accounted for much of his £200,000 fortune left at his death.75    James Oglethorpe’s 
marriage, who was another 1747 general, to the only surviving daughter of the 
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wealthy Sir Nathan Wright only occurred after he was already a major general in the 
army.  Oglethorpe in a similar fashion to Bowles gained substantial financial 
resources from his marriage; he settled at his wife's family home, Cranham Hall in 
Essex, and lived in some style on the £1,500 yearly income she possessed.76  These 
financially rewarding marriages were not isolated to the early period.  When he was 
a lieutenant colonel the future 1800 general John Simcoe married the wealthy 
heiress Elizabeth Gwillim which gained him a 5,000 acre estate in Devon.77  Near the 
end of David Baird’s career, after he obtained a baronetcy for his military service and 
was a lieutenant general in the army, Baird married a wife with an estate at 
Perthshire where he was to spend the remainder of his life.78 
  
 
Another way of measuring marital mobility through fathers and fathers-in-law 
social status is by including a number of the fathers-in-law whose social status 
remains unknown by making an assumption about their probable social status. As 
most people married partners from the same social backgrounds it seems 
reasonable to assume that those fathers-in-law whose names are known but whose 
occupational background is unknown came from the same social background as 
their sons-in-law.  Table 10 recalculates marital mobility on this basis. The main 
implication of this method is to increase endogamy and to decrease mobility in both 
directions.  The extent of these changes depends on the number of observations and 
how many of these had known fathers-in-law with unknown social backgrounds.  
Mostly this assumption shifts endogamy in the region of ten percentage points, 
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although this does vary with some larger or smaller moves in groups that generally 
have more limited numbers of observations.   
 
Table 10: Marriage mobility of army officers by first marriage 
  
  1715-1754 1754-1790 
  Wife  Wife  
  Aristocrat Non-aristocrat N Aristocrat Non-aristocrat N 
‘Officer MPs’ Aristocrat 72 28 36 79 21 44 
 Non-aristocrat 24 76 25 19 81 26 
 N 32 29 61 40 30 70 
        
  1747  1800  
  Wife  Wife  
  Aristocrat Non-aristocrat N Aristocrat Non-aristocrat N 
Generals Aristocrat 94 6 18 71 29 34 
 Non-aristocrat 25 75 12 21 79 28 
 N 20 10 30 30 32 62 
Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as percentage of final column N.  Fathers-in-law 
whose occupational details could not be traced were assumed to have come from the same 
social group as their sons-in-law. Excludes marriages of illegitimate husbands or wives and 
generals whose father's social status could not be traced. 
 
Source: 
‘Officer MPs’: Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volumes 1-2, Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–
1790, Volumes 2-3. 
Generals: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
 
 
 
One question that may be asked is whether this procedure makes endogamy 
rates unrealistically high for army officers?  An endogamy rate of at least 71% is 
certainly high relative to many other studies.  For instance, Mitch found endogamy 
for all members of his top occupational group was 48%, which declined to 41% when 
considering only upwardly mobile grooms.79  On the other hand, there were some 
historical precedents in Europe during this period for such high endogamy rates.  
The peak endogamy rate in Rendalen, Norway, for instance, during the nineteenth-
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century was 76%.80  Moreover, as most studies calculate marital mobility with 
unknowns excluded it may not be valid to compare results in table 10 with other 
studies without any adjustment.  This point can be clearly made by recalculating the 
marital mobility rates of London merchants using the same assumption as in table 
10.  If this was done for London merchants in Roger’s eighteenth-century and 
Horwitz’s seventeenth-century studies this would make their endogamy rates 75.5% 
and 72.7% respectively.81   
 
 
A far more important point is whether using this assumption changes the main 
findings.  This assumption does not change the findings. There was still no sign of 
‘affective individualism’ impacting on the marriage patterns of ‘officer MPs’ and a 
significant number of non-aristocratic generals still used the marriage market to 
advance their social position.  There is also little difference between the marriage 
mobility of the generals and ‘officer MPs’.  The new assumption only affected the 
degree to which these things happened.   
 
 
Using this assumption does allow for an assessment of changes in future 
generals marital mobility over time due to the expanded number of observations for 
aristocrats in 1747.  Table 10 shows there was a significant increase in the 
downward mobility patterns of aristocratic generals between 1747 and 1800.  The 
extent of this shift may be exaggerated due to the small sample size, but it does 
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229. 
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seem probable that downward marital mobility of aristocratic generals increased over 
this period. There is certainly qualitative evidence to support this contention.  Lord 
Herbert, the future Earl of Pembroke and 1800 operational general, originally wanted 
to marry Caroline, relation of Lord Charles Spencer, but was rejected because  
“... she has not that kind of liking for you, without which she is determined not to marry any man; she 
has made no resolution not to marry, but does not think marrying at all necessary to her happiness, 
unless some man should offer, for whom she feels herself inclined to have the sort of attachment 
which she thinks essential to make her happy.  She has no feelings of this kind towards you and is 
sure she never shall have, though she likes you very well, but not as a Lover....”
82
 
 
Likewise, Charles Cornwallis, eldest son of fifth Baron and first Earl Cornwallis, 
married Jemima Jones, who had no dowry and was the daughter of an army captain, 
for love.83   
 
 
One notable difference in the marriage mobility of generals compared to 
‘officer MPs’ was significant differences in aristocrat downward mobility over time. 
The downward mobility of generals who were aristocrats increased markedly over 
time, whereas there was no sign of a corresponding increase for ‘officer MPs’. This 
may suggest a combination of two factors were important in determining rates of 
endogamy, time period and local context.  The difference in endogamy rates 
between aristocratic ‘officer MPs’ and generals may be related to career success.  
Perhaps a greater level of career success provided more freedom of choice in 
selection of marriage partners for operational generals than ‘officer MPs’ due to the 
financial independence from their family that career success may have brought 
them.  Thus, this different group characteristic may have had a greater impact on 
rates of endogamy than any time period considerations per se.  This is possibly why 
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 Lord Charles Spencer to Lord Herbert, 10 October 1786, in S. Herbert (ed.), The Pembroke papers: letters 
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studies of nineteenth-century European marital mobility have found local context far 
more important than time period.84  
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has addressed the role two important mechanisms of social 
mobility, education and marriage, played in operational general’s mobility patterns.  
The education level of future generals did not seem an especially important factor in 
them becoming a general.  A minimum level of education was required for all officers 
due to the necessity of literacy in performing their administrative functions.   
However, it was not necessary to have a high level of formal education in order to 
become a general.   Those who attended public school were mostly aristocrats and 
many generals attending university only did so with the intention of pursuing a law 
career before belatedly changing career paths.  Consequently, education did not act 
as a social closure mechanism in becoming a general.  It was not necessary to 
attend public school or Oxbridge to progress in the army. A high level of education 
may have helped some careers as many future generals published books on military 
tactics, which often aided their careers by gaining favour of higher ranking officers.   
Nevertheless, the level of literacy required to publish a book did not necessitate 
attendance at a prestigious educational institution.   
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Nor did marriage seem to play a major part in becoming a general. The future 
generals typically married late in life when they were already well established in their 
careers.  Over 60% of late eighteenth-century generals married at the regimental 
rank of lieutenant colonel or higher and nearly half of these delayed marriage until 
they were regimental colonel or general.85  When they did marry the future generals 
typically married wives from the same social groups and this high rate of endogamy 
meant marriage did not play a role in the mobility of most generals.  However, there 
were always a significant minority of operational generals who seemed to use their 
career success to continue their social advance through marriage. Depending on the 
assumptions made in calculating marital mobility, approximately one quarter to one 
third of non-aristocrats appeared to continue their advance by marrying aristocratic 
wives. These rates were very similar to the upward mobility of ‘officer MPs’ who were 
not as successful in their careers as generals suggesting career success was not as 
important as family background in marriage patterns.  Nevertheless, career success 
did play a role in marriage. It probably allowed greater freedom of choice in selection 
of marriage partner and provided the opportunity for some non-aristocratic 
operational generals to gain in the marriage market either socially or financially. 
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Chapter six: Career patterns 
 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
 
 
The literature on the army in the eighteenth-century identifies a number of 
important factors that affected entering and advancing with the army.  Social status 
and money were the most important factors in career success, but war, merit and 
regimental mobility also played a role in army careers.1  These may have affected 
the mobility patterns of those who became generals and had implications for military 
efficiency.  If status and money overrode service considerations levels of social 
mobility might be restrained and the competency of generals adversely affected.  
Hence, the focus of this chapter is to analyse the entry and career patterns of the 
future generals to determine the extent to which social status, money, war, merit and 
regimental mobility played a role in becoming an operational general.   
 
 
The roles money and social status played in army careers was possibly very 
important due to the nature of entry and promotion within this period.  Money at 
times played a key role in entering and advancing with the army as two thirds of 
regimental ranks in the eighteenth-century army were purchased.2    The origin of 
purchasing commissions in the British army can be traced back to the fourteenth-
century when groups of adventurers invested money in free companies taking the 
                                                 
1
 Conway, War, State and Society, pp. 121-125; Burton and Newman, “Sir John Cope”, p. 661; Brewer, The 
Sinews of Power, p. 57; French, The British Way, pp. 36-37. 
2
 Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 103. 
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rank and reward in proportion to the sum invested.3  All active regimental officer 
ranks were open to purchase from ensign to lieutenant colonel.  Royal warrants of 
1720 and 1722 fixed the price of commissions, obligated the selling officer to sell 
only to an officer who held the rank below his own and subjected all transactions to 
crown approval.4   
 
 
Money could also be used to buy regimental rank by officers offering to raise 
bodies of men at their own expense.   Once an officer had met this initial expense of 
raising troops through private means the subsequent running costs were then taken 
over by the government.  The government provided no levy money for the raising of 
regiments or companies that were recruited in exchange for commissions and only 
paid troops serving once the corps had been fully completed.5  ‘Recruiting for rank’ 
as it was known was a popular option for senior army officers to gain regimental 
colonelcies, usually a sinecure appointment by the King.6   Thus, there were many 
examples of regimental officers offering to recruit a regiment in return for their first 
regimental colonelcy.  One such example was Lieutenant Colonel Morgan of the foot 
guards who proposed to raise a regiment of 240 dragoons at his own expense in 
return for command of that regiment and the authorisation to sell his commission.7  
However, there was a downside to gaining a regimental colonelcy in this way as 
regiments were disbanded in the reverse order they were created.8  Consequently, 
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 Turner, Gallant Gentleman, p. 29; Roy, “The Profession of Arms”, p. 197. 
4
 Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 100. 
5
 R. Middleton, "The Recruitment of the British Army, 1755-1762", Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, 67, (1989), p. 236. 
6
 J. Hayes,”The Purchase of Colonelcies in the Army, 1714-1763”, Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, 39, (1961), pp. 5-8. 
7
 NA, WO 34/167, Baron Jeffrey Amherst, Commander in Chief, Papers, 1780, Lieutenant Colonel Morgan to 
Jeffrey Amherst, in Lord North’s note, 15 September 1780, f. 187.  
8
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many new regiments created in wartime were often disbanded when peace came.   
Another rank sometimes gained by raising troops was a captaincy. In wartime new 
companies were raised to augment battalions and some of these companies were 
recruited by gentlemen at their own cost in return for a captaincy.     
 
 
Social status was even more important to an army career than money.  All 
commissions were subject to approval of the Secretary at War or Commander in 
Chief for England.  During wartime local commanders in chief also had the power to 
appoint to vacancies.  These powers might be restricted and could vary over time.  In 
early 1776 William Howe, the commander in chief of America, could only grant 
commissions below major, but later that year he was given approval to authorise 
appointments as high as lieutenant colonel except in the case of the guards who 
were still appointed from London.9  Gaining approval from these high ranking officials 
was usually dependent on proving gentlemanly status.  Accordingly, when Sam 
Fairltough wrote to the Commander in Chief in 1780 seeking an ensigncy he 
emphasised that: 
“...Captain Maguines, (who is in this town), who can inform you, that I am a young gentleman of good 
character; and if necessary, I can procure, a certificate, signed by the Mayor, and corporation of 
Drogheda, certifying that I am a gentleman of good character...”
10
   
 
 
  
 
  
Money and social status were not the only important factors in obtaining 
commissions.  War was also a critical factor in entering or getting promoted in the 
army. There were simply many more vacancies for officers during war than peace, 
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 Robson, “ Purchase and Promotion”, pp. 62-63. 
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particularly at the most junior ranks.  This point is aptly demonstrated by table 11 
showing officer places available in the 27th foot during two different periods, one 
representing peace and the other war. There were fifteen additional officer places in 
the 27th foot available during war compared to peace.   
 
Table 11: Officer places in the 27th foot 
   
 1767 (peace) 1800 (war)   
Colonel 1 1   
Lt. Colonel 1 2   
Major 1 2   
Captain 7 9   
Captain Lt. 1 1   
Lieutenant 10 22   
Ensign 9 8   
Total 30 45   
Source: 
NA, WO 65/17, 50, Printed Annual Army Lists, 1767, 1800. 
 
Most of this expansion was at the most junior ranks. The number of lieutenants 
serving in the 27th foot more than doubled between periods of peace and war.  War 
was also important in becoming an operational general as most general commands 
only existed during wartime.  
 
 
Another important aspect of war was that most non-purchase, or ‘free’ 
vacancies, could only be obtained in wartime.  ‘Free’ vacancies for officers generally 
occurred through death in battle.  In the event of an officer's death it was the custom 
for his commission to automatically be given to the most senior regimental officer in 
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the rank immediately below him.11  Vacancies for ensigns, the lowest rank of officer, 
often went to gentleman volunteers.  Gentleman volunteers entered the army with 
the aim of gaining promotion to an ensign vacancy resulting from death in battle by 
performing bravely on the battlefield.12  However, even gaining a ‘free’ vacancy was 
not entirely divorced from social status.   Apart from death, ‘free’ vacancies occurred 
through sickness, shipwreck, accident, court martial, and creation or augmentation of 
regiments.  These latter ‘free’ vacancies were subject to the patronage of the King, 
the Secretary at War, the Commander in Chief of England and regimental colonels.  
Some account was supposed to be given to merit in the distribution of this 
patronage.  Newly created commissions, for example, were usually awarded to 
officers who had displayed merit.13  The Duke of York, after he became Commander 
in Chief in 1795, was known to keep a list of meritorious officers for vacancies 
subject to his patronage.14  Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that social status did 
not also play some role in who gained a vacancy through patronage.  Merit was also 
recognised in promotion through the army ranks via the awards of major and 
lieutenant colonel brevets. 
 
 
 Promotion was also affected by the type of regiment officers served with and 
the extent they were willing to change regiments.  Serving with the artillery, 
engineers or marines might facilitate entry into the army as these branches of the 
army had no purchase, but entry was still subject to social status.15   Changing 
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regiments might lead to faster promotion.  Serving in the guards could accelerate 
promotion prospects if officers were willing to change regiment due to the guards’ 
higher army rank.  Their higher army rank provided the possibility that guards’ 
officers could trade up their regimental rank to an equivalent army rank if they held 
seniority in the army and could gain patronage.   Regimental captains in the guards, 
who ranked as lieutenant colonels in the army, sometimes used this advantage to 
become regimental lieutenant colonels or even colonels in foot regiments.16   
However, there was a trade-off between promotion speed and career stability.  
Staying with the guards or a non-purchase regiment often resulted in slower 
promotion times, but could provide greater career stability as many of the newer foot 
regiments that enabled faster promotion were quickly disbanded when peace 
came.17   
 
 
 Modernisation of the army may have affected the relative role these different 
factors played in promotion over time.  Some historians have argued social status 
and money was less important in promotion in the early period compared to the late 
eighteenth-century.18   Certainly, social status may have become more important in 
gaining a regimental colonelcy over time.  In the early period these ranks were able 
to be directly purchased, but this practice was gradually phased out so that the last 
purchase is believed to have taken place in 1762.19  This may have meant that social 
status was more important in gaining a regimental colonelcy in the absence of 
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purchase.  There is also some evidence to suggest that modernisation may have 
made promotion slower than in the early period.  In the early eighteenth-century 
brevet promotions were at least twice suspended due to abuse of this system.20  In 
addition, the late eighteenth-century saw the introduction of minimum levels of 
service and confidential reports on officers’ competence; both of these hurdles had 
to be overcome before promotion could be gained. From 1795 promotion to captain 
required two years army service, while promotion to major took at least six years. 
These requirements were extended to three years and seven years respectively in 
1809.21 
 
 
 Establishing entry profiles and career paths of the future generals, and the 
extent to which different factors affected these, did present some difficulties.  
Comprehensive career patterns of officers are not readily available as biographical 
profiles only mention career highlights.  In order to establish the dates at which 
individual officers gained commissions substantial primary research needed to be 
undertaken involving extensive analysis of the various army lists and war office 
papers relating to commissions.   For most late eighteenth-century officers this can 
usually be done with accuracy due to the high quality of evidence after army lists 
began to be published annually in 1754.  There is not a problem in having a high 
number of ‘unknowns’, but this is a time intensive process. 
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The accuracy of career patterns for early eighteenth-century officers, and the 
time it takes to establish these, is more problematic due to the quality of evidence on 
army careers before 1754.  The army list of 1740 and The Succession of Colonels 
from 1742 to 1749 provide useful information on careers for officers after they 
reached colonel.  However, most early career patterns can only be clarified by 
examining the manuscript army lists that exist for 1702, 1709, 1715, 1736, 1745 and 
1752 (WO 64).  The early manuscript army lists provide a much more limited range 
of information than the later period army lists.  These sources usually only give the 
date of an officer’s current regimental appointment and at times a summary of dates 
he gained the various army ranks up to colonel.  The gaps in dates between lists 
also mean that inevitably there are often considerable gaps in career history.  
Another problem is the great variability in the extent to which individual officers 
details are recorded.  For some officers the summary dates of their army ranks are 
simply left blank, whereas for others every different rank has a date in it.  In 
consequence, for many early eighteenth-century future generals the regimental or 
army rank they held at different stages of their careers could not always be identified. 
In addition, there were often significant gaps in the regiments some early period 
officers served with. In the absence of this information on regimental rank it is 
assumed for non-guards officers that their regimental rank was the same as their 
army rank.  This seems a reasonable assumption as regimental and army rank for 
officers before colonel was mostly the same, except when they received brevets or 
promotion in their regiment was particularly slow.  This can be seen by examining 
any army list for the later period.  In any event, this only affects a handful of 1747 
future generals usually for certain portions of their career.  An additional problem 
was that some sources only mention the regimental rank for guards’ officers and not 
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their army rank.  In these cases the army rank of guards’ officers is based on what 
their army rank should have been relative to their regimental rank. There is no 
reason to believe that there were any exceptions to these equivalent army ranks for 
the corresponding regimental ranks.  Indeed, in researching the future generals no 
exceptions have been found in either period when both regimental and army rank 
have been located for those who served in the guards. 
    
 
A particular problem in researching the careers of early period officers was 
that many of these officers seem to have frequently skipped ranks.  If a commission 
cannot be located does this mean the officer never served at that rank or do the 
sources consulted simply not record it?  This problem was dealt with in two ways.  
Gaps in career histories were firstly checked against the sources that contained 
biographical profiles of the officers and contemporary publications that listed the 
career patterns of army officers, a discussion of which is found in chapter three.      
After this process was complete the notification books (WO 25) for individual 
commissions were examined.  The notification books record letters sent by the 
Secretary at War to the Secretary of State informing him of commissioned officers 
and the details of their commissions.  This should fill in any remaining gaps as 
officers registered their commissions with the Secretary at War. 
 
 
The method for establishing the role of money in promotion was simply to 
clarify the extent to which commissions were bought.  This is defined as the sum of 
commissions either purchased directly or recruited for.  It is almost impossible to 
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ascertain the extent to which officers bought their commissions for the early period 
as the way officers gained their commissions is not usually mentioned in most 
biographical sources.   However, the evidence of the role money played in obtaining 
commissions improves significantly for the later period. In the 1760s The London 
Gazette began to publish promotion lists from the War Office, which specify whether 
commissions were directly purchased.  Accordingly, Glover used The London 
Gazette to systematically analyse the extent to which ranks were purchased for the 
Napoleonic wars.    
 
 
There are some potential problems with using The London Gazette in this 
way.  Is it likely non-purchase vacancies were more widely reported than those 
purchased?   If this was the case it would downplay the significance of purchase.  
Yet, there is no indication non-purchase appointments were more or less likely to be 
published in The London Gazette compared to purchase ones so the data do not 
seem biased in this respect.  The second problem is that there was no distinction 
between non-purchase vacancies that were gained freely and those that were 
bought by recruiting for rank.  Moreover, it has not been possible to locate any 
sources that systematically state the extent to which non-purchase ranks were 
recruited for rank.  In consequence, it is possible the extent to which ranks were 
bought by recruiting for rank is significantly understated.   This issue, however, may 
not be such a problem as it first appears.  The reason for this is that apart from 
regimental colonel, a rank that was regularly recruited for and where there is more 
information on, it was not usual to gain many other ranks by recruiting for them.   
Buying commissions through recruiting for them did happen for other ranks, 
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especially when they had companies attached to them, but seemed relatively rare 
compared to the extent to which ranks were gained through other means.  Research 
on mid eighteenth-century infantry officers indicates that only ten captaincies were 
gained by recruiting for them out of 177 whose origins could be traced and only one 
or two other commissions were ever recruited for.22   Finally, it is possible that some 
promotions published in The London Gazette that do not state they were purchased 
were in fact purchased.  In order to ascertain whether this was a problem some spot 
checks were carried out to confirm the accuracy of the data in The London Gazette 
against more modern sources.  In every case it was found the data in The London 
Gazette agreed with that published in the Dictionary of National Biography. 
 
 
Apart from The London Gazette, muster records (WO 12), the regimental 
attendance records for army personnel, were also consulted to clarify the extent to 
which commissions were bought as they sometimes included details of promotions.  
Consulting The London Gazette and muster records produces valuable information 
in considering the role of money in army promotions, but again is a very time 
intensive process.  A problem that remains in tracing how commissions were 
obtained is that there still remained a large number of ‘unknowns’ and they 
outnumbered the ‘knowns’.  This could possibly distort the results and for this reason 
the results must remain tentative.  
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The London Gazette was also used as a supplementary source to the 
Dictionary of National Biography and Phillippart’s third edition of The Royal Military 
Calendar  to establish whether the future generals were wounded in action, one of 
the proxies for merit. In the mid eighteenth-century The London Gazette began to 
publish lists of casualties from battles and skirmishes fought by the British army 
abroad.  These lists included numbers of officers, NCOs and men killed and 
wounded for each regiment and overall losses of the army. For example, the battle 
near Alexandria, Egypt in 1801 resulted in the second battalion of the 54th foot 
having one officer and three ‘rank-and-file’ killed and two officers and 39 ‘rank-and-
file’ wounded.  In this engagement the army lost ten officers who were killed and 60 
wounded, while the numbers for ‘rank-and-file’ were 224 killed and 1082 wounded. 
The casualty lists also provided the names of officers killed and wounded.  The two 
officers in the second battalion of the 54th foot who were wounded, for instance, were 
Lieutenants Conror and Predam.23  Thus, these lists are a good way of establishing 
whether particular officers were wounded in action.   However, before these lists 
appeared biographical sources have to be relied on to establish whether the future 
generals were wounded.  Consequently, the extent to which early period future 
generals were wounded may be underestimated as not all generals had biographical 
profiles and injuries were not necessarily recorded in them.   
 
 
The labour intensive nature of researching officers’ careers, and the 
consequent high quality of data that can be obtained from such research, meant a 
slightly different approach was adopted for researching careers compared to some 
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other chapters.  Random samples of 50 officers were taken from the population of 
1747 and 1800 operational generals.  The selection process involved taking all 
generals listed in the population and picking 50 generals at random for each sample.  
A sample size of 50 officers was selected as this provides a sample large enough to 
make reliable observations about the characteristics of generals.  This sample size is 
also in line with the samples taken for previous research on generals.  Razzell’s 
samples of general officers for 1830, 1912, 1930 and 1952 all had sample sizes of 
50 officers.24  Otley’s research on nineteenth-century general officers respectively 
had sample sizes of 80 (1870), 63 (1897), 58 (1913), 48 (1926), 45 (1939), 36 
(1959).25  The highest sample size, then, is only 80 officers and indeed only three 
samples exceed the sample sizes used for this chapter.     
 
 
In previous chapters social status has usually been analysed in terms of the 
difference between aristocrats and non-aristocrats based on the social status of the 
future generals’ fathers.  In this chapter social status is analysed slightly differently.  
Social status is considered more broadly as a division between aristocrats and 
‘others’.   Historians emphasise aristocrats had a significant advantage in army 
careers.26  Hence, it is important to make a distinction between the careers of 
aristocrats, defined by their fathers’ social background, and other individuals.  The 
random sampling process produced a significant number of individuals who could 
not be classified as non-aristocrats based on their fathers’ social status.  Their 
fathers’ social background was either unknown or in one case they were the 
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 Razzell, “Social Origins of Officers”, Table 8, p. 253. 
25
 Otley, “The Origins and Recruitment”, Table 1, p. xii. 
26
 Odintz, “The British Officer Corps”, pp. 334, 347; Hayes, “The Social and Professional Background”, pp. 53-
54. 
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illegitimate son of an aristocrat. It was decided to include these individuals with the 
sons of non-aristocrats in a group called ‘others’.  The reason for this was that in 
some cases there was some information available on their family background that 
indicated they were probably non-aristocrats and in other cases where no family 
information was available their career patterns were very similar to non-aristocrats.   
 
 
The ‘others’ group for 1747 operational generals includes twelve whose 
fathers social status was unknown.  Family information contained on eight of these 
individuals indicated they probably were non-aristocrats, while the remainder of 
‘unknowns’ all served at the rank of major. In the early period this was one clear sign 
that they were probably also non-aristocrats.  In the later period there were five 
‘unknowns’ and one illegitimate son of an aristocrat. Two of the ‘unknowns’ seemed 
to be non-aristocrats based on their general family background and the other three 
all seem to have had careers that were similar to non-aristocrats. Out of the three  
‘unknowns’, whose family background could not be traced, two of them entered non-
purchase regiments and the other ‘unknown’ served at all the different army ranks, 
even including captain lieutenant, and only gained his regimental colonelcy after 
becoming a general.  The illegitimate aristocrat’s career also seemed similar to non-
aristocrats.  He gained his captaincy and colonelcy in the army slower than the 
average aristocrat.  In addition, his first regimental colonelcy was obtained through 
recruiting for rank, whereas most aristocrats gained this rank through appointment by 
the King. 
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II. Entering the army   
 
 
 The starting point in considering the careers of the future generals is their 
profile upon entering the army.  This is important as entry into the army could have 
been affected by social status, money and war.   There are five basic entry 
characteristics that are considered: (1) date of entry, (2) age at entry, (3) rank at 
entry, (4) the role of money in entry, (5) entry by regiment type.  Analysis of these 
five different entry characteristics enables an assessment of the extent to which 
social status, money and war affected the future generals’ entry into the army.   
 
 
 The different dates the future generals entered the army are shown by figure 
2.  War certainly seemed to affect the years in which the future generals chose to 
enter the army.  Most of the future generals in both periods entered the army during 
wartime.  Figure 2 shows that the entry years with the most number of future 
generals entering the army occurred during war. This is not surprising as there were 
simply many more officer places available in war.  There was a slight variation in 
entry patterns between time periods; 68% of 1747 future generals entered during 
war compared to 58% for the later period.  One explanation for these differences is 
that pursuing an army career became a more attractive option outside of wartime in 
the later period as the peacetime establishment grew larger, the army’s image 
improved and opportunities of serving in imperial locations increased.   There were 
also other factors that could account for these differences.  Speed of promotion, a 
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factor to be discussed in more detail later, and the different distribution between war 
and peace years may have also played a role in differences between time periods.     
 
Note:  N=100.  1747 future operational generals entered the army between 1678 and 1738, 
while the range of entry dates for 1800 generals was from 1741 to 1782.  The 1747 generals 
who entered the army on more than one occasion after leaving the service previously are only 
counted by their first entry. 
 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
 
 
 
There were also differences between the two periods in the age at which most 
future generals entered the army.  The average age of entry for the future 
operational generals was 19.6 years for 1747 generals and 16.5 years for 1800 
generals, a difference of three years.  Moreover, as figure 3 shows the range of ages 
that future generals entered the army was far more concentrated for the later period 
compared to the early eighteenth-century.   
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War War WarWar War
176 
 
Note:  1747 generals N= 44, 1800 generals N= 46.  The date of birth of six 1747 and four 
1800 generals is unknown.  Age at entry from first entry only. 
 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers; Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social 
Backgrounds 
 
 
Entry into the early eighteenth-century army seemed more individualised than the 
later period as some future generals entered the army either very early or late in life.  
A number of early eighteenth-century future generals only entered the army in their 
thirties, while at the other extreme 14% of 1747 future generals entered the army 
between the ages of six and eleven.  Other studies of officers have shown 
particularly early entry in this period was not uncommon as children were sometimes 
given commissions before they could serve.27  This may have been related to lack of 
regulation in the early period.  Age of entry did not seem to be regulated until 1711 
when Regulations for the Better Government of the Forces introduced a regulation 
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that commissions should not be given to anyone under the age of sixteen.28  Most 
1747 future generals were not subject to this regulation as they had already entered 
the army by this time.  However, the entry ages of the late period future generals’ 
careers were affected by this regulation, which may account for the greater 
uniformity in entry ages over time. 
 
 
Did social status play any role in the ages future generals entered the army?  
Social status did not seem to affect the age at which future generals entered the 
army.  For those entering the army after thirty or before twelve there was an almost 
equal distribution between 1747 aristocrats and ‘others’.  Nor did modernisation 
change the effect of social status on entry age.  Late eighteenth-century aristocrats 
who would become generals entered the army on average at an age of 16.8 years 
compared to 17.0 years for ‘others’.  The results of my research are similar to 
Odintz’s findings in respect of mid-eighteenth century infantry officers.  Nearly 85% 
of future 1800 general officers had entered the army by the age of nineteen 
compared to 74% of mid eighteenth-century infantry officers.  The range of ages was 
also fairly similar; the earliest entry for a mid-eighteenth-century infantry officer was 
twelve years old and the latest in their late twenties.29  
 
 
There were differences in the entry ranks of the future operational generals 
between the two periods.  The early period future generals entered the army at a far 
wider range of ranks than their later counterparts.   
                                                 
28
 R.E Scouller, “Purchase of Commissions and Promotions”, Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, 62 (252), (1984), p. 220. 
29
 Odintz, “The British Officer Corps”, Chart VI, p. 258. 
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Note:  1747 generals N= 50, 1800 generals N= 50.  Cadet was the entry rank for future 
officers in the artillery while they completed their training.  Figure 4 excludes the subsequent 
entry ranks of 1747 future generals who entered the army on more than one occasion.   
 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
 
The most common entry rank for 1747 future generals was ensign, but there was 
also the opportunity to enter at much higher ranks.  One third of early period future 
generals entered at the army rank of at least captain.  In contrast, entry rank was 
much more uniform by the later period.   The highest entry rank for 1800 future 
generals was ensign and 90% entered at this rank.  In a similar fashion to age, the 
entry rank of later period generals was almost identical to officers. Accordingly, 
Odintz found 87% of mid-eighteenth-century foot officers also entered at ensign.30      
 
 
Social status appeared to play a role in entering the army at the higher ranks 
in the early period.  Eleven out of fifteen future generals, who entered at the ranks 
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captain or higher, were the sons of aristocrats.  The extreme example of this was 
Charles Spencer, third Duke of Marlborough, who began a military career at the age 
of 32 by entering the army as regimental colonel of the 38th foot.  Marlborough 
entered the army at such an elevated position as a reward for abandoning opposition 
to the government in parliament.31   The particularly high entry rank of Marlborough, 
however, was probably unrepresentative of other officers.  Some other officers did 
enter at the army ranks of major or lieutenant colonel, but this was because these 
were guards’ officers who had higher army ranks due to brevets.  Hence, if 
Marlborough is excluded as an outlier the highest regimental entry rank was captain.  
This was definitely an advantage, but the extent of this should not be overestimated.  
It may not have affected mobility much because rate of progression is not dependent 
on point of entry.   
 
 
Did money affect entry into the army?  It is almost impossible to assess the 
role money played in entering the army for 1747 future generals.  The only evidence 
on this is that four of the future generals entered the army as volunteers and as such 
would not have paid the costs of their first commission.  The evidence on the impact 
of money on entry is rather better for the later period.   It has been possible to locate 
the way 29 future 1800 generals entered the army. Five entered through joining non-
purchase regiments in the artillery, engineers and marines, while two served as 
volunteers before gaining commissions.  Another eleven officers did not buy their 
commissions. Thus, only eleven officers or 38% of future generals bought ensign 
commissions directly in order to enter the army.  Interestingly, the role money played 
                                                 
31
 ODNB, s.v., Spencer, Charles (1706-1758). 
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in entering the army for mid-eighteenth-century infantry officers was almost identical.  
Odintz found that out of 336 first infantry commissions he managed to trace only 
38% of commissions were purchased and 1% recruited for.32   This is perhaps not 
surprising as most officers entered the army during war when it was relatively easy 
to obtained commissions without purchasing.33   Accordingly, most of the ten 
commissions purchased by the future generals occurred during peacetime.  In the 
middle of a major war it could often prove quite difficult to find purchasers for junior 
commissions as the correspondence of George Harris, one of the leading 1800 
operational generals, shows.   In 1809 he advised to his son who was serving as an 
officer in his regiment:  
“...You have not mentioned the young man whose friend’s [sic] want to purchase for in the 73 so I 
suppose you have not enquired about him. In the present situation of the army purchasers are not 
easily found and in your distress for officers it might be worth your while to look after the offer...”
34
 
 
Hence, money seemed to only play a relatively minor role in entering the army due to 
the ease with which most officers could obtain entry through non-purchase. 
 
 
 The final entry characteristic to be considered is the types of different 
regiments the future generals entered.  This is important because social status may 
have influenced the type of regiment joined.  In the literature on the army it is often 
emphasised that there were social distinctions between some regiments.  The main 
distinction drawn is between the guards and other regiments. Glover has argued 
officers serving in the guards were usually well-connected aristocrats.35   Moreover, 
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181 
 
the high proportion of aristocrats serving in the guards may have expanded over 
time.36  Indeed, Razzell has argued this trend was a consequence of aristocrats 
trying to maintain their social exclusivity at a time when they were losing monopoly of 
high rank.37  In contrast to the guards, the non-purchase regiments of the army may 
have had a lower social status as few aristocrats served in these regiments.   
According to Razell, British officers serving in 1810, who possessed inherited 
aristocratic titles, only accounted for between 0.5% and 1.5% of all artillery, 
engineering and marine officers.38  Similarly, a study of mid-eighteenth-century 
engineering officers showed that only 2.7% of these engineers were aristocrats.39   
 
 
Another factor possibly influencing entry regiment was geography.    
Historians of the navy have shown the geographical origins of navy officers played a 
role in their recruitment.  During the late eighteenth-century two thirds of navy 
officers were recruited from England and these were drawn from a narrow range of 
counties.40   Middlesex, Devon, Hampshire and Kent dominated navy recruitment.41  
This seemed to be related to these counties having prominent ports in their vicinity.  
There was Plymouth at Devon and Portsmouth at Hampshire, for example.  Indeed, 
half the officers recruited from Devon and Hampshire where born within close 
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 Hayes, “The Social and Professional Background”, pp. 103-107; Razzell, “Social Origins of Officers”, Table 
10, p. 255. 
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 Razzell, “Social Origins of Officers”, p. 255. 
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proximity of the local dockyards at Plymouth and Portsmouth.42    This may suggest 
that place of birth had an impact on military recruitment.  
 
 
In the army recruitment for different regiments was usually concentrated in 
certain geographical areas.  The late eighteenth-century saw infantry regiments 
become known by county names related to where they were most commonly 
recruited.  In 1782 the 33rd foot was also known as the first Yorkshire West Riding 
regiment because according to its regimental colonel “...the 33rd Regt. of Infantry has 
always recruited in the West Riding of Yorkshire, and has a very good interest & the 
general goodwill of the people, in that part of the countryH.”43  Local connections 
often influenced the regiments soldiers or officers joined.  This is shown by the 
original muster of the 73rd foot, a new regiment formed by Lord MacLeod of the 
Mackenzies in 1778.  Only 3% of the 73rd foot’s soldiers were not Scottish and three 
quarters of the Scots were Highlanders like their regimental colonel.  Moreover, most 
of its officers were members of Lord MacLeod’s clan.44       
  
 
 Did social status and regimental hometown, defined as entry regiment being 
based in the same county as place of birth, have an impact on the regiments the 
future generals joined?  There is strong evidence to suggest that social status did 
impact the regiments the future generals entered the army with.  In both periods the 
dominant type of entry regiment for aristocrats was the guards. 
                                                 
42
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Table 12: Type of entry regiment  
 
Entry  1747 1800 
regiment Aristocrat ‘Others’ N Aristocrat ‘Others’ N 
Foot guards 30 13 9 47 10 12 
Horse guards 25 0 5 0 0 0 
Infantry 35 70 23 37 45 23 
Cavalry 10 9 4 16 26 10 
Artillery 0 4 1 0 13 3 
Engineers 0 0 0 0 3 1 
Marines 0 4 1 0 3 1 
Unknown - - 7 - - 0 
N 22 28 50 19 31 50 
Hometown 31 0 5 11 29 5 
Rest 69 100 19 89 71 18 
Unknown - - 26 - - 27 
N 22 28 50 19 31 50 
Note:  All rows (except N rows) expressed as percentage of known N. Hometown defined as 
entry regiment being based in the same county as place of birth.  Rest is a residual category 
for those that entered regiments not based in their regimental hometown.  First entry only.  
 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers; Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social 
Backgrounds 
 
Over half of early period aristocrats entered either the foot or horse guards, while 
nearly half of later period aristocrats began their careers with the foot guards.  In 
contrast, the ‘others’ usually entered the army by joining a regiment of infantry.  
Another notable difference between aristocrats and the ‘others’ was the tendency to 
join non-purchase regiments.   No aristocrats in any period joined a non-purchase 
regiment, whereas a minority of the ‘others’ joined the artillery, engineers or marines.  
It is very difficult to make any comments on the extent to which any change over time 
occurred due to the small number of observations per regiment type.  Geography did 
not seem to have any impact on the regiments the future generals joined.  The future 
generals usually joined regiments that were located in different places to where they 
had been born.  There were occasional exceptions to this. George Don, who was 
born in Edinburgh, joined and remained with the 51st foot for much of his career, a 
new Scottish regiment.  This may have been related to the 51st foot being raised 
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close to his birthplace. Nevertheless, it was far more common for the future generals 
to join regiments that had no geographical relationship to their birthplace. 
 
 
 War, money and social status affected the entry characteristics of the future 
generals to varying degrees.  War and money seemed to have an inverse 
relationship with entry.  During times of conflict it was relatively easy to enter the 
army through non-purchase as war facilitated entry by dramatically increasing the 
number of officer places available.  Accordingly, most of the future generals entered 
the army during war, which meant money only played a minor role in entry.  Money 
was mainly important during peacetime when dramatic reductions in the size of the 
army meant far greater competition for officer places.  Social status also did not 
seem to overly affect the entry characteristics of the future generals.  Age of entry 
was similar regardless of social status and aristocrats only had a slight advantage in 
entry rank for the early period.  The only entry characteristic social status seemed to 
have an important effect on was the type of regiment joined.  Aristocrats usually 
entered the guards, whereas the ‘others’ entered the army through joining infantry 
regiments.  Modernisation affected the entry characteristics by reducing individual 
variations in entry patterns between the two periods. This was most evident in the 
greater uniformity in entry ages and ranks.  In the early period the future generals 
entered the army at a much wider variety of ages than the later period.  In a similar 
fashion, there was a considerable narrowing in the range of entry ranks by the late 
period.  In the early eighteenth-century it was possible to enter the army at 
regimental captain, whereas by the late eighteenth-century almost all future generals 
entered at ensign. 
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   III. Career paths 
 
 
 Social status and money may not have affected entering the army too much, 
but it could be a different story for advancing with the army.  The reason for this is 
simply supply and demand.  There were fewer officer places available at the higher 
ranks and great competition to gain them.  Thus, social status and money may have 
played a significant role in getting promoted to the higher ranks of the army.  The 
role of social status in promotion is considered first and then the effect of money on 
promotion is examined.  In respect of social status the key question seems to be was 
there a significant difference in the career paths and average promotion times of 
aristocrats compared to the ‘others’? 
 
 
 Examining the career paths of individuals is often a difficult thing to do 
because of the multiplicity of roles followed in careers.  A clear sense of career 
moves, however, can often be seen through a career transition matrix.  Overall 
career transition matrixes for the army ranks of 1747 and 1800 operational generals 
by social group are shown in tables 13 and 14.  Each row in these transition matrixes 
shows all exits from every rank and where they go next.  Old rank” is the current rank 
held and “new rank” is where the future generals moved to when they were 
promoted, left the army or moved to a lower rank.  Let us take the example of 1747 
lieutenants in the army.  According to table 13, 4% of "others" entered the army at 
this rank and 27% of "others" held this army rank at some point in their career.  
Where did the "others" who held the rank of army lieutenant move to next?  The 
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table shows, according to the “new rank” of lieutenants, that 14% of the lieutenants 
became captain lieutenants and 86% were promoted to captain.  Thus, these career 
transition matrixes show the extent to which the future operational generals skipped 
ranks or move in odd ways.      
 
 
 The overall transition matrix for the army ranks of 1747 generals shows that 
career paths in the early period were highly individualised.  In consequence, there 
were often great differences between aristocrats and the ‘others’ as social status 
played a key role in career path.   Aristocrats skipped ranks far more often than the 
‘others’ and consequently spent less time serving in the junior officer ranks.  Not 
even half of the aristocrats served at the rank of ensign and none served as 
lieutenant or captain lieutenant.  If aristocrats served at ensign their next promotion 
was usually captain and some even became lieutenant colonels. There were also 
few aristocrats who served at the rank of major.  The tendency to skip ranks was not 
isolated to aristocrats; it was a general feature of the early period.  Only a minority of 
‘others’, for example, served at lieutenant or captain lieutenant.  Nevertheless, far 
more aristocrats skipped the junior officer ranks or the rank of major compared to the 
‘others’.   Most future generals, who can be classified as ‘others’, became army 
majors compared to only 19% of aristocrats. 
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Table 13: Overall transition matrix for army ranks of 1747 generals 
      
   Aristocrats      
   % moving to new rank:      
Old Rank Vol Ens Lt C.
Lt 
Cpt Maj Lt.C. Col. BG MG LG G FM N 
Entry 10 38 - - 29 14 5 5 - - - - - 21 
Vol - - - - - - 50 50 - - - - - 2 
Ens - - - - 88 - 12 - - - - - - 8 
Lt - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 
C.Lt - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 
Cpt - - - - - 8 77 15 - - - - - 13 
Maj - - - - - - 100 - - - - - - 4 
Lt.C. - - - - - - - 100 - - - - - 17 
Col - - - - - - - - 95 5 - - - 21 
BG - - - - - - - - - 100 - - - 20 
MG - - - - - - - - - 10 90 - - 21 
LG - - - - - - - - - - 26 74 - 19 
G - - - - - - - - - - - 71 29 14 
FM - - - - - - - - - - - - 100 4 
% holding rank 10 38 0 0 62 19 81 100 95 100 90 67 19  
         
   ‘Others’      
   % moving to new rank:      
Old Rank Vol Ens Lt C. 
Lt 
Cpt Maj Lt.C. Col. BG MG LG G FM N 
Entry 8 73 4 - 8 - 8 - - - - - - 26 
Vol - - 50 - 50 - - - - - - - - 2 
Ens - - 26 16 47 5 5 - - - - - - 19 
Lt - - - 14 86 - - - - - - - - 7 
C.Lt - - - - 100 - - - - - - - - 4 
Cpt - - - - - 68 27 5 - - - - - 22 
Maj - - - - - - 100 - - - - - - 16 
Lt.C. - - - - - - - 100 - - - - - 25 
Col - - - - - - - - 100 - - - - 26 
BG - - - - - - - - - 100 - - - 26 
MG - - - - - - - - - 12 88 - - 26 
LG - - - - - - - - - - 78 22 - 23 
G - - - - - - - - - - - 60 40 5 
FM - - - - - - - - - - - - 100 2 
% holding rank 8 73 27 15 85 62 96 100 100 100 88 19 8  
Note: All rows (except N column) expressed as percentage. The table shows all transitions 
between army ranks as a percentage of movements from the old rank held to the new rank.  
Exits are indicated by numbers in the cells where the old rank and new rank are the same. 
Temple, Gooch and Oglethorpe are excluded from this analysis as they entered the army on 
more than one occasion.   
 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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Skipping ranks became rarer once the future generals had achieved the rank of 
lieutenant colonel, yet this still did happen occasionally.  There was also another 
advantage aristocrats seemed to have. They left the army at much higher ranks on 
average than the ‘others’.  Aristocrats usually exited the army at the rank of general 
compared to lieutenant general for the ‘others’ and many more also made it to field 
marshal.  Only 8% of ‘others’ who were to become generals made it to the rank of 
field marshal compared to 19% of aristocrats. 
 
 
The ability of many future generals to frequently skip ranks was the result of a 
time when promotion was highly individualised and even somewhat irregular on 
occasion.  This individualised nature of promotion meant those with social influence 
or army interest could advance especially rapidly.    For example, Thomas Fowke, 
one of the ‘others’ who came from an army family, was able to skip the junior officer 
ranks and advance directly from ensign to captain through his father, who served as 
a captain in the same regiment, swapping positions with him.  The elder Fowke 
became an ensign, while Thomas advanced to captain.45   Fathers using their 
influence to advance their sons in slightly irregular ways was not uncommon in this 
period.   Another example of this was the number of sons who replaced their fathers 
as regimental colonels.  Handasyd and O’Hara, two other 1747 future generals, were 
promoted swiftly to regimental colonels by their fathers resigning in their favour. 
 
 
 
                                                 
45
 Dalton, George The First’s Army, Volume 2, pp. 215-217. 
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The irregular nature of army promotion in this period is also demonstrated by 
the careers of future generals who entered the army on more than one occasion.  
The most extreme example of this was Richard Temple, the future Viscount 
Cobham, who entered the army on three different occasions.  Temple first entered 
the army as an ensign at the age of nine in 1685, but within a year of joining up was 
dismissed for disobeying a superior officer.  A year later he was then re-
commissioned, again as an ensign, in the same regiment.  Then in 1733 Temple lost 
his army rank of lieutenant general and his regimental colonelcy for not supporting 
the government in parliament.  He was reinstated in 1742 at the army rank of field 
marshal and also regained a regimental colonelcy.46   William Gooch and James 
Oglethorpe both entered the army on two different occasions.  They re-entered the 
army after previously resigning their commissions.  Gooch was the son of an 
alderman who entered the army as an ensign in 1700 and made his way up to major 
by 1715. However, his Dictionary of National Biography profile states he resigned his 
commission shortly after becoming a major because he was frustrated at the speed 
of promotion during peace.  After this time he became lieutenant governor of Virginia 
in 1727.47  Gooch then appears to re-enter the army at the army rank of colonel in 
1740.48  Guy also mentions an officer serving in Colonel William Gooch’s American 
regiment in 1741.49  Gooch’s re-entry to the army appears to be related to his role in 
the expedition to Cartagena in 1741 as he commanded the colonial troops in the 
expedition, possibly as a local brigadier general.50  Oglethorpe resigned his 
lieutenancy in the guards in 1715. Subsequently he was involved in founding the 
colony of Georgia.  To this end, he recruited a regiment to aid in the defence of the 
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colony, the 42nd foot.  In return for recruiting this regiment he was granted firstly a 
captaincy in June 1737 and later a regimental colonelcy in August of the same year.  
It is noteworthy that there were no examples of ‘re-entry’ with the 1800 cohort which 
suggests that this irregularity also disappeared were over time.   
 
 
Table 14 shows the nature of career paths were quite different for late 
eighteenth-century future generals compared to their earlier period counterparts.  
The later period future generals appeared to follow a more regular and structured 
career path.   Both social groups served more often at the different ranks, especially 
for the ranks that were often skipped in the early period.  In the early eighteenth-
century only seven future generals served at the rank of lieutenant compared to 39 
officers by the late period.   Aristocrats in the later period had some of the same 
advantages as their earlier counterparts.  They skipped ranks more often and usually 
exited the army at a higher army rank than the ‘others’.   
 
 
This advantage in career paths for aristocrats, and the extent to which it 
changed over time, can be assessed by comparing the relative difference between 
the percentage of aristocrats and ‘others’ that served at the different ranks. For 
example, in the early period none of the aristocrats and 27% of ‘others’ served at the 
army rank of lieutenant giving a relative difference of 27% between aristocrats and 
‘others’.   
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Table 14: Overall transition matrix for army ranks of 1800 generals 
      
   Aristocrats      
   % moving to new rank:      
Old Rank Ens Lt C.
Lt 
Cpt Maj Lt.C Col MG LG G FM N 
Entry 100 - - - - - - - - - - 19 
Ens - 58 - 42 - - - - - - - 19 
Lt - - 10 90 - - - - - - - 10 
C.Lt - - - 100 - - - - - - - 1 
Cpt - - - - 53 47 - - - - - 19 
Maj - - - - - 100 - - - - - 10 
Lt.C - - - - - - 100 - - - - 19 
Col - - - - - - - 100 - - - 19 
MG - - - - - - - - 100 - - 19 
LG - - - - - - - - 5 95 - 19 
G - - - - - - - - - 89 11 18 
FM - - - - - - - - - - 100 2 
% holding rank 100 53 5 100 53 100 100 100 100 95 11  
         
   ‘Others’      
   % moving to new rank:      
Old Rank Vol Cadt Ens Lt C.Lt Cpt Maj Lt.C Col MG LG G FM N 
Entry 6 13 81 - - - - - - - - - - 31 
Vol - - 100 - - - - - - - - - - 2 
Cadt - - 100 - - - - - - - - - - 4 
Ens - - - 84 3 13 - - - - - - - 31 
Lt - - - - 19 81 - - - - - - - 26 
C.Lt - - - - - 100 - - - - - - - 6 
Cpt - - - - - - 84 16 - - - - - 31 
Maj - - - - - - - 100  - - - - 26 
Lt.C. - - - - - - - - 100 - - - - 31 
Col - - - - - - - - - 100 - - - 31 
MG - - - - - - - - - 3 97 - - 31 
LG - - - - - - - - - - 16 84 - 30 
G - - - - - - - - - - - 94 6 26 
FM - - - - - - - - - - - - 100 2 
% holding rank 6 13 100 84 19 100 84 100 100 100 97 84 6  
Note: All rows (except N column) expressed as percentage.  The table shows all transitions 
between army ranks as a percentage of movements from the old rank held to the new rank.  
Exits are indicated by numbers in the cells where the old rank and new rank are the same.  
 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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This can then be compared to the later period relative difference to see if the effect 
of social status on career paths changed over time.  In the case of lieutenant the 
relative difference for the 1800 generals was 31% indicating the effect of social 
status on promotion through the junior ranks remained similar regardless of time 
period, a finding supported by the fact that the relative difference in captain 
lieutenant between the periods was almost identical.  The relative difference for 
some of the higher ranks, however, appeared to be narrowing over time.  The 
aristocratic advantage in skipping major compared to ‘others’ declined 9% between 
the two periods, while the percentage of ‘others’ relative to aristocrats making it to 
the highest army rank of field marshal increased 6%.  This indicates the role social 
status had in careers may have diminished between the early and late eighteenth-
century. 
 
 
 The career paths of the future generals, however, cannot be understood fully 
in terms of army rank only. It is important to consider their regimental ranks as well, 
especially given so many officers benefited from a higher army rank than their 
regimental rank due to brevets.  Viewing the career paths of the 1747 future generals 
in terms of regimental rank instead of army rank does not change the main findings.  
Career paths still seemed highly individualised with most future generals skipping at 
least some ranks.  Aristocrats still had significant advantages over the ‘others’ in 
their ability to skip ranks.  On the other hand, it does narrow the extent of this 
advantage in some respects. More aristocrats served at the most junior regimental 
ranks, but they still skipped these ranks far more often than the ‘others’. An analysis 
of regimental rank also shows most future generals served at the rank of captain 
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regardless of social background.  The next regimental promotion after captain was 
quite different and seemed to depend greatly on social background.  Aristocrats 
typically advanced to regimental colonel, whereas the ‘others’ had to serve at 
regimental major and lieutenant colonel before becoming colonels of a regiment.   
 
Table 15: Overall transition matrix for regimental ranks of 1747 generals 
      
   Aristocrats      
   % moving to new rank:      
Old Rank Vol Ens Lt C.Lt Cpt Maj Lt.C. Col. N 
Entry 10 48 14 - 24 - - 5 21 
Vol - - - - 50 - - 50 2 
Ens - - 10 - 90 - - - 10 
Lt - - - - 100 - - - 4 
C.Lt - - - - - - - - 0 
Cpt - - - - - 21 16 63 19 
Maj - - - - - - 50 50 4 
Lt.C. - - - - - - - 100 5 
Col - - - - - - - 100 21 
% holding rank 10 48 19 0 90 19 24 100  
         
   ‘Others’      
   % moving to new rank:      
Old Rank Vol Ens Lt C.Lt Cpt Maj Lt.C. Col. N 
Entry 8 73 4 - 15 - - - 26 
Vol - - 50 - 50 - - - 2 
Ens - - 26 16 58 - - - 19 
Lt - - - 14 86 - - - 7 
C.Lt - - - - 100 - - - 4 
Cpt - - - - - 73 19 8 26 
Maj - - 5 - 11 - 79 5 19 
Lt.C. - - - - 5 - - 95 22 
Col - - - - - - - 100 26 
% holding rank 8 73 27 15 100 73 85 100  
Note: All rows (except N column) expressed as percentage. The table shows all transitions 
between army ranks as a percentage of movements from the old rank held to the new rank.  
Exits are indicated by numbers in the cells where the old rank and new rank are the same.  A 
reduction in regimental rank, which occurred in the case of four different ‘others’ future 
generals, is seen by new rank being lower than old rank. Temple, Gooch and Oglethorpe are 
excluded from this analysis as they entered the army on more than one occasion.   
 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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Four of the ‘others’ who made it to regimental major or lieutenant colonel also 
suffered a reduction in regimental rank before continuing their advancement in 
regimental rank.   This appeared to happen for two reasons.  First, the end of the war 
in 1713 seemed to result in two of the future generals losing their regimental places 
with foot regiments.  Both Wynyard and Bragg held positions as regimental major 
and lieutenant colonel respectively in 1710, but then turned up as captains of 
different foot regiments in 1715, a period of peace. Presumably they lost their places 
due to reductions in the size of the army during peace and could only regain a 
regimental captaincy of another foot regiment.  Second, two regimental majors 
serving in foot regiments appeared to be willing to accept a lower regimental rank in 
return for a transfer to the foot guards.  Blakeney went from major in the eighteenth 
foot to lieutenant in the first foot guards.  Wolfe transferred from major in an infantry 
regiment to captain in the third foot guards, which gave him a promotion in the army 
to lieutenant colonel. 
 
 
In a similar fashion to the 1747 future generals, analysing career paths in 
terms of regimental rank for the later period does not change the overall picture 
much.  It merely increases the numbers of aristocrats serving at the ranks of 
lieutenant, captain lieutenant and major.  However, a few notable points emerge.  
Perhaps most importantly, there was little difference between the future generals of 
both social classes who held the regimental rank of lieutenant colonel compared to 
their army rank.  The 1747 future generals who were aristocrats tended to use their 
higher army rank of lieutenant colonel to advance from regimental captain to colonel 
and only 24% of these officers served at regimental lieutenant colonel.  In contrast, 
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95% of 1800 aristocrats who were to become generals served at the regimental rank 
of lieutenant colonel before gaining a regimental colonelcy giving them greater 
military experience of high command.   
 
Table 16: Overall transition matrix for regimental ranks of 1800 generals 
       
 Aristocrats     
 % moving to new rank:     
Old Rank Ens Lt C.Lt Cpt Maj Lt.C. C.Com. Col. N 
Entry 100 - - - - - - - 19 
Ens - 63 - 37 - - - - 19 
Lt - - 25 75 - - - - 12 
C.Lt - - - 100 - - - - 3 
Cpt - - - - 68 27 5 - 19 
Maj - - - 3 - 82 8 7 13 
Lt.C. - - - 10 - - 5 85 18 
C.Com. - - - - - - 33 67 3 
Col. - - - - - - - 100 18 
% holding rank 100 63 16 100 68 95 16 95  
         
 ‘Others’    
 % moving to new rank:    
Old Rank Cadt Vol Ens Lt C.Lt Cpt Maj Lt.C. C.Com. Col. N 
Entry 6 13 81 - - - - - - - 31 
Vol - - 100 - - - - - - - 2 
Cadt - - 100 - - - - - - - 4 
Ens - - - 91 3 6 - - - - 31 
Lt - - - - 25 72 3 - - - 28 
C.Lt - - - - - 100 - - - - 8 
Cpt - - - 3 - - 77 7 3 10 30 
Maj - - - - 4 - - 96 - - 25 
Lt.C. - - - - - 3 - 7 10 80 28 
C.Com. - - - - - - - - 33 67 9 
Col. - - - - - - - - - 100 25 
% holding rank 6 13 100 90 26 97 81 90 29 81  
Note: All rows (except entry column) expressed as percentage.  The table shows all 
transitions between army ranks as a percentage of movements from the old rank held to the 
new rank.  Exits are indicated by numbers in the cells where the old rank and new rank are 
the same.  A reduction in regimental rank is seen by new rank being lower than old rank. 
 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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On the other hand, it appeared harder for the ‘others’ to become regimental colonels 
as only 81% of the ‘others’ attained these positions compared to all of their 1747 
counterparts.  Part of this difference can be explained by the additional regimental 
rank of colonel commandant, which like a regimental colonelcy was a sinecure 
position, and became the final regimental rank of a minority of later period generals.  
There was a similar tendency for some officers to trade down their regimental rank in 
return for a commission in the guards, although this phenomenon was more evenly 
distributed between aristocrats and the ‘others’ in the later period.  Again, this 
appeared to be closely related to peace as three out of four of these transfers to the 
guards occurred during peace and the other one was due to Cathcart suffering poor 
health on active duty in America and having to return home. 
 
 
A comparison of the relative difference between the different social groups for 
regimental ranks tends to indicate the advantages aristocrats had in skipping ranks 
was in a similar fashion to army rank narrowing between the time periods.  Five out 
of seven regimental ranks saw the aristocratic advantage in skipping ranks decline 
over time.  Admittedly, it was slightly harder for the ‘others’ to secure the sinecure 
position of regimental colonel.  However, the largest relative changes were in the 
positions of major and lieutenant colonel.  Many more aristocrats relative to the 
‘others’ were serving in these regimental command positions in the later period than 
the early eighteenth-century. 
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 A comprehensive assessment of the effect social status had on the careers of 
the future generals should not only be limited to the career paths taken in advancing 
through the army. It is important to also consider the speed of career progression as 
having to ascend more steps on a career ladder might be offset if the time between 
steps is shorter than previously.  Table 17 measures the speed of promotion by 
examining the length of time it took the future generals to obtain key ranks in the 
army and their regiment.  Promotion in the later period was slower to most ranks.  
There were only two exceptions to this. First, the ‘others’ became generals much 
faster, while promotion to general for aristocrats was almost identical in the later 
period.  This may be another indication that the importance social status in obtaining 
high command was narrowing between the periods.  Second, promotion to 
regimental major was also faster for aristocrats in the later period, which may have 
been related to so many more aristocrats serving at this rank than previously.  A 
decrease in promotion time may have compensated for not being able to skip the 
rank of major as frequently as before.   One of the strangest results was that it took 
less time for 1747 aristocrats to reach army major than captain or lieutenant colonel.  
This was simply a function of outliers affecting averages for what was a small sample 
to begin with.  There were only four 1747 aristocrats who were majors and three of 
these entered at the rank of major due to the higher army rank in the horse guards.   
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Table 17: Speed of promotion 
    
  1747 1800 
  Aristocrat ‘Others’ N Aristocrat ‘Others’ N 
Army B.Gen./M.Gen. 25.0 35.1 50 24.5 29.6 50 
 Colonel 13.9 23.5 50 18.5 24.9 50 
 Lt. Colonel 6.6 13.7 42 10.7 16.9 50 
 Major 1.5 12.5 21 9.1 13.7 36 
 Captain 2.4 5.5 38 4.3 6.6 50 
 N 22 28 50 19 31 50 
        
  1747 1800 
  Aristocrat ‘Others’ N Aristocrat ‘Others’ N 
 Colonel 17.2 28.2 49 24.0 31.2 43 
Regiment Lt. Colonel 7.4 18.4 27 14.5 20.9 46 
 Major 17.8 13.5 24 14.5 15.6 38 
 Captain 3.6 5.4 48 6.1 8.0 49 
 N 22 28 50 19 31 50 
Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as average length of time in years from entry. The 
table shows speed of promotion expressed as average length of time in years from entry to the 
ranks specified.  Speed of promotion to general rank was measured by the time it took the 
future generals to obtain the first substantive general rank.  For 1747 future generals this was 
brigadier general and major general for the later period.  
 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
 
 
In both time periods aristocrats had a significant advantage over the ‘others’ in 
the length of time it took them to be promoted.  For every army and regimental rank, 
with the exception of regimental major in 1747, aristocrats were promoted faster than 
the ‘others’.  Social status thus seemed a key factor in promotion prospects.  
However, the advantage social status provided in getting promoted was narrowing 
between the periods.  The relative difference in promotion times between aristocrats 
and the ‘others’ for almost all ranks decreased from the early to late eighteenth-
century.  The largest reductions were for the army ranks of general and colonel, but 
this was a general process for most ranks.  Even for regimental colonel it took the 
‘others’ less time to gain these positions relative to aristocrats in the later period. For 
1747 future generals it took aristocrats 17.2 years and the ‘others’ 28.2 years to 
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become regimental colonels, a relative difference of 11 years.  By the later period it 
took the ‘others’ slightly longer to obtain this rank, yet the relative difference had 
narrowed to 7.2 years. 
 
 
Social status may have played a significant role in getting promoted for 
aristocrats, but was this a similar story for the effect of money on promotion?  Did 
money play an important part in becoming a general?  This is more difficult to assess 
than social status due to the nature of the surviving evidence.  There is little 
evidence available on the means by which early period officers gained their 
commissions so it is difficult to say much about the role money played in becoming a 
general for the early period or the extent to which change occurred over time.   
 
The role money played in becoming a general for the 1800 future generals is 
shown by table 18.  This demonstrates the extent to which various types of mid to 
late eighteenth-century officers bought commissions from lieutenant to lieutenant 
colonel by either purchasing them directly or recruiting for rank.     
 
Table 18: Promotions bought 
 
 Period Lieutenant Captain Major Lt. Colonel  N 
Generals 1800 27.3 42.4 37.0 19.3 112 
Infantry officers 1754-1783 43.5 65.5 54.5 41.1 574 
Officers 1810-1813 17.6 28.9 31.1 15.9 1884 
Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as promotions bought as a percentage of total 
promotions. Officers includes infantry, cavalry and life guards or what were previously 
known as horse guards.  Recruiting for rank not included in officers.   
 
Source:  
Generals: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
Infantry officers: Odintz, “The British Officer Corps”, Chart XI, p. 316. 
Officers: Glover, Wellington’s army, Table A, p. 83. 
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The results seem similar regardless of the officer group or time period. A significant 
number of officers bought their commissions and thus money played an important 
role in advancing with the army.  The importance of this did vary depending on many 
different factors.  The type of commission being purchased played a key role in the 
extent to which commissions were bought.  The most popular commissions to be 
purchased for the three groups of officers were captain followed by major.  One third 
to one half of all officers purchased these commissions.  On the other hand, 
lieutenant colonel was the promotion least likely to be purchased.   
 
 
 The large variation between the different groups of officers in the extent to 
which individual ranks were purchased was quite notable.  The most popular rank to 
be purchased, captain, was bought by as few as 28.9% of Napoleonic war officers 
compared to as many as 65.5% mid-eighteenth-century infantry officers.  This large 
variation seemed to be a function of two different factors. First, it illustrated the 
importance of war in reducing the role of purchase in promotion.  The Napoleonic 
war officers purchased the lowest proportion of commissions, a point in time at the 
height of the largest scale conflict in the eighteenth-century.  In contrast, the mid-
eighteenth-century infantry officers and 1800 generals both purchased their 
commissions during periods of peace and war.  These differences between the 
groups of officers were related to the supply and demand of commissions.  Non-
purchase commissions were widely available in war so it was not necessary to 
purchase to gain promotion unless an officer wanted to serve in a specific regiment.  
Thus, the proportions of commissions purchased were naturally lower for the 
Napoleonic war officers.  A similar rate of purchase would be found for the other two 
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groups if only wartime purchases are considered.  If peace purchases were 
excluded, 30% of 1800 future generals’ captaincies were purchased, an almost 
identical proportion to the number of captaincies purchased by Napoleonic war 
officers.  The importance of money in promotion was less than expected in part due 
to the key role war played in gaining promotion.  Most promotions for the future 
generals occurred during wartime and few of these were purchased.  For example, 
the majority of captaincies were gained during wartime; 73% of 1747 and 58% of 
1800 future generals became captains during war.  Even though a captaincy was the 
most common rank to be purchased two thirds of future generals who gained 
captaincies during war managed to obtain this commission without purchase.  
  
 
Second, social status may have affected the extent to which officers 
purchased their commissions.  The future generals purchased less often than mid-
eighteenth-century infantry officers.  This may have been related to the different 
levels of social status between these two groups.   An examination of the social 
backgrounds of future generals who purchased shows it was relatively rare for 
aristocrats to purchase commissions. Only one third of all the commissions 
purchased by the future generals were bought by aristocrats. Moreover, 70% of 
these aristocratic purchases occurred at the rank of captain.  This suggests a 
paradoxical relationship between purchase and social status.  Aristocrats rarely 
purchased as they had the social connections to obtain vacancies ‘free’.  Thus, 
purchase may have actually been a device that helped to increase mobility by giving 
those with money, but limited social connections the opportunity to advance. 
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 War and the high social status of some future generals may have reduced the 
importance of money in promotion, but its significance should not be underestimated.  
Money facilitated advancement by ensuring promotion came more speedily to those 
who bought their commissions.   It took future generals only 7.2 years to gain a 
regimental captaincy through buying their commission compared to 8.3 years for 
those that did not buy this rank, a time saving of over one year.  In a similar fashion, 
Glover found that purchasing a commission significantly reduced promotion times for 
almost all ranks.51   In addition, the ability to buy a commission was particularly 
important for some officers.  There was a minority of future generals who mainly 
advanced through buying commissions.  Henry Fox, for example, purchased his 
ensigncy, lieutenancy, captaincy and majority.  Similarly, the only promotion between 
ensign and lieutenant colonel William Goodray Strutt did not purchase was his 
lieutenant commission. 
 
 
 Social status and to a lesser extent money provided clear advantages in 
advancing with the army. Irrespective of time period future generals who were 
aristocrats advanced much more quickly than the ‘others’.  They were able to skip 
more ranks on the way to becoming generals and advanced more speedily. 
However, the extent of this advantage seemed to be declining over time.   Money 
played a less important role in promotion as most promotions occurred during war 
when they were usually obtained without the need to purchase.  Nevertheless, one 
third of all promotions were purchased and buying a commission was particularly 
important during peace time.  Money also reduced the length of time promotions took 
                                                 
51
 Glover, Wellington’s  army, Table B, p. 84. 
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and played a key role in the careers of some future generals who bought most of the 
promotions.   
 
 
 The advantage aristocrats had in promotion may have had important 
implications for military performance.  If privilege, that is to say, aristocratic status, 
led to over promotion then aristocratic senior officers should be more prone to 
experience defeat than their non-aristocratic counterparts.  This can be examined by 
comparing the extent to which aristocratic commanders of major battles in the 
eighteenth-century experienced losses compared to their non-aristocratic peers.  
Appendix 2, table 2.8, provides individual information on the commanders and 
outcome of 52 of the major battles that occurred during the eighteenth-century 
ranging from Blenheim in 1704 to Waterloo in 1815.52   This again illustrates the 
aristocratic advantage in the army as aristocrats were more likely to be the main 
commanders in these engagements.  Aristocrats commanded in 29 battles 
compared to sixteen for non-aristocrats with the remainder being commanded by 
foreign allies of the British. However, there is no indication this adversely affected 
military performance.  Perhaps surprisingly the aristocrats won proportionately more 
battles than the non-aristocrats.  This was achieved in part by concentrating 
command in the hands of few aristocrats.  Only eight aristocrats had overall 
command for the 29 different battles.  Moreover, most of the aristocrats who held the 
highest command positions, such as the Duke of Marlborough, the Duke of 
Cumberland, William Howe and Arthur Wellesley, had good reputations as fighting 
                                                 
52
 Information for this was taken from the following sources: J.W Fortesque, A history of the British Army, 
volumes I-X, (London, 1899-1930). 
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generals of ability.53  This suggests that aristocrats were not usually given important 
operational commands unless they also possessed some skill at being generals.  
There were of course other factors involved in winning battles than merely the ability 
of the generals involved.  For example, success in the 52 battles generally went to 
those who had larger armies.  Nevertheless, generalship usually played an important 
part in victory.  Another important factor limiting any negative aristocrat impact on 
military performance was that throughout the eighteenth-century operational failure 
by those generals in charge typically resulted in removal from subsequent 
commands regardless of their social status.  Generals that were dismissed from the 
army or not appointed to subsequent commands due to operational failures included 
Lord Sackville, Thomas Fowke, Sir Hew Dalrymple and Richard Whitelock.  This is 
not to say that over promotion of aristocrats did not lead to some performance 
problems for the army. Lack of talent as military commanders among some generals 
was probably an issue as the correspondence of Wellington alludes to.54  However, 
this problem was minimised through the tendency of only appointing aristocrats who 
were also talented generals to the top command in major battles. 
 
         IV. Merit 
 
 If aristocratic commanders of major battles were generally meritorious officers 
does this mean merit played an important role in becoming a general?  There is 
often some disagreement among historians about the role of merit in an army career.  
There are some historians who claim merit played little role in advancing with the 
army due to the importance of social influence.  In this view, professionalism and 
                                                 
53
 ODNB, s.v., Churchill, John (1650-1722),  William Augustus, Prince (1721-1765),  Howe, William (1729-
1814), Wellesley, Arthur (1769-1852).  
54
 Glover, Wellington’s army, pp. 144-145. 
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experience counted for little as promotion was solely dependent on social 
connections or purchase.55  Consequently, the average British officer was 
sometimes regarded as worse than their French counterparts.56    Yet, this is not a 
universal view.  Other historians stress that experience, professionalism and merit 
did matter in promotion.57  Brewer argued most promotions in the army reflected 
military experience.58  For Hayes ability and enthusiasm often played a critical role in 
advancing.59   
 
 
 Assessing the role of merit in army promotion is rather problematic for many 
reasons.   Merit is difficult to define. There could be many different aspects of merit 
that were important for generals including courage on the battlefield, administrative 
skills and strategic ability.  Moreover, a competent general at one level, of say a 
brigade, might be found wanting at a higher level of a division or an army.  
Considering only the role merit played in the careers of future generals is also 
problematic.  These were the most successful officers in the army and as only the 
‘winners’ in army promotion are considered it is difficult to draw too many 
conclusions about the role of merit in promotion for less successful officers.  There 
are also some issues with the sample size and measurement of merit, which could 
affect the results. Even though two different measures of merit are used the sample 
size of meritorious officers compared to non-meritorious officers remains small.  This 
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 Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, p. 172; Robson, “Purchase and Promotion”, p. 58; 
Childs, “The Army and State in Britain”, p. 68; Barnett, Britain, p. 138. 
56
 Barnett, Britain, p. 238. 
57
 Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 106; French, The British Way in Warfare, pp. 36-37.  
58
 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 57. 
59
 Hayes, “The Social and Professional Background”, pp. 169-170. 
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is particularly the case for the first proxy of merit, major and lieutenant colonel 
brevets.  
 
 
 Merit is measured using two proxies to indicate meritorious officers. The first 
proxy establishes merit by the award of major and lieutenant colonel brevets 
excluding those that were awarded for serving in the guards.  There was a clear link 
between the award of these brevets and merit.  Brevets were explicitly awarded to 
field officers, those ranked captain and higher, on the grounds of merit or long 
service.60   This mechanism allowed the army to accelerate the promotion prospects 
of deserving officers so they could gain ‘promotion to the higher ranks at an 
appropriate age.’61  Accordingly, this proxy should capture many of the different 
aspects that were needed to be a meritorious officer from skill at battle to 
organisational ability.  An examination of the careers of the future generals who 
gained these brevets showed they were often awarded for merit.  For example, 
George Beckwith was given a brevet to army major for "Hhis spirited assistance in 
the assault on fort GriswoldH.”62  The only problem with this proxy is the small 
number of future generals who gained major and lieutenant colonel brevets outside 
of the guards. 
 
  
 The second proxy used assesses merit in a more limited fashion.   Courage is 
undoubtedly one quality needed for a meritorious officer.  Throughout history the 
most able generals, from Alexander the Great to Napoleon or Wellington, have 
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 Glover, “Purchase”, pp. 356-359. 
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 Neave-Hill, “Brevet Rank”, p. 90. 
62
 ODNB, s.v., Beckwith, George (1752/3-1823). 
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displayed courage on the battlefield.  Admittedly, they had many other qualities that 
made them great generals, but courage was certainly one of them.  One way that 
courage is represented on the battlefield is through wounding.  Wounding typically 
results from exposure to a fierce part of battle, which contemporaries viewed as 
proof of courage.  The relationship between courage and wounding has often been 
formally recognised by various armies. In the United States army, soldiers and 
officers killed or wounded in action are awarded the Purple Heart in recognition of 
their courage.  At different points in history various other armies have recognized 
soldiers wounded in battle as deserving special mention.  For instance, all Allied 
soldiers during World War I were awarded a wounded stripe if they were wounded in 
action.  Hence, the second proxy of merit is whether the future generals were 
wounded. This should represent one important aspect of a meritorious military 
officer, courage.  The only study of eighteenth-century military officers that 
systematically analysed the role of merit in promotion adopted a very similar proxy to 
represent merit.  Consolvo’s study of late eighteenth-century naval lieutenants used 
action in battle to represent merit.63  Action in battle merely seems a different way to 
represent courage.   
  
 
A close examination of the actions in which the future generals were wounded 
also demonstrates many of these occurred through courageous action.  In 1794 
John Moore was wounded in action and was later commended in dispatches during 
this time by his commander, Lieutenant General Sir Charles Stewart, as Moore had 
“... distinguished himself upon this Expedition for his Bravery, Conduct and Military 
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 Consolvo, “The Prospects and Promotion”, pp. 147-151. 
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Talent....”64  Ligonier came close to death at the battle of Malplaquet when during an 
assault on a French position it was said his clothes were shredded by at least twenty 
different musket balls.65  In 1780 David Baird’s regiment was part of a relief force 
sent to Madras after the ruler of Mysore, Haidar Ali, attacked a British ally.  
Unfortunately, on the way they were surrounded by enemy forces and destroyed.  
Baird’s corps fought with ‘heroism and determination’ in this engagement from which 
he sustained sabre wounds to his head, a pike wound in his arm and a ball in his 
thigh.66    In January 1796, William Gooday Strutt was wounded three times when his 
force of only 200 men attacked a French army of 1200, which eventually resulted in 
him having to get his leg amputated.67     
 
 
The best approach to measuring merit is to measure it from the point it is 
observed. In other words, measuring the effect of being wounded for instance on 
subsequent career progression. However, in the case of the future generals this is 
impractical.  The main interest in analysing merit is to establish what role it played in 
becoming a general.  Analysing merit from the point it was observed would result in a 
small sample size becoming much smaller as many officers were only wounded after 
they became generals.  Moreover, in order to establish differences between 
meritorious and non-meritorious future generals it would be necessary to compare 
the subsequent progress of the meritorious future generals to those holding the 
same rank at the same time who did not display merit when the meritorious future 
generals displayed their merit.  As the future generals entered the army at a myriad 
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of different dates, and merit was often only observed at senior ranks, this would 
reduce any comparable group of non-merit officers to single figures in most cases 
further intensifying the small sample size problem.  For these reasons it is 
impractical to measure merit from the point it was observed.  Thus, merit is 
measured by assuming that if merit was displayed at some point in the careers of the 
future generals they were generally meritorious officers.   This is far from ideal, but 
given the sample size constraints seems to be the only practical way to measure 
merit.  Merit is therefore measured by comparing speed of advancement to general 
for future generals who displayed some aspect of merit at any point in their careers 
compared to those that did not.     
 
 
The two proxies used for merit indicate that the role of merit in becoming a 
general was somewhat limited.  However, this did vary between time period and 
social group.   For many future 1747 generals displaying merit through brevets or 
wounding did not usually lead to faster promotion.  Only in the case of wounding for 
the ‘others’ did promotion to general come slightly faster than for their non-
meritorious counterparts.  Merit seemed to matter more for the later period officers, 
but the extent of this varied with social group.  The promotion time of aristocrats to 
general did not seem affected by whether they were meritorious officers.  Promotion 
to general was slower for those aristocrats holding brevets and there was hardly any 
difference in promotion times for those displaying courage on the battlefield through 
wounding.  In contrast, merit did seem to have an effect on the promotion times to 
general of the ‘others’ regardless of the proxy for merit. The ‘others’ who gained 
brevets to major or lieutenant colonel became generals one year sooner than those 
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that did not receive these distinctions. This advantage was even greater for the 
‘others’ who displayed courage on the battlefield through wounding.  These latter 
future generals became major generals after 27 years in the army compared to 31.8 
years for the ‘others’ who were not wounded on the battlefield.  There are a number 
of important implications from these results. Promotion in the army was not divorced 
from merit, but the part it played may have depended on time period and social 
group. It may not have been an important factor in the promotion of aristocrats.  
However, for those not coming from aristocratic backgrounds merit could have 
played an important part in promotion.  The relative difference in the role merit 
played between the two periods for both social groups may be another indication that 
over time the role social status played in promotion to the highest levels experienced 
a relative decline due to the modernisation of the army. 
 
Table 19: The role of merit in promotion 
  
  1747 1800 
  Aristocrat ‘Others’ N Aristocrat ‘Others’ N 
Brevet Merit 37.0 43.0 4 28.5 28.7 10 
 Non-merit 24.5 37.0 46 23.4 29.9 40 
 N 22 28 50 19 31 50 
        
        
  1747 1800 
  Aristocrat ‘Others’ N Aristocrat ‘Others’ N 
Wounded Merit 26.9 32.3 17 24.0 27.0 19 
 Non-merit 24.0 33.1 33 24.6 31.8 31 
 N 22 28 50 19 31 50 
Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as length of time in years from entry to brigadier 
general (1747) or major general (1800).  Brevet counts major and lieutenant colonel brevets 
except those given for serving in the guards. 
 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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   V. Regimental mobility  
 
 
       It has become clear that social status, money, war and merit were all factors 
that to a greater or lesser extent played a role in becoming a general.  Another factor 
that may have been important was regimental mobility.  Officers might change 
regiments to try and accelerate their promotion prospects.  Hayes noted foot guards’ 
officers often used their army seniority to trade up to higher regimental ranks.68  
There seem to be two important questions regarding the way in which regimental 
mobility may have affected future generals’ career progression.  First, did regimental 
mobility lead to faster promotion in regimental rank?   Second, did the type of 
regiment served in affect speed of promotion?    
 
 
 In order to answer the question of whether regimental mobility led to faster 
promotion table 20 analyses the speed of promotion to the main regimental ranks, 
that had active military commands attached to them, for the future generals by the 
number of regiments they served with.  The extent that regimental mobility affected 
speed of regimental promotion seemed to depend very much on time period and 
social group.  In the early period most future generals only served in one or two 
regiments.  However, the extent of this also varied depending on social group.  It 
was far more likely for the future generals to serve in more regiments if they were not 
aristocrats.    Changing regiments during this time did not seem to lead to faster 
promotion.  For the ‘others’, serving in one regiment brought the fastest promotion 
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time to captain, while those serving in two regiments gained their regimental 
majorities and lieutenant colonelcies sooner than those serving in more regiments. 
This seemed to be a function of the more individualised career paths for early 
eighteenth-century future generals when skipping ranks was commonplace and it 
was not necessary to serve in many regiments to secure speedy promotion. 
 
Table 20: Regimental mobility  
  
 Average number of years taken to reach different regimental ranks from entry:  
1747                            Aristocrat                                                ‘Others’  
 Captain Major Lt. Colonel N Captain Major Lt. Colonel N 
Total 3.7 17.8 6.5 19 5.4 13.5 18.4 28 
 - number of regiments served with from entry to Lt. Colonel:   
1 3.5 14.3 8.5 8 4.4 13.5 23.2 8 
2 5.1 28.0 - 7 4.8 9.5 15.0 6 
3 1.75 - 4.5 4 5.1 15.0 15.8 7 
4 - - - 0 7.2 12.4 17.5 5 
5 - - - 0 7.0 17.0 20.5 2 
     
1800                            Aristocrat                                                ‘Others’  
 Captain Major Lt. Colonel N Captain Major Lt. Colonel N 
Total 6.1 14.5 14.5 19 8.0 15.6 20.9 31 
 - number of regiments served with from entry to Lt. Colonel:  
1 12.0 24.7 29.5 3 13.8 29.7 33.8 4 
2 12.5 20.5 22.0 2 6.7 19.5 27.3 9 
3 4.5 13.5 15.0 2 8.1 13.8 16.7 11 
4 3.7 8.0 9.9 10 6.0 11.7 20.0 4 
5 4.0 7.0 14.5 2 8.0 15.6 20.9 3 
Note: This analysis excludes three 1747 aristocratic future generals.  Marlborough and 
Montagu are not included as they never held any of the regimental ranks of captain, major or 
lieutenant colonel.  It has not been possible to trace the regiments Kerr served with before he 
became a regimental colonel so he has also been excluded.    
 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
 
 
With the slowing of regimental promotion times for the ranks of captain, major 
and lieutenant colonel over time, regimental mobility for the late eighteenth-century 
future generals appeared to play a far greater role in securing speedy promotion 
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than previously.  The later period future generals generally served in more regiments 
than their 1747 counterparts.  There was a particularly dramatic shift in the number 
of regiments aristocrats served in; 78% of the 1747 aristocratic future generals 
served in one or two regiments compared to only 26% by 1800. Slower regimental 
promotion times meant it was now a better career strategy to serve in more 
regiments in order to gain speedier promotion. For all the regimental ranks, 
regardless of social group, promotion was much slower if the future generals decided 
to serve in only one or two regiments. Thus, most future generals served in three or 
four regiments, which generally brought them quicker promotion.   
 
 
The speedier career progression facilitated by regimental mobility was 
illustrated by the career of Henry St John, an 1800 aristocratic general.  He entered 
the army as an ensign with the second foot guards in 1754.  In order to gain his 
captaincy St John then moved to the 18th foot in 1758.  Only two years after this he 
was able to gain a majority by switching to the 91st foot and then his lieutenant 
colonelcy in 1767 by again moving regiments, this time to the 67th foot.  Thus, 
serving with four different regiments facilitated St. John's career progression in the 
army.  However, serving in three or four regiments was not common for most late 
eighteenth-century officers.  Studies of mid-eighteenth-century infantry officers and 
late eighteenth-century army surgeons show that most officers served in only one or 
two regiments.69  The difference between the future generals and these other groups 
of officers may have been due to career success, different career lengths or perhaps 
a combination of these two factors.  This difference in the number of regiments 
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 Odintz, “The British Officer Corps”, Chart XIII, p. 332; Ackroyd et al, Advancing with the Army, Table 4.11, 
p. 168. 
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served with implies that a willingness to change regiments may have had a positive 
effect on future career progress for the later period future generals. 
 
 
 Speed of career progress may have also been affected by the type of 
regiment the future generals served with.  In the literature on the army the main 
distinction in regimental type is drawn between those who served in the guards and 
other officers.70   The reason for this is most officers in the guards had a higher army 
rank than their regimental rank.  Particularly favoured in this respect were guards 
captains who ranked as lieutenant colonels in the army.  The fact these officers had 
a regimental rank that was two ranks higher in the army possibly produced a number 
of advantages in promotion.  In terms of regimental promotion, a regimental captain 
in the guards as a lieutenant colonel in the army could become a regimental 
lieutenant colonel in another regiment or even gain promotion directly to regimental 
colonel.  As general was an army rank the higher rank of guards captains in the army 
may have allowed them to become general sooner compared to non-guards officers.   
  
 
 In order to assess the effect of regimental type on promotion speed a simple 
dichotomy is drawn between those future generals who held commissions as 
regimental captains in the guards and those that did not. Did holding a regimental 
captaincy in the guards lead to faster promotion?  Where guard’s captains promoted 
to regimental lieutenant colonel or colonel faster than their counterparts?  Did their 
higher army rank allow them to become generals sooner?   The evidence is mixed 
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on the difference regiment type provided in promotion.  In some instances holding a 
regimental captaincy in the guards did lead to quicker promotion.  For the ‘others’ 
who were generals in 1747 serving as a regimental captain in the guards led to 
quicker promotion for all of the regimental and army ranks analysed.  On the other 
hand, the advantage of regimental type was not as clear cut for the early period 
aristocrats.  It allowed these future generals promotion to regimental lieutenant 
colonel faster, but made no difference in the promotion times to regimental colonel 
and general.  Most advantages of regimental type in securing quicker promotion 
appeared to disappear by the late period. 
 
Table 21: Regiment type 
  
  1747 1800 
  Guards Non-Guards N Guards Non-Guards N 
Aristocrat B.Gen./M.Gen. 26.2 23.2 21 22.6 25.8 19 
 Colonel 19.0 12.5 21 24.1 23.9 18 
 Lt. Colonel 5.3 10.0 4 19.0 11.6 18 
 N 15 6 21 8 11 19 
        
  1747 1800 
  Guards Non-Guards N Guards Non-Guards N 
‘Others’ B.Gen./M.Gen. 34.5 36.9 28 32.3 29.1 31 
 Colonel 27.3 28.6 27 29.2 30.5 25 
 Lt. Colonel 16.0 18.9 22 28.5 18.9 28 
 N 8 20 28 7 24 31 
Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as average length of time in years from entry to 
obtaining stated rank. Guards are defined as those generals who at some point in their career 
held a commission in the guards as a regimental captain. Colonel and lieutenant colonel are 
regimental ranks not army ranks. This analysis excludes one 1747 aristocratic general as it 
has not been possible to trace the regiments Kerr served with before he became a regimental 
colonel.    
 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
 
In most cases, whether a future 1800 general was an aristocrat or ‘other’, spending 
time as a regimental captain in the guards did not produce faster promotion.  The 
only advantage seemed to be that later period aristocrats were able to become 
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generals quicker if they served in the guards. In summary, regiment type seemed to 
produce a small advantage in promotion times for a minority of officers that served 
as guard’s captains, but this was highly dependent on time period and social group.  
The ‘others’ who served as regimental captains in the guards in the early period 
were promoted more quickly on average than those that never held this position. In 
the later period the only advantage was for aristocrats serving in the guards who 
became generals sooner than their counterparts that did not serve in the guards. 
 
 
 
   VI. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has revealed that to a greater or lesser extent social status, 
money, war, merit and regimental mobility all played a role and affected the timing in 
becoming an operational general.   Social status regardless of time period triumphed 
at almost every turn.  Aristocrats entered at higher ranks, skipped ranks more often 
and were promoted much faster than their untitled colleagues.  The importance of 
social status was so great that the other factors affecting promotion often played only 
a limited role in the career progression of aristocrats.  Thus, aristocrats gained most 
of their promotions without paying for them and merit did not affect their promotion 
speed.  The role money played in promotion was slightly less than expected due to 
the influence of war.  Most of the future generals entered the army and gained 
promotion during wartime when non-purchase commissions were readily available 
so it was not necessary to buy commissions directly. However, purchase of 
commissions did produce faster promotion times.  It was very important during peace 
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due to the limited supply of officer places, and played a key role in the careers of a 
minority of officers who brought most of their commissions.  In common with money, 
the role non-social status factors played in promotion was more important for the 
‘others’.  Merit or serving as a regimental captain in the guards produced faster 
promotion times for the ‘others’ depending on the time period.  
 
 
Social status may have triumphed at almost every turn, but its importance 
appeared to decline over time as the army became more professional.  The relative 
difference between the promotion times of aristocrats and the ‘others’ narrowed over 
time. In the early period promotion was more individualised and this often led to 
greater advantages in promotion for aristocrats. A significant minority of aristocrats 
entered at regimental captain and it was not uncommon for aristocrats to jump 
straight from their entry rank to regimental colonel.  In contrast, the career paths of 
later period aristocrats were far more similar to the ‘others’.  Both social groups 
tended to enter the army at ensign and served in most regimental ranks apart from 
captain lieutenant.  This more structured career path led to slower promotion times 
for the main regimental ranks, although the army rank of general was attained 
sooner.  There was also greater uniformity in other areas, such as entry age, 
between social groups.  
 
 
One implication of the substantial advantage aristocrats had in promotion was 
that it may have had an adverse effect on military performance as aristocrats were 
over promoted.   This probably happened at times, but any negative impact on 
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military efficiency was minimised as the army usually only gave the key commander 
positions in important battles to those who also had talents as military commanders.  
Accordingly, an analysis of 52 of the major battles during the eighteenth-century 
showed that the aristocratic commanders had better records in producing victories 
than their non-aristocratic colleagues.   Moreover, poor performance in an 
operational capacity was usually dealt harshly with by the army authorities who often 
did not give subsequent commands of importance to those that failed or in extreme 
cases even dismissed them from the army. It should also be noted that the 
advantage aristocrats had in army careers may not have been too different from 
other careers in the eighteenth-century.   Consolvo’s study of late eighteenth-century 
navy lieutenants showed that interest or patronage, defined in part by social status, 
was the dominant factor in navy promotion and was far more important than merit.71  
In a similar fashion, Cavell in the most recent study of navy officers found that 
 "...in years when fewer positions were available for young gentleman, particularly in times of peace or 
when there was a marked surplus of officer aspirants, social influence of one form or another 
generally triumphed..."
72
      
 
  
 
 
                                                 
71
 Consolvo, “The Prospects and Promotion”, pp. 151-152. 
72
 Cavell, "A Social History”, p. 434. 
 
219 
 
Chapter seven: Rewards of army service 
 
 
    I.  Introduction  
 
An integral part of the argument for those claiming social mobility in the army 
was limited was that army officers received meagre rewards for their services. 1  It is 
often claimed the army was a losing concern for officers even if high rank was 
obtained.2  This seems rather puzzling.  Why would anyone enter a profession that 
produced financial losses for them?  The answer to this question this chapter argues 
is primarily related to the timeframe considered.  In the short term an army career did 
mostly produce losses for officers, but over the long-term the rewards from an army 
career outweighed short-term losses.  Long-term service in the army allowed officers 
to sell their commissions, the gains from which exceeded any short-term losses even 
for relatively unsuccessful officers.  If officers were very successful and became 
operational generals the financial and social gains could be large.  The rewards army 
officers gained from service are analysed in three main sections.  In the first part an 
overview is provided of the rewards and costs of army service.  The second part 
considers evidence for the short-term rewards and costs of army officers and the 
third part analyses long-term gains. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Otley, “The Social Origins”, pp. 213-215; Otley, “The Origins and Recruitment”, pp. 19, 81, 100. 
2
 Guy, “The Colonel’s Advantage”, p. 36; Glover, Wellington’s army, pp. 43, 149; Clayton, The British Officer,  
p. 55; Storrs and Scott, “The Military Revolution”, p. 31; Guy, “This Insulting Misfortune”, pp. 10-21; Odintz, 
“The British Officer Corps", p. 261. 
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Analysing the rewards and costs resulting from entering any particular career 
in the eighteenth-century is challenging due to the nature of surviving evidence.  
Some historians focus on the financial outcomes of careers through evidence of 
wealth left at death taken from probate valuations in wills.  This is the approach a 
recent study on British army surgeons adopted.3  It was notable that many officers in 
the surgeons’ sample, more than 100 doctors by my calculations, died after 1837.4  
This is important because 1837 was the point at which civil registration was adopted 
in England and Wales.   It was only after this happened that historians have been 
able to use a wealth at death approach due to the improved quality of evidence 
resulting from the adoption of civil registration.5  The outstanding historical 
contribution using this approach is the work by Rubinstein on the wealthiest 
individuals in Britain during the nineteenth-century.6  For officers from slightly earlier 
time periods it becomes impractical to use a wealth at death approach for two 
reasons.7  First, even when wills in this period contain estimates of wealth at death 
these are at best only general figures.  For example, according to the will of General 
Lord Fitzroy, an 1800 operational general, his wealth was "under £100,000" when he 
died in 1829. 8  Second, even the estimates tend to be inaccurate as probate returns 
during the early modern period excluded realty and debt.  Wealth estimates 
contained in wills were based on the value of personal property excluding any landed 
property and debts that may be owed.  As land was typically the most important 
financial asset and debts were commonplace excluding these items could drastically 
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alter the financial picture of individuals, a fact that might not be evident from probate 
records.    This can be seen from the financial records left behind by General Harris.  
His probate estimate of wealth at death was "under £90,000", whereas a statement 
of his concerns left with the intention of guiding his executors a few years before his 
death placed a value on all of his assets at £221,270 in 1812, including landed 
property in excess of £34,000. 9       
 
 
Another approach is to examine the income and expenditure of officers 
through their personal accounts.  This seems more promising for eighteenth-century 
officers, but finding personal accounts of these individuals is extremely difficult.10   
Perhaps this is why most historians do not attempt any but the most cursory 
examination of the rewards and costs of military officers.11  In the most recent 
research on the social origins of navy officers there was no assessment of their costs 
and rewards from primary sources because the data was thought to be 
unavailable.12   Only one historian, Alan Guy, has conducted an in depth analysis of 
military officers’ rewards and costs.  Guy tries to overcome these data problems by 
using a wide range of evidence including correspondence, official pay rates and 
contemporary publications specifying probable expenses.  Evidence drawn from 
personal accounts is limited to a single lieutenant colonel’s personal account for one 
year and several ‘stock purse’ fund accounts which shed light on part of captains’ 
rewards.13   
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   This chapter is a major departure from previous contributions on the rewards 
and costs of British officers by utilising previously unused data sources allowing a 
more in-depth analysis of officers’ personal financial affairs.  Most of the data is 
drawn from the account ledgers of the leading late eighteenth-century regimental 
agent, Cox and Co.  Richard Cox began this business with the agency of the first 
foot guards in 1758.  This business grew over the years and by 1811 Cox and 
Greenwood, as it later became known, accounted for 55% of all government 
payments to regimental agents.14  The account ledgers of Cox and Co. are 
organised by regiment and time period from the foundation of the business up until 
the early nineteenth-century.    Within each different regimental ledger there are 
several accounts relating to the pay of the regiment as a whole, such as the 
subsistence account, and personal accounts for most officers serving with the 
regiment.   
 
 
The personal accounts of officers contained within these regimental ledgers 
are analysed at two different levels.  To provide some perspective on the future 
generals’ accounts, the overall rewards and costs of 137 non-sample officers’ 
accounts who served at a similar time period and in the same regiments as the 
generals are analysed.  In order to ascertain whether future generals had surviving 
accounts with Cox it was first necessary to know what regiment they served in and 
when.  This information is only available for the sample officers whose career 
patterns were researched in detail.  In consequence, the analysis of rewards using 
the Cox evidence is based on the samples of generals drawn from the chapter on 
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 “An Account of the Annual Sums of Money paid, or due, to each and every of the Army Agents in Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland from 25th December 1810 to 24th December 1811”, Parliamentary Papers, 
Volume XII, (1812-1813), pp. 179-185.   
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careers.  This allows for more detailed analysis on the personal accounts of fourteen 
different future generals at various stages of their careers from ensign all the way up 
to general.   
 
 
In order to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of the main data source 
it is necessary to understand something of the business of regimental agents.  
Regimental colonels in the eighteenth-century were responsible for paying, feeding, 
clothing and providing weapons for their regiment.  In order to effectively accomplish 
these tasks regimental colonels appointed in their stead, by a personal power of 
attorney, a regimental agent to organise the financial administration of their 
regiment.15  The primary responsibility of a regimental agent was to receive pay from 
the pay office and distribute it to the regiment.  In addition, agents organised the 
delivery of clothing, weapons and any other items that were needed. 16   
 
 
Officers held personal accounts with their regimental agents mainly to receive 
their pay, but also because agents often acted for them in a private capacity.  The 
Deputy Secretary War noted in 1778:  
“HThe latter branch of the business which the agents transact partakes more of the nature of that of 
private agents to the several individuals of the regiment, whose interests and convenience their 
situation particularly enables them to promoteH.”
17
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One of their main private roles was to act as private bankers to officers.18  In 
common with other professional groups, such as attorneys, regimental agents were 
ideally placed to perform private banking functions due to their good credit and close 
connections to the officers they served.19   It is not possible to know exactly how 
agents managed their private business due to lack of surviving evidence, yet it 
seems probable they adopted similar policies to other private banks in this period.   
 
 
During this time private banks lent to their customers small amounts of money 
charging little or no interest. Some 23% of all loans by C. Hoare, a leading London 
private bank for aristocrats and the gentry, in the early eighteenth-century were 
charged no interest.20  Another important practice was to have an extremely 
concentrated loan portfolio.  Hoare’s focused on lending large amounts of money 
usually at the usury rate of 5% to a few customers who could provide good levels of 
collateral and were well known by the bank.21  During 1705-1709, 69% of all money 
lent was allocated to the top twenty clients of the bank.22  Attorneys also often loaned 
small amounts interest free to many people with most of their lending by value 
concentrated in a few mortgages at the rate of 5% to well-known local individuals.23   
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The evidence on regimental agents seems to suggest a similar mode of 
operation.  Many agents appeared to loan small amounts to officers at no or little 
interest against future pay.  For example, when Lieutenant Philip Thicknesse, who 
squandered over £12 on a drunken night out in London, was left with only a penny to 
his name his agent advanced him six months’ pay.24  It is noticeable that the 
personal accounts of officers with Cox do not show any interest charges for small 
debts. However, there were limits to the amount of interest-free credit agents 
advanced officers.  On one of the bills of Charles Harris with Cox in 1811, who was a 
cavalry officer and the son of General George Harris, it was requested that "Hyou 
[Charles Harris] will not draw upon us [Cox] again until the balance of £44.17.0 is 
liquidatedH”25  Large loans were made to some officers, but in a similar fashion to 
Hoare’s these seemed concentrated among a few wealthy individuals.  Calcraft, the 
dominant agent of the Seven Years War (1757-1763), lent as much as £5,000 for 
mortgages, but mostly to aristocrats.26  Likewise, loans appearing in the sample 
future generals’ personal accounts belonged to officers who were already very 
wealthy in their own right, such as Earl Ligonier, or the sons of wealthy individuals 
most of whom were aristocrats such as Ludlow, the son of an earl who had repeated 
loans from Cox.  One consequence of this was that Cox’s accounts of higher ranking 
officers were often more in-depth and contained greater detail than for other ranks.    
 
 
  Even though Cox’s policies may have been similar to private banks, the 
nature of the evidence drawn from regimental ledgers is different in two respects 
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from private banks.  Firstly, regimental agents and private banks had different types 
of client.  Private banks concentrated on only the wealthiest individuals. 27   
Consequently, few private bank accounts for the sample officers were found at 
Drummonds, a leading London private banking that had close connections to the 
army, when they were junior or even middle ranking officers.  Apart from one 
aristocrat, only lieutenant colonels or higher seemed to have private bank accounts.  
Thus, at best private bank accounts represent only a limited slice of military society.  
In contrast, personal accounts of officers with their regimental agents were not 
limited to only the wealthiest.  Virtually every officer with the regiment had an 
account with their agent.  This can be shown by comparing the quantity of officers’ 
accounts contained in particular ledgers with corresponding army lists for the same 
year.  There were 83 officers listed in the 1772 army list for the first foot guards, all of 
whom had personal accounts in the corresponding Cox ledger.  In a similar fashion, 
28 out of 29 officers for the 10th foot in 1793 had accounts with Cox.28  Availability of 
accounts was limited by the development of Cox’s regimental agency business.  As 
Cox’s first agency was the first foot guards, and his business developed gradually 
over time, the surviving evidence, particularly for the mid eighteenth-century when 
many future generals were beginning their careers, is primarily drawn from guards’ 
officers.  As the guards served half their time at home few personal accounts remain 
for officers serving in colonial locations where the rewards of service were different.   
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    Secondly, the quality of information contained within each personal account 
with regimental agents is quite different to similar accounts for private banks.  Most 
of the private bank accounts of officers examined contain little information on the 
nature of incomings and outgoings.  The majority of entries merely mention the name 
of the individual concerned who paid or received money without any indication as to 
the nature of the transaction.  In cases where this does not occur usually the 
transaction is merely listed as cash.  Therefore, it is only possible to get a broad 
sense of military income or expenditure through identifying payments or receipts 
from the officer’s regimental agents.  The accounts with Cox, especially on the 
income side, contain far more information as to the exact nature of transactions.  For 
instance, the different types of salary, subsistence and arrears, are individually 
identified as are most other income sources.  On the expenditure side the quality of 
information is less revealing.  It is not possible to identify the details of most 
expenditure.  Many of the entries are of a general nature and do not specify the 
expense they relate to.  A common practice was to have expenditure descriptions, 
such as subsistence or arrears, the two parts of an officer's salary, the opposite to 
the same income descriptions.  Another general expenditure descriptor used was 
expenditure on ‘himself’.  Moreover, the largest amounts of expenditure in the 
accounts were usually classified as payments to particular individuals, most of whom 
cannot be identified, without any indication of what these expenses related to.  Some 
of the extraordinary expenditure, such as recruiting expenses or fees paid for 
commissions, can be precisely identified, but these were for amounts much less than 
those that cannot be identified.  Thus, it is highly probable that any estimate of 
extraordinary expenditure is understated.   
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Another weakness of the accounts is that at best they provide a snapshot of 
the military rewards and costs officers at a particular point in time, but they say very 
little of career returns.   
 
 
Many officers would have had personal accounts with different financial 
institutions that were separate from their regimental agent.  Hence, an important 
question is to what extent did accounts with officers’ regimental agents capture the 
total military income and expenses of individual officers?  One way of assessing this 
is to examine the flows of military income for officers whose financial affairs survive 
in great detail.  One such officer was General George Harris.  In 1816 he managed 
his military affairs through his account with Cox and his private finances through two 
bank accounts, one with his local bank in Faversham, Wright and Hilton, and the 
other with Coutts.  An examination of these various accounts shows that although 
military payments could be and were occasionally received through private banks the 
vast amount of military income flowed through his regimental agent.  In 1816 only 
£400 out £6,099 in military income was not deposited with Cox.29  Therefore, if 
Harris’s financial affairs were representative of officers generally, accounts with 
regimental agents should capture most military income and expenditure, except 
perhaps if the officers were based abroad in which case some military income would 
only show up with their local agents where they were serving.  There are inevitably 
other aspects of officers’ financial affairs that are not contained in these accounts.  
The accounts are missing most non-military income, which only appears incidentally 
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in them, and stocks of wealth.  For the more successful officers, the military side of 
their financial affairs may have not been as important as other revenue streams.  
Returning to Harris’s accounts, his non-military income exceeded £37,000 in 1816, a 
sum far greater than his military income.30   
 
 
The main source on officers’ rewards and costs of service, the personal 
accounts of officers located in the regimental agent ledgers from Cox and Co., are 
supplemented by two different types of sources.   Firstly, private bank accounts of 
officers held at Drummonds, a London private bank, are utilised. The Drummonds 
accounts concern three different future generals whose accounts contain details of 
their army income when they were lieutenant colonels.   Secondly, the surviving 
personal papers of Generals Harris and Lindsay, two 1800 operational generals who 
gained colonial command appointments, are used to shed light on rewards gained 
when serving abroad.  This is only possible because both of these generals left 
behind large collections of documents pertaining to their personal financial affairs, 
including much detail on the financial returns of their army service.  Details drawn 
from Harris's correspondence, official papers, legal documents, personal accounts of 
his army pay and of the property he brought back from India are used to get a sense 
of the capital gains he made from serving in the army.  The surviving accounts of 
Lindsay’s Jamaican agent and his regimental agent in England, John Carstairs, 
allows analysis to be conducted of Lindsay’s military rewards and costs received 
when he served as lieutenant governor of Jamaica between 1796 and 1799.  It is 
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also possible to get a sense of the indirect profit opportunities high command 
provided officers serving in the colonies in two ways.  In the first place, the accounts 
Lindsay had with Adams, Robertson and Co., detailing the profits he made from his 
part in a government military contract, are used to show one type of indirect profit 
opportunity from serving in the colonies.  In the second place, it was popular for 
officers based in the colonies to make capital gains or provide additional income 
streams through the acquisition of cheap property.  Lindsay’s manuscript volumes on 
his Jamaican plantations are used to illustrate the extent that some officers gained 
from the acquisition of cheap property while serving in the colonies.   
 
 
Together the personal papers of Harris and Lindsay provide a valuable insight 
into the gains from army service of those who held colonial command appointments 
as profits from service abroad are not always included in the accounts of officers’ 
regimental agents in England.  These sources of evidence are also not without their 
own weaknesses.   They only provide a snapshot of the returns of service at various 
points in time, rather than allowing an assessment of the net gains from army service 
over the course of a career.  For both Harris and Lindsay these snapshots are 
inevitably when they had already obtained very senior positions in the army and say 
nothing about the early and middle stages of their careers.  In a similar fashion, the 
bank accounts at Drummonds are only for officers who were already lieutenant 
colonels, a rank most officers never reached.  Moreover, details of the individual 
transactions flowing through the bank accounts are very limited to say the least.          
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II. Rewards and costs of army service  
 
 
The origins of army compensation can be traced back to medieval times when 
Kings raised armies by sub-contracting this work out to knights.  Financial 
compensation was given to knights in return for raising and maintaining a specified 
force of men.31   Thus, most early regiments and companies became entrepreneurial 
undertakings for those officers in charge of them.  Officers were paid a low basic 
wage, but were in return able to extract legitimate profits and rents from the 
management of their companies or regiments.  This system continued into the 
eighteenth-century, but there was gradually a transition away from pre-modern 
proprietary soldiering to a system based on fixed salaries and allowances within a 
hierarchical structure.32   Officers were compensated for their labour in a number of 
different ways that reflected these early origins and the subsequent move away from 
proprietary soldiering to a more bureaucratic payment structure.   
 
 
The main way officers were rewarded was through a salary set by the 
government consisting of two different payments, subsistence and arrears. This 
salary only varied according to rank, regiment type and establishment.  Higher ranks 
earned a greater salary, but payments to the same rank could also be different 
depending on the type of regiment served with and whether it was based on the 
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English or Irish establishment.33  As table 22 shows, officers in the cavalry and 
guards were paid more than other officers.  This was due to the extra expenditure 
these officers were expected to undertake, such as in the maintenance of horses for 
cavalry officers.  There was also a difference in salary between English and Irish 
establishment officers.  Officers on the Irish establishment typically received a 
slightly lower salary than for the English establishment.  For example, a captain in 
the foot on the English establishment was paid 7s 6d per diem in subsistence 
compared to 7s 1d for his counterpart on the Irish establishment.34   
 
Table 22: Annual payments of subsistence and arrears to officers on the English establishment, 1795 
  
  Dragoons Foot Guards Foot 
  Subsistence Arrears Subsistence Arrears Subsistence Arrears 
  £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
 Colonel 483.12.6 112.12.3 547.10.0 126.14.3 328.10.0 80.7.0 
 Lt. Colonel 337.12.6 79.14.10 392.7.6 100.6.5 237.5.0 52.7.0 
 Major 283.17.6 66.7.0 337.12.6 85.13.5 209.17.6 45.13.10 
 Captain 209.17.6 54.3.5 228.2.6 56.17.6 136.17.6 33.9.7 
 Lieutenant 127.15.0 25.11.4 109.10.0 24.10.6 63.17.6 15.12.5 
 Ensign/Coronet 109.10.0 26.15.8 82.2.6 17.13.7 54.15 7.14.3 
Source: Williamson, A Treatise of Military Finance 1
st
 Ed., pp. 17, 19, 2nd Ed., pp. 25-27. 
 
 
Another aspect of officers’ compensation evident in table 22 is that most of 
the salary paid was in the form of subsistence.  This was to cover daily food and 
drink and subsistence payments were supposed to be received every two months.35 
There was a much longer delay in receiving the balance of pay, called arrears.  This 
should have been remitted every six months, but there could be even more 
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substantial delays as payments were held back until regimental accounts were 
closed at the end of a financial period to act as an insurance policy against fraud or 
incompetence.36   These salary scales were established early in the eighteenth-
century and remained essentially unchanged for most of the century: officers on the 
English establishment received the same salary in 1785 as 1725. This was a 
constant cause of complaint by officers as some living costs rose substantially during 
this time.  As one officer put it: 
 
"...Butcher's meat and bread, are at present four times the prices they were when the pay was first 
established; and every absolute necessity of life in the same proportion, from the decrease of the 
value of money, the extensive commerce, and riches of the kingdom, and the great taxes which have 
since been laid on every article of universal consumption...."
37
 
 
 
There were some changes in salaries paid during the eighteenth-century, but 
considering the interval of time they remained relatively minor.  The pay of junior 
officers and captains on the Irish establishment increased 2d and 6d per diem 
respectively in 1754 and in 1797 subalterns gained an extra 1s a day.  From 25 June 
1806, the salaries of all officer ranks rose; the per diem salary a captain received, for 
example, increased from 9s 5d to 10s 6d.  Widows’ pensions also rose and for the 
first time lieutenants with more than seven years’ service gained a higher salary than 
other lieutenants and brevets also received additional pay. 38       
 
 
Officers could also earn additional salaries through appointments to military 
jobs within their regiment and the wider army.  Each regiment had vacancies for an 
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adjutant who was responsible for discipline and clothing, a quartermaster who looked 
after housing and operations and a paymaster.  However, most military jobs were 
only available at the army level and were usually reserved for experienced officers.  
For middle ranking officers the most common job was as aides-de-camp (ADCs), 
personal assistants to generals who they assisted with administrative tasks such as 
writing letters and delivering messages.39  By the Napoleonic wars, general officers 
were allowed one ADC, divisional commanders two and the commander of the 
forces four.40  Once officers had obtained the most junior general rank on the army 
list they were eligible to be selected for general command or staff positions. 41  The 
salaries for general appointments were standardised by the type of job and 
geographical location.  For instance, in 1762 a major general on the Irish staff 
received an extra income of £547, while a lieutenant general was paid £1,095.42  All 
lieutenant generals on staff in Europe thus received the same salary, but the salary 
of a lieutenant general in another geographical location might be different.  Most 
general appointments were only available during war and so income from these 
positions disappeared during peace.  Officers could also be appointed to 
governorships and lieutenant governorships.   
 
 
The second way officers were compensated for their labour was through the 
payment of allowances intended to compensate for extra expenses incurred as a 
consequence of military service.  The two most common allowances that officers 
received were for baggage and forage.  Baggage money was used to finance the 
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purchase of horses needed to carry officers’ equipment on active service, while 
forage provided money to feed these horses.  As with salaries, allowances were 
graduated according to rank.   Each rank was allocated a certain number of horses 
on active service and allowances were paid in proportion to the number of horses 
they were allowed.    During 1794 the number of horses each officer was allowed in 
an infantry regiment varied from one for every two junior officers to nine for a colonel.  
Officers were granted a baggage allowance of £18 18s per horse and their forage 
allowance for 100 days ranged from £8 8s for two junior officers to £27 10s for a 
colonel.43  Officers usually received 200 days of forage every year, if they were on 
active service, in two half yearly payments.44  Apart from payments for baggage and 
forage, there were a whole host of other allowances officers might also receive 
including for servants, travel, lodging, cost of ‘fire and candle’ in quarters, losses of 
equipment or camp necessaries.45  In addition, for every company the regimental 
colonel was entitled to a ‘colonel’s man’ to cover the loss of clothing from deserters.  
This allowance was worth approximately £73 for regiments of horse, £45 12s 10d for 
dragoon regiments and £21 5s 10d for foot.46    Allowances paid also varied with 
geographical location.  Officers posted to India received different allowances to 
home officers as they were paid the same allowances as their East India Company 
counterparts.    The main allowance officers received in India, called Batta, was 
given as  
“... the climate of India, and several customs that cannot easily be altered, expose European officers 
to some articles of expense, which are not indispensably requisite in other parts of the world where 
British troops are stationed..."
47
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Officers could receive half, full or double Batta. The levels of Batta payments, 
however, were not wholly related to expenses, but rather to the ability of the local 
government where they were stationed to pay.    Batta allowances were highest in 
Bengal where living costs were the lowest, whereas Bombay had higher costs but 
lower allowances.48    
 
 
A final income stream available to officers was profits derived from their 
command positions.   The origin of these profits dates back to the Middle Ages when 
commands were entrepreneurial concerns for officers.  Within every regiment, each 
company (infantry) or troop (cavalry) had a ‘stock purse’ or ‘non-effective’ fund to pay 
for the cost of recruiting, supplying horses and any unforeseen contingencies that 
may arise.  According to Guy, these contingencies included:  
“... allowances to riding masters or rough-riders in the horse and dragoons, payments to the surgeon 
to enable him to maintain his medicine chest, the cost of treating the sick and burying the dead, the 
hire of storehouses and parade grounds, gratuities attending the alteration of consignments of new 
clothing or compiling muster rolls, the printing of furlough and discharge warrants, the cost of 
advertizing and taking up deserters, fees charged on warrants, postage and regimental 
stationery....”
49
     
 
The income for the "stock purse" or "non-effective" fund was derived from 
subsistence payments to non-effective personnel.  All companies were allocated the 
subsistence of two "warrant men" to finance recruiting and also usually benefited 
from one to four "contingent men" to increase wartime strength.  These latter "fake 
men" were created by not recruiting regiments to full strength and a regulation of 
1743 reserved £5 per man in the non-effective accounts to bring companies up to full 
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strength if ordered.50  Originally these allowances appeared in the subsistence rolls 
under fake names.   However, from 1716 the "fake men" had to be entered 
separately on regimental ledgers.51  Additional income was generated from the 
subsistence payments for personnel that needed to be recruited.  There was usually 
a difference between pay received from the war office based on the established 
strength of a regiment and its actual numbers.  For example, the full establishment of 
the 73rd foot in 1823 was 650, but there were only 618 effectives as 33 were 
"wanting to complete".52  The ‘stock purse’ received extra income for the subsistence 
of these men.  Supplementary income was also possibly gained through rent-
seeking activities.  Captains were responsible for making various deductions from 
soldiers pay.  Many of these were legitimate, such as stoppages made for the 
Chelsea Hospital, but there were probably illegal stoppages as well.  When musters 
of troop strength were taken every two months there was an incentive to falsify 
returns so that the actual strength matched the established strength in order to retain 
surplus pay. 53  This vacant pay was frequently retained by the colonel.54    
 
 
The captain of each troop or company, who was responsible for managing the 
‘non-effective’ fund, often received a cash dividend if this fund generated a yearly 
surplus.  This was supposed to benefit the captains of companies "...partly in aid of 
their extraordinary expenses, and partly as a reward for their care and diligence in 
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completing their companies...."55   However, if the fund generated a deficit the 
captain might be forced to make up the balance with part of his personal pay or have 
a negative balance carried forward.56  It is difficult to know the extent of profits 
generated for captains through the management of the ‘stock purse’.  Guy estimated 
captains received a cash dividend of £20 on average for managing an infantry 
company during the 1740s, while Hayes asserted dividends were limited at best and 
at worst no profits were made.57 Guy’s estimate was derived from testimony given to 
a parliamentary enquiry, which may have resulted in underestimating the income 
gained from these sources.  An assessment of the cash dividend during the early 
eighteenth-century, a slightly earlier period than for Guy’s estimate, claimed captains 
earned on average 10% of the total subsistence or a cash dividend of £60 a year for 
infantry officers.58   Not all captains of companies received this dividend.  The 
regimental colonel’s ‘non-effective’ dividends were usually paid to or at least shared 
with the captain lieutenant, who in the colonel's absence administered their 
company.59    European armies followed similar systems with one notable difference; 
captains in European armies generally earned more than their British counterparts.  
The reason for this was that captains in European armies managed the procurement 
of items such as clothing, which was the responsibility of the regimental colonel in 
the British army.  This important difference meant that a captain in the Prussian army 
could earn twenty times the pay of a first lieutenant.60 
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 Management of clothing procurement was one of the main profits regimental 
colonels derived from their positions. They received a dividend, deducted from 
soldiers’ pay, for providing the regiment’s clothing and equipment.  Colonels usually 
made a profit from this enterprise as clothing payments received from the war office 
were based on the full regimental establishment rather than the actual numbers 
serving.  However, making profits from clothing was complicated by delays in 
payments.  There were usually lengthy delays between delivery of clothing and 
payment from the pay office, which often reduced profits.  The payments for clothing, 
called ‘net off reckonings’, were not received until the end of a clothing cycle, usually 
a year for the infantry and up to three for the cavalry, and during war there could be 
further delays of up to twelve months in receiving payment.  These delays meant 
colonels either had to pay for clothing out of their own capital or on credit with high 
interest rates.61  Guy estimates colonels made between £550 for the foot and £908 
for the horse guards every year from 1733 to 1758.62  Originally colonels also 
arranged for the provision of weapons.  This role was superseded by the Board of 
Ordinance in 1740 for the infantry, but in the cavalry colonels continued to enter into 
private contracts for pistols and swords until the 1780s.63   
 
 
 Returns from clothing and equipment could increase if colonels decided to 
behave opportunistically to raise their profits from this enterprise.  This was usually 
done by reducing the quality or quantity of articles supplied. From the few frauds that 
became public knowledge it is evident this occurred.  One such case was when 
Lieutenant General Robert Dalzell, a 1747 operational general, was found guilty in 
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the early 1750s of only supplying 300 suits for an establishment of 500. This kind of 
abuse was supposed to be prevented by a general officer from the clothing board 
confirming the quality and quantity of clothing being delivered and the regiment’s 
lieutenant colonel certifying delivery.  However, in the Dalzell case it was discovered 
the supervising general only examined 50 or 60 suits before passing the inspection 
and the certificates of delivery were falsified. 64  Similar cases of abuse occurred in 
the private supply of highland pistols to cavalry regiments during the Seven Years 
War.  An allowance of £1 15s per pistol pair was given to colonels for the supply of 
these weapons, but it was later discovered that some colonels were buying poor 
quality pistols at only 18s a pair.65 
 
 
There were also other rent-seeking activities colonels could profit from.  As 
regimental agents were appointed by the colonel often he would receive some 
monetary compensation for this favour.  In return for executing his public duties the 
regimental agent was usually paid two customary allowances.  An agent’s man, the 
equivalent of a private’s subsistence allowance, was deducted from the subsistence 
of every troop or company in the regiment.66  There was also an agency allowance of 
two pence in the pound from the remaining pay of the regiment.67  It was common for 
agents to hand over the return for the agent’s men to their colonel or receive both 
allowances with the proviso they would pay a fixed yearly amount to the colonel.  An 
example of this was when William Adair paid Major General Huske £60 per annum 
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for his agency of foot.68  Some agencies were also purchased from the colonel, yet 
this seems to have only happened in a minority of cases.69  Colonels might also 
obtain payment from clothiers for dispensing clothing contracts.  It is reputed that in 
1686 clothiers were offering colonels £600 for contracts.70  In addition, it was 
possible for colonels to sell junior commissions or their recommendation.  A 
regimental agent testifying before parliament in 1746 revealed that his colonel had 
sold an adjutant’s commission for £300 and two chaplaincies for £400 and £500 
respectively.71   
 
 
 Officers’ salaries may not have changed much during the eighteenth-century, 
but there were nonetheless important changes related to the modernisation of the 
army that impacted on rewards received.  On the one hand, the globalisation of 
warfare and expansion of Britain's empire that resulted from victory in the Seven 
Years War created more opportunities for army officers to be employed abroad as 
the number of regiments permanently based in colonial locations expanded 
significantly.72  Consequently, officers were more likely to remain on full pay during 
peace than their earlier eighteenth-century counterparts and prize money 
opportunities increased as most prize money was gained in India.  On the other 
hand, other aspects of the modernisation of the army may have adversely affected 
the rewards of army officers.  The move away from the entrepreneurial model of 
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soldiering to more professional structures meant the crown increasingly tried to 
restrict profits derived from command.  The legitimate profits captains derived from 
the management of their companies were restricted. A series of regulations between 
1749 and 1766 reduced most flexible dividends to fixed annual allowances.   By 
1766 captains’ ‘profits’ were limited to an annual allowance of £20 for those in the 
infantry and £30 for the cavalry.73    Further reforms were to follow in the 1780s when 
‘warrant’ and ‘contingent’ men were replaced by an annual allowance to the captain.  
Guards’ captains, however, were exempt from these reforms and continued to 
receive flexible dividends.  There were also attempts to eliminate some of the more 
dubious profits officers made.  A number of regulations were introduced concerning 
the stoppages from soldiers pay (1717, 1721, 1732, 1749) and musters (1747) to 
prevent illegal stoppages and the falsifying of musters.74     
 
 
The rewards officers gained from their service were used to meet several 
expenses.  The most immediate costs for officers were daily living expenses which 
included breakfast and dinner, wine and beer, new clothing such as shirts and 
stockings, basic stationery and other miscellaneous items like hair powder and a 
soldier who acted as a servant.  According to Simes, who wrote a contemporary 
guide for young officers, an ensign’s yearly subsistence in the infantry of £54 15s 
should have been sufficient to cover these expenses of £46 11s 8d. 75   Most junior 
officers did seem able to finance their daily living requirements through their salary.76    
John Moore, an 1800 operational general, remarked that the salary he received 
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when he was a lieutenant was "... not more than enough to make me live with some 
little degree of comfort...."77   
 
 
The problem for officers was not so much in meeting their daily living 
expenses, but rather in paying for what officers termed ‘extraordinary expenses’.78   
The largest extraordinary expense was purchasing commissions.  A 1765 regulation 
set out the prices at which commissions should be bought and sold.  The full 
purchase prices, which essentially remained unchanged for the remainder of the 
period, varied from £400 for an ensign in an infantry regiment to £6,700 for a 
lieutenant colonel in the foot guards.79   Serving officers buying a commission sold 
their existing commission which meant it was unusual to pay the full purchase price 
for commissions, except in the case of first commissions.  The price paid for 
commissions therefore was the difference between the price of the new commission 
and the return gained from selling the old commission.  These differences, or what 
contemporaries called ‘succession prices’, based on the regulation prices ranged 
from £150 for a lieutenant in the foot to £2,800 for a major in the foot guards.80  
However, it was not unusual for the actual market prices paid for commissions to be 
different from official prices.  Depending on a number of demand and supply factors - 
such as desirability of where the regiment was stationed, the availability of non-
purchase commissions and the price demanded by the seller - the market price 
could either be cheaper or more expensive than the regulation price.81  For instance, 
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according to some authorities during peace time it was common for officers who 
purchased promotion to “almost always” pay more than the regulation price.82     
 
 
 Another major extraordinary expense arose from the fact officers were 
expected to supply their own regimentals, that is to say, military dress and 
equipment.  This was a relatively large setup cost at the beginning of a career.    The 
initial clothing and equipment list of a new officer joining the third dragoons in 1811 
included the following items:  
1 regimental camlet coat 
1 regimental great coat 
2 regimental jackets 
2 pair overalls 
2 white regimental waistcoats 
3 white waistcoats for evening dress 
2 pair refs blue pantaloons 
3 pair white pantaloons 
1 regimental saddle and bridle  
1 marching collar 
1 coat case 
1 valise  
1 pack saddle 
1 regimental hat 
A set of regimental buff belts 
A black patent leather sword belt 
1 sabre 
1 parade sword 
1 parade sword knot 
Pair of pistols 
Pair of large regimental spars (sic) 
2 Pair of small spars (sic) 83 
 
In 1799 Coronet Richard Jones wrote to Major General George Harris, a friend of his 
uncle’s, requesting a loan of £100 as he did not have the means to buy the 
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equipment necessary for a cavalry officer and could not join his regiment without it.84   
Similarly, it has been estimated the initial equipment required of a new ensign cost 
as much as £100, nearly double an ensign's full year salary.85  In addition, certain 
types of regiments, such as the cavalry or guards who had higher salaries, also 
entailed greater extraordinary expenses.    In the cavalry some of these additional 
costs related to working with horses.  Officers may have had to spend money on the 
purchase or breaking of horses.86  The expense of regimentals was not limited to 
new officers alone.  Most officers embarking on active service abroad usually 
required some additional equipment.87  When Ensign Lister was ordered to America 
with the 10th foot in 1771 he spent £36 on equipment for colonial service.88   
 
 
Apart from purchasing commissions and equipment, officers were faced with 
many other extraordinary expenses.  Officers may have received allowances to 
recompense them for military duties involving extra expense, but these often proved 
inadequate.  Additional expenses not covered by government allowances were fairly 
common for officers on recruiting duty or other activities requiring travel.89  Officers 
recruiting paid new soldiers a bounty to enlist, but any losses accruing from bounty 
jumpers were the personal responsibility of the officer.90  Further losses for recruiting 
officers could also result from the rejection of new soldiers by field officers back at 
the regiment, personnel lost in travelling to the regiment and the necessity of paying 
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a bounty during wartime that exceeded the official allowance in order to gain 
sufficient recruits.  Officers who had frequent changes of location were also put to 
some personal expense.91  Other extraordinary expenses were a direct result of the 
army's drinking and gambling culture. 92   This was especially the case in foreign 
locations; as Moore remarked in 1781 about Gibraltar, "... a spirit for play prevailed in 
this garrison..."93  Indeed, Conway notes that gambling ruined many officers 
stationed in America during the American war and led to some leaving the army.94  
The mess bills of the 73rd foot demonstrate this also entailed extra expense for 
those at home.  Junior officers often had bets with higher ranking field officers for 
one or two bottles of wine.  There were also a variety of fines levied on ensigns and 
lieutenants for such things as spilt wine or not wearing the proper uniform on duty.95   
 
 
Levels of extraordinary expense typically increased with promotion.  Captains 
of companies faced additional expenditure in managing their company.  Company 
commanders arranged the supply of soldiers’ necessaries or equipment, which were 
paid for through deductions from current pay or debited against future pay.  
Consequently, many troops were in debt to their captains, but it was not always 
possible for these debts to be paid off.  Soldiers transferred from one regiment to 
another, called drafting, usually went with their necessaries, which might result in 
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losses for their captains.  As Lieutenant Colonel Edward Windus complained in 
1760:  
"... Our Captains suffer greatly by giving these drafts... all are obliged to send them complete in 
necessaries, even those which are greatly in debt, which is so much loss to each captain..."
96
  
 
Apart from drafting, losses from necessaries resulted from desertion.  Senior 
regimental army officers, those ranked major and above, were subject to even higher 
extraordinary expenses caused by increasing social, regimental and paternal 
obligations.  A colonel’s expenses included entertainment, assisting unlucky troops 
and providing the bulk of the regiment’s funds for music and horses.97  A general had 
to provide a mess for his immediate staff and to entertain visiting senior officers and 
their staff.  Moreover, if a general wanted to employ additional ADCs he had to pay 
for them from his private funds.  This was particularly problematic if a general of 
modest means succeeded to the command of a rich aristocrat as he inherited his 
predecessor’s pay roll.  This happened to General Hope during the Peninsular War 
when he succeeded to the most expensive command, Graham's corps.  In 
consequence, even though he received pay of £1,861 this was not able to cover his 
annual expenses of £2,140.98   
 
 
III. Short-term rewards  
 
 
The historical background to the rewards and costs of officers seems to 
suggest that an army career was a losing concern.  Does the evidence drawn from 
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officers’ personal accounts with their regimental agents support this hypothesis?  
The answer to this question is examined in two parts.  In this section the "short-term" 
rewards and costs of army service are analysed.  The term "short-term" is used as a 
frame of reference for the rewards and costs of army service at the beginning or 
middle stages of an army career, examining the returns of officers between the 
regimental ranks of ensign and lieutenant colonel.  Then in the next section “long-
term” rewards are analysed.  These are defined as rewards and costs at the end of a 
career or after becoming general officers.  They are “long-term” in the sense that 
these rewards could only usually be realised after twenty years’ service in the army. 
 
 
The first measure of the "short-term" rewards and costs of army service is the 
overall rewards and costs of the non-sample officers who were contemporaries of 
the future generals and served in the same regiments.  These accounts provide a 
good comparative yardstick for the future generals’ accounts because they are 
based on a much larger sample size and give a means to assess how representative 
future generals’ accounts were for army officers generally, as the experience of 
future generals may have been different from officers who did not rise so high in the 
service.  In addition, these accounts should also help to shed light on whether there 
was any difference between regiments.  Differences in regiment type are hard to 
capture for the future generals because the only data on balances for generals when 
they held junior ranks was for those serving in the guards.     
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Table 23 shows the overall rewards and costs of the non-sample officers who 
held the regimental ranks from ensign to lieutenant colonel in the first foot guards, 
12th and 20th foot regiments between 1765 and 1774.    The most reliable 
conclusions about the rewards and costs of these officers can be drawn for the ranks 
of ensign, lieutenant and captain. The reason for this is that these ranks contained 
the most number of officers and annual observations that were analysed. For 
example, in the Guard's ledger for this period there were accounts relating to 33 
different ensigns covering 85 annual observations.  On the other hand, it is very 
difficult to read too much into the major and lieutenant colonel accounts of foot 
officers as these covered so few individuals and annual observations.  Moreover, it 
was also not possible to compare foot majors and lieutenant colonels to their guards’ 
counterparts as all the majors and lieutenant colonels in the guards were also 
generals in the army and as such were not comparable. 
 
Table 23: Annual rewards and costs of non-sample officers,  1765-1774 
   
Ensign Lieutenant Captain Major Lt. Colonel  
 Guards Foot Guards Foot Guards Foot Foot Foot  
 £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £  
Mean rewards 105 82 225 134 527 327 263 1499  
Mean costs 103 78 209 132 503 291 218 935  
Mean balance 2 4 16 2 24 37 45 564  
% in credit 38 43 38 28 44 35 64 60  
Standard deviation 28 26 212 84 108 243 56 1373  
No. of officers 33 18 27 20 25 11 2 1  
No. of years 85 80 78 97 95 54 11 5  
Note: Standard deviation is the standard deviation of balances.     
 
Source: Cox, A/56/e/70.0.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1770-1774, ff. 1-208; Cox 
A/56/e/89.0.  Agent’s Ledger 12th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 1-177; Cox A/56/e/99.0.  Agent’s 
Ledger 20th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 31-190. 
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 The first conclusion that can be drawn is that these accounts clearly show that 
it was a struggle for junior officers, ensigns and lieutenants, to survive financially on 
the meagre rewards of their service. The average balance of ensigns was only £2 for 
the guards and £4 for the foot, while the mean balance as lieutenants for foot officers 
seemed to decline slightly.  A rather odd finding was that lieutenants in the guards 
had a mean balance of £16, which was strikingly different to their balance as ensigns 
or for foot lieutenants. Further investigation reveals the unexpected mean balance 
for lieutenants in the guards was simply a case of an outlier affecting the mean 
values.  This was a consequence of William Fauquier’s 1771 account registering a 
credit balance of £1803 15s 9d, which was strikingly different to any other balance 
for guard’s lieutenants.  The next highest credit or debit balance was only £392 and 
after that £97. If this account was taken out and the data reworked without 
Fauquier’s 1771 account guards’ lieutenants would have registered a mean balance 
of minus £7. This adjusted mean balance for guards’ lieutenants probably closer 
reflected the actual experience of most lieutenants in the guards.  The financial 
challenge facing subalterns was also reflected in the percentage of balances that 
were in credit. Only one third of the time were ensigns or lieutenants accounts in 
credit.  There seem to be two important points from the ensign and lieutenant 
accounts.  First, the early stages of an army career posed many financial challenges 
for junior officers and for some it may have been a losing concern.  Second, the first 
early promotions did not necessarily lead to greater financial rewards.  Lieutenants in 
both the guards and foot seemed to be worse off than the ensigns.  They had slightly 
lower mean balances and their accounts were not in credit as often as ensigns.  
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 The struggle junior officers faced financially improved markedly once they 
obtained a captaincy. The mean balance of regimental captains in the foot and 
guards was significantly higher than junior officers. The average credit balance of 
captains was £24 for the guards and £37 for the foot.  This was by no means a large 
sum, but was a significant improvement compared to junior officers.  It provided 
officers with a more comfortable existence and perhaps the opportunity to save a 
small amount for the first time in their careers.  Certainly, the future General John 
Moore anticipated being able to save some money after gaining a captaincy as he 
assured his father: 
"Hyou have mistaken me very much when you imagined I thought it unbecoming a gentleman to save 
money, if he can do it out of his pay, and I hope in a very short time to convince you that nothing is so 
distant from my way of thinkingH.”
99
 
 
 However, captains did often have to cope with more variations in annual returns 
compared to junior officers.  The percentage of accounts in credit did not necessarily 
improve for captains and there was a sharp increase in the standard deviation of 
account balances.  Accordingly, ensigns in the foot had a higher proportion of their 
accounts in credit than captains.    Another point that emerges from a comparison of 
the captains and junior officer accounts is that serving in the guards may have 
bought lower rewards when costs are taken into account than serving in a normal 
infantry regiment.  The average balance for those officers serving in the guards at 
the ranks of the ensign, lieutenant and captain was lower if outliers are excluded 
than their counterparts in the foot.  Guards did receive higher income, but this did not 
compensate for the higher expenses they had to maintain as guards officers.  
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 It is difficult to draw too many conclusions from the accounts of the two 
infantry majors and one lieutenant colonel due to the small number of accounts and 
officers involved.  One striking feature of these accounts is that there seems to be an 
improvement in the proportion of accounts that were in credit. For both the majors 
and lieutenant colonel their accounts were much more frequently in credit than the 
other officers. However, there did not seem to be much difference in the average 
balances of the majors vis-a-vis captains; majors’ average balances were only £45 
compared to £37 for captains.   Thus, it remains unclear whether advancing to major 
or lieutenant colonel resulted in a significantly improved financial position compared 
to captains. 
 
 
 How did the short-term rewards of the future general officers compare to 
these findings for the non-sample officers?   Table 24 sheds some light on this by 
providing a detailed breakdown of the rewards and costs the future generals had 
when serving from the ranks of ensign to lieutenant colonel during the mid to late 
eighteenth-century.  This comparison is limited by the small sample size of the future 
generals’ accounts.  Nevertheless, the average balances and percentage of 
accounts in credit appear similar for the future generals compared to the non-sample 
officers.  Most future generals when they were ensigns and lieutenants struggled to 
balance their accounts. A substantial improvement was then seen once these 
officers became captains, although the extent of this is different depending on 
regiment type.  Serving in the guards was relatively more expensive than the 
infantry.  One difference was that the future generals’ accounts as lieutenant 
colonels did reveal promotion to this rank did not necessarily bring improved rewards 
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due to the high costs involved in maintaining this position.  The largest loss in any 
one year was experienced by a lieutenant colonel.   In addition, the percentage of 
accounts in credit did not always improve for lieutenant colonels.  In the infantry the 
proportion of accounts in credit for lieutenant colonels were the same as captains. 
 
Table 24: Average annual rewards and costs of future generals, 1761-1793 
   
Ensign Lieutenant Captain Major Lt. Colonel 
 Guards Guards Guards Foot Foot Dragoons Foot 
Rewards £ £ £ £ £ £ £ 
Salary 89 132 274 168 204 462 284 
Allowances  0 1 51 10 0 15 11 
Profits - - 166 8 0 30 6 
Appointments 0 29 32 0 0 0 192 
Extraordinary 0 2 60 131 448 38 12 
Private income 0 13 £23 36 75 0 114 
sub-total        
     -Rewards 89 177 606 353 727 545 619 
Costs        
Himself 5 60  308 6 150 0 280 
Salary 87 67 0 46 0 0 8 
Extraordinary 0 6 108 32 43 21 178 
Private bills 0 48 179 147 407 524 251 
Other 0 5 0 0 0 0 113 
sub-total        
     -Costs 92 186 595 231 600 545 830 
Balance (5) (9) 11 122 127 0 (211) 
Balance ex private income (5) (22) (12) 86 52 0 (325) 
Private income % of rewards 0 7 4 10 10 0 18 
% in credit 40 50 40 50 100 50 60 
Standard deviation 34 76 61 382 - 14 850 
No. of officers 2 3 2 2 1 1 3 
No. of years 5 22 5 8 2 2 5 
Note: Standard deviation is the standard deviation of balances.  The account for the major 
covers two years, but it was unable to be separated into individual years and thus there is no 
standard deviation.  Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals.      
 
Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
 
  
 A detailed examination of the rewards and costs of the future generals that 
made up the average annual balances reveals some of the reasons for these 
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characteristics.  A problem for officers in balancing their accounts, and one that was 
particularly acute for ensigns and lieutenants, was the delays in receiving their 
income.   The accounts show most subsistence payments were received on time or 
in advance.  However, the balance of salary, arrears, was received with substantial 
delays.  Most arrears payments to ensigns were only received two years after they 
were due.  Nor did the frequency of these payments improve with time or promotion, 
as most lieutenant colonels still only received their arrears several years after they 
were due.  For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave received his 1783 arrears in 
1785.  This made it much more difficult for new officers to survive off their salary as 
in the early years they would only receive subsistence payments, whereas officers 
who had served for a few years could at least expect to receive back payments of 
arrears on a regular basis even though their current arrears were also delayed.  The 
receipt of allowances also seemed highly uncertain and subject to great delays.  The 
allowances appearing in the accounts were usually for baggage or forage, but the 
amounts received were less than would be expected under the rules of pay.  
Drummond as a lieutenant in the foot guards only received 100 days forage 
allowance for 1778 instead of the 200 days due to him.  This seemed a common 
problem for many income streams, such as payments for equipment losses 
sustained during battle.  Ludlow and Drummond, two future generals serving in the 
guards, did not receive compensation for equipment losses sustained on the 
continent in 1794 until 1797. 
 
 
Apart from delays in receiving their salary and allowances, junior officers also 
suffered from lack of diversification in their income streams.  Ensigns and lieutenants 
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were typically in receipt of only subsistence on a regular basis.  Ludlow was the 
exception to this.   He obtained an appointment as equerry to the Prince of Wales, 
which was a significant supplement to his income.  However, there were few officers 
who obtained such appointments and thus his experience cannot be regarded as 
typical.   In contrast, field officers, those ranked captain and higher, had many more 
income opportunities, which probably played a role in their improved balances.   
Captains, majors and lieutenant colonels had the possibility of receiving profits from 
the management of their company’s ‘stock purse’.  In line with previous research on 
this topic, the accounts show infantry and cavalry officers gained little from this 
income source.100   Indeed, the profits of infantry officers show that many captains 
did not even receive the statutory limit of £20 for their efforts.  There was one 
exception to this rule.  Guards officers profited nicely from the management of their 
companies as their dividends remained unrestricted.  The average profit from this 
source for guards’ captains of £166 vastly exceeded even the statutory limit for 
cavalry officers of £30.  Field officers were also able to more frequently than junior 
officers augment their salaries with other appointments. Some of the lieutenant 
colonels acted as ADCs to generals or governors.    
 
 
 If the two main issues for junior officers were delays in payments and lack of 
income diversification, the challenges in balancing accounts senior officers faced 
were rather different.  The problem for senior regimental officers was that promotion 
brought increased expense that far outpaced income growth.  This is shown by 
comparing the income and expenses of captains in the foot to lieutenant colonels.  
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The average annual income of a captain was £317, if private income is excluded, 
which increased to £505 for lieutenant colonels, a rise of 59%.  However, 
expenditure more than doubled creating a funding problem for most lieutenant 
colonels.   
 
 
The increased expenses of lieutenant colonels were the result of different 
obligations compared to other officers.  Many of the expenses in their accounts are 
not found in the accounts of middle ranking officers such as captains.  To cite one 
example, two lieutenant colonels contributed annually sums ranging from £3 to £21 
to help finance the regimental band.  Another common expense for high ranking 
regimental officers was loans to junior and middle ranking officers.  Cuyler as a 
major in the 55th foot received a payment for £199 10s from Lieutenant Charles 
Cathcart of the 23rd foot for money advanced him.  In a similar fashion, Harris as a 
lieutenant colonel was repaid £13 14s in 1787 for money he had loaned to officers of 
his regiment.  Bills made out to other officers could also be an indication of loans or 
debts with other officers. This category of extraordinary expenditure first occurs in 
the accounts of lieutenants and appears to escalate with each rank, although there 
are few observations. The aggregate cost to lieutenants of this item was only £2 11s 
6d, which rose to £52 10s for captains, £77 2s for the major and £701 8s 1d for 
lieutenant colonels.   
 
 
The financial difficulties faced by officers were also shown by flows of private 
capital.   The first point to note is that all ranks except ensigns supplemented their 
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military rewards with private income, which was an indication of the difficulty officers 
had in balancing their accounts.  This was not a large amount; most officers only 
supplemented their military rewards between 4% and 10% of their total income.  
However, there was a difference in the private capital contributions lieutenant 
colonels and other officers made to their accounts.  Lieutenant colonels deposited 
almost double the amount of private income into their accounts compared to other 
officers. This suggests that to become a lieutenant colonel more was required than 
merely military expertise. A sufficient level of private liquidity may have also been 
necessary to maintain the position of lieutenant colonel of a regiment.   
 
 
This point can be further shown by an analysis of the accounts some of the 
future generals held with Drummonds bank when they were lieutenant colonels.  
Table 25 shows the three lieutenant colonels that had accounts with Drummonds in 
which military income can be identified.  The income they received from their 
regimental agents was often substantial, as much as £1,500 per year.  Yet, even this 
income would not have been sufficient to meet their expenses, and the bulk of 
income flowing through these accounts came from private sources.  Even taking into 
account all sources of income, some of the time these accounts registered annual 
deficits.  It may be that these accounts missed items of military income or were used 
for different purposes than a standard current account.  Even so, the income and 
expenditure contained in these accounts suggest it might have been difficult for 
lieutenant colonels to maintain their positions without substantial private funds. 
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Table 25: Annual income and expenditure of future generals as lieutenant colonels with Drummonds 
   
Stanhope Tarleton Musgrave 
 1778 1781 1783 1785 1786 
Income £ £ £ £ £ 
Army salary 0 0 0 0 200 
Regimental agent 1500 1000 449 150 0 
Cash 0 2708 550 100 100 
Private income 0 9830 0 239 220 
sub-total      
     -Income 1500 13538 999 489 520 
Expenditure      
Himself 0 0 150 277 15 
Family 0 0 0 15 0 
Private bills 1500 13873 857 0 435 
sub-total      
     -Expenditure 1500 13873 1007 292 450 
Balance 0 (335) (8) 197 70 
Balance ex private income 0 (10165) (8) (42) (150) 
Private income % of income 0 73 0 49 42 
Note: Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals.      
 
Source: R.B.S Group Archives, Drummonds Customer Account Ledgers (hereafter DR), 
427/78, 1778, f. 1397; DR 427/89, 1781, ff.  881-882, 899; DR 427/99, 1783, f. 1548; DR 
427/106, 1785, f.  1129; DR 427/110, 1786, f.  1129. 
 
 
 
The personal accounts of the non-sample officers and future generals suggest 
an army career in the short term was a losing concern for most officers.  Even 
though some officers showed modest surpluses on their accounts these probably 
would have turned into deficits once private income contributions are taken into 
account.  However, the short-term returns of service depended on rank and regiment 
type.  The greatest financial challenges were for junior officers or senior officers in 
the regiment; whereas, captains, the middle ranking officers, typically seemed on 
average better off than both of these groups.  In addition, the guards were more 
expensive to serve with than other regiments. These findings are broadly in line with 
the conclusions of other authors who have studied the eighteenth-century British 
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Army in great detail.  Conway, for example, noted a captaincy for struggling junior 
officers gave them financial security.101  The problems for these two groups of 
officers were different.  Junior officers had to cope with delays in receiving an 
already modest income and lack of alternative income opportunities, while the 
problem senior officers faced was demands on their expenditure grew far greater 
than any rise in income.   
 
 
The short-term losses of an army career would have created a near perpetual 
debt for many officers.  Why were officers’ bankers, the regimental agents, and more 
to the point the officers themselves willing to tolerate a career that seemed only to 
generate short-term losses?  For most officers the debit balances were rather small.  
The average balance for the future generals who were lieutenants in the guards was 
only a debt of £9.  Given the economic circumstances of the time it was not 
unexpected for businessmen to finance small short term deficits of their clients.  It 
was common practice for private bankers to lend small amounts interest free to their 
clients.102  One explanation for this was that England was an economy based on 
credit due in part to a scarcity of specie.  Thus, it was not unusual for payments to be 
received with large delays as many people’s wages were received substantially in 
arrears.103  The regimental agents managed their risk by only advancing substantial 
amounts of money to officers from wealthy backgrounds.  In the generals’ accounts, 
for the ranks of ensign to lieutenant colonel, the only personal loan from the 
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regimental agent was to Ludlow, the son of an earl.  The risk agents were taking on 
in advancing small sums to officers appeared to be limited.  Credit would be cut-off 
and no further monies advanced if these sums became too large. Moreover, agents 
had collateral against any loans through the receipt of future pay and purchase 
transactions.  As most officers purchased at least some of their commissions, loans 
advanced to officers had additional collateral apart from future pay because ranks 
had economic value.104  Purchase also help to smooth liquidity issues and generated 
an additional return for agents.  Sellers of commissions would register substantial 
surpluses in their accounts, which the agent could match against other accounts that 
happened to be in deficit.  This was particularly the case as the business of 
regimental agents in this period was concentrated among few agents.  Returns were 
generated for agents on purchase transactions as agents received interest on sums 
deposited for purchase until commissions were signed.  This typically amounted to 
several weeks’ interest on sums usually in their thousands.105      
 
 
IV. Long-term gains: officers 
 
 
Officers tolerated the short-term losses of an army career for two reasons.  
Firstly, for most officers financial gain was not the primary motivation in entering the 
army.  For some glory was more important than monetary rewards.106  Indeed, it was 
not unusual for officers to give up their share of prize-money or not take full financial 
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advantage of their position.107  For other officers the social benefits of being an 
officer in the army may have compensated for any monetary losses.  An army career 
provided an outlet for those seeking status and honour.  Officers often felt the high 
status of an army career was important. Alexander Lindsay, for example, attributed 
his army career a key role in transforming his fortune: 
“...I succeeded to my family title before I was 21 years of age having soon after attained high military 
rank I got early access to the best circles of society and fashion in London.  My patrimony was the 
estate of Balcarres the yearly gross rent of which did not exceed £1100 sterling charged with two 
jointures many thousand pounds of debt and 10 brothers and sisters whose interests it lay with me to 
protect and to forward in their several careers of life.  With these disadvantages, I did not enjoy as a 
peer of the realm £150 yearly income; classed with the gay world and associated with the rich and 
brilliant I found myself exposed to every mortification.  Under such a great weight I must have sank 
had I not felt and placed a due confidence on the great advantages of youth, rank and high military 
situation.  My youth and title was one string to my bow, my rank in the army furnished another. The 
first I presume in some degree forwarded my suit with your mother and gave me the estate of Haigh.  
The other placed me in the government of Jamaica....”
108
 
 
Nicholas Delacherois, a junior officer in the 9th foot during the mid-eighteenth 
century, was aiming to "Hgain empty titles at the risque of my life and separation 
from all my friendsH” which he thought preferable to his brother’s career who 
worked at home in the family business as a linen manufacturer.109   A commission in 
the army during the eighteenth-century gave every officer the status of a 
gentleman.110  This status was institutionalised by the army who made it a serious 
offence to socialise with those lower down the social hierarchy.  Two officers found 
this out to their cost in 1761 when they were court martialled for “not getting up and 
leaving when they discovered the nature of the company they were dining with”.111  
Officers’ high status was closely related to the fact that originally they were drawn 
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from the aristocracy.112  In addition, the status of officers may have also increased 
over time with Britain's military success.  In the early eighteenth-century there was 
always some public discontent about the threat to civil peace of having a standing 
army.  However, success in the Seven Years War transformed the image of the army 
in the eyes of the public.  This was shown by the immortalisation of the heroic deeds 
of generals who had participated in this war.  Thus, two of the best-selling mid 
eighteenth-century pieces of art were Edward Penny's painting The Marquess of 
Granby Relieving a Sick Soldier and Benjamin West's Death of General Wolfe.113  By 
the Napoleonic wars one manifestation of this public support was that street 
celebrations often followed news of victories.114 
 
 
   Secondly, a long career in the army generated long-term rewards that 
outweighed short-term losses.  In the eighteenth-century army there were no 
pensions for long service, but officers could fund retirement through selling their 
commissions. The long-term rewards of ‘selling out’ depended on a variety of factors 
including: exit rank, sale prices of commissions, short-term losses generated from 
army service and the number of commissions gained through purchase.   
Nevertheless, ‘selling out’ usually resulted in a capital gain and thus provided a 
financial incentive for entering the army.115  According to Park and Nafziger, this 
financial incentive attracted many new officers who otherwise would not have 
normally considered an army career.116 
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 It is possible to estimate the long-term returns from ‘selling out’ if some 
assumptions are made regarding the factors that affected the long-term rewards of 
such transactions.  In order to calculate the long-term rewards of ‘selling out’ the 
following assumptions were made: 
(1)  Short-term returns: Table 23 showed the average annual balances of infantry 
officers’ accounts for ensigns, lieutenants, captains and majors were 
respectively £4, £2, £37 and £45. However, these were gross and not net 
returns as no account was taken of private capital contributions.  This is an 
important point as the future generals’ accounts showed most ranks 
supplemented their military pay with private capital. Private capital 
contributions were usually up to 10% of total income.  Hence, the annual net 
short-term returns are assumed to be gross returns less a deduction of 10% 
of total gross income as an allowance for private capital.  This produces 
average net annual returns of minus £4 for ensigns, minus £12 for lieutenants, 
£4 for captains and £19 for majors.  The short-term return over the course of a 
career also depends on the length of time spent at each rank. This is taken 
from Glover’s work on the length of time it took to be promoted by seniority, 
the slowest method of regimental promotion, during the Napoleonic wars.   
According to Glover, an officer promoted by seniority spent the following 
duration at the various ranks:  ensign (two years), lieutenant (seven years), 
and captain (nine years).117  It could also be argued a discount rate should be 
applied to calculate compound interest on losses.  However, the regimental 
agents did not typically charge interest on the small losses that accrued in 
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most accounts.  In the accounts examined interest was only charged on long-
term loans to officers for relatively large amounts usually exceeding £100. 
(2)  Market prices of commissions: It is difficult to estimate the actual market 
prices that officers paid for purchasing their commissions as this information is 
usually only available in personal correspondence or private accounts.  Using 
a combination of these sources, appendix 5 details the market prices paid for 
23 different commission transactions for lieutenants, captains and majors at 
various points in the eighteenth-century.  This is a small sample size to base 
the market prices of commissions on as there were only either six or eleven 
transactions per rank.  Nevertheless, it does provide a sense of the prices 
officers paid for commissions at this time.  The market prices officers paid for 
each rank varied greatly depending on the rank and whether it was war or 
peace.  The most junior commissions were usually bought at their regulation 
price, except on occasion during wartime when it appeared possible to gain a 
substantial discount to these prices. In contrast, captaincies and majorities 
seemed to be most commonly purchased at a significant premium.  For many 
officers this was in the region of 30%, although this premium could double 
during peace.  War did provide some opportunity to get these highly sought-
after vacancies much more cheaply. It was possible at this time to sometimes 
purchase near the regulation price or perhaps at best at a 10% discount.   The 
assumed market price for the purchase or sale of commissions is the average 
premium paid per rank plus the regulation price of that rank in a foot regiment 
plus an allowance for transaction costs as buyers and sellers paid 5% of the 
transaction cost to the Chelsea Hospital.118    The average premiums paid for 
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the different ranks were as follows: lieutenant -7%, captain 24% and major 
38%.   
(3) Ranks purchased: It is assumed priority of ranks to be purchased were firstly 
captain, followed by major and then lieutenant based on table 18. 
(4) Length of career:  It is also assumed officers stayed in the army for twenty 
years.  Officers could only ‘sell out’ for three reasons according to regulations 
introduced in 1711: with Her Majesty's permission under the Royal Sign 
Manual, officers with twenty years’ service or disabled officers.119  Thus, it is 
unlikely officers would have sold their commissions until they had served at 
least twenty years.120  In addition, Odintz’s research on infantry officers 
showed officers typically had long careers. Nearly half of the officers serving 
in his sample regiments stayed in the army for at least fifteen years.121  This 
was particularly the case for officers who made it to the rank of captain or 
major as "Hholders of captaincies and majorities showed no great disposition 
to leave the service, except when elderlyH."122 
(5) All officers gained at least one ‘free’ vacancy before leaving the army. It is 
thought that one third of all commissions in the army were obtained through 
non-purchase methods.123   Hence, it would have been a rare officer who did 
not obtain at least one of their commissions without purchase. 
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The long-term returns of three ranks are calculated, lieutenants, captains and 
majors.  These three ranks were the final destinations of most officers serving in the 
army.  Odintz found 70% of the eighteenth-century officers he studied exited at the 
ranks of lieutenant, captain and major.124  Most infantry officers left the army at 
captain and if relatively successful major.   As Odintz put it:  
“...the average gentry officer could probably expect to reach the rank of captain if he survived and if 
he was willing to stay in long enough, and, with a bit of luck, a majority was hardly out of the 
question....”
125
       
 
 
On the other hand, the unsuccessful officer usually left the army at lieutenant.  The 
lack of success for those retiring at lieutenant was signified by the fact that most 
officers raised from the ranks, who were usually from lower social groups than other 
officers, generally retired at the rank of lieutenant.126   
 
 
 Table 26 shows officers who served for twenty years in the army should have 
been able to generate a long-term capital gain through selling their commission.  
This would have more than compensated for any short-term career losses and 
allowed them to leave the army with some profit.  The extent of this gain did vary 
depending on levels of career success.  The unsuccessful officers retiring at 
lieutenant only generated a small long-term return from their careers; this was 
approximately equivalent to one and half years full-time pay as a lieutenant on the 
English establishment.  Yet, most officers left the army at captain, a rank which 
would have provided a retirement fund of at least £857.   
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Table 26: Estimated long-term returns of mid to late eighteenth-century infantry 
officers 
  
 Commissions purchased: 
Exit rank: 0 1 2 3 
Lieutenant £ £ £ £ 
Short-term loss (224) (224) - - 
Commission profit 485 339 - - 
Long-term return 261 115 - - 
Captain     
Short-term loss (48) (48) (48) - 
Commission profit 1767 1051 905 - 
Long-term return 1719 1003 857 - 
Major     
Short-term loss (18) (18) (18) (18) 
Commission profit 3408 2692 1098 952 
Long-term return 3390 2674 1080 934 
Source: 
Short-term loss: Table 23; Glover, Wellington’s army, Table B, p. 84. 
Commission profit: Appendix 5, Market Prices of Commissions. 
 
 
 
This was equal to five years full-time pay, a decent retirement pot. If an officer made 
it all the way to major the profit made on retiring by selling their commission could 
even be as much as three times the amount of captains.   
 
 
 How did a captain gain a profit of at least £857 from selling his commission?  
At the end of his career the captain would have sold his commission at a 24% 
premium to the regulation price of £1,500 receiving £1,767 for the sale after 
deductions were made for the Chelsea Hospital.  His commission profits were not 
only determined by this final sale price, but also by the prices he paid for the 
commissions he purchased during the course of his career.    As the captain making 
the least amount of profit purchased two commissions, it is assumed he purchased 
his captaincy and lieutenancy and gained his ensigncy ‘free’ based on the most 
popular ranks officers purchased.  After initial entry to the army officers promoted by 
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purchase did not pay the full regulation or market price, but a succession price.  This 
was the difference between the value of their current rank and the value of the rank 
they were promoted to.  The succession price for a lieutenancy was £150, but as the 
future captain was able to purchase this at a 7% discount he only paid £139, which 
increased to £146 as a 5% contribution was made to the Chelsea Hospital on the 
market price.  To purchase his captaincy he had to pay a 24% premium to the 
succession price of £550 entailing an overall cost of £716 including contributions to 
Chelsea Hospital.  His net profit from these commission sales was the £1,767 he 
gained from ‘selling out’ less £862, the succession costs of his lieutenancy and 
captaincy, resulting in an overall gain of £905.  However, over the course of his 
career he also had to sustain short-term losses from serving in the army. Prior to 
becoming a captain, he spent two years at ensign and seven years at lieutenant 
resulting in cumulative losses of £8 and £84 respectively. The remaining eleven 
years of his career at captain he was able to make up some of these losses and 
reduced the overall loss from his career to only £48.  The £48 career loss reduced 
his overall profit from the sale of his commission to £857. 
 
 
 Even if an officer gained a captaincy it was not guaranteed he would make a 
long-term capital gain from ‘selling out’ as an army career involved some risk.  Many 
officers lost their lives in the course of their service through being killed in action, 
disease and accidents.  A study of 394 officers based on four mid-eighteenth-century 
infantry regiments showed that during the American war 31 of these officers died of 
disease, seventeen from action, three from accidents and one from a duel.127   If 
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these figures are representative of the army generally this provides a fatality rate 
among officers of approximately 15%.  Of course, there were significant variations 
between fatality rates of regiments depending on where regiments were based and 
how much active of service they saw.  On the one hand, regiments based in the 
colonies often had extremely high mortality rates.  In the 1790s the 13th Light 
Dragoons spent 30 months in the West Indies and out of the 31 officers that served 
with them there only twelve returned alive.128  On the other hand, the guards’ 
regiments spent half their time in England. In the event of an officer’s death the sums 
invested in commissions were lost. However, this was not a total loss for many 
officers as their widows received pensions.  For a captain in 1717 this was £30 per 
year, which increased to £40 in 1806.129  Service could also result in injury leading to 
early retirement.  In the event of injury most officers were able to ‘sell out’ as 
disability was one of the three conditions under which officers were permitted to sell 
their commissions.130   
 
 
 Another option for injured officers was to retire on half pay instead of selling 
their commissions.  Half pay literally gave officers half their yearly salary.  Captains 
received £86 per annum, lieutenants £40 and ensigns £31.131   The purpose of half 
pay was not to fund retirement as it was meant to be for "Hmaintaining gentleman in 
the navy and army until the necessities of State required their servicesH.”132  
                                                 
128
 Glover, “Purchase”, p. 356. 
129
 "Report from the committee appointed to consider the distribution of the money, 1746", taken from S. 
Lambert (ed.), House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century, Volume 16: George II Army 
1739-1749, (Wilmington, 1975), p. 151; CKS, U624 Harris, Official Papers, O722 Circular regarding increased 
pay, 15 July 1806. 
130
 Scouller, “Purchase of Commissions”, p. 220. 
131
 Williamson, A Treatise of Military Finance, 1
st
 Ed., p. 25. 
132
 Quoted in Odintz, “The British Officer Corps”, p. 348. 
270 
 
However, exceptions were made for officers forced to retire due to injury or age.  
According to The King's Regulations of 1837, officers could request to retire on half 
pay if they were unfit for active service due to wounds, illness or infirmity caused by 
age.  This request had to be authorised by their regimental colonel and the 
regiment’s doctor.  In addition, retiring on half pay due to age required at least 25 
years’ service.133   In return for receiving half pay retiring officers forfeited all future 
claims to further employment, rank and widows pensions.134   Half pay was a useful 
supplement to other income streams, but did not provide a sufficient amount of 
money to live off.   One lieutenant complained half pay was “Hmuch too hard to live 
on, having a wife and family to maintain out of the small pittance of £40 per 
annumH.”135  In exceptional cases it was possible for some officers to retire on full 
pay.  This depended on making private financial arrangements with the remaining 
officers of the regiment who benefited from the officer retiring.  One such scheme 
was having the junior officers giving a portion of their pay to support the retiring 
officer or the most recent ensign serving without pay.136 
 
 
V. Long-term gains: generals 
 
 
 The long-term gains from an army career were potentially much greater for 
the very successful officers in the army who made it all the way to operational 
general.  Generals who gained command or other appointments could be given 
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opportunities to make large profits either directly or indirectly from their military 
service.  These long term rewards, however, were by no means certain.  For one 
thing, most officers did not become generals with command appointments.  In the 
Napoleonic period there were over 10,000 officers serving in the army, but only 200 
posts on the staff as generals.137  Thus, it was only 2% of officers at any one time 
that served as operational generals.    For another thing, even obtaining prestigious 
command appointments did not necessarily produce a profit for the generals 
involved.  In addition, the gains from generalship could only be realised through very 
long careers as it took the average operational general between 25 and 35 years to 
gain the first substantive general rank (see table 17).   
 
 
 The variability of returns among general officers is shown by table 27 outlining 
the average annual rewards and costs of general officers.   Generals serving in the 
dragoons and life guards had accounts that registered average annual deficits and 
many of the other generals only balanced their accounts through large contributions 
of private capital.  The percentage of accounts in credit indicated some generals had 
accounts less often in credit than junior officers.  In a similar fashion to lieutenant 
colonels, promotion to general at times resulted in a worsening short term financial 
position due to the extra costs involved in command.   
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Table 27: Average annual rewards and costs of generals, 1758-1810 
   
Field officer Colonel  
 F. Guards Dragoons F. Guards Foot L. Guards Dragoons  
Rewards £ £ £ £ £ £ 
Salary 362 462 913 528 606 812 
Allowances  57 0 476 301 508 53 
Profits 267 0 1427 475 1115 687 
Appointments 355 0 2062 630 399 513 
Extraordinary 71 159 143 108 59 0 
Private income 12 0 714 210 708 496 
sub-total       
     -Rewards 1124 621 5735 2252 3395 2561 
Costs       
Himself 196 0 2261 404 0 33 
Salary 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Extraordinary 120 9 1754 447 209 97 
Private bills 601 583 887 1275 3154 2926 
Other 8 0 299 38 63 0 
sub-total       
     -Costs 929 592 5201 2164 3426 3056 
Balance 195 29 534 88 (31) (495) 
Balance ex private income 183 29 (180) (122) (739) (991) 
Private income % of rewards 1 0 12 9 21 19 
% in credit 71 50 75 60 39 33 
Standard deviation 543 219 1145 1620 1879 2990 
No. of officers 3 1 1 4 1 1 
No. of years 17 2 8 15 13 6 
Note: Standard deviation is the standard deviation of balances.  Private bills are payments to 
unidentified civilian individuals. Field officer and colonel were the regimental ranks of the 
different generals.  The life guards were known as the horse guards until 1788. 
 
Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
 
 
 Profitability seemed to vary depending on the type of regimental appointment 
the generals held.  Generals who were field officers in their regiment consistently 
produced better financial returns from their service than those who were regimental 
colonels.  This was particularly the case for those serving in the foot guards. They 
had a higher average annual balance; more often had accounts in credit and lower 
volatility of yearly returns as measured by the standard deviation of balances. This 
seemed to be the result of income growth for once outpacing the growth of 
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expenditure.  Generals who were field officers in the foot guards experienced 
significant income growth through command appointments as generals and the 
flexible profits that guards officers benefited from.  The guards’ generals gained 
almost as much reward from command appointments as from their salary.  In 
addition, changes in the scale of warfare increased their profits from their companies 
due to the benefits of flexible dividends.  This allowed officers such as Drummond to 
gain as much as £891 from company profits in 1800 when infantry captains were still 
restricted to £20 at most.  Their improved financial position was demonstrated 
through the flows of private capital and debt repayments.  1800 operational generals 
serving in the guards as field officers and generals in the army only supplemented 
their military income on average with £12 of private capital, the lowest contribution 
for any rank.  Their improved financial position also allowed the only field officer with 
a personal loan from his regimental agent, Ludlow, to pay off his debt.   Before 
Ludlow was a general he was only able to meet the yearly interest repayments of 
£100 on his loan of £2,000, but by 1801 he had completely repaid the principal and 
interest of his loan. 
 
 
In contrast, promotion did not necessarily produce profits for many generals 
that were also regimental colonels.  Hayes claimed that some regimental colonels 
with landed property received as much income from the military as they did from 
their estates.138  This may have been true for the generals who were regimental 
colonels as well.  They certainly had large incomes; their annual rewards averaged 
between £2,252 and £5,735.  Yet, these high incomes from the army did not usually 
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produce a profit.  There were, however, exceptions to this.  Fox, as regimental 
colonel of the 10th foot, showed profits in his accounts for three out of four years, a 
cumulative net gain that exceeded £1,000.  The reason many regimental colonels 
who were generals struggled to balance their accounts was due to expenditure 
increasing at a far greater rate than income.  This was shown by the dramatic rate of 
expansion in the cost of private bills and extraordinary items.  Take the expenditure 
on these items, for example, for generals that served in the foot.  The cost of private 
bills and extraordinary items to lieutenant colonels in the foot was £251 and £178 
respectively (table 24), which increased to £1,275 and £447 as generals, a far 
greater rate of increase than any similar income growth.  The greater obligations of 
regimental colonels meant these officers spent far more on similar items of 
expenditure compared to other ranks.  Moore as colonel of a foot regiment spent 
three times more on the band than any lieutenant colonel.   
 
 
 There were also many more categories of expenditure the generals who were 
regimental colonels were subject to.  Some of this expenditure may have been 
discretionary depending on the generosity of the particular colonel.  Ligonier for one, 
as colonel of the foot guards, paid an annual gratuity to the sergeant majors of his 
regiment.  However, much of the expenditure probably resulted from a funding gap 
between government subsidy and actual requirements for running the regiment.  The 
payments by many of the general officers for ‘regimental charges’ was probably one 
such example of this.  Another example of this funding gap was that colonels had to 
finance the excess transport costs of sending clothing to regiments as official 
275 
 
allowances were not always sufficient to cover the entire cost of transport.139   
Finally, regimental colonels as proprietors of regiments took on additional risks.  
They personally appointed the regimental agent and paymaster to handle the 
financial administration of their regiment.  In the event that any losses resulted from 
these appointments colonels were personally liable to make good any shortfall.  This 
happened most commonly in the event of death, but also occurred through 
fraudulent activity.  In 1758 Ligonier’s regimental agent, Henry Taylor, died leaving 
the subsistence of officers and companies unpaid.  Ligonier was only able to meet 
the pay shortfall by depositing £3,000 of private income into his account.  Taylor’s 
executors were supposed to repay the subsistence, but Ligonier’s accounts only 
show him receiving £620 out of £4,101 owed leaving him with a large loss.  Another 
of the 1747 sample generals, Lieutenant General Philip Anstruther, lost the majority 
of his wealth when his regimental agent, Captain Wilson, went bankrupt in 1751.140   
This problem was not entirely isolated to 1747 generals.  Alexander Lindsay suffered 
a similar problem when the regimental paymaster of the 63rd foot, Zeller, died owing 
debts to the government of £1,200.141  His regimental agent attempted to recover 
these losses without success from the government leaving Lindsay out of pocket.142   
 
 
 Appointment to regimental colonel may have brought greater expenditure, but 
it also provided opportunities to make large profits on occasion.  This is not 
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surprising as Park and Nafziger maintain the main benefit of a colonelcy was the 
financial gains to be made from it.143  One such area of potential profitability came 
from the management of their regiment's clothing and equipment provision.  The 
colonel’s dividend from managing clothing varied greatly due to the length of the 
clothing cycle and delays in payments.  In consequence, some colonels only gained 
income from the management of clothing on an irregular basis.  The accounts of 
General Fox as colonel of the 10th foot, for example, show him only receiving profits 
from clothing in his personal account one year out for four.  Even given these 
difficulties many colonels made as much money from the management of their 
clothing as from their salary as the high level of income from profits in table 27 
shows.    
 
 
 Other potential command profits, some of which were only quasi-legitimate at 
best, that increased colonel’s income included pocketing officers’ vacant pay and 
selling offices.  These activities were probably more widespread for 1747 generals 
compared to their later counterparts who were subject to greater levels of regulation.  
Ligonier’s accounts, the only 1747 general featured, who was regimental colonel of 
the foot guards, show him pocketing vacant pay every year from 1758 to 1762 with 
amounts ranging from £12 to £243.  Vacant pay was public money and if colonels 
were caught with money received from this source they were either required to repay 
it or if fraud was involved they might even be court martialled.144   When it was 
discovered that Lieutenant General Wolfe, another 1747 general, had increased his 
income over several years through vacant pay, a discovery which was only made 
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due to the complaints of his late agent’s executor, the war office insisted he repay 
the £1,217 in vacant pay he had received.145  Brigadier General Jefferys was dealt 
with even more severely as his gains from vacant pay also involved fraud.  He 
obtained the pay of a second lieutenant who never actually served or even joined his 
regiment of marines by falsifying muster rolls, which led to his court martial and 
cashiering from the army.146   In contrast to the early period, it has not been possible 
to locate any evidence from either the Board of General Officers or court martial 
proceedings linking 1800 generals to similar activities.147  Of course, the absence of 
evidence does not necessarily mean there was no opportunistic behaviour.  
However, the increasing number of regulations aimed at preventing rent seeking 
(see regulations on stoppages from soldiers pay 1717, 1721, 1732, 1749 and 
musters 1747) probably meant gains from these activities were reduced.148   
 
 
 Another advantage early period officers may have had was to do with 
inflation.  Guy, commenting on the financial difficulties of many officers, claimed 
“...The inflationary torrent could only be ridden with confidence only by men who had 
already enjoyed access to a private income..."149  The impact of inflation on the 
operational generals, however, was probably not as great as Guy's statement would 
suggest.  There are two important points here.  Firstly, for most of the eighteenth-
century real prices were trendless apart from a marked acceleration in inflation 
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during the 1790s.  This increase in inflation did not last and real prices had almost 
recovered to pre-1790 levels by 1810.150   Secondly, the effect of rising prices on the 
middling sort or the more affluent members of society such as generals may be 
overestimated.  Many studies focus on measuring inflation mainly through changes 
in the prices of staple foods.151  Certainly, it is true that prices of staple foods rose 
between 1740 and 1815.  However, middle income groups spent more on servants, 
clothing and other luxuries than food.  The top 20% of households in 1688 spent only 
37% of their income on food compared to 48% on clothing and servants alone.  In 
contrast, the bottom 40% of households for the same period spent 69% of their 
budget on food.152  This is important because while food prices rose between 1740 
and 1815, the cost of other goods such as clothing and servants tended to 
decline.153  Hence, a high income lifestyle was becoming cheaper.  Consequently, 
the fall in prices of other goods that army officers consumed may have to some 
extent offset any rises in food prices.   
 
 
 Apart from profits, generals gained financially from appointments to general 
command and governorships.  All the generals in table 27 with one exception 
received income from holding a general command position.  The level of command 
and income generated from these roles varied quite significantly between the 
generals.  At the peak was Ligonier who as Commander in Chief of the English 
establishment earned a salary of £3,375 in 1760 alone.  At the other end were 
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generals such as Moore whose salary as major general amounted to £615 in 1804.  
One drawback of these roles was that they usually only lasted during wartime so 
peace could bring a dramatic reduction in general’s income.  Thus, Garth earned 
£558 in 1783 as a brigadier general in North America, but was not to receive a 
similar addition to his income for general command until 1795.   
 
 
 The other main income stream from appointments was derived from gaining a 
role as a lieutenant governor or governor within Britain or abroad.  The nature of 
governorships varied widely, ranging from governor of large districts or even 
countries to small forts.  This was reflected in the income paid for the different 
positions. The army list of 1740, which detailed the different annual income received 
from 38 governorships and 27 lieutenant governorships, showed the average annual 
income for these positions was respectively £419 and £233.154  There was a wide 
range of variation in income from governorships; the generals’ accounts showed 
annual income from governorships ranging from £136 for a lieutenant governorship 
of Stirling Castle to £1,212 as Governor of Plymouth.  
 
 
Responsibilities of different governorships also varied greatly.  Many of these 
governorships were sinecures that did not require the holders to even visit their 
posts.  For instance, Strutt was appointed Governor of Quebec in 1800 after ‘selling 
out’ and remained in this post until his death in 1848 despite never visiting Canada.  
Other governorships were genuine military appointments requiring attention to duty.  
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James Henry Craig as Governor in Chief and Captain General of British North 
America played an active part in the political and military life of Canada.  A 
governorship was a reasonably certain income stream for an operational general as 
only a few commanding generals were not rewarded with governorships.  Moreover, 
many operational generals held these appointments for very long periods of time. 
Strutt was the extreme example of this, but it was common for generals to hold 
governorships for decades.  Burrard, for instance, held the governorship of Calshot 
Castle, between 1787 and 1813.155  Generals from both periods held a similar 
number of appointments as governors, but the geographical distribution of 
appointments was quite different.  The governorships of 1747 generals were usually 
in the UK and Europe, whereas the globalisation of warfare resulted in more 
opportunities for appointments to be located abroad in the later period. In addition, 
most of the foreign governorships held by generals in the 1800 sample were in active 
military commands.   
 
 
One problem in gaining an accurate measure of the rewards that generals 
gained from active command and governorships is the bias of Cox’s accounts 
towards the guards, who were frequently stationed at home, and the fact that income 
from foreign appointments probably flowed through the hands of local agents on the 
spot, rather than regimental agents.  It therefore seems likely that the income 
contained in Cox’s accounts underestimates actual gains for those stationed abroad.  
This was especially the case as income while stationed abroad could be derived 
through private as well as public activities.  This problem can be overcome 
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somewhat by examining the few surviving accounts with their local agents of those 
who served abroad.  The accounts of George Harris, who was commander in chief of 
the Madras army in India during the 1790s, and Alexander Lindsay, 6th Earl of 
Balcarres, who held the position of lieutenant governor of Jamaica between 1795 
and 1801, revealed that generals holding command or governorship appointments in 
the colonies could generate substantial profits from their positions. 
 
 
Active service in the colonies could certainly bring greater financial rewards 
than serving in Europe.   The correspondence of officers stationed in places such as 
India places strong emphasis on the financial motives for accepting such positions or 
staying in often hostile climates.  As Major Floyd stated in 1781:  
“...I don’t expect to die in India, & I am persuaded I shall make a fortune.  The climate of Madras, 
where we go, is exceedingly fine & favorable.  My rank will be very considerable in India, & I hope to 
return & enjoy many social hours with you & some others of my friends.  Staying at home offered me 
no chance of rising above the crowd, or of ever overcoming that miserable penury, myself & my family 
have hitherto been exposed to.  I appear’d contented because it was in vain to complain, but I felt my 
situation, & was determined to seize the first opportunity that offered of changeing it.”
156
   
 
Harris calculated serving in Bengal would at least double his capital compared to 
staying in Europe. 157  In contemplating his return to India after spending some time 
at home he looked forward to the “...princely income and great command..." his rank 
gave him.158   
 
 
The salary and allowances of command positions for many locations in the 
colonies were much higher than in Europe.  As commander of the forces in North 
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Britain, Cathcart received an annual salary of £1,210 for 1808 compared to £500 per 
month for Harris and Clarke as local commanders in chief in India at the turn of the 
nineteenth-century.159   There were also additional profit opportunities.  Commanding 
officers in India benefited from profits derived from bazaars, the main means of 
victualling the East India Company’s army in India, and field officers in Bengal 
shared revenue money.160  In the early nineteenth-century bazaar and revenue 
profits were abolished suggesting officers were obtaining excess profits from these 
sources.   
 
 
Serving overseas also provided opportunities to receive prize money from 
successful campaigns.  These gains very much favoured the highest ranks.  It was 
the custom to allocate one eighth of any prizes taken to the commanding officer, who 
was usually, although not always, a general.161  The army had no formal rules for the 
division of prize money gains and so prize divisions, as an 1803 report by the Board 
of General Officers noted, “... instead of being the result of a preconceived and well 
digested plan, has been entirely accidental..."162  The exact division of prize money 
was left up to the commanders of operations and as most operations were joint 
affairs with the navy or East India Company army prize divisions were usually shared 
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along navy lines.  Harris certainly made a vast fortune from prize money and other 
profits accumulated during his military service in India.  On returning permanently to  
England in 1800 he brought back £112,867 gained as his share of prizes taken in 
India and a further £36,788 that Harris classified as his ‘private fortune from savings 
in India’.163  These were absolutely mind boggling gains as it would have taken a 
captain 880 years to make a similar amount from his salary!  Officers serving abroad 
might also be able to take advantage of private profit opportunities such as trading 
commodities, profiting from army supply contracts or acquiring cheap property.   
 
 
The career of Alexander Lindsay in the West Indies suggests commanding 
generals in colonial locations outside of India were also able to make substantial 
profits through high emoluments and prize money.  Lindsay’s accounts between 
1796 and 1799 show he made an annual profit of at least £6,000 per year from his 
military pay.  This was a very large sum and it would take a captain 35 years to make 
an equivalent amount to this salary.  Most generals based in Europe made losses 
because the extra income they derived from their positions were exceeded by far 
greater expenses.  A comparison of Lindsay's expenses to the other generals shows 
they were rather similar.  Lindsay’s annual average expenditure between 1797 and 
1799 ranged from £1,734 to £2,870, whereas the average annual expenditure of 
1800 generals in Europe who in common with Lindsay were colonels of foot 
regiments was £2,164 (table 27).      
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Table 28: Annual rewards and costs of Alexander Lindsay as Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica 
       
 1796 1797 1798 1799 % share  
Rewards £ £ £ £   
Governor’s salary 4482 4500 3228 5225 31.6  
General’s salary 0 2621 1314 983 12.0  
Allowances 0 730 338 467 3.7  
Prize-money 2033 88 1996 842 12.1  
Extraordinary 1966 98 35 698 6.8  
Private trade 37 361 15 0 1.0  
Colonel’s salary 329 328 0 1006 4.2  
Colonel’s allowances 266 109 0 0 0.9  
Colonel’s clothing profits 3578 2000 2000 341 19.3  
Private income 256 1178 844 1142 8.4  
sub-total       
     -Rewards 12947 12013 9770 10704 100.0  
Costs       
Food and drink 337 62 827 92 18.0  
Transport 13 9 19 140 2.5  
Plantation 0 463 122 868 19.7  
Extraordinary 0 1065 594 0 22.6  
Private bills 89 116 1209 636 28.0  
Regiment 2 3 16 3 0.6  
Other 137 16 83 401 8.6  
sub-total       
     -Costs 578 1734 2870 2140 100.0  
Balance 12369 10279 6900 8564   
Balance ex private income 12113 9101 6056 7422   
Note: Jamaican income and expenses originally priced in Jamaican pounds.  In order to 
convert Jamaican pounds to contemporary pounds sterling the procedure Lindsay himself 
used was adopted (see Earl of Balcarres to Lord Lindsay, 17 January 1818, NLS, Account 
9769 Lindsay, 23/14/14, Aggrandising Fund, 1818-1824, ff.  46-47). Lindsay’s method for 
converting his Jamaican assets into English pounds was as follows: £Jamaican *5/7= 
difference in currency to pounds sterling – 10% average loss on exchange rate.  This 
procedure was followed for all of his Jamaican accounts. 
 
Source: NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Manuscript Volumes, 23/14/4 Jamaican Accounts, 
1795-1802; Military Accounts, 23/3/84-87 John Carstairs, General, 1796-1799, 23/3/96-100 
John Carstairs, Clothing, 1796-1799. 
 
 
The key difference for Lindsay was his colonial service produced many more 
and greater military income streams than a similar general based in Europe.   In a 
similar fashion to regimental colonels who were generals based in Europe, he 
received pay and allowances for his role as colonel of the 63rd foot, made large 
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profits from clothing and through his command position as major general on the staff.   
Unlike the other generals, however, he was also able to gain substantial rewards 
through his role as lieutenant governor.  He received a large salary for his 
governorship, more allowances and regular opportunities for prize money.  His salary 
as lieutenant governor alone exceeded £4,000 in most years.  Lindsay also benefited 
from regular prize money.  In both 1796 and 1798 he made approximately £2,000 
from prize money gains.  These prizes included such items as mules and a schooner 
seized at Port Antonio.  This was a significant income stream equivalent to his salary 
as a general, which amounted to 12% of his military income during this period.  
Thus, the multitude of military income streams, and the extent of these, allowed 
Lindsay to make healthy profits from his military service in the West Indies.  
 
 
Nor were Lindsay's profits limited to the savings he made from his official 
roles in the West Indies.  Lindsay's personal involvement in the contract given to 
merchants to raise a Negro corps of pioneers, soldiers responsible for the physical 
labour and light engineering tasks of the army, was an example of how official roles 
in the colonies could generate officers’ private financial benefits.  Merchants profited 
from this contract as they were paid a capital sum for each Negro raised and a 
portion of their pay and clothing allowance. 164   Lindsay as lieutenant governor was 
responsible for allocating the contract to a partnership of merchants including his 
Jamaican agents.165  It is unclear Lindsay's exact role within this partnership, but his 
accounts show him receiving one third of the annual net profits generated from the 
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contract.  This was a significant addition to his income.   Lindsay’s accounts with his 
local agents in Jamaica show him receiving £27,343 profits from this contract 
between 1801 and 1823, an annual average income from this contract alone of 
£1,923.166 
 
 
Lindsay was also active in the property market during his time in Jamaica.  He 
purchased three properties in Jamaica; “Government pen”, so named as this was 
where the governor tended to reside, and two plantations – Martins Hill and 
Balcarres Plantation.  On paper at least these properties gave Lindsay impressive 
capital gains.  He purchased the three properties for the combined sum of £50,000 
and by 1809 their valuation had risen to £100,000.167     
 
 
Apart from capital gains, his Jamaican properties also produced some 
income.  Both plantations generated income from the sale of coffee crops.  The 
nature of growing coffee, with weather playing such a vital role, did mean returns 
were volatile.  Nevertheless, a healthy profit was made over the long run. Taken 
collectively, the average annual net gain from both properties, in years where both 
sets of figures are available, averaged £1,276 between 1806 and 1824.168  Another 
good income producing investment was “Government pen”.  Lindsay rented it to 
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subsequent governors as their official residence at the rate of £300 per annum.169  
This was an advantageous arrangement for Lindsay as his rent was paid in English 
sterling to his London bank account and was a reliable income stream.  This 
generated him an average annual income of £312 between 1808 and 1824.170  
Based on the 1809 valuation, which included repair costs, “Government pen” yielded 
10%, a much greater rate of return than he could have expected for a similar 
investment in England.171   
  
 
The limited surviving evidence of the financial affairs relating to other generals 
indicates the large gains that Harris and Lindsay derived from their military service 
were not isolated cases. Cathcart’s DNB entry claimed he shared £300,000 prize 
money with his navy counterpart for capturing Copenhagen in 1807.172   In a similar 
fashion to Lindsay, James Grant while governor of East Florida acquired local 
property.  When East Florida was returned to the Spanish in 1783 Grant sold his 
slaves and later obtained £3,327 compensation from the government in lieu of his 
estate there.173   The cost basis of his property in East Florida is unknown, but it 
seems likely this was a substantial capital gain.  The acquisition of cheap property 
was a fairly common way for profiting from army service abroad.  After the Seven 
Years War, British officers serving in America were given land grants, ranging from 
2000 acres for the most junior officer to 5000 for field officers, to encourage 
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settlement in the colony.174  Marshall noted that many British officers originally 
stationed in North America bought land, which may have resulted in large capital 
gains.175  The wills of non-aristocratic generals who served as colonial governors or 
commanders in chief, which probably underestimate their wealth, indicate they left 
substantial estates.  Sir James Henry Craig left between £40,000 and £50,000 and 
Sir Alured Clarke £258,000.176   It seems likely that a significant portion of these 
estates were acquired in common with Harris’s during their time in the colonies.  An 
important implication of these high rewards for those holding commanding general 
roles in the colonies is that the rewards operational generals gained over time may 
have increased significantly with modernisation as there were many more 
opportunities to serve as local commanders or governors of colonies where the 
rewards from army service were the greatest.  Rubinstein's research on the very 
wealthy in the nineteenth-century certainly seems to suggest the late eighteenth-
century provided good opportunities for those reaching the peak of professions such 
as the army to make fortunes from their service.  Rubinstein noted that 23% of those 
leaving between £150,000 and £500,000 during the years 1809-1829 came from the 
professional classes, yet this declined significantly after this period.177   
 
 
Generals could also gain significant social rewards from a long-term career in 
the army.  It was common for successful operational generals to receive knighthoods 
or even aristocratic titles in recognition of their success in the army.  The social value 
of titles was that they conferred on their holders a high degree of social distinction 
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and prestige by setting them apart from the non-titled.  Evidence of the high value of 
titles was that at various points in English history monarchs raised money through 
the sale of titles.  The sale of peerages between 1603 and 1641 doubled the number 
of lay peers sitting in the Lords.178  Even for those who did not buy titles receiving 
them also entailed an economic cost which was not insignificant.  After George 
Harris became a baron for his military services in 1815 he also received a GCB in 
1820 as a further social reward.  His correspondence shows that accepting this 
award cost him £333 17s 2d in fees attached to his knighthood.  Harris’s GCB fees 
included payments for officers of the order, the Secretary of State's office, servants 
and officers of the Kings household, the Lord Chamberlain's office for the insignia, 
and the College of Arms for requesting the pedigree.179  Thus, the fees for accepting 
a GCB knighthood exceeded one year’s pay for a lieutenant colonel of foot.  The 
relatively high economic cost of accepting titles further demonstrates their social 
value to the recipients of these awards. 
 
 
There were various types of titles that could be awarded.  Knighthoods were 
divided into a number of different orders with slightly different levels of status and 
prestige.  The oldest order, and most prestigious, was Knight of the Garter (1348), 
followed by Knight of the Thistle (1687) and Knight of Bath (1725).  Then in 1815 the 
Knight of Bath was split into three separate orders, Grand Cross (GCB), Commander 
(KCB) and Companion (CB).  Above knighthoods were titles of the aristocracy.  The 
lowest title of the aristocracy was a baronetage.  Baronets in this study are counted 
as part of the aristocracy as they had a similar social standing and income level to 
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many peers.  In a similar fashion to peers, baronets possessed hereditary titles.180  
Other members of the aristocracy were called peers and were split into five main 
ranks.   At the top was a duke, followed by marquis, earl, viscount and baron.  These 
titles were also separated by country of origin.  The most prestigious were English 
titles as they gave the holder the right to sit in the House of Lords.  In 1707, with the 
Act of Union, all English and Scottish titles were combined to form the peerage of 
Great Britain.  Under this act, Scottish peers chose sixteen representative peers, 
who were entitled to sit in the English House of Lords for one parliament.  Irish 
peerages conferred the least status, at least for the early period.  They had the right 
to sit in the Irish House of Lords, but were excluded from the English House of Lords 
until the Union with Ireland Act 1800 when all peerages became United Kingdom 
peerages and 28 Irish representative peers were chosen to sit in the Lords for life.181   
 
 
 A significant number of operational generals were awarded titles in 
recognition of their military achievements.  Table 29 shows 29% of 1747 and 38% of 
1800 operational generals gained titles for military services performed.  There did 
seem to be a ceiling on the type of title received.   It was common to receive a 
knighthood, but few generals gained peerages and even those awarded were usually 
the lowest type of peerage.    Moreover, some of the increase in titles given to 1800 
generals may have also been due to an expanding supply of titles.  The number of 
knighthoods awarded did double between 1750 and 1800, yet baronetcies in 
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existence essentially remained static despite far more being awarded to generals in 
the later period.182   
 
 
The effect on the status of individuals receiving titles was dependent on the 
distribution of titles between aristocrats and those not possessing titles as it was 
common for many titles to be awarded to those that already possessed titles.183  
Naturally, the social value of a title given to someone without a title would be far 
greater than titles awarded to members of society that already had a title.  An 
analysis of highest titles received by social background indicates many generals not 
possessing a title were able to increase their status through gaining titles.    
 
Table 29: Highest titles awarded to generals for military service 
       
Type of 1747 1800 
title Aristocrat ‘Others’ N Aristocrat ‘Others’ N 
Marquis 0.0 0.0 0 2.4 0.0 1 
Earl 4.2 3.2 2 2.4 0.0 1 
Irish Earl 0.0 0.0 0 2.4 0.0 1 
Viscount 4.2 0.0 1 0.0 1.1 1 
Baron 0.0 0.0 0 9.8 5.7 9 
Irish Baron 4.2 3.2 2 0.0 1.1 1 
Baronet 0.0 3.2 1 2.4 12.6 12 
sub-total       
     -Aristocracy 12.6 9.6 6 19.4 20.5 26 
Knight of the Garter 8.3 0.0 2 9.8 0.0 4 
Knight of the Thistle 8.3 0.0 2 0.0 0.0 0 
Knight of Bath 16.7 6.4 6 12.2 16.0 19 
sub-total       
     -Knights 33.3 6.4 10 22.0 16.0 23 
No title 54.1 84.0 39 58.6 63.5 79 
N 24 31 55 41 87 128 
Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as percentage of N. 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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In the eighteenth-century 16% of 1747 and 36.5 % of 1800 generals who were not 
members of the aristocracy gained titles.  Moreover, there was a noticeable shift in 
favour of ‘others’ generals receiving titles between the two periods.  In the early 
period there was a large difference between the numbers of ‘others’ and aristocrats 
not gaining a title for military service; 84% of ‘others’ did not receive a title for military 
service compared to 54% of aristocrats.  During the late eighteenth-century the 
aristocratic share of military titles remained fairly constant as 58% of aristocrats did 
not receive titles related to their career.  However, the ‘others’ received many more 
titles for military service than previously as only 63% of ‘others’ were without an 
honour for their military service.  This suggests the high status a title conferred was a 
major long term reward for later period generals from the ‘middling sort’ who entered 
the army.  In fact, many of the ‘middling sort’ generals who gained titles were the first 
members of their family to be honoured in such a fashion.  The chance of gaining a 
title, even if it was a low probability event, certainly seemed to act as an incentive to 
enter the military.  Cavell noted the possibility of gaining a title in the navy acted as 
an incentive to enter this profession and encourage the perception that it was a 
career open to all with merit.184  Thus, the increasing share of ‘others’ gaining titles 
was perhaps an indication that merit became more important over time. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
 
 The current literature on the rewards and costs of British officers in the 
eighteenth-century focuses on the poor financial returns of military service.  Guy, the 
foremost authority on the rewards and costs of British officers, argues that many 
officers gained little from their service apart from the honour of serving King and 
country.185  In the short-term this was undoubtedly true for many ranks.  The analysis 
of officers and future generals personal accounts showed that once private income is 
taken into account most ensigns and lieutenants had on average small annual net 
deficits.  This was due to delays in receiving payments and lack of income 
diversification.  Senior officers, such as lieutenant colonels or generals who were 
also regimental colonels, were also often faced with great financial challenges as 
mounting expenditure increased far more rapidly than any income growth.  
Nevertheless, even in the short term not all ranks necessarily made a loss from their 
positions. Captains and majors typically had accounts that were usually in credit. 
 
 
 The short-term losses of an army career, however, were usually more than 
compensated for by long-term returns.  A reasonable profit from army service was 
gained by an officer who served in the army for twenty years and then retired at 
captain, the most common retirement rank, through selling his commission.  This 
should have resulted in a long-term gain at least equivalent to five years full pay.  
Admittedly, not all officers gained these rewards as army service always brought the 
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risk of premature death.  In addition, only a small return from army service was 
gained for the relatively unsuccessful officers who retired at lieutenant.  A lieutenant 
with twenty years’ service could probably expect a return equal to approximately one 
and half years pay.   
 
 
Even greater long-term gains could be had by those few officers who made it 
to operational general.  Obtaining the rank of general opened up the possibility of 
substantial long term financial rewards through appointments to command, 
governorships or profits derived from the colonelcy of a regiment.  The rewards of 
generalship were slightly different depending on time period.  Early eighteenth-
century generals may have been able to make large returns from the colonelcies of 
regiments when more quasi-legitimate rewards were available, whereas colonial 
expansion, and an increase in prize money opportunities in the later period, provided 
more opportunity for late eighteenth-century period generals obtaining high 
command positions in the colonies.  As the greatest long-term financial rewards 
could be gained through obtaining a high command position in the colonies 
modernisation probably led to increasing rewards for generals.  
 
 
An army career also provided the opportunity to increase social status for 
officers from the ‘middling sort’.  Status and honour was an important part of 
eighteenth-century life and by entry into the army officers immediately gained the 
status of a gentleman in an honourable profession.   It was even possible for very 
successful officers to gain knighthoods or aristocratic titles in recognition of their 
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military service. Entering the army was one of the best ways to obtain a knighthood.  
Long-term social rewards also seemed to be increasing over time as a higher 
proportion of ‘others’ relative to aristocrats gained knighthoods and aristocratic titles 
for military service than in the early eighteenth-century. 
 
 
For a young gentleman seeking a career that combined status, honour and 
wealth the army was a good career choice.  Law perhaps brought larger long term 
financial gains, but the short term financial costs were even greater.  Even in 1718 it 
cost a potential barrister £200 per year to train at the Middle Temple.186 Moreover, 
the probability of a successful law career may have been even more uncertain than a 
career in the army.  When Patrick Agnew, the son of Sir James Agnew, switched 
from the law to an army career during the eighteenth-century it was because he was  
“...very much discouraged... by reason that there are already too many of that profession; for there is 
not one-third of that employment that are able to gain their bread by it, and even of that number the 
most part are such as have good estates, and are able to live upon their own till such time as they 
come into business; and indeed they cannot propose coming into business for good many years after 
entering....”
187
 
 
The church was another alternative, but this usually required a university education 
prior to entry and promotion may have been slower due to lack of purchase and the 
more peaceable nature of the profession.  In consequence, a church career probably 
not only required academic ability, but also influence to smooth career progression to 
a greater extent than in the army.188  A navy career was probably more financially 
rewarding due to the greater frequency of prize money, but the social status of navy 
officers was much lower than the army until the 1780s when the royal family started 
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sending their sons to sea.189  This was also a career that required a private income.  
It is estimated that in 1807 initial setup costs for joining the navy as a volunteer may 
have been as much as £80.190  In addition, new recruits needed private funds to 
supplement their military pay ranging from £20 to £60 per year, depending on the 
time period.191  The costs of a navy career were lower than the army, but still 
problematic for a recruit of modest means.  There were also greater technical 
requirements for navy officers and the conditions of service at sea may have been 
harsher than for those on the land.  Indeed, the civilised nature of an army career 
was one of its great attractions as the father of Lord Herbert reminded him when he 
was considering quitting the army: 
“...To quit a profession, &  have none, I always held a very silly thing, but every line of life carries 
some constraint with it, & so it ought to do; none is so little, I sincerely believe however, upon my 
honor, as the military one in England....”
192
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Chapter eight: Conclusion 
 
 
    I.  Introduction  
 
 
The aim of this thesis was to answer two important questions on the nature of 
the army in particular and professions in general as a mechanism of social mobility in 
the eighteenth-century.  Did the upper levels of the army remain isolated from social 
mobility?  Were the social origins and career patterns of generals different in the late 
eighteenth-century compared to their earlier counterparts?   These questions relate 
to the extent to which social mobility was limited for those managing to reach the 
upper levels of professions and the effect of modernisation on levels of social 
mobility.  A survey of the literature on the eighteenth-century army and social 
mobility generally indicates the following answers to these questions.  It would be 
expected that generals remained mostly isolated from social mobility.  Officers may 
rise as high as major if they were lucky, but advancement above this level presented 
great difficulties due to the nature of army service in this period. The importance of 
social status and money in promotion restrained progress to the higher ranks.  
Furthermore, the rewards and costs and service would have assisted in placing a 
ceiling on the advancement of officers as no matter how high officers rose the army 
remained a losing concern as expenditure outpaced income growth.  These findings 
are given theoretical support by the ‘closure thesis’ of social mobility.  Modernisation, 
in line with the recent research of Clark and Goldthorpe, would not have improved 
this situation.  The ‘social snobbery’ of the late eighteenth-century army meant social 
status became more important in promotion resulting in declining rates of social 
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mobility to the highest ranks.  The actual findings of this study, however, are rather 
different from these expectations. 
 
 
II. The limits of social mobility  
 
 
 The first important finding is that the upper levels of the army did not remain 
isolated from social mobility. Operational generals as a social group remained 
relatively open.  The measures of social mobility examined clearly indicate this.  The 
social status of generals’ fathers show that 35% of 1747 future generals’ fathers 
were esquires, gentlemen or members of the middling sort.  If the destination social 
status of an operational general was at least somewhere between esquire and 
knight, which would seem a reasonable assumption given that army captains were 
entitled to call themselves esquire, this would indicate a relatively high level of social 
mobility among generals.  The extent of this upward social mobility was even greater 
for some of the generals who advanced.  This was because their military service 
rewarded them with hereditary titles or facilitated marriages to aristocrats enabling 
some generals to assimilate into the aristocracy.  Ligonier became an earl, Blakeney 
a baron, Gooch a baronet, while three other generals married the daughters of 
baronets.  Accordingly, by the end of their careers six of the generals that advanced 
in social status or 15% of all generals were the social equivalent of aristocrats. 
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 Apart from the social backgrounds of future generals’ fathers there were other 
signs that operational generals were open to those from below.  Levels of self-
recruitment, a key measure of mobility, were not especially high. Nearly 60% of 
future 1747 generals had fathers who pursued non-army careers and the sons of 
generals only accounted for 20% of future generals.  Given that 54% of mid-
eighteenth-century officers’ fathers pursued non-army careers it may be that the self-
recruitment of generals was not overly different from that of regular officers.1  Self-
recruitment of generals may have also been lower than similar ranks in comparable 
occupations.  The self-recruitment of the top occupations in Victorian society, in a 
period within close proximity of many later period generals’ careers, was over 60% 
between 1839 and 1843, a much higher level than the self-recruitment of operational 
generals.2  Education, in common with self-recruitment, is another facet of mobility 
that can help to increase social closure to the highest positions.  For example, to 
become a government minister in the late eighteenth-century it seemed a 
requirement to attend public school.3   However, there was no evidence that a 
particularly high level of education was necessary to become a general. Those who 
attended public school were mostly aristocrats and many generals attending 
university only did so with the intention of pursuing a law career before belatedly 
changing career paths.  Consequently, education did not act as a social closure 
mechanism in becoming a general. It was not necessary to attend public school or 
attend university to progress in the army. 
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Outsiders may have had the opportunity to advance to general, but this did 
not mean there was anything close to equality of opportunity or “complete” social 
mobility.  In both periods aristocrats were a very important social group, especially 
given the small number of aristocrats in the population. This meant that rates of 
social mobility among generals were always substantially less than for army officers.  
According to the research of Odintz and Razell, the number of aristocrats serving as 
officers in the army may have been between 11% and 24%.4  A slightly higher 
estimate is provided by Conway who suggests in 1780 30% of army officers were 
aristocrats.5  As the lowest proportion of aristocrats in any period was still as many 
as 44% of all generals this means that rates of social mobility among general officers 
were significantly lower than that of officers.  Social mobility was also limited as even 
generals who originated from the middling sort generally came from families that 
were fairly well-off.  In both periods there were no stories of operational generals 
rising from poverty to command.  The most dramatic move was probably the sons of 
relatively unsuccessful members of the middling sort who became operational 
generals.  Even these stories were rare.  Most of the middling sort who became 
generals were the sons of fathers who had achieved great success in their 
professions; for example, the future General Clarke who was the son of a judge. This 
characteristic of generals’ backgrounds does lend support to the ‘closure thesis’, that 
it is relatively difficult to ascend too many steps in any social hierarchy as most 
moves concern people holding relatively similar positions. 
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The reason for this large difference in the rates of social mobility between 
generals and other officers was indeed related to the way social status constrained 
social mobility in rising to the highest ranks.  The analysis of generals’ careers 
showed that social status was the most important factor in promotion and triumphed 
at almost every turn.  Aristocrats entered at higher ranks, skipped ranks more often 
and were promoted much faster than their untitled colleagues.  The importance of 
social status was so great that other factors often only played a limited role in the 
promotion of aristocrats.  Non-social status factors, however, did play an important 
role in the advancement of future generals who were not aristocrats.  In the later 
period being a meritorious officer or serving as a regimental captain in the guards for 
the early period produced faster promotion times for these non-aristocratic officers.  
Money was less important than expected in promotion as future generals purchased 
relatively few commissions.  In large part this was due to the opportunity war 
provided in securing promotions at relatively low cost.  Most of the future generals 
entered the army and gained promotion during wartime when non-purchase 
commissions were readily available so it was not necessary to buy commissions 
directly. This was also related to the high proportion of generals who were 
aristocrats; most of these officers obtained promotions without purchase, which was 
probably a function of their high social status.  Of course, money did help promotion 
prospects.  During periods of peace the situation was reversed and most promotions 
were purchased, which was an especially important method of promotion for non-
aristocrats.  Money also accelerated speed of promotion; buying a commission 
decreased promotion times, especially for the sought after ranks of major and 
captain. 
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The role the rewards and costs of an army career played in constraining 
levels of social mobility was much more limited than social status. This study has 
shown that officership was not a losing concern, despite the current literature on the 
rewards of the army stressing the losses officers made. Returns from army service 
depended on the rank and the timeframe of analysis.  The junior ranks, ensign and 
lieutenant, did mostly produce short-term losses.  However, as these losses were 
relatively small and agents did not charge interest on small debts this probably did 
not affect mobility patterns.  In contrast, captains and majors regularly produced net 
credits in their accounts.  Moreover, if officers managed to stay in the army long-
term, which most did, and sell their commissions to fund their retirement this would 
have produced a reasonable long-term return from army service. An officer retiring at 
captain after twenty years’ service probably would have been able to generate a 
retirement fund equivalent to five years’ full-time pay.  
 
 
The rewards and costs of lieutenant colonels, regimental colonels and 
operational generals may have slightly impacted on levels of mobility. On the one 
hand, these positions did require greater financial resources than other ranks, which 
in some respects may have limited mobility. Some of the personal accounts of the 
generals holding these positions showed large losses on occasions as expenditure 
outpaced income growth. Thus, the private capital contributions required of 
lieutenant colonels and generals were much higher than other ranks. On the other 
hand, there were also opportunities to make large financial gains from their positions, 
which would more than balance previous losses. The operational generals serving in 
the guards, for instance, consistently made healthy profits in their accounts.  Even 
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some regimental colonels who were generals made significant financial gains from 
their positions.  Fox showed profits in his accounts for three out of four years, a 
cumulative net gain that exceeded £1000. In addition, many generals made 
substantial gains while on active service abroad as the personal accounts of Harris 
and Lindsay demonstrated. Thus, the effect of the rewards and costs of army officers 
in restraining mobility was probably limited at best. 
 
 
III. Modernisation and social mobility 
 
 
 The second major finding of this study is that modernisation did matter to 
social mobility. The modernisation of the army in this period increased rates of social 
mobility among operational generals.   
  
 
The social origins and career patterns of generals in the late eighteenth-
century were quite different to their earlier counterparts in many respects.  Rates of 
social mobility measured by future generals’ fathers’ social origins and self-
recruitment were clearly increasing between the periods.  General's fathers who 
were esquires, gentlemen or members of the middling sort increased from 35% for 
1747 generals to 56% for their 1800 counterparts.  Thus, 56% of 1800 generals 
increased their social status through a successful army career.  However, the extent 
to which upward mobility was increasing between the periods may be slightly 
exaggerated due to changes in the size of the army relative to the pool of aristocrats 
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during this period.  As the number of operational generals increased over time if the 
number of aristocrats did not increase or increased lower than the rising demand for 
generals then a higher percentage of aristocrats would have to join the army just to 
ensure the proportion of aristocratic generals did not decline.  Therefore, a declining 
proportion of aristocratic generals as the army increased in size would not be 
unexpected.  Nevertheless, even if this accounted for 5% or 10% of social mobility 
increases it does not change the fact that rates of social mobility among generals still 
increased impressively between the early and late eighteenth-century.  In addition, 
the depth of the social mobility was not overly different compared to the earlier 
period officers.  An almost identical number of operational generals assimilated into 
the aristocracy through gaining hereditary titles or marrying aristocrats; 17% of 1800 
operational generals whose beginning social status was at best esquire joined the 
aristocracy in this way.  More did make it to the slightly higher level of knight than 
their 1747 counterparts; 13% of late eighteenth-century generals achieving upward 
mobility became knights compared to 7% for the early period .  There were similar 
directional moves in self-recruitment, although the magnitude was much less than for 
fathers’ social backgrounds.  The number of future generals joining the army whose 
fathers pursued non-army careers rose 10% between the periods and the sons of 
generals declined 4%. 
 
 
Social status was still a critical factor in promotion for the later period officers, 
and as such acted to restrain mobility, but its influence clearly declined over time due 
to the impact of modernisation on army careers.  Aristocrats had greater advantages 
in promotion during the early eighteenth-century due to the more individualised 
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career patterns at this time. This allowed aristocrats to enter at higher army ranks 
than most other officers and skip ranks which the ‘others’ generally served at.  
However, modernisation brought more uniformity in career patterns. Regardless of 
social group, late eighteenth-century future generals entered at the same ranks and 
age and served in most of the regimental ranks. This reduced the aristocratic 
advantage in army careers as the narrowing relative difference in promotion times 
between aristocrats and the ‘others’ showed.  Greater uniformity also affected the 
impact of regiment type on promotion prospects. The advantage some future 
generals gained from serving in the guards in the early period, which often allowed 
them to skip regimental ranks, disappeared by the late eighteenth-century as even 
those serving in the guards with higher army ranks still served in most regimental 
ranks.  Promotional times for most regimental ranks slowed, which meant that 
changing regiments or regimental mobility became increasingly common. 
Accordingly, later period future generals tended to serve in many more regiments 
than their earlier counterparts.  The more professional army of the later period also 
led to merit playing a greater role in promotion than previously.  The proxies used for 
merit indicated that merit for the ‘others’ only gave a slight advantage in promotion 
during the early period, but this significantly increased over time as modernisation 
occurred.   
 
 
The rewards operational generals gained from their service most likely 
increased over time with the expansion of warfare and empire, which may have had 
a positive effect on rates of mobility. In the later period an increasing number of 
commands were located in colonial jurisdictions providing greater opportunities for 
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wealth creation from an army career.  The proportion of generals who held the top 
commands of national or local commander or a governorship in the West Indies, 
India and North America increased from 7% for the early period to 35% by the late 
eighteenth-century.  Of these later period commands, 12% of operational generals 
held commands in India which provided the most opportunity in building fortunes due 
to the easy availability of prize-money. However, even colonial commands outside of 
India, such as the West Indies, as the accounts of Lindsay showed provided the 
opportunity to make a fortune in army service.  The long-term social rewards non-
aristocrats gained from army service also seemed to increase over time.  There was 
a noticeable shift in favour of ‘others’ generals receiving titles between the two 
periods.  In the early period there was a 30% difference between the numbers of 
‘others’ and aristocrats not gaining a title for military service, but this declined to only 
4.9% by the later period.   
 
 
Another factor in the increasing rates of social mobility for operational 
generals was that the social status of an army career in this period remained high 
despite increasing numbers entering the profession. In fact, it could even be argued 
the social status of army officers increased over time.  In the early eighteenth-
century the army was often seen in a less than favourable light due to concerns 
about internal order and it was generally not a popular institution.6  However, 
success in the Seven Years War in many ways transformed the image of the army in 
the eyes of the public.  High status was also maintained due to the continuing 
aristocratic connection with the army. 
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IV. Implications of this study 
 
 
 What are the implications of this study for our understanding of the 
eighteenth-century army and professions and social mobility generally?  
 
 
It has become evident that the most important factor in advancing through a 
professional career in this period was social status and the closeness of aristocratic 
connections. Other factors did matter in promotion, but they were mainly important 
for those who were not aristocrats. Given the importance of social status it might be 
expected this led to the over promotion of aristocrats, which in turn negatively 
affected military performance.  There were probably some instances when this 
happened.  However, for the most part military performance did not seem 
significantly affected by the high proportion of aristocratic commanders as the key 
commands in important battles usually went to generals who had abilities as 
commanders even if they were also aristocrats. For instance, Wellington 
commanded in most of the key engagements of the Napoleonic wars. 
 
 
This thesis challenges the view that officers were poorly rewarded for their 
services and that the importance of social status in professional advancement 
increased during the eighteenth-century.  The research showed the long-term 
returns of army service for even average or unsuccessful officers would have 
outweighed the costs of an army career.  Moreover, operational generals had the 
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opportunity to make significant gains from their service.  It has also been clearly 
shown that the importance of social status in advancing with the army declined over 
time.  Modernisation mattered and the greater uniformity in career patterns by the 
late period served to make advancement more equal than previously.  This 
challenges the impression that the early eighteenth-century army was more 
meritocratic than its later period counterpart and the recent work on social mobility by 
Clark and Goldthorpe suggesting economic growth and modernisation does not 
affect rates of social mobility.  Modernisation for future generals led to higher rates of 
social mobility.  The greater uniformity of career patterns for later period future 
generals also has important implications for military efficiency.  One result of this was 
to slow regimental promotion times, which meant the future generals gained more 
experience at intermediary ranks before gaining high command.  This may have 
been helpful in improving performance levels as experience often counts in 
performing any role well. 
 
 
The findings of this research also show the depth of mobility to the highest 
positions is limited and thus provides support for the ‘closure thesis’.  Operational 
generals were not isolated from increases in social mobility, but their rates of mobility 
were far less than for officers.  In addition, the extent of movement up the social 
hierarchy for most operational generals achieving upward mobility was fairly limited.  
They were usually already at high levels in society and merely moved to a slightly 
higher social level.  One common outcome for future generals who used the army to 
advance in the later period was to rise from the wealthy middling sort to become a 
knight.  The limits of mobility were demonstrated by the fact that even though rates 
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of social mobility clearly increased over time the numbers of generals from the 
middling sort or gentry who managed to assimilate into the aristocracy through the 
award of hereditary titles or marriage remained almost constant.   
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Appendix 1, Social backgrounds 
 
                                                                                Table 1.1. Family origins of 1747 generals 
             
 MGFather GFather Father SG1 SG2 SG3  MGFather GFather Father SG1 SG2 SG3 
Anstruther - Knight Knight Naristocrat Gentry Knight Borgard - Foreign ? ? - - 
Bowles Merchant Merchant Merchant Naristocrat Middling Business Blakeney - Gentleman MP Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Bland - - ? ? - - Bligh Colonel MP MP Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Bragg - - ? ? - - Byng - Gentleman Viscount Aristocrat - - 
Campbell - MP Baronet Aristocrat - - Cholmondeley - Viscount Earl Aristocrat - - 
Churchill - - ? ? - - Cope - - Lt. Col. Naristocrat Middling Army 
Dalzell - - ? ? - - Dalrymple Knight Viscount Earl Aristocrat - - 
de Grangues - - ? ? - - Fowke - Gentleman Major Naristocrat Middling Army 
Gooch - JP Alderman Naristocrat Gentry Knight Graham - - ? ? - - 
Guise - Gentleman Gentleman Naristocrat Gentry Esquire Handasyd - - General Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Hargrave - - Captain Naristocrat Middling Army Hawley - - Colonel Naristocrat Middling Army 
Honywood - - ? ? - - Howard, C. Earl Earl Earl Aristocrat - - 
Howard, T. - Knight ? ? - - Huske - - ? ? - - 
Irwin - - ? ? - - Keppel Foreign Foreign Earl Aristocrat - - 
Kerr Marquess Earl Marquess Aristocrat - - Lennox Lord Illegitimate Duke Aristocrat - - 
Leslie Marquess Earl Earl Aristocrat - - Ligonier - - Foreign Naristocrat Middling Foreign 
Lindsay Lord Earl Earl Aristocrat - - Molesworth Lord Merchant Viscount Aristocrat - - 
Montagu Earl Baron Duke Aristocrat - - Mordaunt Baronet Viscount Hon. Aristocrat - - 
Murray Earl Marquess Earl Aristocrat - - O’Farrell - - ? ? - - 
Oglethorpe - Colonel Knight Naristocrat Gentry Knight O'Hara - - Baron Aristocrat - - 
Parker - - ? ? - - Philips - - Gentleman Naristocrat Gentry Gentleman 
Ponsonby - Knight Viscount Aristocrat - - Preston Lord - Baronet Aristocrat - - 
Rich Baronet - Baronet Aristocrat - - Spencer Duke Earl Earl Aristocrat - - 
Note: In all appendix tables Naristocrat is an abbreviation used for non-aristocrat. MGFather stands for maternal grandfather and SG social group.    
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                Table 1.1. Family origins of 1747 generals (continued) 
             
 MGFather GFather Father SG1 SG2 SG3  MGFather GFather Father SG1 SG2 SG3 
St Clair Baronet Viscount Lord Aristocrat - - St George - - ? ? - - 
Temple - Baronet Baronet Aristocrat - - Wade - Major ? ? - - 
Wentworth - Baronet Baronet Aristocrat - - West Merchant Baron Baron Aristocrat - - 
William Foreign King King Aristocrat - - Wolfe - Lt. Col. Major Naristocrat Middling Army 
Wynyard - - Esquire Naristocrat Gentry Esquire        
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                Table 1.2. Birth origins of 1747 generals 
             
 DOB DOD Birth 
Order 
POB RPOB CPOB  DOB DOD Birth 
Order 
POB RPOB CPOB 
Anstruther 1678 1760 1 Airdrie Fife Scotland Borgard 1659 1751 - Holbaek Jutland Denmark 
Bowles 1687 1749 3 Eastcheap London England Blakeney 1672 1761 1 Blakeney Limerick Ireland 
Bland 1686 1763 2 - - Ireland Bligh 1685 1775 2 Brittas Dublin Ireland 
Bragg - 1759 - - - - Byng 1701 1750 2 Southill Bedfordshire England 
Campbell 1665 1752 1 - - - Cholmondeley 1709 1775 2 Malpas Cheshire England 
Cope 1690 1760 1 Icomb Gloucestershire England Dalzell 1662 1758 - - - - 
Dalrymple 1673 1747 2 Edinburgh Edinburgh Scotland Fowke 1690 1765 - - - - 
Gooch 1681 1751 2 G. Yarmouth Norfolk England Guise 1683 1765 - Sandhurst Gloucestershire England 
Handasyd 1684 1763 1 - - - Hargrave 1672 1751 - Westminster London England 
Hawley 1685 1759 - - - - Honywood 1677 1752 2 - - - 
Howard, C. 1696 1765 2 - - - Howard, T. 1684 - 1 - - - 
Huske 1692 1761 - - - - Keppel 1702 1754 1 Westminster London England 
Kerr 1676 1752 - - - - Lennox 1701 1750 1 Goodwood Chichester England 
Leslie 1698 1767 1 Leslie Aberdeenshire Scotland Ligonier 1680 1770 - Castres Toulon France 
Lindsay 1702 1749 1 - - - Molesworth 1680 1758 - Swords Dublin Ireland 
Montagu 1690 1749 3 Boughton Northants England Mordaunt 1697 1780 1 - - - 
Murray 1685 1752 2 Westminster London England O’Farrell  1757 - - - - 
Oglethorpe 1696 1785 5 The City London England O'Hara 1682 1773 1 - - - 
Ponsonby 1695 1745 2 Ashgrove Kilkenny Ireland Preston 1659 1748 2 - - Scotland 
Rich 1685 1768 2 Beccles Suffolk England Spencer 1706 1758 2 Westminster London England 
St Clair 1688 1762 2 - - - Temple 1675 1749 1 West End London England 
Wade 1673 1748 3 Killavally Westmeath Ireland Wentworth 1693 1747 3 - - England 
West 1693 1766 1 - - - William 1721 1765 3 Westminster London England 
Wolfe 1685 1759 - York Yorkshire England Wynyard 1682 1752 - Westminster London England 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                Table 1.3. Family origins of 1800 generals 
             
 MGFather GFather Father SG1 SG2 SG3  MGFather GFather Father SG1 SG2 SG3 
Abercromby, 
Ra. 
- MP Gentleman Naristocrat Gentry Esquire Abercromby
, Ro. 
- MP Gentleman Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Asgill Diplomat - Baronet Aristocrat - - Baird - - Merchant Naristocrat Middling Business 
Balfour - - ? ? - - Barclay - - ? ? - - 
Beckwith - - General Naristocrat Gentry Esquire Borthwick - - General Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Bowyer - - Baronet Aristocrat  - Burrard Lawyer MP Gentleman Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Campbell, 
A. 
Law Army MP Naristocrat Gentry Esquire Campbell, J. Lord Hon. Duke Aristocrat - - 
Carleton, G. - Sheriff Gentleman Naristocrat Gentry Esquire Carleton, T. - Sheriff Gentleman Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Cathcart Lord Lord Lord Aristocrat  - Cavendish Steward Duke Duke Aristocrat - - 
Christie 
Burton 
Foreign - Foreign Naristocrat Middling Foreign Clarke Major Gentleman Judge Naristocrat Gentry Gentleman 
Coates - - ? ? - - Coote - - Dean Naristocrat Middling Church 
Cornwallis Viscount Baron Earl Aristocrat - - Cowell - - ? ? - - 
Cradock - - Archbishop Naristocrat Middling Church Craig - - Judge Naristocrat Middling Law 
Cuninghame - - Officer Naristocrat Middling Army Cuyler - Merchant ? ? - - 
Dalrymple, 
H.W 
- Baronet Captain Aristocrat - - Dalrymple, 
W. 
Baronet - Hon. Aristocrat - - 
Davies - - ? ? - - de Lancy - Merchant General Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Despard - - ? ? - - Don - - Merchant Naristocrat Middling Business 
D’Oyly - - Archdeacon Naristocrat Middling Church Drummond, 
A.J 
- Viscount Viscount Aristocrat - - 
Drummond, 
D. 
- - ? ? - - Dundas, D. - - Merchant Naristocrat Middling Business 
Dundas, F. Judge Judge Judge Naristocrat Gentry Gentleman Duff - Illegitimate Illegitimate Illegitimate - - 
Edward - Prince King Aristocrat - - Fanning - - Captain Naristocrat Middling Army 
Farrington - - Lt. Col. Naristocrat Middling Army Fawcett Gentleman - Gentleman Naristocrat Gentry Gentleman 
Fraser - - Tacksman Naristocrat Gentry Esquire Frederick - Prince King Aristocrat - - 
Fitzroy - Lord Duke Aristocrat - - Forbes - - ? ? - - 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                Table 1.3. Family origins of 1800 generals (continued) 
             
 MGFather GFather Father SG1 SG2 SG3  MGFather GFather Father SG1 SG2 SG3 
Fox Duke Knight Baron Aristocrat - - Floyd Rector - Captain Naristocrat Middling Army 
Gardiner - MP MP Naristocrat Gentry Esquire Garth - Lt. Col. MP Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Gordon Earl Duke Duke Aristocrat - - Grant MP - Laird Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Green - - ? ? - - Grenville MP - MP Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Grey - - Baronet Aristocrat - - Gwyn - - ? ? - - 
Harcourt - MP Earl Aristocrat - - Harris - - Curate Naristocrat Middling Church 
Hastings Earl Baronet Baron Aristocrat - - Herbert Duke Earl Earl Aristocrat - - 
Hewett - - Major Naristocrat Middling Army Howe Baron Viscount Viscount Aristocrat - - 
Hulse Merchant Baronet Baronet Aristocrat - - Hunter - - Laird Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Hely 
Hutchinson 
- - MP Naristocrat Gentry Esquire Irving Captain - Lt. Col. Naristocrat Middling Army 
Johnson, H. - - ? ? - - Johnson, W. - - ? ? - - 
Lake Merchant - ? ? - - Lambart Navy Hon. Earl Aristocrat - - 
Leland - Tradesman ? ? - - Lennox, C. Lord Duke Duke Aristocrat - - 
Lennox, G. Lord Duke Duke Aristocrat - - Lindsay Knight Earl Earl Aristocrat - - 
Lloyd - - ? ? - - Loftus - Colonel Captain Naristocrat Middling Army 
Ludlow Earl - Earl Aristocrat - - Luttrell Knight General Earl Aristocrat - - 
MacLeod Judge Clan Chief ? ? - - Manners - Duke Lord Aristocrat - - 
Martin - - ? ? - - Medows Duke Knight Ranger Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Melville Advocate - Minister Naristocrat Middling Church Mercer - - ? ? - - 
Moore Professor Minister Surgeon Naristocrat Middling Army Morris Foreign Foreign Foreign Naristocrat Middling Foreign 
Morse - - Rector Naristocrat Middling Church Morshead - - ? ? - - 
Morrison - - ? ? - - Munro - - Merchant Naristocrat Middling Business 
Musgrave - Baronet Baronet Aristocrat - - Needham - Viscount Viscount Aristocrat - - 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                Table 1.3. Family origins of 1800 generals (continued) 
             
 MGFather GFather Father SG1 SG2 SG3  MGFather GFather Father SG1 SG2 SG3 
Nicolls - - ? ? - - Nugent - Illegitimate Illegitimate Illegitimate - - 
Percy Earl Haberdasher Duke Aristocrat - - Phipps Baron - Baron Aristocrat - - 
O’Hara - Illegitimate Illegitimate Illegitimate - - Pigot - - MP Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Pitt, J. MP MP Earl Aristocrat - - Pitt, W.A - MP MP Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Prescott - - Officer Naristocrat Middling Army Rainsford - - Alderman Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Roberts - - ? ? - - Ross - - ? ? - - 
Simcoe - - Captain Naristocrat Middling Navy Sloper - - ? ? - - 
Somerset Admiral Duke Duke Aristocrat - - Stanhope Duke Earl Earl Aristocrat - - 
Steuart 
Denham 
Earl Baronet Baronet Aristocrat - - Stevens - - ? ? - - 
St John, F. Duke Viscount Viscount Aristocrat - - St John, H. Baronet Viscount Viscount Aristocrat - - 
St. Ledger Hon. - ? ? - - Strutt Reverend Gentleman MP Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Stuart, C. Hon. Earl Earl Aristocrat - - Stuart, J. Earl Judge Gentleman Naristocrat Gentry Esquire 
Tarleton - - Merchant Naristocrat Middling Business Tonyn - - Colonel Naristocrat Middling Army 
Townshend MP Viscount Viscount Aristocrat - - Trigge - - ? ? - - 
Villettes - - Diplomat Naristocrat Middling Govt. Vyse Bishop - Canon Naristocrat Middling Church 
Walker - - ? ? - - Warde - - ? ? - - 
Wemyss Earl Earl Hon. Aristocrat - - Whitelocke - - Steward Naristocrat Middling Busines
s 
Wilford - - ? ? - - William - King Duke Aristocrat - - 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                Table 1.4. Birth origins of 1800 generals 
             
 DOB DOD Birth 
Order 
POB RPOB CPOB  DOB DOD Birth 
Order 
POB RPOB CPOB 
Abercromby, 
Ra. 
1738 1801 2 Tullibody Clackmannanshire Scotland Abercromby
, Ro. 
1740 1827 3 Tullibody Clackmannanshire Scotland 
Asgill 1762 1823 1 The City London England Baird 1757 1829 5 Newbyth Haddingtonshire Scotland 
Balfour 1743 1823 - - - - Barclay 1741 1823 - - - - 
Beckwith 1752 1823 2 - - - Borthwick 1760 1820 1 - - - 
Bowyer - - - Denham Buckinghamshire England Burrard 1755 1813 1 Vinchelez St. Helier Jersey 
Campbell, 
A. 
1750 1832 1 - - - Campbell, J. 1723 1806 1 - - - 
Carleton, G. 1724 1808 3 Strabane County Tyrone Ireland Carleton, T. 1735 1817 4 - - - 
Cathcart 1755 1843 1 Petersham Surrey England Cavendish 1729 1803 3 - - - 
Christie 
Burton 
1758 1835 1 - - America Clarke 1744 1832 - - - - 
Coote 1759 1823 2 - - Ireland Cornwallis 1738 1805 1 Grovesnor Sq. London England 
Cradock 1762 1839 1 Dublin Dublin Ireland Craig 1748 1812 - Gibraltar Gibraltar Gibraltar 
Cuninghame 1728 1801 1 - - - Cuyler 1740 1819 - Albany New York America 
Dalrymple, 
H.W 
1750 1830 1 Ayr Ayrshire Scotland Dalrymple, 
W. 
1736 1807 2 - - - 
de Lancy 1749 1822 2 New York New York America Despard 1744 1829 - Dublin Dublin Ireland 
Don 1756 1832 2 Edinburgh Edinburgh Scotland D’Oyly  1815 3 - - - 
Drummond, 
A.J 
- - 2 - - - Dundas, D. 1735 1820 3 Edinburgh Edinburgh Scotland 
Dundas, F. 1759 1824 2 - - - Duff 1753 1839 1 Keith Aberdeenshire Scotland 
Edward 1738 1820 4 Westminster London England Fanning 1737 1818 5 Long Island New York America 
Farrington 1742 1823 - - - - Fawcett 1727 1804 1 Halifax Yorkshire England 
Fraser 1737 1813 - - - - Frederick 1763 1827 2 Westminster London England 
Fitzroy 1764 1829 2 - - - Fox 1755 1811 3 - - - 
Floyd 1748 1818 1 - - - Gardiner 1748 1806 2 - - - 
Garth 1733 1819 2 - - - Gordon 1726 1801 4 - - - 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                Table 1.4. Birth origins of 1800 generals (continued) 
             
 DOB DOD Birth 
Order 
POB RPOB CPOB  DOB DOD Birth 
Order 
POB RPOB CPOB 
Grant 1720 1806 2 Ballindalloch Banffshire Scotland Green 1725 1811 - Westminster London England 
Grenville 1742 1823 2 - - - Grey 1729 1807 4 Howick Northumberland England 
Harcourt 1743 1830 2 - - - Harris 1746 1829 1 London London England 
Hastings 1754 1826 1 Dublin Dublin Ireland Herbert 1759 1827 1 Wilton Wiltshire England 
Hewett 1750 1840 1 - - - Howe 1729 1814 3 Langar Nottinghamshire England 
Hulse 1748 1837 2 - - - Hunter 1746 1805 - Longforgan Perthshire Scotland 
Hely 
Hutchinson 
1757 1832 2 - - - Irving 1749 1828 - Waterford County Waterford Ireland 
Johnson, H. 1748 1835 - - - - Lake 1744 1808 - - - - 
Lambart 1763 1837 1 - - - Leland - 1808 - - - - 
Lennox, C. 1735 1806 2 Westminster London England Lennox, G. 1737 1805 3 Westminster London England 
Lindsay 1752 1825 1 Kilconquhar Fife Scotland Loftus 1752 1831 - - - - 
Ludlow 1758 1842 2 - - - Luttrell 1737 1821 1 Cranford Middlesex England 
MacLeod 1754 1801  Forres Moray Scotland Manners 1758 1823 1 - - - 
Medows 1738 1813 3 - - - Melville 1723 1809 - Monimail Fife Scotland 
Moore 1761 1809 1 Trongate Glasgow Scotland Morris 1728 1800 2 New York - America 
Morse 1742 1818 2 - - - Munro 1726 1805 1 - - - 
Musgrave 1738 1812 6 Hayton Cumberland England Needham 1748 1832 3 - - - 
Nugent 1757 1849 - - - - Percy 1742 1817 1 Hanover Square London England 
Phipps 1755 1831 3 - - - O’Hara 1740 1802 - - - - 
Pigot 1750 1840 1 - - - Pitt, J. 1756 1835 1 Hayes Kent England 
Pitt, W.A 1728 1809 4 - - - Prescott 1727 1815 - - - - 
Rainsford 1728 1809 2 West Ham Essex England Ross 1742 1827 - - - - 
Simcoe 1752 1806 3 Cotterstock Northants England Somerset 1767 1831 2 Badminton Gloucestershire England 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                Table 1.4. Birth origins of 1800 generals (continued) 
             
 DOB DOD Birth 
Order 
POB RPOB CPOB  DOB DOD Birth 
Order 
POB RPOB CPOB 
Stanhope 1753 1829 1 - - - Steuart Denham 1744 1839 1 Goodtrees Edinburgh Scotland 
St John, F. 1765 1844 2 - - - St John, H. 1738 1818 2 - - - 
St. Ledger 1756 1800 - - - - Strutt 1762 1848 3 Springfield Essex England 
Stuart, C. 1753 1801 4 Kenwood House London England Stuart, J. 1741 1815 3 Blair Hall Perthshire Scotland 
Tarleton 1754 1833 2 Water Street Liverpool England Tonyn 1725 1804 - - - - 
Townshend 1724 1807 1 London London England Trigge 1742 1814 - - - - 
Villettes 1754 1808 2 Bern  Switzerland Vyse 1746 1825 2 Lichfield Staffordshire England 
Warde 1725 1803 - - - - Wemyss 1760 1822 1 - - - 
Whitelocke 1757 1833 - - - - William 1743 1805 3 Westminster London England 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
319 
 
Table 1.5. Father’s army rank of 1747 generals 
        
 SG1 Father’s army rank 
Blakeney Naristocrat Captain 
Cholmondeley Aristocrat General 
Cope Naristocrat Lt. Colonel 
Fowke Naristocrat Major 
Handasyd Naristocrat Major General 
Hawley Naristocrat Captain 
Hargrave Naristocrat Captain 
Howard, C. Aristocrat Regimental Colonel 
Keppel Aristocrat Lt. General 
Lindsay Aristocrat Lt. General 
Mordaunt Aristocrat Lt. General 
Murray Aristocrat Regimental Colonel 
Oglethorpe Naristocrat Brigadier General 
O'Hara Aristocrat Major General 
Ponsonby Aristocrat Regimental Colonel 
William  Aristocrat King 
Wolfe Aristocrat Major 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                        Table 1.6. Father’s army rank of 1800 generals 
         
 SG1 Father’s army rank  SG1 Father’s army rank 
Beckwith Naristocrat Major General Borthwick Naristocrat Lt. General 
Campbell, A. Naristocrat Officer Campbell, J. Aristocrat General 
Cathcart Aristocrat Lt. General Christie Burton Naristocrat General 
Cuninghame Naristocrat Officer Dalrymple, H.W Aristocrat Captain 
de Lancy Naristocrat Brigadier General Edward Aristocrat King 
Fanning Naristocrat Captain Farrington Naristocrat Lt. Colonel 
Floyd Naristocrat Captain Frederick Aristocrat King 
Grant Naristocrat Lt. Colonel Harcourt Aristocrat General 
Herbert Aristocrat General Hewett Naristocrat Major 
Irving Naristocrat Lt. Colonel Lambart Aristocrat Lt. General 
Lennox, C. Aristocrat General Lennox, G. Aristocrat General 
Lindsay Aristocrat Captain Loftus Naristocrat Captain 
Manners Aristocrat General Moore Naristocrat Surgeon 
Needham Aristocrat Captain Pitt, J. Aristocrat Cornet 
Prescott Naristocrat Officer Stanhope Aristocrat General 
Tonyn Naristocrat Regimental Colonel    
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                        Table 1.7. Education of 1747 generals 
        
 SG1 Tutors Public school Military 
academy 
Inns of Court University 
Cope Naristocrat - Westminster - - - 
Dalrymple Aristocrat   - - - Leiden 
Gooch Naristocrat - - - - Oxford 
Guise Naristocrat - - - - Oxford 
Handasyd Naristocrat - Westminster - - - 
Irwin ?   - - - - 
Keppel Aristocrat   - - - - 
Lennox Aristocrat   - - - - 
Lindsay Aristocrat - - Vaudeuil, Paris - Glasgow 
Molesworth Aristocrat - - - Middle Temple - 
Montagu Aristocrat   - - - - 
Oglethorpe Naristocrat - Eton - - Oxford 
O'Hara Aristocrat - Westminster - - - 
Spencer Aristocrat - Eton - - - 
Temple Aristocrat - Eton - - Cambridge 
Wentworth Aristocrat - - - - Oxford 
West Aristocrat - Eton - - - 
William Aristocrat   Westminster - - - 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                Table 1.8. Education of 1800 generals 
            
 SG1 Tutors Grammar school Public school Military 
academy 
Civilian 
academy 
Inns of 
Court 
Oxbridge UK 
university 
Foreign 
university 
Abercromby, Ra. Naristocrat - Alloa Rugby - - - - Edinburgh Leipzig 
Asgill Aristocrat - - Westminster - - - - - Gottingen 
Baird Naristocrat - - - Lewis Lochée's - - - - - 
Campbell, J. Aristocrat - - Westminster - - - - - - 
Carleton, G. Naristocrat   - - - - - - - - 
Cathcart Aristocrat   - Eton - - - - Glasgow Dresden 
Clarke Naristocrat - - Eton - - - - - - 
Coote Naristocrat - - Eton - - - - Dublin - 
Cornwallis Aristocrat - - Eton Turin - - Cambridge - - 
Cradock Naristocrat - - - - - - - Dublin - 
Cuninghame Naristocrat - - - - - - - Edinburgh - 
Dalrymple, W. Aristocrat - - - - - - - Glasgow - 
de Lancy Naristocrat   - - - - - - - - 
D’Oyly Naristocrat - - - - - - Cambridge - - 
Duff Illegitimate - - - - Keith - - Aberdeen - 
Edward Aristocrat   - - - - - - - - 
Fanning Naristocrat - - - - - - - - Harvard, 
Yale 
Fawcett Naristocrat - Bury - - - - - - - 
Fitzroy Aristocrat - Mr Newcomb’s Harrow - - - Cambridge - - 
Fox Aristocrat - - Westminster Strausbourg - - - - - 
Floyd Naristocrat   - - - - - - - - 
Gordon Aristocrat - - Eton - - - - - - 
Green ?   - - - - - - - - 
Grenville Naristocrat - - Eton - - - - - - 
Harris Naristocrat - - Westminster - - - - - - 
Hastings Aristocrat - - Harrow - - - Oxford - - 
Herbert Aristocrat   - Harrow - - - - - - 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                Table 1.8. Education of 1800 generals (continued) 
            
 SG1 Tutors Grammar school Public school Military 
academy 
Civilian 
academy 
Inns of Court Oxbridge UK university Foreign 
university 
Hewett Naristocrat - Wimborne - - - - - - - 
Howe Aristocrat   - Eton - - - - - - 
Hely Hutchinson Naristocrat - - Eton Strausbourg - - Oxford - - 
Irving Naristocrat - - King's, 
Canterbury 
- - - - - - 
Lake ? - - Eton - - - - - - 
Lennox, C. Aristocrat   - - - - - - - - 
Lennox, G. Aristocrat   - Westminster - - - - - Leiden 
Lindsay Aristocrat - - - - - - - - Gottingen 
Luttrell Aristocrat - - Westminster - - - Oxford - - 
MacLeod ?   - - - - - Oxford St Andrews - 
Manners Aristocrat - - - - Caen - - - - 
Medows Naristocrat - - Eton - - - - - - 
Melville Naristocrat   Leven - - - - - Glasgow, 
Edinburgh 
- 
Moore Naristocrat - Glasgow - - - - - - - 
Morris Naristocrat - - - - - - - - Yale 
Nugent Illegitimate - - Charterhouse - - - - - - 
O’Hara Illegitimate - - Westminster - - - - - - 
Percy Aristocrat - - Eton - - - Cambridge - - 
Phipps Aristocrat - - Eton - - Middle Temple - - - 
Prescott Naristocrat   - - - - - - - - 
Simcoe Naristocrat - Exeter Eton - - Lincoln's Inn Oxford - - 
Somerset Aristocrat - - Westminster - - - Oxford - - 
Stanhope Aristocrat - - Eton - - Inner Temple - - - 
Steuart Denham Aristocrat   - - - - - - - Tubingen 
St John, F. Aristocrat - - Westminster, 
Eton 
- - - Oxford - - 
St John, H. Aristocrat - - Harrow, Eton - - - - - - 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                Table 1.8. Education of 1800 generals (continued) 
           
 SG1 Tutors Grammar school Public school Military 
academy 
Civilian 
academy 
Inns of Court Oxbridge UK 
university 
Foreign 
university 
St. Ledger ? - - Portarlington, 
Eton 
- - - - - - 
Strutt Naristocrat - - Felsted Lewis Lochée's - - - - - 
Stuart, C. Aristocrat   - - - Dr. Graffiani’s - - - - 
Stuart, J. Naristocrat - Dunfermline - - - - - Edinburgh - 
Tarleton Naristocrat - - - - - Middle Temple Oxford - - 
Townshend Aristocrat - - Eton - - - Cambridge - - 
Villettes Naristocrat - Claverton - - - Lincoln's Inn - St Andrews - 
Wemyss Aristocrat - Edinburgh - - - - Oxford - - 
Whitelocke Naristocrat - Marlborough - Lewis Lochée's - - - - - 
William Aristocrat - - - - - - Cambridge - - 
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                                      Table 1.9. First marriages of 1747 generals 
             
 SG1 Marriage 
status 
Marriage 
age 
Rank at 
marriage 
Father- in-
law 
Wife SG1  SG1 Marriage 
status 
Marriage 
age 
Rank at 
marriage 
Father- in-
law 
Wife SG1 
Anstruther Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - Borgard ? Married 44 Captain Bradshaw ? 
Bowles Naristocrat Married 37 Colonel Hill ? Blakeney Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - 
Bland ? Married 69 Lt. General Hon. Aristocrat Bligh Naristocrat Married 52 Lt. Colonel Bury ? 
Byng Aristocrat Married 35 - Daniel ? Campbell Aristocrat Married - - Campbell ? 
Cholmondeley Aristocrat Married - - Earl Aristocrat Cope Naristocrat Married 22 Lt. Colonel Duncombe ? 
Dalrymple Aristocrat Married 35 Brigadier 
General 
Earl Aristocrat Dalzell ? Married 36 Captain Knight Naristocrat 
Fowke Naristocrat Married 31 Lt. Colonel Baronet Aristocrat Gooch Naristocrat Married 33 Captain Gentleman Naristocrat 
Guise Naristocrat Married 40 Major Foreign Naristocrat Handasyd Naristocrat Married 26 Lt. Colonel Baronet Aristocrat 
Hawley Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - Honywood ? Unmarried - - - - 
Howard, C. Aristocrat Unmarried - - - - Howard, T. ? Married - - Bishop Naristocrat 
Huske ? Unmarried - - - - Irwin ? Married - - ? ? 
Keppel Aristocrat Married 21 Captain Duke Aristocrat Kerr Aristocrat Unmarried - - - - 
Lennox Aristocrat Married 18 Pre-entry Earl Aristocrat Leslie Aristocrat Married 43 Brigadier 
General 
Howard ? 
Ligonier Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - Lindsay Aristocrat Married 45 Brigadier 
General 
Duke Aristocrat 
Molesworth Aristocrat Married - - Lucas ? Montagu Aristocrat Married 15 Pre-entry Duke Aristocrat 
Mordaunt Aristocrat Unmarried - - - - Murray Aristocrat Unmarried - - - - 
Oglethorpe Naristocrat Married 49 Brigadier 
General 
Baronet Aristocrat O'Hara Aristocrat Married 42 Colonel Viscount Aristocrat 
Philips Naristocrat Married - - Gentleman Naristocrat Ponsonby Aristocrat Married - - Earl Aristocrat 
Rich Aristocrat Married 29 Colonel Colonel Naristocrat Spencer Aristocrat Married 26 Pre-entry Baron Aristocrat 
St Clair Aristocrat Married 57 Brigadier 
General 
Baronet Aristocrat Temple Aristocrat Married 40 Lt. General Merchant Naristocrat 
Wade Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - Wentworth Aristocrat Married 27 Lt. Colonel Lord ? 
West Aristocrat Married 28 Lt. Colonel Earl Aristocrat William Aristocrat Unmarried - - - - 
Wolfe Naristocrat Married 38 Major Thompson ? Wynyard Naristocrat Married - - Maxwell ? 
Note: ‘Father-in-law’ lists social status of generals’ fathers-in-law.  Where this is not known the surname of the father- in-law is listed instead.   
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                                 Table 1.10. First marriages of 1800 generals 
             
 SG1 Marriage 
status 
Marriage 
age 
Rank at 
marriage 
Father- in-
law 
Wife SG1  SG1 Marriage 
status 
Marriage 
age 
Rank at 
marriage 
Father- in-
law  
Wife SG1 
Abercromb
y, Ra. 
Naristocrat Married 29 Captain Captain Naristocrat Abercromby
, Ro. 
Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - 
Asgill Aristocrat Married 28 Captain Baronet Aristocrat Baird Naristocrat Married 53 Lt. General Preston ? 
Balfour ? Unmarried - - - - Barclay ? Married - - ? ? 
Burrard Naristocrat Married 34 Major Merchant Naristocrat Campbell, 
A. 
Naristocrat Married - - Menzies ? 
Campbell, 
J. 
Aristocrat Married 36 Major 
General 
Gunning ? Carleton, G. Naristocrat Married 48 Major 
General 
Earl Aristocrat 
Carleton, 
T. 
Naristocrat Married 48 Colonel van Horn ? Cathcart Aristocrat Married 24 Major Foreign Naristocrat 
Cavendish Aristocrat Unmarried - - - - Christie 
Burton 
Naristocrat Married 26 Lieutenant General Naristocrat 
Clarke Naristocrat Married 26 Captain MP Naristocrat Coote Naristocrat Married 27 Major Rodbard ? 
Cornwallis Aristocrat Married 30 Colonel Captain Naristocrat Cradock Naristocrat Married 36 Major 
General 
Earl Aristocrat 
Craig Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - Cuninghame Naristocrat Married 26 Captain Captain Naristocrat 
Cuyler ? Married - - Major Naristocrat Dalrymple, 
H.W 
Aristocrat Married 33 Lt. Colonel General Naristocrat 
Dalrymple, 
W. 
Aristocrat Married 47 Major 
General 
Baronet Aristocrat de Lancy Naristocrat Married - - ? ? 
Despard ? Married 49 Lt. 
Colonel 
Hesketh ? Don Naristocrat Married 26 Captain Illegitimate Illegitimate 
Dundas, D. Naristocrat Married 72 General General Naristocrat Dundas, F. Naristocrat Married 41 Major 
General 
Knight Naristocrat 
Duff Illegitimate Married 32 Captain Merchant Naristocrat Edward Aristocrat Married 51 Major 
General 
King Aristocrat 
Fanning Naristocrat Married 48 Colonel Burns ? Farrington Naristocrat Married 24 Captain Foreign Naristocrat 
Fawcett Naristocrat Married 22 Ensign Brooke ? Fitzroy Aristocrat Married 31 Captain MP Naristocrat 
Note: ‘Father-in-law’ lists social status of generals’ fathers-in-law.  Where this is not known the surname of the father- in-law is listed instead.   
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                        Table 1.10. First marriages of 1800 generals (continued) 
             
 SG1 Marriage 
status 
Marriage 
age 
Rank at 
marriage 
Father- in-
law 
Wife SG1  SG1 Marriage 
status 
Marriage 
age 
Rank at 
marriage 
Father- 
in-law  
Wife SG1 
Fox Aristocrat Married 31 Lt. Colonel Clayton ? Floyd Naristocrat Married 43 Colonel Merchant Naristocrat 
Frederick Aristocrat Married 28 Lt. General King Aristocrat Gardiner Naristocrat Married 31 31 Baronet Aristocrat 
Gordon Aristocrat Married 41 Colonel MP Naristocrat Grant Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - 
Grenville Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - Grey Aristocrat Married 33 Lt. Colonel Grey ? 
Harcourt Aristocrat Married 35 Lt. Colonel Reverend Naristocrat Harris Naristocrat Married 33 Major Dixon ? 
Hastings Aristocrat Married 50 Lt. General Earl Aristocrat Herbert Aristocrat Married 28 Lt. Colonel Hon. Aristocrat 
Hewett Naristocrat Married 35 Major Johnson ? Howe Aristocrat Married 36 Colonel MP Naristocrat 
Hely 
Hutchinson 
Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - Irving Naristocrat Married 37 Lt. Colonel Earl Aristocrat 
Johnson, H. ? Married 34 Lt. Colonel Foreign Naristocrat Lake ? Married 26 Lieutenant Diplomat Naristocrat 
Lambart Aristocrat Married 19 Lieutenant Knight Naristocrat Leland ? Married - Major E.I.C Naristocrat 
Lennox, C. Aristocrat Married 25 Lt. Colonel Duke Aristocrat Lennox, G. Aristocrat Married 22 Lt. Colonel Lord Aristocrat 
Lindsay Aristocrat Married 28 Lt. Colonel Hon. Aristocrat Loftus Naristocrat Married 26 Captain King ? 
Ludlow Aristocrat Unmarried - - - - Luttrell Aristocrat Married 39 Lt. Colonel Boyd ? 
MacLeod ? Married 22 Captain Mackenzie ? Manners Aristocrat Unmarried - - - - 
Medows Naristocrat Married 32 Lt. Colonel Hammerton ? Melville Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - 
Moore Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - Morris Naristocrat Married 28 Captain Earl Aristocrat 
Morse Naristocrat Married 43 Captain Godin ? Munro Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - 
Musgrave Aristocrat Unmarried - - - - Needham Aristocrat Married 39 Lt. Colonel Fisher ? 
Nugent Illegitimate Married 40 Major 
General 
Foreign Naristocrat O’Hara Illegitimate Unmarried - - - - 
Percy Aristocrat Married 22 Lt. Colonel Earl Aristocrat Phipps Aristocrat Married 40 Major 
General 
Maling ? 
Pigot Naristocrat Married - - ? ? Pitt, J. Aristocrat Married 27 Captain Viscount Aristocrat 
Pitt, W.A Naristocrat Married 35 Lt. Colonel Viscount Aristocrat Prescott Naristocrat Married - - ? ? 
Rainsford Naristocrat Married 47 Lt. Colonel Miles ? Ross ? Married 53 Colonel Baronet Aristocrat 
Simcoe Naristocrat Married 30 Lt. Colonel Lt. Colonel Naristocrat Somerset Aristocrat Married 21 Colonel Viscount Aristocrat 
Note: ‘Father-in-law’ lists social status of generals’ fathers-in-law.  Where this is not known the surname of the father- in-law is listed instead.   
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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                                                                                        Table 1.10. First marriages of 1800 generals (continued) 
             
 SG1 Marriage 
status 
Marriage 
age 
Rank at 
marriage 
Father- in-
law 
Wife SG1  SG1 Marriage 
status 
Marriage 
age 
Rank at 
marriage 
Father- in-
law  
Wife SG1 
Stanhope Aristocrat Married 26 Lt. Colonel Baronet Aristocrat Steuart 
Denham 
Aristocrat Married 28 Major Blacker ? 
St John, F. Aristocrat Married 23 - Marquis Aristocrat St John, H. Aristocrat Married 33 Lt. Colonel MP Naristocrat 
St. Ledger ? Unmarried - - - - Strutt Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - 
Stuart, C. Aristocrat Married 25 Lt. Colonel Lord Aristocrat Tarleton Naristocrat Married 44 Major 
General 
Illegitimate Illegitimate 
Townshend Aristocrat Married 27 Lt. Colonel Earl Aristocrat Villettes Naristocrat Unmarried - - - - 
Vyse Naristocrat Married - - Reverend Naristocrat Wemyss Aristocrat Married 28 Major Baronet Aristocrat 
Whitelocke Naristocrat Married 26 Lieutenant Merchant Naristocrat William Aristocrat Married 23 Colonel Knight Naristocrat 
Note: ‘Father-in-law’ lists social status of generals’ fathers-in-law.  Where this is not known the surname of the father- in-law is listed instead.   
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
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Appendix 2, Careers 
 
 Table 2.1. Regimental ranks of 1747 generals 
     
 Pre-Ensign Ensign Lieutenant Captain 
Lieutenant 
Captain Major Lt. Colonel Colonel Exit 
Anstruther - - - - 1709, 1fg - - 1720, 26f 1760, death 
Borgard 1692, Volunteer, 
Artillery 
- 1693, Artillery - 1695, 
Artillery; 
1698, 
Engineers 
- 1706, 
Artillery 
1722, Artillery 1750, retirement 
Bowles - - - - 1710, 27f; 
1713, 3fg 
- - 1719, 12d; 1740, 
6dg 
1749, death 
Blakeney - 1695, 18f 1701, 18f; 
1708, 1fg 
- 1704, 18f; 
1712,1fg 
1707, 18f 1718, 31f 1737, 27f 1761, death 
Bland - 1704, ? 1705, ? - 1706,? 1709, 
Sibourg’s 
foot; 1715, 
11d; 1717 1d 
1718, 2dg 1737, 36f; 1741, 
13d; 1743, 3d; 
1752, 1dg 
1763, death 
Bligh - - - - 1717, 5dg 1718, 5dg 1719, 5dg 1740, 20f; 1746, 
12d; 1747, 5dg 
1758, retirement 
Bragg - 1702, 1fg - - 1704, 24f; 
1715, 24f; 
1727, 3fg 
- 1709, 36f; 
1732, 31f 
1734, 28f 1759, death 
Byng - 1708, 3fg - - 1721, 3fg 1741, 3fg - 1742, 4th 
Marines; 1749, 
48f 
1750, death 
Campbell - - 1704, 4hg - 1708, 4hg 1708, 4hg 1711, 4hg 1715, 9f; 1717, 2d 1745, death in 
battle 
Cholmondeley - 1725, 3hg - - 1731, 3hg - - 1741, 48f; 1742, 
34f; 1749, 12d; 
1749, 6dg; 1750, 
6d 
1775, death 
Note: ? indicates where the regiment/date is unknown. In all tables f stands for foot, fg foot guards, d dragoons, dg dragoon guards, hg horse guards and lg life guards.   
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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 Table 2.1. Regimental ranks of 1747 generals (continued) 
     
 Pre-Ensign Ensign Lieutenant Captain 
Lieutenant 
Captain Major Lt. Colonel Colonel Exit 
Cope - 1707, 1d - - 1709, 33f; 
1710, 
Stanhope’s 
dragoons; 
1710 3fg 
- 1712, McCartney’s 
foot; 1712, 
Wynne’s foot 
1730, 30f; 1732, 5f; 1737, 9d; 
1741, 7d 
1760, death 
Dalrymple 1692, Volunteer, 
26f 
- - - 1702, 3fg - - 1706, 26f; 1706-14, 2d; 1715-
34, 6d; 1743, 6d 
1747, death 
Dalzell - 1682, 21f - - 1694, 28f - 1704, 28f 1709-12, Dalzell’s foot; 1730, 
33f; 1739, 38f 
1750, retirement 
de 
Grangues 
- 1695,? - 1715, 13d 1707, 
Waleffe’s 
dragoons 
1712, de 
Borle’s 
dragoons
; before 
1727, 8d 
1731, 14d 1741, 60f; 1742, 30f; 1743, 9d; 
1749, 7dg 
1754 
Fowke - 1704, 
Lepell’s 
foot 
- - 1707, 
Lepell’s 
foot; 1711, 
27f 
1716, 13f 1720, 7d 1741, 43f; 1741, 2f; 1755, 14f 1756, dismissal 
Gooch - 1700,? - - 1704, 16f; 
1715, 
Irwin’s 
foot 
1715-?,? - 1740, Gooch’s foot 1749, retirement 
Guise - - - - 1706, 1fg 1724, 1fg 1735, 1fg 1738, 6f 1763, retirement 
Handasyd - 1694, 28f; 
1702, 22f 
- - 1703, 22f - 1709, 22f 1712, 22f; 1730, 16f 1763, death 
Hargrave - 1701, 36f 1702, 36f - 1703, 36f 1710, 36f 1718, 36f; 1720, 
13f 
1737, 9f; 1739, 7f 1751, death 
Hawley - 1694, 19f; 
1702, 
Temple’s 
foot; 1704, 
Royal hg 
- - 1706, 4d 1711, 4d 1711, 4d 1717, 33f; 1730, 13d; 1740, 1d 1759, death 
Note: ? indicates where the regiment/date is unknown.  Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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Table 2.1. Regimental ranks of 1747 generals (continued) 
     
 Pre-Ensign Ensign Lieutenant Captain 
Lieutenant 
Captain Major Lt. Colonel Colonel Exit 
Honywood - 1694, 
Stanley’s foot 
- - 1696, 7f; 
1702, 33f 
1703, 33f 1705, 33f 1709-11, 68f; 1715, 11d; 1732, 
3d; 1743, 2dg 
1752, death 
Howard, C. - 1715, 2fg - - 1717, 16f; 
?, 9d 
- - 1734, 19f; 1748, 3dg 1765, death 
Howard, T. - 1703, Evan’s 
foot 
- - 1704, 33f 1710, ? 1710, Evan’s 
dragoons; 1715, 33f 
1717, 24f; 1737, 3f 1749, retirement 
Huske - 1708, 
Caulfield’s 
foot; 1709, 
5dg; 1709, 2fg 
- - 1715, 2fg 1734, 2fg - 1740, 32f; 1743, 23f 1761, death 
Irwin - 1689, 1f 1691, 1f - 1695, 1f 1704, 1f 1737, 1f 1737, 5f 1752 
Keppel - - - - 1717, 2fg - - 1731, 29f; 1733, 3hg; 1744, 2fg 1754, death 
Kerr - - - - 1693, ? - 1704, ? 1712, 29f; 1725, 13f; 1732, 11d 1752, death 
Lennox - 1721, 1hg - - 1722, 1hg - - 1750, 1hg 1750, death 
Leslie - - - - 1715, 9d; 
1717, 3fg 
- 1721, 21f 1732, 25f; 1745, 2hg; 1745, 6d; 
1750, 2d; 1752, 3fg 
1767, death 
Ligonier 1702, 
Volunteer, 
foot 
- - - 1703, 10f 1706, 10f 1711, 12f; 1716, 
3dg 
1720, 7dg; 1749, 2dg; 1753, 
Royal hg; 1757, 1fg 
1770, death 
Lindsay - - - - 1726, 
Campbell's 
dragoons; 
1734, 3fg 
- - 1739, 42f; 1740, 4hg; 1746, 25f; 
1747, 2d 
1749, death 
Molesworth - 1701, 1f - - 1704, 1f; 
1707, 1fg 
- - 1710-13, Molesworth’s foot; 
1715-18 Molesworth’s 
dragoons; 1725, 27f; 1732, 
9d; 1737, 5d 
1758, death 
Montagu 1706, 
Volunteer 
- - - - - - 1715-21, 1hg; 1737-37, 1hg; 
1740, 2hg 
1749, death 
Mordaunt - 1721, 3fg 1724, 3fg - 1726, 3d; 
1731, 3fg 
- - 1741, 58f; 1742, 18f; 1747, 12d; 
1749, 7dg; 1749, 10d 
1780, death 
Murray - 1703, 3fg - - 1705, 1f - - 1713, 3fg 1752, death 
Note: ? indicates where the regiment/date is unknown.  Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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                                                             Table 2.1. Regimental ranks of 1747 generals (continued) 
     
 Pre-Ensign Ensign Lieutenant Captain 
Lieutenant 
Captain Major Lt. Colonel Colonel Exit 
O’Farrell - 1692, 9f - - 1714, 9f 1717, 9f 1722, 9f 1741, 22f 1757, death 
Oglethorpe - 1707, ? 1713-15, 
1fg 
- 1737, 42f - - 1737, 42f 1715, resigned; 1748, 
retirement 
O'Hara - 1703, 7f - - 1705, 7f - - 1713, 7f; 1739-43, 4dg; 1746, 
10f; 1749-49, 14d; 1752, 3d; 
1755, 2fg 
1773, death 
Philips - - 1678, 
Morpeth’s 
foot 
- 1689, 
Morpeth’s 
foot; 1692, 
Kirke’s foot 
1707, Kirke’s 
foot 
1710, 
Kirke’s foot 
1712, 12f; 1717, 40f; 1750, 38f 1751, retirement 
Ponsonby - - - - 1705, 27f 1711, 27f 1715, 27f 1735, 37f 1745, death in battle 
Rich - 1700, 1fg - - 1704, 24f; 
1708, 1fg 
- - 1710-13, 18f; 1715-17, 
dragoons; 1722, 13d; 1725, 8d; 
1731, 6dg; 1733, 1h; 1735, 4d 
1768, death 
Spencer - - - - - - - 1738, 38f; 1739, 1d; 1740, 2hg; 
1742-4, 2fg 
1744, resigned 
St Clair - 1694, 1f - - 1708, 1f; 
1714, 3fg 
1722, 3fg - 1734, 22f; 1737, 1f 1762, death 
St George - 1688, ? - 1691, ? 1692, 17f; 
before 1702 
Irish foot 
1708, Slane’s 
foot 
1711, 20f 1737, 20f; 1740, 8d 1755, death 
Temple - 1685-6, Prince 
George’s foot; 
1687, Prince 
George’s foot 
- - 1689, Prince 
George’s 
foot; 
1695, 
Columbine’s 
foot 
- - 1702, Temple’s foot; 1710-13, 
4d; 1715, 1d; 1721-33, 1dg; 
1744 5dg; 1745, 10d 
1686, dismissal; 1733, 
dismissal; 1749, death 
Wade - 1690, 10f 1693, 10f 1694, 10f 1695, 10f 1703, 10f 1703, 10f 1705, 33f; 1717, 3dg 1748, death 
Wentworth - - 1715, 4hg - 1715, 1fg - 1718, 23f 1732, 39f; 1737, 24f; 1745, 5dg 1747, death 
Note: ? indicates where the regiment/date is unknown.  Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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                                                             Table 2.1. Regimental ranks of 1747 generals (continued) 
     
 Pre-Ensign Ensign Lieutenant Captain 
Lieutenant 
Captain Major Lt. Colonel Colonel Exit 
West - - 1715, 1hg - 1717, 1hg; 
1730, 1fg 
- - 1737, 1hg 1766, death 
Wolfe - 1702, Marines - - 1717, 3fg 1710, 20f; 
1715, 
Dubourgsay’s 
foot 
- 1739, Marines; 1745, 8f 1759, death 
Wynyard - 1703, Elliott’s 
foot 
- 1703, ? 1707, ?; 
1715, 
Orrery’s foot 
1710, ? 1718, 35f; 
1729, 17f 
1739, 4
th
 Marines; 1742, 17f 1752, death 
Note: ? indicates where the regiment/date is unknown.  Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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                                                              Table 2.2. Regimental ranks of 1800 generals  
     
 Pre-Ensign Ensign Lieutenant Captain 
Lieutenant 
Captain Major Lt. Colonel Colonel 
Commander 
Colonel Exit 
Abercromby, Ra. - 1756, 3dg 1760, 3dg - 1762, 2dg 1770, 2dg 1773, 2dg - 1781-3, 103f; 1790, 69f; 1792, 
6f; 1795, 7dg; 1796, 2d 
1801, death in 
battle 
Baird - 1772, 2f 1778, 2f 1778, 73f 1777, 73f 1787, 73f 1790, 73f 1799, 2b  
73f 
1800, 54f; 1807, 24f 1829, death 
Barclay - 1755, Marines 1756, 
Marines 
- 1762, 
Marines 
1791, Marines 1794, 
Marines 
1798, 2
nd
 
Marines; 
1803 1
st
 
Marines 
- 1815, 
retirement 
Beckwith - 1771, 37f 1777, 37f 1777, 37f 1778, 37f - - 1806, 6th 
Garrison 
battalion 
1809, 2WI; 1818, 89f 1823, death 
Bowyer - 1767, 68f 1772, 68f - 1778, 66f 1787, 66f 1789, 66f - 1797, 89f; 1797-1808, 16f ? 
Burrard 1768, Cadet, 
Artillery 
1772, Cadet, 
Artillery 
1776, 60f 1777, 60f; 
1789, 1fg 
1779, 60f; 
1792, 1fg 
1786, 14f; 
1798, 1fg 
1804, 1fg - - 1813, death 
Carleton, T. 1753, 
Volunteer, 
20f 
1755, 20f 1755, 20f - 1759, 20f 1772, 20f 1776, 29f; 
1788, 5f 
1792-3, 1b 
60f; 1794, 
2b 60f 
- 1807, 
retirement 
Cathcart - 1777, 7d 1777, 17d - 1777, 17d; 
1781, 2fg 
1779, 38f 1779, British 
Legion; 
1789, 29f 
- 1792, 29f; 1797, 2lg 1843, death 
Clarke - 1759, 50f 1760, 50f - 1763, 50f; 
1767, 5f 
1771, 54f 1775, 54f; 
1777, 7f 
1791, b 60f 1794, 68f; 1794, 5f; 1801, 7f 1832, death 
Coates - 1755, 66f 1757, 66f 1761, 66f 1762, 66f 1766, 66f 1775, 19f - 1794-1822, 2f ? 
Coote - 1776, 37f 1776, 37f - 1778, 37f 1783, 47f 1788, 70f 1799, 17f 1802, 89f; 1806, 62f; 1810, 34f 1816, 
dismissal 
Cornwallis - 1756, 1fg - - 1759, 
Crawford’s 
foot; 1759, 
85f 
- 1761, 12f - 1763, 33f 1805, death 
Cradock  - 1777, 7dg; 
1779, 2fg 
1781, 2fg - - 1785, 12d; 
1786, 13f 
1789, 13f; 
1794, 127f 
- - 1839, death 
Note: Baird’s appointment as captain was backdated  Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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                                                              Table 2.2. Regimental ranks of 1800 generals (continued) 
     
 Pre-Ensign Ensign Lieutenant Captain 
Lieutenant 
Captain Major Lt. Colonel Colonel 
Commander 
Colonel Exit 
Craig - 1763, 30f 1769, 47f - 1771, 47f 1777, 82f 1781, 82f; 
1783, 16f 
- 1795, 46f; 1804, 86f; 1806, 22f; 
1809, 79f 
1812, death 
Cuyler - 1759, 55f 1761, 55f - 1764, 46f 1776, 55f 1777, 55f - 1793, 86f; 1794, 69f 1819, death 
Dalrymple, H.W - 1763, 31f 1766, 31f - 1768, 1f; 
1783, 1fg 
1777, 77f 1781, 68f; 
1796, 66f 
- 1797, 81f; 1798, 37f; 1810, 19f; 
1811, 57f 
1830, death 
de Lancy - 1766, 14d 1770, 14d - 1773, 17d 1778, 17d 1794, 17d - 1795, 17d 1822, death 
Don - 1770, 51f 1774, 51f - 1780, 51f 1783, 71f; 
1784, 59f 
1789, 59f - 1799, 9WI; 1805, 96f; 1818, 
36f; 1829, 3f 
1832, death 
Drummond, A.J - 1773, 1fg 1777, 1fg 1782, 1fg 1782, 1fg 1797, 1fg 1799, 1fg 1801-2, 2b 
5f; 1807-14, 
11
th
 Veteran 
battalion 
- ? 
Dundas, D. 1750, Cadet, 
Artillery 
1755, Artillery 1755, 
Engineers; 
1756, 58f 
 1759, 
Engineers; 
1759, 15d 
1770, 15d 1775, 12d; 
1781-3, 2h 
- 1791, 22f; 1795, 7d; 1801-13, 
2d; 1809-20, 95f; 1813-20, 1dg 
1820, death 
Fawcett 1740s, 
Volunteer, 
foot 
1748, 33f; 
1749, 38f; 
1751, 3fg 
1757, 3fg 1767, 3fg 1767, 3fg - - - 1778, 15f; 1792, 3dg 1804, death 
Fitzroy - 1782, 3fg - - 1787, 43f; 
1789, 45f; 
1794, 3fg 
- - 1804, b 60f 1805, 48f 1829, death 
Fox - 1770, 1dg 1773, 1dg  1774, 38f 1777, 49f 1778, 38f - 1793, 131f; 1795, 10f 1811, death 
Floyd - 1760, 15d 1763, 15d 1770, 15d 1778, 15d 1779, 21d 1781, 23d - 1800, 26d; 1804, 8d 1818, death 
Garth - 1755, 1fg 1758, 1fg - 1772, 1fg 1782, 1fg 1789, 1fg - 1792, 17f 1819, death 
Grant - 1741, 1f 1742, 1f - 1744, 1f 1757, 77f 1760, 40f - 1775, 55f; 1791, 11f 1806, death 
Grenville - 1759, 1fg 1760, 1fg - 1760, 1fg; 
1761, 24f; 
1772, 2fg 
- - - 1786, 23f 1823, death 
Grey - 1744, 6f 1752, 6f - 1755, 
Independent 
co.; 1755, 
20f 
- 1761, 98f - 1777, 28f; 1789, 7dg; 1795, 8d; 
1799, 3d 
1807, death 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
336 
 
                                                              Table 2.2. Regimental ranks of 1800 generals (continued) 
     
 Pre-Ensign Ensign Lieutenant Captain 
Lieutenant 
Captain Major Lt. Colonel Colonel 
Commander 
Colonel Exit 
Harcourt - 1759, 1fg - - 1759, 16d; 
1760, 3d 
- 1764, 31f; 
1765, 4d; 
1768, 16d 
- 1779, 16d 1830, death 
Harris 1759, Cadet, 
Artillery 
1762, 
Artillery; 
1762, 5f 
1765, 5f - 1771, 5f 1777, 5f 1780, 5f; 
1787, 76f 
- 1800, 73f 1829, death 
Herbert - 1775, 12f - - 1778, foot; 
1778, 1d; 
1782, 22d 1782, 2dg - 1797, 6d 1827, death 
Hewett 1761, Cadet, 
Artillery 
1762, 70f 1764, 70f - 1775, 70f 1781, 43f 1787, 43f 1793, 92f; 
1799, 2b 5f 
1800, 61f 1840, death 
Howe - 1746, 15d 1747, 15d 1750, 20f 1750, 20f 1756, 60f 1757, 58f - 1764, 46f; 1775, 23f; 1786, 19d 1840, death 
Hulse - 1761, 1fg 1769, 1fg  1776, 1fg 1789, 1fg 1794, 1fg - 1795, 56f; 1797, 19f; 1810, 62f 1837, death 
Lake - 1758, 1fg 1762, 1fg 1776, 1fg 1776, 1fg 1784, 1fg 1792, 1fg - 1794, 53f; 1796, 76f 1808, death 
Lambart - 1779, 2fg 1781, 2fg 1790, 2fg 1793, 2fg 1800, 2fg  1801, b 68f 1805, 2WI; 1808, 77f; 1811, 
58f; 1823, 45f 
1837, death 
Lindsay - 1767, 15f - - 1771, 42f 1775, 53f 1777, 24f; 
1782-3, 2b 
71f 
- 1789, 63f 1825, death 
Loftus - 1770, 9d; 
1770, 17d 
1776, 17d; 
1777, 3fg 
- 1776, 44f; 
1784, 3fg 
-  - 1794, 24d; 1821, 2dg 1831, death 
Ludlow - 1778, 1fg 1781, 1fg - 1790, 1fg 1800, 1fg  - 1801, 96f; 1805, 38f; 1836, 3fg 1842, death 
Luttrell - 1757, 48f 1759, 34f - 1759, 16d - 1765, 4dg - 1788, 6dg; 1789, 2nd Irish 
Artillery; 1797, 1
st
 Irish 
Artillery 
1801, 
retirement 
Medows - 1757, 50f 1757, 50f - 1764, 3dg 1766, 3dg 1769, 5f; 
1773, 12d; 
1775, 55f; 
1777, 5f 
- 1780, 89f; 1786, 73f; 1796, 7dg 1813, death 
Mercer - 1759, 
Engineers 
1762, 
Engineers 
- 1772, 
Engineers 
- 1787, 
Engineers 
1805, 
Engineers 
- 1815 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
 
 
337 
 
                                                              Table 2.2. Regimental ranks of 1800 generals (continued) 
     
 Pre-Ensign Ensign Lieutenant Captain 
Lieutenant 
Captain Major Lt. Colonel Col. 
Commander 
Colonel Exit 
Moore - 1776, 51f - 1778, 82f 1780, 82f; 
1785, 100f 
1785, 102f; 
1788, 60f; 
1788, 51f 
1790, 51f 1799, 2b 52f 1798, 9WI; 1801, 52f 1809, death in 
battle 
Musgrave - 1754, 3f 1756, 3f - 1759, 64f 1774, 64f 1776, 40f - 1787, 76f 1812, death 
Nugent - 1773, 39f 1775, 7f - 1778, 57f; 
1790 2fg 
1782, 57f 1783, 97f; 
1787, 13f; 
1789, 4dg; 
1793, 85f 
- 1794, 85f; 1805, 62f; 1806, 6f 1849, death 
Pitt, W.A - 1744, 10d - - 1749, 10d 1755, 10d 1755, 59f; 
1759, 10d 
- 1770, 12d; 1775, 6dg; 1780, 
10d; 1796, 1dg 
1809, death 
St John, H. - 1754, 2fg - - 1758, 18f 1760, 91f 1767, 67f - 1778, 36f 1818, death 
Stanhope - 1769, 2fg - - 1773, 29f; 
1778, 3fg 
- 1779, 85f - 1783, 65f; 1788, 29f; 1792, 2lg 1829, death 
Strutt - 1778, 61f 1779, 61f - 1779, 91f; 
1782, 97f 
1787, 60f 1790, 60f; 
1792, 54f 
- - 1800, 
retirement 
Tarleton - 1775, 1dg - - 1778, 79f - 1782, British 
Legion 
- 1799, Prince of Wales Cavalry; 
1802, 21d; 1818, 8d 
1833, death 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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Table 2.3. Higher army ranks of 1747 generals 
      
 Captain Major Lt. Colonel Colonel Local 
General 
Brigadier 
General 
Major 
General 
Lt.  
General 
General Field 
Marshal 
Anstruther - - 1709 - - 1735 1739 1745 - - 
Borgard - - - 1705 - 1726 1735 1739 - - 
Bowles - - 1713 - - 1735 1739 1745 - - 
Blakeney - - 1712 - - 1743 1745 1747 - - 
Bland - - - - - 1743 1745 1747 - - 
Bligh - - - - - 1745 1747 1754 - - 
Bragg - - - - - 1742 1743 1747 - - 
Byng - - 1721 1741 - 1745 1747 - - - 
Campbell - 1704 1708 1711 - 1735 1739 1742 - - 
Cholmondeley 1725 - 1731 - - 1745 1747 1754 1770 - 
Cope - - 1710 1711 - 1735 1739 1743 - - 
Dalrymple - - 1702 1702 - 1706 1709 1710 1712 1742 
Dalzell - - - 1706 - 1711 1727 1735 1745 - 
de Grangues - - - - - 1745 1747 - - - 
Fowke - - - - - 1745 1747 1754 - - 
Gooch - - - 1740 - 1745 1747 - - - 
Guise - - 1706 1724 - 1739 1742 1745 1761 - 
Handasyd - - - - - 1735 1739 1743 - - 
Hargrave - - 1708 1711 - 1735 1739 1743 - - 
Hawley 1704 1707 - 1712 - 1735 1739 1743 - - 
Honywood - - - 1705 - 1710 1727 1735 1743 - 
Howard, C. - - 1719 - - 1742 1743 1747 1765 - 
Howard, T. - - - 1711 - 1735 1739 1743 - - 
Huske - - 1715 1734 - 1742 1743 1747 - - 
Irwin - - 1711 - - 1743 1744 1747 - - 
Keppel - - 1717 1727 - 1739 1742 1745 - - 
Kerr - - - 1706 - 1711 1727 1735 1743 - 
Lennox 1721 - 1722 1724 - 1739 1742 1745 1745 - 
Note: Army ranks are only noted if they were higher than the regimental rank held.  Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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Table 2.3. Higher army ranks of 1747 generals (continued) 
      
 Captain Major Lt. Colonel Colonel Local General Brigadier 
General 
Major 
General 
Lt.  
General 
General Field 
Marshal 
Leslie - - 1717 - - 1739 1743 1747 1765 - 
Ligonier - - - 1711 - 1735 1739 1743 1746 1757 
Lindsay - - 1734 - - 1744 1745 1747 - - 
Molesworth - - 1707 - 1739- Lt. General, Ireland - 1735 1742 1746 1757 
Montagu - - - 1710 - 1735 1739 1746 - - 
Mordaunt 1724 - 1731 - - 1745 1747 1754 1770 - 
Murray - - - - - 1719 1735 1739 1745 - 
O’Farrell - - - - - 1746 1754 - - - 
Oglethorpe 1713 - - - - 1743 1745 1747 1765 - 
O'Hara - - - 1712 - 1735 1739 1743 1761 1763 
Philips - - - - - 1735 1739 1743 - - 
Ponsonby - - 1712 - - 1742 1743 - - - 
Rich - - 1708 1709 - 1727 1735 1739 1745 1757 
Spencer - - - - - 1743 1745 1747 1758 - 
St Clair - - 1714 1722 - 1739 1741 1745 1761 - 
St George - - - - - 1743 1744 1747 - - 
Temple - - - - - 1706 1709 1710 - 1742 
Wade - - - 1704 1707- Brig. General, Spain; 
1708-Major General, Spain 
1708 1714 1727 1739 1743 
Wentworth - 1715 1715 1722 - 1739 1741 1745 - - 
West - 1715 1717 - - 1743 1745 1747 1765 - 
Wolfe - - 1717 - - 1744 1745 1747 - - 
Wynyard - - - - - 1744 1745 - - - 
Note: Army ranks are only noted if they were higher than the regimental rank held.  Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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Table 2.4. Higher army ranks of 1800 generals  
      
 Captain Major Lt. 
Colonel 
Colonel Local General Major 
General 
Lt.  
General 
General Field 
Marshal 
Abercromby, 
Ra. 
- - - 1780 1795, 1797-General, WI; 1799-General, 
Foreign Service 
1787 1797 - - 
Baird - - - 1795 - 1798 1805 1814 - 
Barclay - 1777 1783 1794 - 1796 1803 1813 - 
Beckwith - 1781 1790 1795 - 1798 1805 1814 - 
Bowyer - 1781 1782 1793 1805- General, WI 1795 1802 - - 
Burrard - - 1789 1795 - 1798 1805 - - 
Carleton, T. - - 1776 1782 - 1793 1798 1803 - 
Cathcart - - 1781 1790 1793- Brig. General, Continent 1794 1801 1812 - 
Clarke - - 1775 1782 1783- Brig. General, America 1790 1797 1802 1830 
Coates - - 1775 1782 1775- Brig. General, America 1790 1797 1802 - 
Coote - - - 1795 1796- Brig. General, Ireland 1797 1805 1814 - 
Cornwallis - - - - - 1775 1777 1793 - 
Cradock  1781 - - - 1797- Brig. General, Ireland; 
1804- Lt. General, India 
1798 1805 1814 - 
Craig - - - 1790 1805- General, Mediterranean; 
1807- General, Canada 
1794 1801 - - 
Cuyler - - - 1782 1782- Brig. General, WI 1793 1798 1803 - 
Dalrymple, 
H.W 
- - - 1790 - 1794 1801 1812 - 
de Lancy - - 1781 1790 - 1794 1801 1812 - 
Don - - - 1795 - 1798 1805 1814 - 
Drummond, 
A.J 
1777 - 1782 1793 - 1795 1802 1812 - 
Dundas, D. - - 1775 1782 - 1790 1797 1802 - 
Fawcett 1757 - 1760 1772 - 1777 1782 1796 - 
Fitzroy - - 1794 1795 - 1798 1805 1814 - 
Fox - - - 1783 - 1793 1799 1808 - 
Floyd - - - 1790 1794- Brig. General, India 1794 1801 1812 - 
Garth 1758 - 1772 1779 1779- Brig. General, America 1782 1796 1801 - 
Note: Army ranks are only noted if they were higher than the regimental rank held.  Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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Table 2.4. Higher army ranks of 1800 generals (continued) 
      
 Captain Major Lt. 
Colonel 
Colonel Local General Major 
General 
Lt.  
General 
General Field 
Marshal 
Grant - - - 1772 - 1777 1782 1796 - 
Grenville 1760 - - 1779 - 1782 1796 1801 - 
Grey - - - 1772 1777-Major General, America; 
1793-General, America 
1777 1782 1796 - 
Harcourt - - - 1777 - 1782 1793 1798 1821 
Harris - - - 1790 1796- Lt. General, Madras 1794 1801 1812 - 
Herbert - - - 1793 - 1795 1802 1812 - 
Hewett - - - 1794 - 1796 1803 1813 - 
Howe - - - 1762 - 1772 1777 1793 - 
Hulse 1769 - 1776 1782 - 1793 1798 1803 1830 
Lake 1762 - 1776 1781 - 1790 1797 1802 - 
Lambart 1781 - 1790 1795 - 1798 1805 1814 - 
Lindsay - - - 1782 - 1793 1798 1803 - 
Loftus - - 1784  - 1796 1803 1813 - 
Ludlow 1781 - 1790 1795 - 1798 1805 1813 - 
Luttrell - 1762 - 1777 - 1782 1793 1798 - 
Medows - - -  1778- Brig. General, WI 1782 1793 1798 - 
Mercer - 1783 - 1794 - 1796 1803 1813 - 
Moore - - - 1795 1795- Brig. General, WI 1798 1805 - - 
Musgrave - 1772 - 1782 1782- Brig. General, America 1790 1797 1802 - 
Nugent - - -  1794- Brig. General, Flanders 1796 1803 1813 1846 
Pitt, W.A - - - 1762 - 1776 1777 1793 - 
St John, H. - - 1762 1776 - 1779 1787 1797 - 
Stanhope - - 1778 1782 - 1793 1798 1803 - 
Strutt - - - 1795 1795- Brig. General, WI 1798 - - - 
Tarleton - 1779 1781 1790 - 1794 1801 1812 - 
Note: Army ranks are only noted if they were higher than the regimental rank held.  Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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 Table 2.5. Methods of promotion for 1800 future generals, ensign to captain 
     
 Ensign Lieutenant Captain Lieutenant Captain 
 Purchase Recruit Non-
purchase 
Purchase Recruit Non-
purchase 
Purchase Recruit Non-
purchase 
Purchase Recruit Non-
purchase 
Abercromby, Ra.   x x   x x - - -   x x 
Baird   x x x x   - - - x x   
Barclay x x   x x   - - - x x   
Beckwith   x x - - - x x   x x   
Bowyer x x   x x   - - - - - - 
Burrard x x   - - - - - - x x   
Carleton, T. x x   - - - - - - x x   
Cathcart   x x - - - - - - x x   
Coates - - - - - - - - - x x   
Coote - - - x x   - - - x x   
Cornwallis - - - - - - - - -   x x 
Cradock  x x   x x   - - - - - - 
Craig - - -   x x - - - - - - 
Dalrymple, H.W - - - - - - - - -   x x 
Don - - - x x   - - - x x   
Drummond, A.J   x x x x   - - - x x   
Dundas, D. x x   - - - - - - - - - 
Fawcett x x     x x - - - x x   
Fitzroy x x   - - - - - - x x   
Fox   x x   x x - - -   x x 
Floyd x x   x x   x x   x x   
Garth   x x - - - - - -   x x 
Grenville - - - - - - - - - x   x 
Grey   x x   x x - - -   x x 
Harcourt - - - - - - - - - x x   
Harris x x     x x - - -   x x 
Herbert x x   - - - - - - x x   
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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                                               Table 2.5. Methods of promotion for 1800 future generals, ensign to captain (continued) 
     
 Ensign Lieutenant Captain Lieutenant Captain 
 Purchase Recruit Non-
purchase 
Purchase Recruit Non-
purchase 
Purchase Recruit Non-
purchase 
Purchase Recruit Non-
purchase 
Hewett x x   x x   - - -   x x 
Hulse - - - - - - - - -   x x 
Lake - - - x x   - - - x x   
Lambart x x   - - - x x   - - - 
Loftus - - - x x   - - - - - - 
Lindsay   x x - - - - - -   x x 
Ludlow x x   x x   - - - x x   
Medows     x x   - - - - - - 
Mercer x x   x x   - - - x x   
Moore x x   x x   - - -   x x 
Nugent x x   - - - - - - x x   
Stanhope x x   - - - - - -   x x 
Strutt   x x x x   - - -   x x 
Tarleton   x x - - - - - - - - - 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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                            Table 2.6. Methods of promotion for 1800 future generals, major to lieutenant colonel 
    
 Major Lieutenant Colonel  
 Purchase Recruit Non-
purchase 
Purchase Recruit Non-
purchase 
Baird   x x   x x 
Barclay x x   x x   
Bowyer x x   x x   
Carleton, T. - - - x x   
Clarke - - - x x   
Coates   x x   x x 
Coote x x   x x   
Cornwallis - - - x x   
Cradock    x x x x   
Craig - - - x x   
Cuyler x x   x x   
Dalrymple, H.W - - - x x   
de Lancy - - - x x   
Don x x     x x 
Drummond, A.J x x   - - - 
Dundas, D.   x x   x x 
Fawcett - - - - - - 
Fitzroy - - - x x   
Fox   x x - - - 
Floyd x x   x x   
Garth x x   x x   
Grant x   x - - - 
Grenville - - - - - - 
Grey - - - x x   
Harcourt - - - - - - 
Harris - - - x x   
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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                     Table 2.6. Methods of promotion for 1800 future generals, major to lieutenant colonel (continued) 
    
 Major Lieutenant Colonel 
 Purchase Recruit Non-
purchase 
Purchase Recruit Non-
purchase 
Herbert x x   x x   
Hewett   x x x x   
Hulse x x   x x   
Lake x x   x x   
Lambart x x   - - - 
Loftus - - - - - - 
Lindsay   x x x x   
Ludlow x x   - - - 
Medows x x   - - - 
Mercer x x   x x   
Moore   x x x x   
Musgrave x x   - - - 
Nugent x x   - - - 
St John, H. - - - x x   
Stanhope - - - x   x 
Strutt   x x   x x 
Tarleton - - - x x   
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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                              Table 2.7. Generals wounded in battle 
 1747  1800   
 Date of 
first wound 
Rank when 
wounded 
 Date of 
first wound 
Rank when 
wounded 
Borgard 1710 Colonel   Abercromby, Ra. 1801 Lt General 
Blakeney 1704 Captain Baird 1780 Captain 
Bland 1710 Major Coates 1770s Lt. Colonel 
Gooch 1741 Colonel   Coote 1798 Major General 
Hawley 1715 Colonel Cradock 1794 Lt. Colonel 
Honywood 1715 Brig. General Craig 1775 Captain 
Howard, C. 1743 Major General Drummond, A.J 1794 Colonel   
Huske 1743 Major General Floyd 1791 Colonel   
Keppel 1743 Major General Grey 1759 Captain 
Kerr 1707 Lt. Colonel Harris 1775 Captain 
Ligonier 1709 Major Lambart 1793 Lt. Colonel 
Lindsay 1739 Colonel   Lindsay 1777 Lt. Colonel 
Molesworth 1691 Ensign Loftus 1776 Captain 
O'Hara 1707 Captain Ludlow 1794 Lt. Colonel 
Ponsonby 1745 Major General Medows 1777 Lt. Colonel 
Rich 1704 Captain Moore 1794 Lt. Colonel 
Wade 1706 Colonel Pitt, W.A 1760 Lt. Colonel 
   Strutt 1796 Colonel 
   Tarleton 1781 Lt. Colonel 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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                                                                                Table 2.8. Major battles involving the British army, 1702-1815 
             
Battle Year Commander Commander’s 
social status 
Size of 
Allied army 
Size of 
Enemy 
army 
Result Battle Year Commander Commander’s 
social status 
Size of 
Allied 
army 
Size of 
Enemy 
army 
Result 
Blenheim 1704 Marlborough Aristocrat 56,000 60,000 Win Ramilles 1706 Marlborough Aristocrat 62,000 60,000 Win 
Oudenarde 1708 Marlborough Aristocrat 80,000 95,000 Win Malplaquet 1709 Marlborough Aristocrat 100,000 100,000 Win 
Dettingen 1743 Stair Aristocrat 50,000 70,000 Win Prestonpans 1745 Cope Naristocrat 2,300 2,500 Loss 
Fontenoy 1745 Cumberland Aristocrat 50,000 56,000 Loss Roucoux 1746 Ligonier Naristocrat 80,000 120,000 Loss 
Falkirk 1746 Hawley Naristocrat 7,000 5,000 Loss Culloden 1746 Cumberland Aristocrat 8,000 7,000 Win 
Lauffeldt 1747 Cumberland Aristocrat 60,000 80,000 Loss Monongahela 1755 Braddock Naristocrat 1,500 600 Loss 
Triconderoga 1758 Abercromby Naristocrat 15,000 3,600 Loss Louisburg 1758 Amherst Naristocrat 11,200 6,000 Win 
Minden 1759 Ferdinand Foreign 41,000 51,000 Win Quebec 1759 Wolfe Naristocrat 8,000 5,000 Win 
Warburg 1760 Ferdinand Foreign 16,000 20,000 Win Kloster Kamp 1760 Brunswick Foreign 20,000 25,000 Loss 
Vellinghausen 1761 Brunswick Foreign 65,000 92,000 Win Wilhelmstahl 1762 Brunswick Foreign 50,000 70,000 Win 
Lexington 1775 Smith Naristocrat 1,800 ? Loss Bunker Hill 1775 Howe Aristocrat 2,400 1,500 Win 
Quebec 1775 Carleton, G. Naristocrat 1,200 1,200 Win Long Island 1776 Howe Aristocrat 20,000 10,000 Win 
White Plains 1776 Howe Aristocrat 4,000 4,000 Draw Fort Washington 1776 Howe Aristocrat 8,000 2,900 Win 
Princeton 1777 Cornwallis Aristocrat 8,000 7,000 Draw Triconderoga 1777 Burgoyne Naristocrat 7,213 3,000 Win 
Hubbardton 1777 Fraser Naristocrat 1,000 1,000 Win Brandywine Creek 1777 Howe Aristocrat 6,000 8,000 Win 
Freeman’s farm 1777 Burgoyne Naristocrat 6,000 14,000 Draw Paoli 1777 Grey Aristocrat 1,700 2,500 Win 
Germantown 1777 Howe Aristocrat 8,000 11,000 Win Saratoga 1777 Burgoyne Naristocrat 5,000 12,000 Loss 
Monmouth 1778 Clinton Aristocrat 10,000 11,000 Draw Camden 1780 Cornwallis Aristocrat 2,000 3,000 Win 
Cowpens 1781 Tarleton Naristocrat 1,000 1,100 Loss Guildford Courthouse 1781 Cornwallis Aristocrat 1,900 4,400 Win 
Yorktown 1781 Cornwallis Aristocrat 6,000 16,600 Loss Assaye 1803 Wellesley Aristocrat 6,500 40,000 Win 
Vimeiro 1808 Wellesley Aristocrat 20,500 14,000 Win Corunna 1809 Moore Naristocrat 35,000 153,000 Loss 
Douro 1809 Wellesley Aristocrat 18,000 20,000 Win Talavera 1809 Wellesley Aristocrat 50,000 46,000 Win 
Busaco  1810 Wellesley Aristocrat 50,000 65,000 Win Fuentes de Onoro 1811 Wellesley Aristocrat 37,000 48,000 Win 
Barossa 1811 Graham Naristocrat 15,000 7,000 Win Albuera 1811 Beresford Foreign 32,000 23,000 Win 
Salamanca 1812 Wellesley Aristocrat 50,000 52,000 Win Vitoria 1813 Wellesley Aristocrat 80,000 60,000 Win 
Waterloo 1815 Wellesley Aristocrat 67,000 74,000 Win        
Source: J.W Fortesque, A History of the British Army, Volumes I-X, (London, 1899-1930). 
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Appendix 3, Rewards 
 
                                         Table 3.1. Annual balances of non-sample ensigns in the 1
st
 foot guards 
       
 1770 1771 1772  1770 1771 1772 
 £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d  £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Bayly (34.13.0) (18.0.0) 0.0.0 Irby 13.14.6 0.0.0 0.0.0 
Dewar (17.6.6) 29.4.0 (0.1.6) D’Oyly 0.0.0 20.14.0 6.19.6 
Pye (6.15.0) 0.0.0 (30.0.0) Duffe 40.16.6 0.0.0 0.0.0 
Lee (91.8.0) (12.18.0) 1.15.6 Deane (4.5.6) 0.0.0 0.0.0 
Pratviel 0.0.0 0.0.0 0.0.0 Hughes 0.0.0 - - 
Leaves 20.14.0 0.0.0 9.6.0 Campbell - 0.0.0 6.19.6 
Ascough (0.14.0) 0.0.0 (30.14.0) Nugent 27.9.0 (31.15.0) 0.0.0 
Frederick (6.15.0) (33.10.6) (28.8.0) Talbot 47.16.0 (6.15.0) 0.0.0 
Fitzpatrick 93.5.0 (56.16.0) (35.7.1) Whittington (6.15.0) (6.15.0) (6.15.0) 
Bellew 6.19.6 4.6.0 16.19.6 Evans 20.14.0 20.14.0 52.5.0 
Thomas (4.16.0) (33.17.6) (22.10.0) Edmondstone - 7.4.0 0.0.0 
Collins (23.4.11) (19.6.0) 0.0.0 Strickland 41.8.0 122.16.6 23.10.3 
Jones (6.15.0) (6.15.0) (22.11.5) Fanshawe 14.15.0 27.2.0 26.15.3 
Scawen (17.14.4) (2.1.9) 5.18.3 Hanger - 69.1.0 24.19.1 
Milbanke - 17.3.0 22.6.6 Heywood - (4.16.0) - 
Turner - 6.17.6 7.1.0 Richardson - - (7.15.6) 
Boyfield - - 0.0.0     
Source: Cox, A/56/e/70.0.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1770-1774, ff. 153-200. 
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              Table 3.2. Annual balances of non-sample ensigns in the 12
th
 and 20th foot 
        
 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 
12f £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Cooke - - 0.0.0 (10.5.0) (14.9.11) (14.9.11) (6.15.7) 
Willoe - - 2.12.0 - 0.0.0 - - 
Sweetenham - - 0.0.0 - 0.0.0 (11.15.7) 34.18.9 
Cotes - - 0.0.0 136.5.0 (5.5.0) (12.19.0) 0.0.0 
Stisted - - 6.3.0 - 6.13.2 - - 
Winthorp - - 0.0.0 - 0.0.0 0.0.0 8.8.0 
Freeman - - 0.0.0 0.0.0 0.0.0 29.1.0 0.0.0 
Torch - - 0.0.0 2.9.0 (0.3.0) 0.3.0 0.0.0 
Bate - - (4.1.0) 0.0.0 (0.5.3) (0.5.4) (9.3.0) 
Spilsbury - - 9.3.0 4.15.0 2.0.0 11.7.0 40.19.4 
20f        
Power 0.0.0 0.0.0 8.14.10 - - - - 
Stenhouse 0.0.0 0.0.0 - (50.4.0) (92.1.10) 8.5.6 (8.5.6) 
Dowling 10.2.4 0.19.4 0.0.0 (27.6.0) (10.17.4) 32.6.11 (32.6.11) 
Wood 0.0.0 - 6.12.0 65.2.4 14.10.10 - - 
Gaskill (9.18.0) (52.3.8) 5.10.8 0.0.0 16.17.4 15.9.1 12.8.7 
Maxwell 54.0.0 - 3.9.2 38.15.6 61.2.0 28.13.7 0.0.0 
Meggs 0.0.0 - 8.13.0 7.4.4 - - - 
Reddin 0.0.0 - 0.14.4 - - - - 
Source: Cox A/56/e/89.0.  Agent’s Ledger 12th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 22-172; Cox A/56/e/99.0.  Agent’s Ledger 20th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 50-133. 
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                                      Table 3.3. Annual balances of non-sample lieutenants in the 1
st
 foot guards 
       
 1770 1771 1772  1770 1771 1772 
 £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d  £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Hasler (9.0.0) 0.0.0 - Wollaston (77.10.8) (75.14.8) 2.7.11 
Cox, T. 0.0.0 9.0.0 24.14.4 Fauquier (2.16.0) 1803.15.9 0.0.0 
Fielding 0.0.0 0.0.0 0.0.0 Meyrick (6.16.0) 0.0.0 - 
Howard 0.0.0 0.0.0 0.0.0 West 0.0.0 7.12.0 9.0.0 
Edmondes (9.0.0) (9.0.0) 0.0.0 Byng 8.10.0 0.18.0 63.0.4 
Hervey 27.12.0 0.0.0 0.0.0 Dodd (16.5.0) (9.9.0) (77.19.4) 
Cox, M. (13.10.0) (13.10.0) 0.0.0 Cottrell 0.18.0 0.0.0 - 
Gordon (97.13.10) 86.14.10 6.2.0 Stewart 36.6.0 (32.7.9) 0.0.0 
Keith (9.0.0) (9.0.0) 0.0.0 Hotham (68.1.7) 14.3.6 40.12.4 
Madan (32.17.0) 5.11.4 (10.4.0) Woodford 49.4.0 (68.8.8) (392.11.3) 
Wentworth 13.4.5 37.18.9 (59.4.1) Skeffington (9.0.0) (9.0.0) 0.0.0 
Turton (43.12.4) (22.14.8) 1.13.8 Horton 18.6.0 27.12.0 87.18.10 
Bertie (9.0.0) 9.6.0 0.0.0 Iremonger 6.19.6 0.0.0 0.1.6 
Fawkener 3.3.0 24.6.6 -     
Source: Cox, A/56/e/70.0.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1770-1774, ff. 153-200. 
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             Table 3.4. Annual balances of non-sample lieutenants in the 12
th
 and 20th foot 
        
 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 
12f £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Kay - - 0.0.0 (5.12.0) 0.0.0 12.8.0 139.9.8 
Walcott 0.0.0 (15.16.6) 0.0.0 (5.12.0) 0.0.0 (5.12.0) 0.0.0 
Gape - - (11.6.4) (11.6.5) (11.0.4) (11.0.5) (19.10.0) 
Ormsby - - (3.18.0) 610.3.0 (7.19.3) 0.5.9 137.10.3 
Perryn - - 0.0.0 15.18.6 (18.5.0) (18.5.0) (2.12.6) 
Cotterill - - (1.6.4) (10.11.4) 0.0.0 0.0.0 5.12.6 
Ledbetter - - 0.0.0 - 0.0.0 - - 
Collings - - (0.0.3) 10.13.3 0.0.0 0.0.0 15.15.0 
Montgomery - - 16.2.0 (52.11.6) (0.8.2) (18.7.8) 62.2.8 
Pleydell - - 0.0.0 (10.13.6) 0.0.0 0.0.0 77.4.7 
20f        
Denshire (14.18.9) - (8.12.4) 6.3.10 (2.19.4) - - 
Pringle 0.0.0 - (61.13.5) (37.0.10) (7.11.11) 7.11.11 - 
Sponge 0.0.0 - 1.10.0 80.14.6 140.6.0 0.0.0 - 
Wemys (11.2.9) - 0.0.0 11.6.6 0.0.0 0.0.0 - 
Dent 0.0.0 - 0.0.0 - - - - 
Loftus - 0.0.0 - 5.4.6 (44.11.6) (13.5.8) 13.5.8 
Renton 0.0.0 0.0.0 15.12.6 18.2.6 12.11.2 0.0.0 - 
Dalrymple (15.2.4) (36.16.10) (18.3.6) 0.0.0 0.0.0 1.18.2 (1.18.2) 
Rollinson 0.0.0 0.0.0 - 15.14.0 27.8.6 0.0.0 - 
Thompson 21.7.0 - (46.14.8) (273.19.2) (258.6.8) (259.0.4) 0.0.0 
Source: Cox A/56/e/89.0.  Agent’s Ledger 12th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 13-177; Cox A/56/e/99.0.  Agent’s Ledger 20th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 41-162. 
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                                      Table 3.5. Annual balances of non-sample captains in the 1
st
 foot guards 
           
 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774  1770 1771 1772 1773 
 £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d  £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Lambart (65.11.10) (65.10.1) 0.0.0 28.16.4 - Style (67.10.0) (69.0.4) (9.19.0) 28.16.4 
Baugh 100.9.7 2.11.7 (124.10.0) 0.0.0 28.16.4 Graham (72.2.8) (70.3.2) 0.0.0 - 
Tryon (49.8.3) (47.17.5) 0.0.0 28.1.8 - Lindsay 99.5.10 190.12.4 0.0.0 28.16.4 
Ligonier (18.15.0) 194.15.6 251.8.6 35.4.7 - Jones (17.19.0) 11.18.5 0.0.0 - 
West (73.6.3) (71.3.3) 56.13.0 142.6.4 - Cowper (68.3.3) (67.17.6) (12.0.6) 28.16.4 
Perceval 64.2.2 (14.0.4) 0.0.0 14.15.1 - Miles 289.19.5 (5.7.7) 1.5.6 94.12.10 
Pownall (69.4.0) 0.0.0 0.0.0 - - Wollaston - (22.7.4) 0.0.0 28.16.4 
Nugent 54.14.3 95.5.11 (43.5.11) 39.11.6 - Craig (109.18.10) (317.15.5) 0.0.0 29.9.4 
Thornton 68.14.8 (69.0.4) 0.0.0 28.16.4 - Amherst (65.10.8) 262.14.5 449.10.10 0.0.0 
Howard (29.0.0) 244.9.5 360.5.0 28.16.4 - Allen (48.8.3) (68.16.5) 0.0.0 0.0.0 
Hervey 39.1.4 201.11.0 38.8.1 123.17.5 - Hudson (68.13.5) (69.0.4) 0.0.0 28.16.4 
Hyde (61.19.9) 24.10.5 0.0.0 0.0.0 - Johnson (70.12.4) (70.7.2) 0.0.0 - 
Mordaunt 119.6.2 189.14.2 222.17.6 - -      
Source: Cox, A/56/e/70.0.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1770-1774, ff. 22-118. 
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                 Table 3.6. Annual balances of non-sample field officers in the 12
th
 and 20th foot 
        
 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 
12f £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Captain Dunbar - - (0.11.0) 45.4.0 45.15.0 1476.9.1 (20.0.0) 
Captain Ruthven - - 11.2.9 (4.19.7) (21.11.7) (78.9.9) (88.2.6) 
Captain Parkhill - - 0.10.6 (9.13.4) 86.13.1 (0.7.2) (0.11.6) 
Captain Trigge - - 0.0.0 0.0.0 0.0.0 20.0.0 22.6.6 
Captain Campbell - - 0.0.0 (19.17.6) 32.14.4 - - 
Captain Barlow - - 0.0.0 (21.0.0) 12.11.11 (4.16.2) 38.3.0 
Major Campbell - - 0.0.0 (15.4.6) 115.5.10 0.0.0 45.13.2 
20f        
Captain Parry - (73.5.3) (95.14.5) (124.19.8) (12.9.9) (17.11.3) 15.18.3 
Captain St George (18.5.0) (30.4.6) 3.4.7 71.6.1 0.0.0 - - 
Captain King (19.3.6) - (69.5.11) (4.5.9) (11.5.5) 0.0.0 - 
Captain Stuart (76.5.0) - (238.18.8) 46.16.9 (44.11.11) 0.0.0 - 
Captain Conyngham 91.10.0 - 193.4.7 909.3.8 151.0.2 0.0.0 - 
Major Parr 50.2.9 21.7.6 35.6.2 78.13.0 167.8.9 0.0.0 - 
Lt. Colonel Maxwell - - 3.2.0 (150.9.9) (48.15.6) 3018.10 .1 0.0.1 
Source: Cox A/56/e/89.0.  Agent’s Ledger 12th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 5-174; Cox A/56/e/99.0.  Agent’s Ledger 20th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 32-190. 
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Table 3.7. Rewards and costs of Drummond and Ludlow as ensigns in the 1
st
 foot guards 
 Drummond Ludlow 
 1774 1775 1776 1779 1780 
Rewards £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Subsistence 82.2.6 82.2.6 82.2.6 82.2.6 82.7.0 
Arrears  - 6.11.10 17.6.6 - 10.16.10 
sub-total      
     -Rewards 82.2.6 88.14.4 99.19.0 82.2.6 93.3.10 
Costs      
Himself - - - 25.5.0 - 
Subsistence 87.8.0 95.17.11 54.18.0 90.6.6 86.8.10 
Arrears  19.18.5 26.14.3 - - - 
sub-total      
     -Costs 107.6.5 122.11.3 54.18.0 115.11.6 86.8.10 
Balance (25.3.11) (33.16.6) 45.1.0 (33.9.0) 6.15.0 
Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
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Table 3.8. Rewards and costs of Garth as lieutenant in the 1
st
 foot guards 
      
 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 
Rewards £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Subsistence 108.10.0 109.10.0 108.10.0 109.16.0 109.10.0 109.10.0 109.10.0 109.16.0 109.10.0 109.10.0 109.10.0 
Arrears  49.8 .0 24.14.4 12.7.11 24.14.4 24.14.4 24.15.4 - 24.14.4 24.14.4 24.15.10 24.14.4 
sub-total            
     -Rewards 157.18.0 134.4.4 120.17.11 134.10.4 134.4.4 134.5.4 109.10.0 134.10.4 134.4.4 134.5.10 134.4.4 
Costs            
Himself - - - - 45.18.0 - - - 20.0.0 61.0.0 71.0.0 
Subsistence 141.14.0 139.4.4 109.10.0 158.9.11 124.18.4 45.6.0 104.12.0 91.10.0 93.4.4 33.18.0 69.4.4 
Arrears  - - - 24.14.4 - - - 24.14.4 - 24.15.10 - 
Military - - - - - 10.10.0 - - - - - 
Fees  7.18.0 - - - - - - - - - - 
Recruiting - - - - - - - - 30.0.0 - - 
Private bills  - - - - - 30.6.0 10.10.0 - - - - 
sub-total            
     -Costs 149.12.0 139.4.4 109.10.0 183.4.3 170.16.4 86.2.0 114.12 .0 116.4.4 143.4.4 119.13.10 140.4.4 
Balance 8.6.0 (5.0.0) 11.7.11 (48.13.10) (36.12.0) 48.3.10 (5.2.0) 18.6.0 (10.0.0) 14.12.0 (6.0.0) 
Note: ‘Military’ costs are miscellaneous extraordinary expenses.    Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals.   
Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
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Table 3.9. Rewards and costs of Drummond and Ludlow as lieutenants in the 1
st
 foot guards 
 Drummond Ludlow 
 1777 1778 1779 1780 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 
Rewards £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Subsistence 107.9.0 109.10.0 109.10.0 109.16.0 109.10.0 109.16.0 109.16.0 109.10.0 109.10.0 109.10.0 109.16.0 
Arrears  17.6.6 17.6.6 23.3.9 24.14.4 17.6.6 23.3.9 24.14.4 24.14.4 24.15.8 24.14.4 24.14.4 
Appointments - - - - - - - - 213.15.0 142.10.0 285.4.0 
Baggage/forage - 8.15.0 9.2.6 - - - - - - - - 
Recruiting - - - - - - - - - - 38.13.3 
Military - - - 2.2.0 - - - - - - - 
Private income - 175.0.0 - 120.0.0 - - - - - - - 
sub-total            
     -Rewards 125.5.6 311.1.6 141.16.3 256.12.4 127.6.6 132.19.9 134.10.4 134.4.4 348.0.8 276.14.4 458.7.5 
Costs            
Himself - 33.0.0 153.10.9 45.0.0 30.0.0 - - 50.0.0 310.0.0 330.0.0 170.0.0 
Subsistence 129.2.9 18.6.0 - - - - 91.4.0 - - 28.2.0 69.4.4 
Arrears  - 24.0.0 - - - - - - - - - 
Military - 4.6.0 - - - - 57.4.5 - - - - 
Bills to officers - - - - - - - - - 1.1.0 1.10.6 
Military charity - - - - - - - - - - 0.10.6 
Fees  7.18.0 - - - - - - - - - - 
Recruiting - - - - - - - - - 12.18.3 - 
Private bills  - 196.17.6 48.0.0 136.12.0 352.10.0 - - - - - 274.8.0 
Private income 75.0.0 30.0.0 - - - - - - - - - 
sub-total            
     -Costs 212.10.9 306.9.6 201.10.9 181.12.0 382.10.0 0.0.0 148.8.5 50.0.0 310.0.0 372.1.3 446.9.0 
Balance (87.5.3) 4.12.0 (59.14.6) 75.0.4 (255.3.6) 132.19.9 (13.18.1) 84.4.4 38.0.8 (95.6.11) 11.18.5 
Note: ‘Military’ rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses.    Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers 
are payments to other officers.      
Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
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 Table 3.10. Rewards and costs of future generals as captains  
 Carleton, 20f Tarleton, 78f Garth, 1fg Ludlow, 1fg 
 1766 1767 1768 1769 1778 1780 1781 1782 1780 1781 1795 1796 1797 
Rewards £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Subsistence 273.15.0 136.17.6 136.17.6 136.17.6 125.2.6 137.5.0 136.17.6 135.7.6 228.15.0 228.2.6 228.2.6 228.15.0 228.2.6 
Arrears  - - 33.9.7 33.9.7 - 32.3.10 33.9.7 33.11.5 56.13.0 56.13.0 56.13.0 56.13.0 - 
Company profits - - - - - 40.0.0 20.0.0 - 170.14.10 40.0.0 219.4.1 140.0.0 260.0.10 
Appointments - - - - - - - - - - - - 159.10.8 
Allowances - - - - 52.10.0 30.0.0  - - - 80.0.0 -  
Campaign losses - - - - - - - - 160.0.0 - - - 16.1.10 
Military - - - - - - - 1050.0.0 - - - - 301.2.6 
Private income - 100.9.2 183.11.2 - - - - - - 115.9.7 - - - 
sub-total              
      -Rewards 273.15.0 237.6.8 353.18.2 170.7.1 177.12.6 239.8.10 190.7.1 1218.18.11 616.2.10 440.15.1 583.19.7 425.8.0 964.18.4 
Costs              
Himself - 50.0.0 - - - - - - 400.0.0 400.0.0 150.0.0 180.0.0 410.0.0 
Subsistence 273.15.0 45.7.6  45.15.0 - - - - - - - - - 
Paymaster - 27.8.7 11.17.7 - 32.10.0 12.10.0 30.0.0 - - - - - - 
Company losses - - - - - - - - - - 37.1.8 0.12.8 - 
Military - - - - - - - 6.6.6 - - - - 0.3.4 
Bills to officers - - - - - - 52.10.0 - - - - - - 
Loan - - - - - - - - - - 100.0.0 100.0.0 100.0.0 
Regimental club - - - - - - - - - - 1.11.6 - 3.3.0 
Campaign losses - - - - - - - - 160.0.0 - - - - 
Fees  - - - - - - - - 4.12.6 - 24.18.0 4.7.6 2.2.0 
Equipment - - - - - - - 84.0.0 - - - - - 
Private bills - 130.0.0 350.0.0 133.12.0 16.0.0 452.0.0 - 95.0.0 98.15.0 - 304.9.0 144.9.7 346.16.0 
sub-total              
     -Costs 273.15.0 252.16.1 361.17.7 179.7.0 48.10.0 464.10.0 82.10.0 185.6.6 663.7.6 400.0.0 617.19.4 429.9.9 862.4.4 
Balance 0.0.0 (15.9.5) (17.19.5) (8.19.11) 129.2.6 (225.1.2) 107.17.1 1033.12.5 (47.4.8) 40.15.1 (33.19.9) (4.1.9) 102.14.0 
Note: ‘Military’ rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses.    Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers 
are payments to other officers.       
 Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
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                          Table 3.11. Rewards and costs of future generals as majors and lieutenant colonels 
 Cuyler, 55f Musgrave, 40f Harris, 76f Herbert, 2dg 
 1776-7 1778 1784 1785 1787 1793 1792 1793 
Rewards £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Subsistence 408.5.0 240.3.6 198.5.0 237.5.0 280.0.3 237.5.0 338.11.0 337.12.6 
Arrears  - 43.3.1 - 54.10.0 22.2.3 109.0.0 82.3.10 164.12.2 
Company profits - - 10.0.0 - 19.8.7 - 30.0.0 30.0.0 
Appointments - 163.15.0 383.11.9 351.7.10 - 60.0.0 - - 
Allowances - - 19.2.6 38.5.0 - - - 30.0.0 
Loans to officers 199.10.0 - - - 13.14.0 - - - 
Military 696.14.6 - - - 29.13.3 - - 76.6.6 
Family - - - - 9.17.2 4.11.6 - - 
Private income 148.18.10 373.10.0 - - 26.7.7 169.0.0 - - 
sub-total         
     -Rewards 1453.8.4 820.11.7 610.19.3 681.7.10 401.3.1 579.16.6 450.14.10 638.10.14 
Costs         
Himself 300.0.0 250.0.0 901.16.3 125.0.0 70.0.0 53.7.11 - - 
Subsistence - - -  40.6.0 - - - 
Paymaster - - - 172.10.0 - - - - 
Military - - - - - 1.5.8 - - 
Bills to officers 77.2.0 - 701.8.1 - - - - - 
Band - - - - - - - 10.10.0 
Recruiting - - - - - - 21.0.0 - 
Family - - 563.15.0 - - 10.10.0 - - 
Fees  8.12.0 1.18.6 1.5.0 0.18.0 9.10.0 - - 10.13.0 
Equipment - - 2.18.6 - - - - - 
Private bills 814.7.6 89.8.0 125.0.0 378.15.0 71.0.0 590.10.0 440.4.10 606.18.2 
sub-total         
     -Costs 1200.1.6 341.6.6 2296.2.10 678.3.0 190.16.0 655.13.7 461.4.10 628.1.2 
Balance 253.6.10 479.5.1 (1685.3.7) 4.4.10 210.7.1 (75.17.1) (10.10.0) 10.11.0 
Note: ‘Military’ rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses.  Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers 
are payments to other officers.  All ranks are lieutenant colonels, except Cuyler’s accounts for 1776-7 when he was a major.  Cuyler’s accounts for 1776-7 contain two years 
income and expenditure.  Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
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              Table 3.12. Rewards and costs of Garth as army general and regimental field officer with the 1
st
 foot guards 
  
 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 
Rewards £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Subsistence 337.12.6 228.15.0 228.2.0 228.2.0 271.2.0 338.18.7 380.16.6 392.7.6 392.7.6 
Arrears  56.13.0 56.13.0 56.13.0 56.16.1 56.13.0 56.13.0 85.9.1 85.9.7 96.16.6 
Company profits 50.0.0 147.0.9 203.15.4 69.10.4 120.4.3 27.7.7 95.8.9 99.18.10 113.6.6 
General command 558.10.11 - - - - - - - 167.16.6 
Baggage/forage - - - - - - - 40.0.0 - 
Campaign losses - - - - - - - - 174.2.3 
Bills to officers - - - - - - 210.5.0 - - 
Military - - 140.0.0 - - - 20.12.6 396.15.0 84.0.0 
Private income - 35.14.5 - 47.16.2 - - - 0.6.3 - 
sub-total          
     -Rewards 1002.15 .11 468.3.2 343.15.4 401.6.6 447.4.3 421.7.7 792.6.3 1014.0 .1 1028.5.3 
Costs          
Himself 180.0.0 250.0.0 350.0.0 293.10.10 127.10.0 342.0.0 414.0.0 231.0.0 517.6.6 
Subsistence 45.6.0 - - - - - - - - 
Arrears - - - - - - 17.12.0 - - 
Bills to officers - 18.0.0 10.0.0 50.17.6 - - - 10.0.0 - 
Company losses - 0.12.4 4.10.5 - - 3.14.6 - - - 
Military - - - - - 1.10.0 - - 22.11.6 
Loans to officers 150.0.0 - - - - - - - - 
Fees  11.15.0 9.6.0 - - - - 10.4.0 - 11.3.0 
Equipment - - - - - - - 174.2.3 - 
Family - - - - 30.0.0 50.0.0 16.0.0 - - 
Private bills 256.13.3 93.0.0 272.10.0 31.10.0 255.17.0 63.10.0 269.7.6 450.11.4 475.10.10 
sub-total          
     -Costs 643.14.3 120.18.4 637.10.5 375.7.6 412.17.0 460.5.6 727.3.6 865.13.7 1025.4.6 
Balance 359.1.8 347.4.10 (293.14.3) 25.19.0 34.7.3 (38.17.11) 65.2.9 148.6.6 3.0.9 
Note: Garth’s regimental rank was major 1783-1788 and lieutenant colonel 1789-1791. ‘Military’ rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses.  
Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers are payments to other officers.  Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
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               Table 3.13. Rewards and costs of generals as army general and regimental field officer  
 Herbert, 2dg Drummond, 1fg Ludlow, 1fg 
 1795 1796 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1798 1799 1800 
Rewards £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Subsistence 337.12.6 338.11.0 228.15.0 254.10.6 168.7.0 511.1.7 392.7.6 228.2.6 228.2.6 297.2.6 
Arrears  - 246.11.6 56.13.0 - - 56.16.1 149.0.11 56.16.1 - 113.6.0 
Company profits - - 140.0.0 239.16.2 - 681.16.10 891.2.1 480.0.10 714.9.2 466.7.8 
Appointments - - - 616.17.6 1311.16.0 981.12.0 655.0.0 - 1081.1.7 655.0.0 
Allowances - - 38.18.0 - - 573.13.2 58.16.0 - - 264.19.10 
Campaign losses - - - 18.18.0 - - - - - - 
Bills to officers 317.2.5 - - - - - - - 15.0.0 - 
Military - - - - - 56.12.0 89.17.4 - - - 
Private income - - - - - 98.15.0 - - - 30.0.0 
sub-total           
    -Rewards 654.14.11 585.2.6 463.18.0 1128.11.8 1479.16.0 2959.13.11 2236.3.10 764.19.5 2038.13.1 1826.16.0 
Costs           
Himself - - - - - - - 280.0.0 180.0.0 161.0.0 
Paymaster - - - - - - - - 30.2.5 453.7.2 
Bills to officers - - - - - - 30.0.0 21.0.0 - - 
Company losses - - 70.13.2 - - - - - - - 
Military 1.16.0 0.1.2 1.11.6 45.19.1 12.0.0 0.10.6  9.6.10 2.2.0 6.16.6 
Loan - - - - - - - 100.0.0 594.4.4 75.0.0 
Fees  15.0.0 - - 18.18.0 48.1.6 3.3.0 - 12.12.6 1.10.0 - 
Equipment - - - - - - - 19.8.8 - - 
Family - - - - - - - - - 44.13.2 
Private bills 766.13.3 399.9.6 724.5.11 971.18.0 1672.0.0 2470.0.0 150.0.0 388.10.7 649.7.1 1022.3.8 
sub-total           
     -Costs 782.19.3 399.10.8 796.5.11 1035.18.0 1732.1.6 2473.13.6 180.0.0 830.18.7 1456.16.10 1763.0.6 
Balance (128.4.4) 182.11.10 (332.7.11) 92.13.8 (252.5.6) 486.0.5 2056.3.10 (65.19.2) 581.16.3 63.15.6 
Note: The regimental ranks held were as follows: captain (Ludlow 1798-1799),  major (Drummond 1796-1798; Ludlow 1800) and lieutenant colonel (Herbert 1795-1796; 
Drummond 1799-1800) . ‘Military’ rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses.  Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, 
while bills to officers are payments to other officers.  Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
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              Table 3.14. Rewards and costs of Ligonier as army general and regimental colonel of the 1
st
 foot guards 
   
 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 
Rewards £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Subsistence 489.18.0 839.8.0 770.10.0 771.0.0 770.10.0 908.10.0 772.16.0 839.10.0 
Arrears  496.19.6 71.6.8 - 253.11.0 126.11.0 63.10.8 126.14.2 - 
Clothing 2556.14.9 - 1914.16.3 242.4.10 6367.12.7 - - 336.18.6 
Appointments 3525.15.8 1491.3.0 426.4.0 3614.0.0 3721.3.0 3721.3.0 - - 
Allowances 332.10.0 1307.5.3 515.9.3 597.8.0 287.13.8 767.0.0 - - 
Vacant pay 71.9.6 15.1.6 243.5.0 76.2.0 12.14.0 - - - 
Military 661.16.0 52.13.3 - - - - 10.16.0 - 
Private income 3000.0.0 502.11 .4 1448.16.6 60.4.0 525.1.8 70.0.0 101.11.6 - 
sub-total         
     -Rewards 11135.3.5 4279.9.0 5319.1.0 5614.9.10 11811.5.11 5530.3.8 1011.17 .8 1176.8.6 
Costs         
Himself 2386.18.4 3293.9.7 3195.10.8 3476.0.10 2584.9.7 2954.1.2 200.0.0 - 
Clothing 203.10.5 - 108.12.0 371.17.4 4402.16.6 172.2.0 157.19.0 178.5.6 
Gratuity 30.0.0 30.0.0 31.10.0 63.0.0 - 63.0.0 31.10.0 31.10.0 
Bills to officers 4101.14.8 14.6.4 236.15.0 - 478.16.6 100.0.0 - - 
Loan - - 60.0.0 60.0.0 20.0.0 40.0.0 40.0.0 40.0.0 
Military 442.17.0 20.19.6 58.6.0 54.9.0 25.5.0 144.1.6 108.12.0 18.15.0 
Loans to officers 27.3.0 - - - - - - - 
Fees  7.17.0 102.15.0 4.10.0 289.9.6 3.0.0 443.4.6 - 0.5.0 
Equipment - 279.18.9 930.13.2 - - - - - 
Family 160.0.0 45.0.0 60.0.0 110.0.0 215.5.0 803.2.6 395.0.0 600.16.2 
Private bills 599.10.10 788.19.5 497.14.0 418.9.2 4527.13.2 128.4.0 26.7.0 110.5.2 
sub-total         
     -Costs 7965.11.3 4575.8.7 5183.10.10 4843.5.10 12257.5.9 4848.15.8 962.17.0 979.16.10 
Balance 3169.12.2 (295.19.7) 135.10.2 771.4.0 (445.19.10) 681.8.0 49.0.8 196.10.8 
Note: ‘Military’ rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses.  Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers 
are payments to other officers.  Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
 
362 
 
 Table 3.15. Rewards and costs of Cathcart as army general and regimental colonel of the 2
nd
 life guards 
     
 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 
Rewards £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Subsistence 492.15.0 492.15.0 492.15.0 492.15.0 492.15.0 492.15.0 494.2.0 492.15.0 492.15.0 492.15.0 494.2.0 492.15.0 492.15.0 
Arrears  - - 179.6.2 - 259.4.0 129.12.0 259.4.0 - 129.19.1 259.4.0 129.12.0 - 129.19.1 
Clothing 700.0.0 600.0.0 1200.0.0 1200.0.0 1200.0.0 1200.0.0 1200.0.0 1200.0.0 1200.0.0 1200.0.0 1200.0.0 1200.0.0 1200.0.0 
Appointments - 166.18.0 - 218.10.0 - - 309.16.6 - - 818.19.11 1220.10.5 1210.6.1 1245.10.5 
Allowances 116.0.0 - - 722.15.9 22.14.6 13.13.0 135.8.0 - 1152.7.6 1028.9.0 256.10.0 128.5.0 3028.8.8 
Bills to officers - - - - - - - - 24.10.9 - - - - 
Military - 600.0.0 58.1.5 - - - - - 5.5.0 81.18.0 - - - 
Private income 7225.1.11 - - - - - - 1473.12.5 - 500.0.0 - - - 
sub-total              
      -Rewards 8533.16.11 1859.13.0 1930.2.7 2634.0.9 1974.13.6 1835.15.7 2398.10.6 3166.7.5 3004.17 .4 4381.5.11 3300.14.5 3031.6.1 6096.13.2 
Costs              
Tax - - - - - - 91.2.0 91.2.0 113.18.0 35.14.0 49.8.6 120.0.0 - 
Regiment charges - - - - - - - 21.0.0 - 21.0.0 10.10.0 10.10.0 10.10.0 
Military 65.6.9 - - - - 1.1.0 2.2.0 1.1.0 1.1.0 14.8.0 2.14.0 2.4.0 2.3.0 
Bills to officers - - - - - 6.6.0 - 10.6.0 0.10.6 0.10.6 0.10.6 0.10.6 0.10.1 
Loan 356.8.1 - - - - 188.13.4 188.13.4 - - 400.0.0 200.0.0 200.0.0 401.19.8 
Horses 36.7.5 - - - - 29.7.11 2.2.0 2.2.0 4.2.8 9.7.0 3.3.0 - 2.2.0 
Military charity - - - - - - - 249.6.0 21.17.6 23.9.9 23.10.3 19.10.0 26.6.3 
Fees  22.14.6 - - - - 30.15.6 - 22.9.6 9.17.0 47.4.6 3.5.0 - 6.14.0 
Family - - - - - - - - - - - 266.14.7 49.4.7 
Private bills 2558.6.6 2523.19.6 1854.2.8 2775.4.9 2092.12.1 2309.17.8 1806.12.6 1800.0.0 2524.10.9 5550.0.0 3400.0.0 4400.0.0 7400.0.0 
sub-total              
     -Costs 3038.3.3 2523.19.6 1854.2.8 2775.4.9 2092.12.1 2566.1.5 2090.11.10 2197.6.6 2675.17.5 6102.13.9 3693.1.3 5019.9.1 7899.17.7 
Balance 5495.13.8 (664.6.6) 75.19.11 (141.4.0) (117.18.7) (473.9.4) 307.18.8 969.0.11 328.19.11 (1721.7.10) (392.6.10) (1988.3.0) (1803.4.5) 
Note: ‘Military’ rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses.  Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers 
are payments to other officers.  Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
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 Table 3.16. Rewards and costs of Moore and Pitt as army generals and regimental colonels  
 Pitt, 10d Moore, 52f 
 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 
Rewards £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Subsistence 503.3.7 388.17.6 777.15.0 775.12.3 921.12.6 921.12.6 796.2.6 501.17.6 503.5.0 501.17.6 376.15.0 614.9.9 452.18.6 
Arrears  116.8.7 116.2.3 116.2.3 116.2.3 116.8.7 - - - 54.10.0 - - - - 
Profits 4122.19.8 - - - - - - 837.2.0 21.13.4 - 3539.15.1 29.0.0 - 
Appointments - - - - 1198.14.8 1881.5.4 - 1434.9.10 615.13.6 757.10.9 998.18.3 - - 
Allowances - - - 142.10.0 173.4.0 - - 122.1.4 457.0.5 833.1.5 822.8.1 738.9.10 982.10.2 
Prize-money - - - - - - - 476.15.15 224.9.1 189.12.5 - - - 
Military - - - - - - - - - 24.6.8 - 35.9.10 - 
Private income 494.7.3 772.11.6 1542.6.8 5.5.0 159.19.2 - 413.12.0 631.10.0 - - 140.4.0 120.0.0 - 
sub-total              
      -Rewards 5236.12.1 1277.11.3 2436.3.11 1039.9.9 2569.18.11 2802.17.10 1209.14.6 4003.16.1 1876.11.4 2306.8.9 5878.0.5 1537.9.5 1435.8.8 
Costs              
Himself - - - - - 200.0.0 1500.0.0 200.0.0 - 1950.0.0 300.0.0 - 1100.0.0 
Tax - - - - - - -  60.0.0 60.0.0 31.6.6 - - 
Paymaster - - - - - - - 52.10.0 - 59.5.10 30.9.0 - - 
Military - - - - - - - 221.10.6 12.15.8 - 57.18.0 - - 
Clothing - - - - - - - - - - - - 48.9.7 
Bills to officers - - - - - - - 300.0.0 - 200.0.0 - 156.9.6 1.0.0 
Prize-money - - - - - - - - - - - 272.8.10 - 
Loan 25.0.0 25.0.0 25.0.0 25.0.0 - - - - - - - -  
Band - - - - - - - - 26.5.0 152.1.0 50.0.0 - 150.0.0 
Military charity - - 21.0.0 - - - - - - - - - - 
Fees  - - 366.19.0 31.19.0 13.13.0 46.4.0 11.0.6 12.12.0 4.4.0 20.13.0 28.14.6 45.19.6 83.13.6 
Family - - - - - - 50.0.0 - - - - 103.13 .0 269.3.0 
Private bills 414.8.6 3420.0.0 2982.0.0 4600.3.0 1669.4.5 4470.17.5 9.19.4 2098.15.1 1267.4.0 2363.14.0 1277.4.0 3822.5.10 94.10.0 
sub-total              
     -Costs 439.8.6 3445.0.0 3394.19.0 4657.2.0 1682.17.5 4717.1.5 1570.19.10 2885.7.7 1370.8.8 4806.2.10 1775.12.0 4400.16.8 1746.16 
Balance 4797.3.7 (2167.8.9) (958.15.1) (3617.12.3) 887.1.6 (1914.3.7) (361.5.4) 1118.8.6 506.2 8 (2499.14.1) 4102.8.5 (2863.7.3) (311.7.5) 
Note: ‘Military’ rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses.  Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers 
are payments to other officers.  Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
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              Table 3.17. Rewards and costs of Grant, Garth and Fox as army generals and regimental colonels 
 Grant, 55f Garth, 
17f 
Fox, 10f 
 1777 1778 1779 1795 1795 1796 1797 1798 
Rewards £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d £.s.d 
Subsistence 894.0.0 438.0.0 218.8.0 438.0.0 218.8.0 657.12.0 438.0.0 501.17.6 
Arrears  - 80.11.5 80.7.0 113.16.1 - - - 41.18.10 
Clothing - - 1165.14.1 - - - - 1525.11.10 
Appointments 931.16.1 828.3.5 - 877.11.6 - 655.0.0 1146.14.0 1204.0.0 
Allowances - - - 180.7.0 - 114.0.0 114.0.0 144.0.0 
Bills to officers - - - - - - 9.10.0 - 
Recruiting - - - - - - 63.10.9 - 
Military - - 56.12.12 - - 544.9.9 - - 
Private income 42.19.4 150.0.0 500.0.0 1156.7.5 - - - - 
sub-total         
     -Rewards 1868.15.15 1496.14.10 2021.2.1 2766.2.0 218.8.0 1971.1.9 1771.14.9 3417.7.4 
Costs         
Himself - - - 581.0.0 85.0.0 95.10.0 - 240.10.0 
Clothing - 1039.19.0 - 453.8.8 - - - - 
Paymaster  403.18.0 - - - - - - 
Bills to officers 360.0.0 - - 97.6.0 40.5.6 256.16.4 183.19.0 - 
Regiment charges - - - - - - - 2.5.0 
Military 11.4.10 - 1530.0.0 - 22.19.0 0.2.0 0.2.0 200.0.0 
Fees  - 8.14.0 - 28.7.0 24.6.0 3.15.6 29.8.0 6.6.0 
Private bills 400.0.0 1100.0.0 400.0.0 1355.1.8 527.14.5 1364.18.6 1024.16.3 2024.9.8 
sub-total         
     -Costs 771.4.10 2552.11.0 1930.0.0 2515.3.4 700.4.11 1721.2.4 1238.5.3 2473.10.8 
Balance 1097.10.7 (1055.16.2) 90.7.3 250.18.8 (481.16.11) 249.19.5 553.9.6 943.16.8 
Note: ‘Military’ rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses.  Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers 
are payments to other officers.  Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
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Table 3.18. Governorships and the highest titles of 1747 generals 
       
 Lt. Governor Governor Highest title  Lt. Governor Governor Highest title 
Anstruther Minorca 1733-7 South Carolina 1736, 
Minorca 1737, Kinsale 
- Bowles - Limerick 1739, 
Londonderry 
1740 
- 
Blakeney Stirling Castle 1742, 
Plymouth 1746-8, 
Minorca 1747-56 
- Irish Baron 1756 Bland Gibraltar 1749 Fort William 
1743-52, 
Edinburgh 
Castle 1752-63 
- 
Cholmondeley Chester Castle 1731-70 Chester Castle 1770-75 - Cope - - KB 1743 
Dalrymple Minorca 1742 - KT 1710 Fowke - Gibraltar 1754-6 - 
Gooch Virginia 1727-49 - Bt 1746 Handasyd Minorca 1737-42,   
1743-47 
Berwick 1745 - 
Hargrave - Gibraltar 1740-9 - Hawley - Inverness 1748, 
Plymouth 1752 
- 
Honywood - Duncannon 1728, Berwick 
1735, Plymouth 1740 
KB 1743 Howard, C. Carlile 1725-49 Carlile 1749-52, 
Fort George 
1752-65 
KB 1749 
Howard, T. - Berwick - Huske Hurst Castle 1721 - - 
Keppel - Virginia 1737-54 KG 1749 Kerr - Guernsey 1740, 
Berwick 1745, 
Edinburgh 
Castle 1745 
- 
Lennox - - KG 1726 Leslie - Stirling Castle 
1722, 
Duncannon 
1754 
KT 1753 
Ligonier Minorca 1713-16 Kinsale 1739-40, Guernsey 
1749-52, Plymouth 1752-
59 
Earl 1766 Lindsay - - KB 1743 
Molesworth - Kilmainham Veterans 
Hospital 
- Montagu - St. Lucia 1722, 
IOW 1733-4 
- 
Mordaunt - Sheerness 1752-78, 
Berwick 1778-80 
KB 1749 Murray - Plymouth 1745 KB 1743 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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Table 3.18. Governorships and the highest titles of 1747 generals (continued) 
       
 Lt. Governor Governor Highest title  Lt. Governor Governor Highest title 
O'Hara - Minorca 1747, Gibraltar 
1756, Portsmouth 1759, 
Chelsea Hospital 
Irish Baron 1722 Parker  Cork, Kinsale - 
Philips - Nova Scotia - Preston Edinburgh Castle 1715 - - 
Rich - Chelsea Hospital 1740 - Spencer - - KB 1741 
St Clair Berwick 1733 Cork - Temple - Jersey 1723-49 Viscount 1718 
Wade - Berwick 1732, Fort 
William 1733 
- West - New York 1737, 
Tilbury 1747-
52, Guernsey 
1752-66 
Earl 1761 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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Table 3.19. Governorships and the highest titles of 1800 generals 
       
 Lt. Governor Governor Highest title  Lt. Governor Governor Highest title 
Abercromby, Ra. IOW 1795-9 Inverness 1798-1801 Baron 1801 Abercromby, Ro. - Bombay 1790-
2, Edinburgh 
Castle 1801-27 
GCB 1815 
Baird - Kinsale 1819, Inverness 
1827 
Bt 1809 Beckwith - Bermuda 1797, 
St Vincent 
1804-8, 
Barbados 1808-
14 
KB 1809 
Burrard - Calshot Castle 1787-1813 Bt 1807 Campbell, J. - - Baron 1766 
Carleton, G. Quebec 1766-8 Quebec 1768-78, 1786-93, 
Nova Scotia 1786-93 
Baron 1786 Carleton, T. - New Brunswick 
1784-1817 
- 
Cathcart - Hull 1830 Earl 1814 Christie Burton Upper Canada 1799-
1802 
 - 
Clarke Jamaica 1784-90, 
Quebec 1790, Lower 
Canada 1790-5 
India 1797 KB 1797 Cornwallis - India 1786-97, 
1805 
GCB 1815 
Cradock Cape of Good Hope 
1811 
- Baron 1831 Craig - Cape Colony 
1795-7, North 
America 1807 
KB 1797 
Cuninghame - Kinsale 1770-1801 Irish Baron 1796 Cuyler Portsmouth 1794-7 Kinsale Bt 1814 
Dalrymple, H.W Guernsey 1796, Gibraltar 
1806 
Gibraltar 1806, Blackness 
Castle 1818 
Bt 1815 Dalrymple, W. - Chelsea 
Hospital 1798-
1807 
 
Despard - Cape Breton 1800-7 - Don Jersey 1806-14, 
Gibraltar 1814-30 
Scarborough 
Castle 1831 
GCB 1820 
D’Oyly - - KCB Drummond, A.J - Dumbarton 
Castle 
- 
Dundas, D. - Landguard Fort 1800, Fort 
George 1801, Chelsea 
Hospital 1804 
KB 1804 Dundas, F. - Carrickfergus 
1817, 
Dumbarton 
Castle 
- 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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Table 3.19. Governorships and the highest titles of 1800 generals (continued) 
       
 Lt. Governor Governor Highest title  Lt. Governor Governor Highest title 
Edward - Gibraltar 1802 - Fanning Nova Scotia 1783-6, 
Prince Edward Island 
1786-1805 
- - 
Farrington - - Bt 1815 Fawcett - Pendennis, 
Tilbury, Chelsea 
Hospital 1796 
KB 1786 
Fox Minorca 1799, Gibraltar 
1804 
Portsmouth 1810 - Floyd - Tilbury 1813 Bt 1816 
Gardiner Kinsale 1801 - - Garth Placentia - - 
Gordon - Tynemouth 1778, 
Edinburgh Castle 1796-
1801 
- Grant - E. Florida 1763-
73, Dumbarton 
Castle 1782, 
Stirling Castle 
1789-1806 
- 
Green - - Bt 1786 Grey - - Baron 1801 
Gwyn - Sheerness - Harcourt - Fort William 
1794-5,Hull 
1795-1801, 
Sandhurst 1802-
11, Portsmouth 
1811-26, 
Plymouth 1827 
GCB 1820 
Harris - Dumbarton Castle 1824 Baron 1815 Hastings - India 1813-22, 
Malta 
Marquess and Earl 
1817 
Herbert - Guernsey 1807 KG 1805 Hewett -  Bt 1813 
Howe IOW 1768-95 Berwick 1795-1808, 
Plymouth 1808-14 
GCB 1820 Hulse Chelsea Hospital 
1806 
Chelsea 
Hospital 1820 
GCH 
Hunter Upper Canada 1799-
1805 
British Honduras 1790-1 - Hely Hutchinson - Stirling Castle 
1806-32, 
Londonderry 
1806 
Baron 1801 
Irving - - Bt 1809 Johnson, H. - - Bt 1818 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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Table 3.19. Governorships and the highest titles of 1800 generals (continued) 
       
 Lt. Governor Governor Highest title  Lt. Governor Governor Highest title 
Lake Berwick 1793-4 Limerick 1794-7, 
Dumbarton Castle 1797-
1807, Plymouth 1807-8 
Viscount 1887 Lambart - Calshot Castle 
1813-37 
- 
Leland Cork 1796-1808 - - Lennox, C. - Hull 1813-14, 
Plymouth 1814-
19, North 
America 1818-
19 
KG 1812 
Lennox, G. - Plymouth 1784-1805 - Lindsay Jamaica 1795-1801 - - 
Ludlow Berwick - Baron 1831 Medows IOW 1798 Bombay 1788, 
Madras, Hull 
1808 
KB 1792 
Melville Guadeloupe 1759-61 Guadeloupe 1761, Grenada 
& others 1762-71 
- Moore - - KB 1804 
Morris Quebec 1797-1800 - - Morrison Jamaica 1809 Chester - 
Munro - - KB 1779 Musgrave Stirling Castle 1780 Tilbury 1796 - 
Needham - - Irish Earl 1822 Nugent Jamaica 1801-6 - Bt 1806 
Percy - - KG 1788 Phipps - Scarborough 
Castle 1796-
1831 
Baron 1794 
O’Hara Gibraltar 1792 Gibraltar 1795 - Pigot - - GCMG 1837 
Pitt, J. - Plymouth 1805-7, Jersey 
1807-20, Gibraltar 1820-
35 
KG 1790 Pitt, W.A - Portsmouth 
1794-1809 
KB 1792 
Prescott Lower Canada 1796 North America 1796-1807 - Rainsford - Chester 1776-
96, Tynemouth 
1796-1809 
- 
Ross - Fort George - Simcoe Upper Canada 1791-6 San Domingo 
1796-7 
- 
Somerset - Cape of Good Hope 1813-
27 
- Stanhope - Windsor Castle 
1812 
- 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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Table 3.19. Governorships and the highest titles of 1800 generals (continued) 
       
 Lt. Governor Governor Highest title  Lt. Governor Governor Highest title 
Strutt - Stirling Castle 1796, 
Quebec 1800-48 
- Stuart, C. - Minorca 1798-
1801 
KB 1798 
Trigge Portsmouth 1790-4, 
Gibraltar, Chelsea 
Hospital 1804 
- KB 1801 Tarleton - Berwick 1809-
33 
Bt 1816 
Tonyn - E. Florida 1774-85 - Townshend - Hull, Jersey - 
Villettes Jamaica 1807 - - Whitelocke Portsmouth 1799 - - 
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
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Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds 
 
 
1747 generals 
 
 
Anstruther, Philip  
 
Dalton, George, Volume 1, p. 127; Volume 2, pp. 230, 395; Cokayne, The Complete 
Baronetage, Volume IV, p.  366; A.W Anstruther, History of the family of Anstruther 
(London, 1923), pp.  93, 97; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 1, Anstruther, Philip (circa 
1680-1760), pp. 417-418; ODNB, s.v. Anstruther, Sir William, of that ilk, (d. 1711); PCC 
wills, PROB11/865. 
 
Borgard, Albert  
 
ODNB, s.v. Borgard, Albert (1659–1751); PCC wills, PROB11/786. 
 
Bowles, Phineas  
 
http://www.familysearch.org/eng/default.asp; ODNB, s.v. Bowles, Phineas (bap. 1690, d. 
1749); Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 1, Bowles, Phineas (1690-1749), pp. 479-480, 
Bowles, William (1686-1748), p. 480; W.H Bowles, Records of the Bowles Family (London, 
1918), pp. xvi-xvii, 52-57, 62-63, 71-76, 85-89; PCC wills, PROB11/775. 
 
Blakeney, William, 1st Baron  
 
http://www.familysearch.org/eng/default.asp; ODNB, s.v. Blakeney, William (1671/2–1761); 
Memoirs of the life and actions of General William Blakeney (London, 1756), pp. 3-4, 12; 
Chester, The Marriage, Baptismal, and Burial Registers, p. 398; Montgomery-Massingberd, 
Burke's Irish Family Records, pp. 123-124; Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage, Volume II, 
p. 182; PCC wills, PROB11/869. 
 
Bland, Humphrey  
 
ODNB, s.v. Bland, Humphrey (1685/6–1763); Montgomery-Massingberd, Burke's Irish 
Family Records, p. 130; PCC wills, PROB11/887. 
 
Bligh, Thomas  
 
ODNB, s.v. Bligh, Thomas (1685–1775); Montgomery-Massingberd, Burke's Irish Family 
Records, p. 61; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, 107th edition, volume 1, 
p. 1032; Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage, Volume III, p. 311. 
 
Bragg, Philip  
 
ODNB, s.v. Bragg, Philip (d. 1759) ; PCC wills, PROB11/851. 
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Byng, George, 3rd Viscount Torrington 
 
ODNB, s.v. Byng, George (1663-1733), Byng, John (1704-1757); Cokayne et al, The 
Complete Peerage, Volume XII/1, pp. 789-793. 
 
Campbell, Sir James  
 
Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 1, Campbell, Sir James (circa 1665-1752), p. 521, 
Campbell (formerly Livingstone), James (?  1719-1788), p. 522; Cokayne, The Complete 
Baronetage, Volume IV, p. 307. 
 
Cholmondeley, James  
 
http://www.familysearch.org/eng/default.asp; Chester, The Marriage, Baptismal, and Burial 
Registers, p. 419; ODNB, s.v. Cholmondeley, James (1708–1775), Cholmondeley, George 
(c.1666–1733), Cholmondeley, Hugh (1662?–1725); Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 1, 
Cholmondeley, Hon James (1708–1775), p. 551, Cholmondeley, Hon George (1703-1770), p. 
551 Barry, James (1667-1748), pp. 440-442; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, 
Walpole, Robert (1676-1745), pp. 513-517; Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of 
England, Volume III, pp. 201-202; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, 107th 
edition, volume 1, p. 784. 
 
Cope, Sir John  
 
I.F Burton and A.N Newman, “Sir John Cope”, pp. 655-688; ODNB, s.v. Cope, Sir John 
(1690–1760); Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–1790, Volume 2, Cope, James (circa 1709-
1756), p. 252; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 1, Cope, John (1690-1760), p. 576; PCC 
wills, PROB11/858. 
 
Dalrymple, John, 2nd Earl of Stair  
 
ODNB, s.v. Dalrymple, John (1673-1747), Dalrymple, James (1619-1695), Dalrymple 
Eleanor (d.  1759), Dalrymple, John (1648-1707), Dalrymple, Sir James, of Borthwick (1650-
1719), Dalrymple, Sir David (circa 1665-1721); Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 1, 
Dalrymple, Hon Sir David (circa 1665-1721), pp. 600-601, Dalrymple, Hon William (1678-
1744), p. 602; PCC wills, PROB11/756. 
 
Dalzell, Robert 
 
ODNB, s.v. Dalzell, Robert (1661/2-1758). 
 
Fowke, Thomas 
 
http://genealogy.links.org/fowke; E. Lodge, The genealogy of the existing British peerage 
and baronetage, containing the family histories of the nobility. With the arms of the peers., 
(London, 1859); ODNB, s.v. Sansom [née Fowke], Martha (1689–1736). 
 
Gooch, Sir William 
 
ODNB, s.v. Gooch, William (1681-1751), Gooch, Thomas (1675-1754); Mosley, Burke's 
Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 2, pp. 1578-1579. 
373 
 
Guise, John  
 
ODNB, s.v. Guise, John (1682/3–1765), Guise, William (bap. 1652, d. 1683); J. Maclean, 
‘Elmore and the family of Guise’, Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire 
Archaeological Society, 3 (1878–9), pp. 72-73. 
 
Handasyd, Roger 
 
Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Handasyd, Roger (1684-1763); Dalton, George, 
Volume 1, pp. 162-163. 
 
Hargrave, William  
 
Chester, The Marriage, Baptismal, and Burial Registers, p. 380; PCC wills, PROB11/787. 
 
Hawley, Henry  
 
ODNB, s.v. Hawley, Henry (bap. 1685, d. 1759) ; PCC wills, PROB11/844. 
 
Honywood, Sir Philip  
 
ODNB, s.v. Honywood, Sir Philip (c.1677–1752); Parker, “General Sir Philip Honywood, 
KB”, pp. 39-40; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Honywood, Robert (1676-1735), p 
147; PCC wills, PROB11/796. 
 
Howard, Sir Charles  
 
ODNB, s.v. Howard, Sir Charles (circa 1696-1765), Howard, Charles (1669-1738), Howard, 
Henry (1694-1758); Henning, HOP, 1660-1690, Volume 2, Howard, Charles (circa 1669-
1738), p. 591, Howard, Edward (1646-1692), pp. 591-592; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, 
Volume 2, Howard, Hon Charles (circa 1696-1765), pp. 152-153, Howard, Henry (?1693-
1758), p. 153; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, 107th edition, volume 1, 
p. 686; PCC wills, PROB11/911-298. 
 
Howard, Thomas 
 
Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 1277; L. G. 
Pine, The New Extinct Peerage 1884-1971: Containing Extinct, Abeyant, Dormant and 
Suspended Peerages With Genealogies and Arms (London, 1972), p. 94; PCC wills, 
PROB11/801. 
 
Huske, John  
 
ODNB, s.v. Huske, John (1692?-1761), Huske, Ellis (1700-1755) ; PCC wills, PROB11/862. 
 
Irwin, Alexander  
 
Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–1790, Volume 2, Irwin, John (circa 1728-1788), pp. 667-
668; PCC wills, PROB11/796. 
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Keppel, William Ann, 2nd Earl of Albemarle  
 
http://genealogy.links.org/; ODNB, s.v. Keppel, William Anne (1702–1754), Keppel, Arnold 
Joost van (1669/70–1718), Keppel, George (1724–1772), Keppel, Augustus (1725–1786), 
Keppel, Frederick (1729–1777), Lennox, Charles (1701-1750), Adair, Sir Robert (1763–
1855); Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Keppel, George (1724-1772), p. 187; Namier 
and Brooke, HOP, 1754–1790, Volume 3, Keppel, Augustus (1725-1786), pp. 7-11 Keppel, 
George (1724-1772), p. 11 Keppel, Hon William (1727-1782), p. 11; G. T. Keppel, Fifty 
years of my life, Volume 1, second edition, (London, 1876); Cokayne et al, The Complete 
Peerage of England, Volume I, pp. 94-95. 
 
Kerr, Lord Mark 
 
ODNB, s.v. Kerr, Mark (1676-1752), Kerr, Robert (1636-1703), Kerr, William (1605-1675); 
Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 2, p. 2401. 
 
Lennox, Charles, 2nd Duke of Richmond 
 
ODNB, s.v. Lennox, Charles (1701-1750), Lennox, Charles (1672-1723), Charles II (1630-
1685); Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of England, Volume X, pp. 836-839; Mosley, 
Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 636, 3, p. 3335; 
Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Lennox, Charles (1701-1750). 
 
Leslie, John, 10th Earl of Rothes  
 
ODNB, s.v. Leslie, John (1698?-1767), Leslie, John (1679-1722), Hay, John (1645-1713), 
Langton, Bennet (bap. 1736, d. 1801); Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Leslie, Hon 
Thomas (circa 1701-1772), p. 210. 
 
Ligonier, John, 1st Earl  
 
http://www.familysearch.org/eng/default.asp; ODNB, s.v. Ligonier, John (1680-1770), 
Ligonier, Edward (1740?-1782); Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Ligonier, John 
Louis (1680-1770), p. 218; PCC wills, PROB11/957. 
 
Lindsay, John, 20th Earl of Crawford 
 
ODNB, s.v. Lindsay, John (1702-1749), Murray, James, (1690-1764); Cokayne et al, The 
Complete Peerage of England, Volume I, pp. 318-322,  III, pp. 521-522; Mosley, Burke's 
Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 3, p. 3384, (106th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 
134. 
 
Molesworth, Richard, 3rd Viscount 
 
ODNB, s.v. Molesworth, Richard (1680-1758), Molesworth, Robert (1656-1725), 
Molesworth, John (1679-1726); Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of England, Volume 
IX, p. 31, X, p. 576; Montgomery-Massingberd, Burke's Irish Family Records, p. 1158. 
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Montagu, John, 2nd Duke of Montagu  
 
ODNB, s.v. Montagu, John (1690-1749), Montagu, Ralph (bap. 1638, d. 1709), Montagu, 
Edward (1562/3-1644), Cavendish, Henry (1630-1691), Churchill, John (1650-1722); 
Henning, HOP, 1660-1690, Volume 2, Montagu, Hon Edward (circa1636-1665), pp. 84-85, 
Montague, Hon Ralph (1638-1709), pp. 86-89; PCC wills, PROB11/772. 
 
Mordaunt, Sir John 
 
http://www.familysearch.org/eng/default.asp; ODNB, s.v. Mordaunt, John (1696/7-1780); 
Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Mordaunt, Hon Harry (?  1663-1720), p. 272, 
Mordaunt, John (1697-1780), pp. 272-273. 
 
Murray, John, 2nd Earl of Dunmore  
 
ODNB, s.v. Murray, John (1685–1752), Murray, John (1631–1703), Murray, Charles (1661–
1710) 
Murray, Catherine (1814-1886), Stanley, James (1607–1651); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, 
Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 1232, volume 2, p. 2997, (106th Ed.), 
volume 1, pp. 134, 1284; Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of England, Volume I, pp. 
315-317, volume VI, p. 270, volume IX, p. 445, volume XII/2, pp. 69-70; PCC wills, 
PROB11/794. 
 
O’Farrell, Richard 
 
Dalton, George, Volume 1. 
 
Oglethorpe, James  
 
http://www.familysearch.org/eng/default.asp; ODNB, s.v. Oglethorpe, James Edward (1696-
1785), Oglethorpe, Sir Theophilus (1650-1702); Henning, HOP, 1660-1690, Volume 2, 
Oglethorpe, Theophilus (1650-1702), pp. 170-171; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, 
Oglethorpe, James Edward (1696-1785), pp. 305-306; PCC wills, PROB11/1132. 
 
O'Hara, James, 2nd Baron Tyrawley  
 
ODNB, s.v. O’Hara, James (1681/2-1773), O’Hara, Charles (d. 1724), O’Hara, Charles (circa 
1740-1802) ; PCC wills, PROB11/990. 
 
Phillips, Richard  
 
Chester, The Marriage, Baptismal, and Burial Registers, p. 379; ODNB, s.v. Cosby, William 
(circa 1619-1736); PCC wills, PROB11/791. 
 
 
Ponsonby, Henry 
 
http://genealogy.links.org/; Dalton, George, Volume 1, pp. 164-165; Ponsonby, The Ponsonby 
family, Tables B, F, pp. 15-18, 27, 37-40, 45-46; ODNB, s.v. Ponsonby, Henry (d. 1745). 
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Preston, George 
 
ODNB, s.v. Preston, George (1659? -1748). 
 
Rich, Sir Robert  
 
ODNB, s.v. Rich, Sir Robert (1685-1768), Rich, Sir Robert (1717-1785); Henning, HOP, 
1660-1690, Volume 3, Rich, Sir Robert (circa 1648-1699), pp. 328-329; Sedgwick, HOP, 
1715–1754, Volume 2, Rich, Sir Robert (1685-1768), p. 382; PCC wills, PROB11/936. 
 
Spencer, Charles, 3rd Duke of Marlborough 
 
ODNB, s.v. Spencer, Charles (1706-1758), Spencer, Charles (1675-1722), Spencer, Robert 
(1641-1702), Churchill, John (1650-1722); Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of England, 
Volume XII/1, pp. 153, 489, VIII, pp. 499-500; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & 
Knightage, (106th Ed.), Volume 2, pp. 1867-1868; J. Pearson, Blood Royal: The Story of the 
Spencers and the Royals (London, 1999). 
St Clair, James  
 
ODNB, s.v. Sinclair, James (1687/8-1762), Sinclair, John (bap. 1683, d. 1750); Mosley, 
Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 643; Sedgwick, HOP, 
1715–1754, Volume 2, St Clair, Hon James (1688-1762), pp. 402-403. 
 
Temple, Richard, 1st Viscount Cobham 
 
ODNB, s.v. Temple, Richard (1675-1749), Temple, Sir Richard (1634-1697), Temple, Sir 
Peter (1592-1653); Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of England, Volume III, pp. 339, 
341;  Pine, The New Extinct Peerage, p. 43; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & 
Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 838. 
 
Wade, George  
 
http://www.familysearch.org/eng/default.asp; ODNB, s.v. Wade, George (1673-1748); 
Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Wade, George (1673-1748), pp. 501-502; Chester, 
The Marriage, Baptismal, and Burial Registers, p. 374; PCC wills, PROB11/761. 
 
Wentworth, Thomas 
 
Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Wentworth, Thomas (1693-1747). 
 
 
 
 
West, John, 1st Earl de la Warr 
 
ODNB, s.v. West, John (1693-1766), Maccarthy, Donough (1668-1734); Cokayne et al, The 
Complete Peerage of England, Volume I, p. 39, IV, p. 162; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, 
Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 1075; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, 
Volume 2, West, John (1693-1766). 
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William, Prince, 1st Duke of Cumberland 
 
ODNB, s.v. William Augustus, Prince (1721-1765), George II (1683-1760), George I (1660-
1727); Weir, Britain's Royal Family, pp. 277-85; Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of 
England, Volume II, p. 497. 
 
Wolfe, Edward  
 
http://genealogy.links.org/; http://www.familysearch.org/eng/default.asp; Dalton, George, 
Volume 1, p. 168; ODNB, s.v. Wolfe, James (1727-1759); Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography, volume 3:1741-1770, (Toronto, 1985), Wolfe, James, pp. 666-673; A.R Wagner, 
“The Genealogy of James Wolfe”, Wolfe: portraiture and genealogy, (Glasgow, 1959), pp. 
45-56; PCC wills, PROB11/846. 
 
Wynyard, John 
 
Dalton, George, Volume 2, p. 181; Chester, The Marriage, Baptismal, and Burial Registers, 
p. 383; ODNB, s.v. West, John (1729-1777), West, John(1693-1766). 
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Abercromby, Sir Ralph  
 
http://genealogy.links.org/; ODNB, s.v. Abercromby, Sir Ralph, of Tullibody (1734-1801), 
Abercromby, Sir Robert (1740?-1827), Abercromby, Alexander (1745-1795), Abercromby, 
Sir John (1772-1817), Abercromby, James (1776-1858); Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–
1790, Volume 2, Abercromby, Burnet (?1738-1792), p. 2, Abercromby, James (1707-1775), 
pp. 2-3, Abercromby, Ralph (1734-1801), pp. 3-4; Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 3, 
Abercromby, Hon Alexander (1784-1853), p. 10 Abercromby, Hon George (1770-1843), pp. 
10-11 Abercromby, Hon James (1776-1858), pp. 11-15 Abercromby, Sir John (1772-1817), 
p. 15 Abercromby, Sir Robert (1740-1827), p. 17; Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage, 
Volume I, pp. 12-13; Pine, The New Extinct Peerage, p. 1; The Records of the Honourable 
Society of Lincoln’s Inn, Volume 1: Admissions from AD 1422 to AD 1799 (London, 1896), p. 
395; PCC wills, PROB11/1358. 
 
Abercromby, Sir Robert 
 
http://genealogy.links.org/; ODNB, s.v. Abercromby, Sir Ralph, of Tullibody (1734-1801), 
Abercromby, Sir Robert (1740?-1827), Abercromby, Alexander (1745-1795), Abercromby, 
Sir John (1772-1817), Abercromby, James (1776-1858); Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–
1790, Volume 2, Abercromby, Burnet (?1738-1792), p. 2, Abercromby, James (1707-1775), 
pp. 2-3, Abercromby, Ralph (1734-1801), pp. 3-4; Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 3, 
Abercromby, Hon Alexander (1784-1853), p. 10 Abercromby, Hon George (1770-1843), pp. 
10-11 Abercromby, Hon James (1776-1858), pp. 11-15 Abercromby, Sir John (1772-1817), 
p. 15 Abercromby, Sir Robert (1740-1827), p. 17; Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage, 
Volume I, pp. 12-13; Pine, The New Extinct Peerage, p. 1; The Records of the Honourable 
Society of Lincoln’s Inn, Volume 1: Admissions from AD 1422 to AD 1799 (London, 1896), p. 
395; PCC wills, PROB11/1358. 
 
Asgill, Sir Charles 
 
ODNB, s.v. Asgill, Charles (1762-1823), Ogle, Charles (1775-1858); Cokayne, The 
Complete Baronetage, Volume V, pp. 120-121. 
 
Baird, Sir David 
 
http://genealogy.links.org/; ODNB, s.v. Baird, Sir David (1757-1829); Haley, Our Davy, p. 
11; Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 3, Baird, Robert (circa 1745-1828), pp. 112-113; W. 
H Wilkin, The life of Sir David Baird (London, 1913), p. 1; T. E. Hook, Life of General, the 
Right Honourable Sir David Baird, bart., volume 1, (London, 1832). 
 
Balfour, Nesbett 
 
Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 3, Balfour, Nesbett (1743-1823). 
 
Barclay, John  
 
ODNB, s.v. Barclay, John (1741-1823) ; PCC wills, PROB11/1678. 
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Beckwith, Sir George 
 
ODNB, s.v. Beckwith, George (1752/3-1823), Beckwith, Thomas (1772-1831). 
 
Borthwick, William 
 
ODNB, s.v. Borthwick, William (1760-1820). 
 
Bowyer, Henry 
 
Australian Dictionary of Biography Online Edition, 
http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/adbonline.htm, Atkins, Richard (1745-1820); Cokayne, The 
Complete Baronetage, volume III, p. 59; ODNB, s.v. Bowyer, Sir George (1740-1800), 
Atkins [formerly Bowyer], Richard (1745–1820); Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–1790, 
Volume 2, Bowyer, George (1739-1799), p. 109, Brett, Sir Piercy (circa 1710-1781), p. 115; 
PCC wills, PROB11/1485. 
 
Burrard, Sir Harry 
 
ODNB, s.v. Burrard, Harry (1755-1813); Cokayne, The Complete Baronetage, Volume V, p. 
148. 
 
Campbell, Alexander 
 
Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 3, Campbell, Alexander (1750-1832). 
 
Campbell, John, 5th Duke of Argyll 
 
Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–1790, Volume 2, Campbell, John (1723-1806); Cokayne et 
al, The Complete Peerage, volume I, pp. 209-212, VI, p. 280. 
 
Carleton, Guy, 1st Baron Dorchester 
 
ODNB, s.v. Carleton, Thomas (circa 1735-1817), Carleton, Guy(1724-1808); Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography, volume 5:1801-1820, (Toronto, 1987), Carleton, Thomas, pp. 155-163, 
Carleton, Guy, first Baron Dorchester, pp. 141-155; L.R Carleton, The Carleton Collection, 
(Leamington Spa, 1990), pp. 135-138; Pine, The New Extinct Peerage, p. 105; PCC wills, 
PROB11/1590. 
 
Carleton, Thomas  
 
ODNB, s.v. Carleton, Thomas (circa 1735-1817), Carleton, Guy(1724-1808); Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography, volume 5:1801-1820, (Toronto, 1987), Carleton, Thomas, pp. 155-163, 
Carleton, Guy, first Baron Dorchester, pp. 141-155; L.R Carleton, The Carleton Collection, 
(Leamington Spa, 1990), pp. 135-138; Pine, The New Extinct Peerage, p. 105; PCC wills, 
PROB11/1590. 
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Cathcart, William Schaw, 1st Earl Cathcart  
 
http://genealogy.links.org/; ODNB, s.v. Cathcart, William Schaw(1755-1843), Cathcart, 
Charles Schaw(1721-1776), Cathcart, Sir George (1794-1854); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, 
Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 718, (106th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 1284; 
Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage, volume III, p. 109; Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–
1790, Volume 2, Cathcart, Hon Charles Allan (1759-1788), p. 198; Austen-Leigh, The Eton 
College Register, p. 97; Dictionary of Canadian Biography, volume 8:1851-1860, (Toronto, 
1985), Cathcart, Charles Murray, second Earl Cathcart, pp. 134-136; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–
1754, Volume 2, Hamilton, Lord Archibald (1673-1754), pp. 98-99; PCC wills, 
PROB11/1982. 
 
Cavendish, Lord Frederick 
 
ODNB, s.v. Cavendish, Frederick (1729-1803), Cavendish, William (1720-1764), Cavendish, 
John (1732-1796); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 
1, p. 1128; Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage, volume II, p. 171; Pine, The New Extinct 
Peerage, p. 211. 
 
Christie Burton, Napier 
 
Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 3, Christie Burton, Napier (1758-1835). 
 
Clarke, Sir Alured  
 
ODNB, s.v. Clarke, Sir Alured(1744-1832), Clarke, Charles (circa 1702-1750), Clarke, 
Alured (1696-1742); Dictionary of Canadian Biography, volume 6:1821-1835, (Toronto, 
1987), Clarke, Sir Alured, pp. 150-151; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 1, Clarke, 
Charles (circa 1702-1750), p. 554; Austen-Leigh, The Eton College Register, p. 107; PCC 
wills, PROB11/1806. 
 
Coates, James  
 
PCC wills, PROB11/1661. 
 
Cornwallis, Charles, 1st Marquess Cornwallis  
 
ODNB, s.v. Cornwallis, Charles (1738-1805), Cornwallis, James (1743-1824), Cornwallis, 
Sir William (1744–1819), Cornwallis, Frederick (1713-1783), Townshend, Charles(1674-
1738); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, pp. 903-
904; Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–1790, Volume 2, Cornwallis, Hon Edward (1713-
1776), pp. 256-257, Cornwallis, Hon Henry (1740-1761), p. 257, Cornwallis, Hon William 
(1744-1819), pp. 257-258; Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 3, Cornwallis, Charles (1774-
1823), pp. 502-503; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 1, Cornwallis, Hon James (1701-
1727), p. 582 Cornwallis, Hon John (1706-1768), p. 582 Cornwallis, Hon Stephen (1703-
1743), pp. 582-583; Austen-Leigh, The Eton College Register, pp. 127-130; Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography, volume 4:1771-1800, (Toronto, 1979), Cornwallis, Edward, pp. 168-
171; PCC wills, PROB11/1442. 
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Coote, Eyre 
 
ODNB, s.v. Coote, Eyre (1759-1823), Coote, Sir Eyre (1726-1783). 
 
Cradock, John, 1st Baron Howden 
 
ODNB, s.v. Cradock, John (1762-1839), Cradock, John (1707/8-1778); Cokayne et al, The 
Complete Peerage, volume VI, pp. 594-595; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & 
Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 796. 
 
Craig, Sir James Henry  
 
ODNB, s.v. Craig, Sir James Henry (1748-1812); Dictionary of Canadian Biography, volume 
5, Craig, Sir James Henry, pp. 205-215. 
 
Cuninghame, Robert, 1st Baron Rossmore 
 
Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–1790, Volume 2, Cuninghame, Robert (1728-1801); Mosley, 
Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 3, p. 3408; Montgomery-
Massingberd, Burke's Irish Family Records, p. 309. 
 
Cuyler, Sir Cornelius 
 
Nicoll, The Earliest Cuylers, pp. 15-16, 24-25, 31, 38-39. 
 
Dalrymple, Sir Hew Whitefoord  
 
http://genealogy.links.org/; ODNB, s.v. Dalrymple, Sir Hew Whitefoord (1750-1830), 
Oughton, Sir (James) Adolphus Dickenson (bap.  1719, d. 1780), Dalrymple, Sir Adolphus 
John (1784-1866), Dalrymple, Sir Hew (1652-1737); Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 3, 
Dalrymple, Adolphus John (1784-1866), p. 560; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & 
Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 2, p. 1752; PCC wills, PROB11/1771. 
 
Dalrymple, William 
 
Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–1790, Volume 2, Dalrymple, William (1736-1807). 
 
de Lancy, Oliver 
 
ODNB, s.v. de Lancey, Oliver (circa 1749-1822), de Lancey, Oliver(1803-1837), de Lancey,  
James (1703-1760); “The Story of the Hugenot de Lanceys”, The New York Times, April 30, 
1889; R.A Austen-Leigh (ed.), The Eton College Register 1753-1790, (Eton, 1921), p. 155; 
L. S. Lanitz-Schürer, ‘Whig-loyalists: the de Lanceys of New York’, New York Historical 
Society Quarterly, 56 (1972), pp. 179–98; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Warren, 
Sir Peter (circa 1703-1752), pp. 522-523; Austen-Leigh, The Eton College Register, p. 155; 
Dictionary of Canadian Biography, volume 5, de Lancey, James, pp. 238-239. 
 
Despard, John 
 
ODNB, s.v. Despard, John (1743/4-1829), Despard, Edward (1751-1803). 
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Don, Sir George 
 
ODNB, s.v. Don, George (1756-1832). 
 
D’Oyly, Sir Francis 
 
ODNB, s.v. D’Oyly, Francis (d. 1815). 
 
Drummond, Andrew John 
 
ODNB, s.v. Drummond, William (1690-1746), Drummond, Henry (c.1730–1795), Dundas, 
Henry, (1742–1811); J. Taylor, The Great Historic Families of Scotland, Volume 2, (London, 
1887), pp. 102-103; Namier and Brooke, HOP, 1754–1790, Volume 2, Drummond, Hon 
Henry (1730-1795), pp. 342-343; PCC wills, PROB11/1592. 
 
Dundas, Sir David  
 
ODNB, s.v. Dundas, Sir David (1735?-1820); PCC wills, PROB11/1626. 
 
Dundas, Francis 
 
ODNB, s.v. Dundas, Francis (1759?-1824), Dundas, Robert (1713-1787), Dundas, Robert 
(1685-1753). 
 
Duff, Sir James 
 
ODNB, s.v. Duff, James (1753-1839), Duff, James (1729-1809). 
 
Edward, Prince, 1st Duke of Kent 
 
ODNB, s.v. Edward, Prince (1767-1820), George III  (1738-1820), Frederick Lewis, Prince 
(1707-1751); Weir, Britain's Royal Family, pp. 277-299. 
 
Fanning, Edmund 
 
ODNB, s.v. Fanning, Edmund (1737-1818). 
 
Farrington, Sir Anthony 
 
ODNB, s.v. Farrington, Anthony (1742-1823); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & 
Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 1400. 
 
Fawcett, Sir William  
 
ODNB, s.v. Fawcett (Faucitt), Sir William (1727-1804); J. Lister, “Life and Letters of 
General William Fawcett, KCB”, Papers, Reports, & C., read before Halifax Antiquarian 
Society, (Halifax, 1910), pp. 61-78; PCC wills, PROB11/1406. 
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FitzRoy, Lord Charles  
 
ODNB, s.v. Fitzroy, Lord Charles (1764-1829), Fitzroy, Augustus Henry (1735-1811), 
Fitzroy, Charles (1683-1757), Fitzroy, Sir Charles Augustus (1796-1858), Fitzroy, Robert 
(1805-1865); Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 2, Fitzroy, Augustus Henry 
(1735-1811), p. 435, Fitzroy, Hon Charles (1737-1797), p. 435, Fitzroy, Lord Charles (1764-
1829), pp. 435-436, Fitzroy, George Henry (1760-1844), p. 436, Volume 3, Mundy, Edward 
Miller (1750-1822), pp. 179-180; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th 
Ed.), Volume 2, p. 1617; Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 3, Fitzroy, Lord John Edward 
(1785-1856), p. 768, Fitzroy, Lord William (1782-1857), pp. 768-769; W. H. Oliver, (ed.), 
The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography: Volume One, 1769 - 1869 (Wellington, 1990), 
Fitzroy, Robert (1805-1865), pp. 130-132; Dictionary of Canadian Biography, volume 6, 
Fitzroy, Sir Charles Augustus (1796-1858), pp. 295-297; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, 
Volume 2, Fitzroy, Lord Augustus (1716-1741), p. 37; PCC wills, PROB11/1764. 
 
Floyd, Sir John 
 
ODNB, s.v. Floyd, John (1748-1818); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, 
(107th Ed.), Volume 1, pp. 1445-1446. 
 
Fox, Henry, Edward 
 
http://genealogy.links.org/; ODNB, s.v. Fox, Henry Edward (1755-1811), Fox, Henry (1705-
1774), Fox, Charles James (1749-1806), Fox, Henry Stephen (1791-1846), Fox, Sir Stephen 
(1627–1716); Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Fox, Henry (1705-1774), pp. 48-49 
Fox, Stephen (1704-1776), pp. 49-50, Horner, Thomas (1688-1741), p. 150; Namier and 
Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 2, Fox, Hon Charles James (1749-1886), pp. 455-461, 
Fox, Henry (1705-1774), pp. 461-466, Fox, Hon Stephen (1745-1774), p. 466, Fitzpatrick, 
John (?  1719-1758), p. 431; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), 
Volume 2, p. 2025; Henning, HOP, 1660-1690, Volume 2, Fox, Stephen (1627-1716), pp. 
356-359; Austen-Leigh, The Eton College Register, p. 206; PCC wills, PROB11/1525. 
 
Fraser, Simon 
 
ODNB, s.v. Fraser, Simon (1737/8-1813). 
 
Frederick, Prince, 1st Duke of York 
 
ODNB, s.v. Frederick, Prince (1763-1827), George III  (1738-1820), Frederick Lewis, Prince 
(1707-1751); Weir, Britain's Royal Family, pp. 277-299. 
 
 
Gardiner, William 
 
ODNB, s.v. Gardiner, William (1748-1806), Gardiner, Luke (1745-1798). 
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Garth, George  
 
http://genealogy.links.org/; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Garth, John (1701-1764), 
p. 59; Namier, “Charles Garth and His Connexions”, pp. 443-470; Namier and Brooke, HOP 
1754–1790, Volume 2, Garth, Charles (circa 1734-1784), pp. 483-485, Garth, John (1701-
1764), p. 485 ; PCC wills, PROB11/1624. 
 
Gordon, Lord Adam 
 
ODNB, s.v. Gordon, Adam (1726-1801), Gordon, Alexander (1678-1728), Gordon, George 
(1649-1716); Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage, volume I, p. 319; Mosley, Burke's 
Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 2, p. 2012. 
 
Grant, James  
 
ODNB, s.v. Grant, James, of Ballindalloch (1720-1806); Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–
1790, Volume 2, Grant, James (1720-1806), pp. 529-531; PCC wills, PROB11/1444. 
 
Green, Sir William 
 
ODNB, s.v. Green, William (1725-1811); Montgomery-Massingberd, Burke's Irish Family 
Records, p. 226. 
 
Grenville, Richard  
 
Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 2, Grenville, Richard (1742-1823), p. 547 
Grenville, James (1715-1783), pp. 546-547, Grenville, James (1742-1825), pp. 546-547, 
Grenville, George (1712-1770), pp. 537-544, Grenville, Henry (1717-1784), pp. 545-546; 
Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Grenville, Richard (1711-1779), pp. 84-85, 
Grenville, Thomas (1719-1747), p. 85, Grenville, Richard (1678-1727), p. 84; Pine, The New 
Extinct Peerage, p. 43; Austen-Leigh, The Eton College Register, p. 229; PCC wills, 
PROB11/1670. 
 
Grey, Charles, 1st Earl  
 
ODNB, s.v. Grey, Charles (1729-1807); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, 
(107th Ed.), Volume 2, p. 1661; Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage, volume VI, pp. 119-
120. 
 
Harcourt, William, 3rd Earl   
 
ODNB, s.v. Harcourt, William (1743-1830), Harcourt, Simon (1714-1777), Harcourt, Simon 
(bap. 1684, d. 1720); Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 2, Harcourt, George 
Simon (1736-1809), p. 580, Harcourt, Hon William (1743-1830), p. 581; PCC wills, 
PROB11/1773. 
 
Harris, George, 1st Baron  
 
http://genealogy.links.org/; ODNB, s.v. Harris, George (1746-1829), Harris, William George 
(1782-1845), Harris, George Francis Robert (1810-1872) ; PCC wills, PROB11/1757. 
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Hastings, Francis, 1st Marquess Moira 
 
ODNB, s.v. Hastings, Francis (1754-1826); Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage, volume II, 
p. 244; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 2, pp. 2407-
2409. 
 
Herbert, George Augustus, 11th Earl of Pembroke  
 
http://genealogy.links.org/; ODNB, s.v. Herbert, George Augustus (1759-1827), Herbert, 
Henry (1734-1794), Herbert, Henry (circa 1689-1750), Herbert, Sydney (1810-1861), 
Herbert, George Robert Charles (1850-1895); Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 
2, Herbert, George Augustus (1759-1827), pp. 610-612; PCC wills, PROB11/1733. 
 
Hely Hutchinson, John, 2nd Earl of Donoughmore 
 
ODNB, s.v. Hutchinson, John Hely- (1757-1832), Hutchinson, John Hely- (1724-1794), 
Hutchinson, Richard Hely-(1756-1826); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, 
(107th Ed.), Volume 1, pp. 1162-1163; Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 4, Hely 
Hutchinson, John (1757-1832). 
 
Hewett, Sir George 
 
ODNB, s.v. Hewett, George (1750-1840); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & 
Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 2, p. 1896. 
 
Howe, William, 5th Viscount  
 
ODNB, s.v. Howe, William (1729-1814), Howe, George Augustus (1724?-1758), Howe, 
Richard (1726-1799), Manners, John (1721–1770), Conolly, Thomas (1738-1803); 
Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Howe, Emanuel Scrope (circa 1699-1735), p. 154, 
Howe, George Augustus (?1724-1758), pp. 154-155; Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, 
Volume 2, Howe, Richard (1726-1799), pp. 647-648, Howe, George Augustus (1724-1758), 
p. 647 Howe, Hon Thomas (circa 1728-1771), p. 649 Howe, Hon William (1729-1814), pp. 
649-650; Henning, HOP, 1660-1690, Volume 2, Howe, Sir Scrope (1648-1713), pp. 611-612; 
G.N.B Huskinson, ‘The Howe family and Langar Hall, 1650–1800’, Transactions of the 
Thoroton Society, 56 (1952), pp. 54–59; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, 
(107th Ed.), Volume 2, p. 1986; PCC wills, PROB11/1558. 
 
Hulse, Sir Samuel 
 
ODNB, s.v. Hulse, Samuel (1747/8-1837). 
 
Hunter, Peter 
 
OCDB, s.v. Hunter, Peter (1746-1805). 
 
Irving, Sir Paulus 
 
ODNB, s.v. Irving, Paulus (1749-1828); Pine, The New Extinct Peerage, p. 152. 
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Johnson, Sir Henry 
 
ODNB, s.v. Johnson, Henry (1748-1835); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & 
Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 3, p. 3136. 
 
Lake, Gerald, 1st Viscount 
 
ODNB, s.v. Lake, Gerald (1744-1808); Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of England, 
Volume VII, pp. 366-368; Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 4, Lake, Gerald (1744-1808). 
 
Lambart, Richard, 7th Earl of Cavan 
 
ODNB, s.v. Lambart, Richard (1763-1837), Gould, Henry (1710-1794); Cokayne et al, The 
Complete Peerage of England, Volume III, pp. 119-120; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, 
Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 721.  
 
Leland, John  
 
Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 4, Leland, John (d. 1808). 
 
Lennox, Charles, 3rd Duke of Richmond 
 
ODNB, s.v Lennox, Charles (1735-1806), Lennox, George (1737-1805), Lennox, Charles 
(1701-1750), Lennox, Charles (1672-1723); Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of 
England, Volume X, pp. 836-839; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th 
Ed.), Volume 1, p. 636, 3, p. 3335; Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 4, Lennox, Charles 
(1735-1806); Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 3, Lennox, George (1737-1805). 
 
Lennox, Lord George 
 
ODNB, s.v Lennox, Charles (1735-1806), Lennox, George (1737-1805), Lennox, Charles 
(1701-1750), Lennox, Charles (1672-1723); Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of 
England, Volume X, pp. 836-839; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th 
Ed.), Volume 1, p. 636, 3, p. 3335; Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 4, Lennox, Charles 
(1735-1806); Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 3, Lennox, George (1737-1805). 
 
Lindsay, Alexander, 6th Earl of Balcarres  
 
ODNB, s.v. Lindsay, Alexander (1752-1825), Lindsay, Colin (1652-1721); Cokayne et al, 
The Complete Peerage of England, Volume I, pp. 377-379, Volume III, pp. 523-525; A.W.C. 
Lindsay, Lives of the Lindsays; a memoir of the houses of Crawford and Balcarres, Volumes 
1-2, (London, 1858); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), 
Volume 1, pp. 952-955, (106th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 10, Volume 2, p. 112; PCC wills, 
PROB11/1699. 
 
Loftus, William  
 
http://www.loftusweb.com/tree.htm; PCC wills, PROB11/1789. 
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Ludlow, George James, 3rd Earl   
 
ODNB, s.v.Ludlow, George James (1758-1842); Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, 
Volume 3, Ludlow, Peter (1730-1803), p. 62; PCC wills, PROB11/1962. 
 
 
Luttrell, Henry, 2nd Earl of Carhampton 
 
ODNB, s.v. Luttrell, Henry (1737-1821) ; Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 4, Luttrell, 
Henry (1737-1821); Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of England, Volume III, pp. 23-24. 
 
MacLeod, Norman 
 
ODNB, s.v. MacLeod, Norman (1754-1801). 
 
Manners, Robert 
 
Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 3, Manners, Robert (1758-1823). 
 
Medows, Sir William  
 
ODNB, s.v. Medows, Sir William (1738–1813); Pine, The New Extinct Peerage, pp. 189-
190; Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of England, Volume VIII, p. 394; Austen-Leigh, 
The Eton College Register, p. 362; PCC wills, PROB11/1550. 
 
Melville, Robert 
 
ODNB, s.v. Melville, Robert (1723-1809), Melville, Thomas (1726-1753). 
 
Mercer, Alexander  
 
PCC wills, PROB11/1588. 
 
Moore, Sir John  
 
ODNB, s.v. Moore, Sir John (1761-1809), Moore, John (1729-1802), Moore, James (1762-
1860), Moore,Sir Graham (1764-1843), Simson, John (1667-1740); Heath, Records of the 
Moore Family;  Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 3, Moore, John  (1761-1809), 
p. 161; PCC wills, PROB11/1493. 
 
Morris, Staates Long 
 
ODNB, s.v. Morris, Staates Long (1728-1800), Morris, Lewis (1671-1746), Gordon, 
Katharine (1718-1779); Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 3, Morris, Staates 
Long (1728-1800). 
 
Morse, Robert 
 
ODNB, s.v. Morse, Robert (1741/2-1818). 
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Munro, Sir Hector 
 
ODNB, s.v. Munro, Hector (1725/6-1805/6); Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 
3, Munro, Hector (1725/6-1805/6). 
 
Musgrave, Sir Thomas  
 
ODNB, s.v. Musgrave, Sir Thomas (1738-1812), Musgrave, Sir William (1735-1800); PCC 
wills, PROB11/1540. 
 
Needham, Francis, 1st Earl of Kilmorey 
 
ODNB, s.v. Needham, Francis (1748-1832) ; Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 4, Needham, 
Francis (1748-1832); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), 
Volume 2, p. 2159. 
 
Nugent, Sir George  
 
ODNB, s.v. Nugent, Sir George (1757-1849), Skinner, Cortlandt (1727-1799); Sedgwick, 
HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 1, Drax, Henry (?1693-1755), pp. 621-622, Volume 2, Nugent, 
Robert (1709-1788), pp. 302-303; Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 3, Nugent, 
Edmund (1731-1771), p. 218; Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 4, Nugent, George (1757-
1849), pp. 679-680; PCC wills, PROB11/2093. 
 
Percy, Hugh, 2nd Duke of Northumberland 
 
ODNB, s.v. Percy, Hugh (1742-1817), Percy, Hugh (1712-1786); Namier and Brooke, HOP 
1754–1790, Volume 3, Percy, Hugh (1742-1817); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & 
Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 608; Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of England, 
Volume II, pp. 174-175. 
 
Phipps, Henry, 1st Earl Mulgrave 
 
ODNB, s.v. Phipps, Henry (1755-1831), Phipps, Constantine (1744-1792); Namier and 
Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 3, Phipps, Henry (1755-1831); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, 
Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 633. 
 
Pigot, Sir Henry 
 
ODNB, s.v. Pigot, Henry (1750-1840), Pigot, Hugh (1722-1792). 
 
Pitt, John, 2nd Earl of Chatham 
 
ODNB, s.v. Pitt, John (1756-1835), Pitt, William (1759-1806), Pitt, William (1708-1778), 
Pitt, Thomas (1653-1726); Cokayne et al, The Complete Peerage of England, Volume III, pp. 
143-147. 
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Pitt, Sir William Augustus  
 
ODNB, s.v. Pitt, Sir William Augustus (circa 1728-1809), Pitt, George (1721-1803); 
Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Pitt, George (?1663-1735), pp. 348-349, Pitt, George 
(aft. 1691-1745), p. 349; T. Lever, The house of Pitt: a family chronicle (London, 1947) ; 
PCC wills, PROB11/1508. 
 
Prescott, Robert 
 
ODNB, s.v. Prescott, Robert (1726/7-1815); OCDB, s.v. Prescott, Robert (1726/7-1815). 
 
Rainsford, Charles 
 
ODNB, s.v. Rainsford, Charles (1728-1809), Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 
3, Rainsford, Charles (1728-1809). 
 
Ross, Alexander 
 
ODNB, s.v. Ross, Alexander (1742-1827), Gunning, Robert (1731-1816). 
 
Simcoe, John 
 
ODNB, s.v. Simcoe, John (1752-1806), Simcoe, Elizabeth (1762-1850); Thorne, HOP, 1790–
1820, Volume 5, Simcoe, John (1752-1806). 
 
Somerset, Lord Charles 
 
ODNB, s.v. Somerset, Charles (1767-1831), Boscawen, Edward (1711-1761); Mosley, 
Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (106th Ed.), Volume 1, pp. 221-223; Cokayne et 
al, The Complete Peerage of England, Volume II, p. 55. 
 
Stanhope, Charles, 3rd Earl of Harrington  
 
http://genealogy.links.org/; ODNB, s.v. Stanhope, Charles (1753-1829), Stanhope, Leicester 
Fitzgerald Charles (1784-1862), Stanhope, William (1683?-1756), Stanhope, Charles (1780-
1851), Foote, Maria (1797–1867); Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2, Stanhope, Hon 
William (1719-1779), p. 438, Stanhope, William (circa 1683-1756), p. 437; Namier and 
Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 3, Stanhope, Charles (1753-1829), pp. 462-463, Stanhope, 
Hon Henry Fitzroy (1754-1828), p. 463; Mosley, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, 
(107th Ed.), Volume 2, pp. 1796-1797; PCC wills, PROB11/1764. 
 
Steuart Denham, Sir James 
 
ODNB, s.v. Denham, James Steuart (1744-1839), Steuart, James (1713-1780) ; Thorne, 
HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 5, Denham, James Steuart (1744-1839). 
 
St John, Honourable Frederick  
 
Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 5, St John, Frederick (1765-1844). 
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St John, Honourable Henry  
 
Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 3, St John, Hon Henry (1738-1818), pp. 399-
400; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 1, Bladen, Thomas (?1698-1780), p. 467, Volume 
2, St John, Hon John (1702-1748), p. 403, Furnese, Sir Robert (1687-1733), 56-57; Mosley, 
Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 417; Cokayne et al, The 
Complete Peerage of England, Volume II, pp. 205-207; Austen-Leigh, The Eton College 
Register, pp. 459-460; PCC wills, PROB11/1604. 
 
St Ledger, John 
 
ODNB, s.v. St Ledger, John (1756-1800); Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 5, St Ledger, 
John (1756-1800). 
 
Strutt, William Godday  
 
DNB, s.v. Strutt, William Gooday (bap. 1762, d. 1848); Strutt, The Strutt family, pp. 7-35, 
68; Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 3, Strutt, John (1727-1816), pp. 493-495; 
Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 5, Strutt, Joseph Holden (1758-1845), pp. 303-305; PCC 
wills, PROB11/2072. 
 
Stuart, Sir Charles 
 
DNB, s.v. Stuart, Charles (1753-1801), Stuart, John (1713-1792); Mosley, Burke's Peerage, 
Baronetage & Knightage, (107th Ed.), Volume 1, p. 607. 
 
Stuart, James 
 
DNB, s.v. Stuart, James (1741-1815). 
 
Tarleton, Sir Banastre  
 
ODNB, s.v. Tarleton, Sir Banastre (1754-1833); The Cheshire Sheaf, 3rd series, vol. 27, 
1930, pp. 61-64; Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 5, Tarleton, Banastre (1754-1833), pp. 
332-336; Tarleton, John (1755-1841), p. 336; PCC wills, PROB11/1813. 
 
Tonyn, Patrick 
 
ODNB, s.v. Tonyn, Patrick (1725-1804). 
 
Townshend, George, 1st Marquess 
 
ODNB, s.v. Townshend, George (1724-1807), Townshend, Charles (1700-1764), 
Townshend, Charles (1674-1738). 
 
Trigge, Sir Thomas 
 
http://www.westminster-abbey.org/our-history/people/thomas-trigge 
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Villettes, William 
 
ODNB, s.v. Villettes, William (1754-1808). 
 
Vyse, Richard 
 
ODNB, s.v. Vyse, Richard (1746-1825); Thorne, HOP, 1790–1820, Volume 5, Vyse, Richard 
(1746-1825). 
 
Warde, George 
 
J.J Howard (Ed.), Visitation at England and Wales Notes, 5, (1903), p. 81. 
 
Wemyss, William 
 
Namier and Brooke, HOP 1754–1790, Volume 3,Wemyss, William (1760-1822). 
 
Whitelocke, Richard  
 
ODNB, s.v. Whitelocke, Richard (1757-1833). 
 
William, Prince, 1st Duke of Gloucester  
 
ODNB, s.v.
 
William Henry, Prince (1743–1805), William Frederick, Prince (1776-1834), 
Henry Frederick, Prince (1745-1790), Edward Augustus, Prince (1739-1767), Frederick 
Lewis (1707-1751); Weir, Britain's Royal Family, pp. 277-285; ; Cokayne et al, The 
Complete Peerage of England, volume II, p. 497, Volume XII/2, pp. 920-921; PCC wills, 
PROB11/1433. 
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Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers 
 
 
1747 generals 
 
 
Anstruther, Philip 
  
The Succession of Colonels 1747; WO 64/3, f. 29; Dalton, George, Volume 1, p. 127; Leslie, 
The Succession of Colonels, p. 68; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 1, Anstruther, Philip 
(circa 1680-1760), pp. 417-418. 
 
Borgard, Albert  
 
The Succession of Colonels 1747; Dalton, George, Volume 1, p. 284, Volume 2, pp. 257-258; 
ODNB, s.v. Borgard, Albert (1659–1751). 
 
Bowles, Phineas  
 
The Succession of Colonels 1747; WO 64/9, f. 172, 64/10, f. 150; Dalton, George, Volume 1, 
p. 130; Leslie, The Succession of Colonels, pp. 13, 27; Sedgwick, HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 
1, Bowles, Phineas (1690-1749), pp. 479-480. 
 
Blakeney, William, 1st Baron  
 
The Succession of Colonels 1747; WO 64/9, f. 84; Dalton, George, Volume 2, p.177; Leslie, 
The Succession of Colonels, p. 68; ODNB, s.v. Blakeney, William (1671/2–1761); 
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Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards 
 
 
1747 generals 
 
 
Ligonier, John , 1st Earl 
 
Cox A /56/e/31. Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1758-1760, ff.  1-4, 77, 106, 123, 149, 185; 
Cox A/56/e/32.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1760-1762, ff. 1-2, 138, 147-148, 192, 202; 
Cox A/56/e/33.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1762-1763, ff.  1, 137, 181, 213; Cox 
A/56/e/34. Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1763-1767, ff. 3, 137, 175, 194. 
 
 
1800 generals 
 
 
Carleton, Thomas  
 
Cox A/56/e/99.  Agent’s Ledger 20
th
 Foot, 1765-1785, ff.  35, 136. 
 
Cathcart, William Schaw, 1st Earl   
 
Cox A/56/e/1.  Agent’s Ledger Second Life Guards, 1797-1803, ff.  1-6; Cox A/56/e/2.  
Agent’s Ledger Second Life Guards, 1802-1811, ff. 1-3, 130-131, 228. 
 
Cuyler, Sir Cornelius 
 
Cox A/56/e/126.  Agent’s Ledger 55
th
 Foot, 1775-1779, f.  15. 
 
Drummond, Andrew John 
 
Cox A/56/e/39.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1772-1777, f.  189; Cox A/56/e/41.  
Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1777-1781, ff.  147, 166; Cox A/56/e/45.  Agent’s Ledger 
1st Foot Guards, 1791-1802, ff.  398-399. 
 
Fox, Henry, Edward 
 
Cox A/56/e/86. Agent’s Ledger 10
th
 Foot, 1790-1798, ff.  3-7. 
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Garth, George  
 
Cox A/56/e/32, Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1760-1762, f.  55; Cox A/56/e/33, Agent’s 
Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1762-1763, f.  47; Cox A/56/e/34, Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 
1763-1767, f.  76; Cox A/56/e/35. Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1765-1768, f.  45; Cox 
A/56/e/41.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1777-1781, ff.  54, 308; Cox A/56/e/42.  
Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1782-1799, f.  11; Cox A/56/e/43.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot 
Guards, 1783-1788, ff.  10, 102; Cox A/56/e/44, Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1788-1792, 
ff. 10, 65, 94; Cox A/56/e/69.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1768-1770, f.  99; Cox 
A/56/e/70.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1770-1774, ff.  40; Cox A/56/e/97.  Agent’s 
Ledger 17
th
 Foot, 1788-1798, ff.  23, 41, 141, 194, 232. 
 
Grant, James  
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Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1782-1799, f.  165; Cox A/56/e/43.  Agent’s Ledger 1st 
Foot Guards, 1783-1788, f.  155; Cox A/56/e/45.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1791-
1802, ff.  14, 141; Cox A/56/e/46.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1798-1801, ff.  33, 36-
37. 
 
Moore, Sir John  
 
Cox A/56/e/122.  Agent’s Ledger 52nd Foot, 1801-1806, ff.  1-6; Cox A/56/e/124.  Agent’s 
Ledger 52nd Foot, 1806-1809, ff.  1-3. 
 
Musgrave, Sir Thomas  
 
Cox A/56/e/112. Agent’s Ledger 40
th
 Foot, 1783-1786, ff.  10-11. 
 
Pitt, Sir William Augustus  
 
Cox A/56/e/20.  Agent’s Ledger 10
th
 Light Dragoons, 1787-1796, ff.  1-5, 8-9, 18, 232. 
 
Tarleton, Sir Banastre  
 
Cox A/56/e/143.  Agent’s Ledger 79
th
 Foot, 1778-1819, ff.  20, 25. 
 
 
 
407 
 
Appendix 5, Market Prices of Commissions 
 
 Market prices of commissions, 1709-1805 
  
     
Purchaser Year Rank Regiment Regulation  Market Premium 
    £ £ % 
John Christopher 1758 Ensign Foot 400 162 -59.5  
Alexander Lindsay 1767 Ensign 15f 400 408 2.0  
Francis Le Maistre 1760 Lieutenant 98f 550 315 -42.7 
Cavendish Lister 1768 Lieutenant 3fg 1500 1500 0.0  
John De Burgh 1770 Lieutenant 1fg 1500 1500 0.0  
Chalmers 1776 Lieutenant 12f 550 550 0.0  
Thomas Picton 1777 Lieutenant 12f 550 550 0.0  
Henry Smith 1805 Lieutenant 95f 550 550 0.0  
John Cope 1709 Captain 33f 1500 300 -13.3 
Philip Browne 1745 Captain 3hg 2700 3100 14.8 
Lewis Duffe 1762 Captain 8f 1500 2100 40.0 
Alexander Lindsay 1771 Captain 42f 1500 2550 70.0 
George Harris 1771 Captain 5f 1500 2050 36.7 
George Garth 1772 Captain 1fg 3500 4600 31.4 
John Moore 1780 Captain 82f 1500 1295 -13.7 
Charles Merry 1782 Captain 79f 1500 2000 33.3 
? 1790 Captain 8f 1500 2000 33.3 
? 1790 Captain 8f 1500 2000 33.3 
Correvant 1797 Captain 20d 3150 3166 0.5 
Alexander Lindsay 1775 Major 53f 2600 3500 34.6 
James Cockburne 1776 Major 35f 2600 2600 0.0  
Lewis Duffe 1776 Major 8f 2600 2725 4.8 
Edward Drewe 1778 Major 35f 2600 4200 61.5 
Andrew Parke 1793 Major 8f 2600 5000 92.3 
William Harris 1805 Major 73f 2600 3500 34.6 
Source: 
Odintz, “The British Officer Corps”, pp. 305, 314-315, 324-327; Glover, "Purchase", p. 360; 
Burton and Newman, "Sir John Cope", p. 660; Oakley, "Introduction",  p. 3; Captain John 
Moore to Dr John Moore, 3 May 1781, in Heath, Records of the Moore Family, p. 45; 
Captain Philip Browne to Thomas Browne, Letter No. 41, 23 April 1745, in Leslie, "Letters 
of Captain Philip Browne", p. 146; NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Family Papers, 23/1/401, 
Accounts of James, 5th Earl of Balcarres; NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Manuscript Volumes, 
23/14/4 Jamaican Accounts, 1797; CKS, U624 Harris, Accounts, A67 Statement of My 
Concerns for the Guidance of Executors, 1812; CKS, U624 Harris, Correspondence, C233 
Letterbook, George Harris to Messrs Latour, 24 April 1805; Cox A/56/e/62. Agent’s Ledger 
3rd Foot Guards, 1767-1769, f.  68; Cox A/56/e/70.  Agent’s Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1770-
1774, ff.  40, 125, 149; Cox A/56/e/90. Agent’s Ledger 12th Foot, 1772-1783, ff.  9, 10, 62; 
Cox A/56/e/143, Agent’s Ledger 79
th
 Foot, 1778-1819, ff. 20, 25.  
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